PANAGODA LIYANAGE SURANGA DULIP PERERA v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 1838/2025

[2026] HKCFI 412

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1838 OF 2025

____________

____________

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

Introduction

1.  This is the Applicants’ application by summons filed on 15 December 2025 for extension of time to appeal the order of this Court dated 30 September 2025 (the “Order”) refusing him leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”).

2.  Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order.  The Applicant is two months and one day out of time.  In Jagg Singh and Torture Claims Appeal Board / non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office^[1], the Court of Appeal held that in considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted.  If the delay is not substantial, it would be readily condoned if there is some credible explanation and an arguable ground of appeal.  If the first three factors are resolved against granting leave, there is no need to consider prejudice to the respondent.

Discussion and conclusion

3.  The delay of more than two months in an appeal period of 14 days is substantial.  The Applicant’s explanation for the delay as well as his ground of appeal as stated in his supporting affirmation is that he has been informed by his family members that it was dangerous for him to return to Sri Lanka as he would be killed.  This does not explain why it took him more than two months to make up his mind to raise an appeal, nor could it constitute any arguable ground of appeal as it failed to disclose what was wrong with this Court’s decision.  In effect, his statement in the affirmation is a challenge of the finding of fact by the Board.  To assist him to make a proper application for extension of time, the Applicant was given directions by letter dated 18 December 2025 to file a statement within fourteen days of the directions: (1) explaining why it took him more than two months to apply for extension of time to appeal; (2) stating the date when and circumstances under which the Order and Form CALL-1 was first brought to his notice; and (3) setting out the grounds of his intended appeal. The information under the first two items are required to enable the Court to assess the reasonableness of his explanation for the delay and the credibility of the explanation.  The grounds of the intended appeal is a necessary requirement in an application for extension of time to appeal.  It is required to enable the Court to assess the prospect of success in the intended appeal on which the exercise of the Court’s discretion to grant leave depends. 

4.  As at the date of this decision, twenty-one days have lapsed.  The Applicant has not responded.  The inference to be drawn from his failure to respond is that he has no reasonable explanation for the delay, no arguable grounds of appeal, and lacks the will to prosecute his intended appeal.   As explained above, his statement in his supporting affirmation does not constitute an arguable ground of appeal.  There is no basis upon which the Court may exercise its discretion to grant him extension of time.  For the above reasons, the Applicant’s application for extension of time to appeal is refused.