Case Details
Listing:
MAHAD ASIH BT TALAM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
MAHAD ASIH BT TALAM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5527 · HCAL 1811/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1811/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5527
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1811 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Mahad Asih Bt Talam |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 10 October 2023, the applicant applied
for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The
intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 25 September 2023 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the
applicant's appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 5 January 2022 on all applicable grounds[1]. The
Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00181
1_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Indonesia,
she would be harmed or killed by (i) the creditor of her father as she
had refused to marry him to settle the father’s debt; and (ii) her ex-
husband after he found out the applicant’s relationship with another
Indonesia man in Hong Kong. The Board’s reasoning and findings were
set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for
me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the
Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
3. At the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application,
this court scheduled a hearing on 24 September 2026. The applicant
attended the hearing in person, and said she had nothing to say. When
she was asked for elaboration on the allegations she made in her
supporting affirmation, she stated that all the allegations were in
fact directed against the Director. She had nothing to complain about
the Board. When she was asked why she wanted to challenge the Board’s
Decision, she said that she was confused and her only wish was to be
allowed to stay in Hong Kong.
Discussion
4. A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
5. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. The applicant’s Form 86 provided no such grounds. In the
supporting affirmation, the applicant made general allegations about
un-translated documents and the conduct of the interpreter. However,
she clarified at the hearing that those allegations were only
concerned with the Director.
6. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the
Board found that the applicant’s claimed fear from the father’s
creditor or from her 1st ex-husband not credible, Even if the Board
were to accept her evidence, the Board still found that there was no
basis for the applicant’s fear of risk of harm if refouled as the past
ill-treatment did not meet the requisite level of suffering. The
Board further found that internal relocation would be reasonably
viable. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial
review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law
errors
7. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the
Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and
observed a high standard of fairness. Upon the applicant’s
clarification at the hearing that she had in fact no complaints about
the Board’s Decision, the applicant therefore effectively has provided
no grounds at all in support of the Leave Application. In the
circumstances, I find that the applicant has not shown any errors of
law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.
The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not
reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that
would enable this court to grant leave[5].
Order
8. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Dated the 6th day of October 2026
( Alfred CHAN )
for Registrar, High Court
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such | |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 6/10/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Mahad Asih Bt Talam |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. no: |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |6/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 19744 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |2236/21 (formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |11355/21) (T1I104) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers
to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the
risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under
Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s
Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to
process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description
of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor
[2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL
21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142].
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and
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[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676