LAU SUK YEE RITA v. CHAN SUK HAN LANA
[2026] HKDC 1904 · DCCJ 4430/2025
District Court
DCCJ 4430/2025
[2026] HKDC 1904
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4430 OF 2025
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BETWEEN
LAU SUK YEE RITA Plaintiff
and
CHAN SUK HAN LANA Defendant
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Coram: Deputy District Judge Rebecca Lee (Paper Disposal)
Date of Defendant’s Submissions: 7 July 2026
Date of Plaintiff’s Submissions: 16 July 2026
Date of Defendant’s Submissions in reply: 26 July 2026
Date of Decision: 27 October 2026
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DECISION
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THE APPLICATION
By a summons dated 10 June 2026 (“the Summons”), the Defendant applies for,
among other things:
1) All proceedings in this action as against the Defendant be
stayed and the dispute be referred to arbitration pursuant to
section 20(1) of the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609);
2) The costs of the Defendant in this action and of this
application be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant forthwith
on an indemnity basis with certificate for one counsel, to be
summarily assessed.
BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff is the registered owner of 4/F, 20 Observatory Road, Kowloon
(“the Building”) and the Defendant is the registered owner of 5/F of the
Building.
The Plaintiff commenced the present proceedings against the Defendant for,
inter alia, injunction and damages allegedly caused by the Defendant’s
breach of Clause 1(b), 4 and 8 of the Deed of Mutual Covenant governiong
the Building (“DMC”) for causing, permitting, allowing or suffering water
to be leaked, seeped, escaped, percolating and/or emitted from the
Defendant’s unit to the Plaintiff’s unit: Statement of Claim dated the 9
December 2025.
The Defendant relies on Clause 16 of the DMC in support of the Summons:
“All disputes and questions which shall hereafter arise between the
parties hereto touching these presents or the construction or
interpretation thereof or whether these presents are still subsisting
or not or touching any account or calculation to be made hereunder or
as to any act deed or to these presents or the rights duties or
liabilities of any person hereunder shall be referred to a single
arbitrator in case the parties agree upon one otherwise to two
arbitrators one to be appointed by each party to the difference and
their umpire in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the
Arbitration Ordinance and the decision of the arbitrator arbitrators
or umpire as the case may be on any of the matters and things
aforesaid shall be final and absolutely binding upon all the parties
hereto”.
The present Application is an attempt by the Defendant to enforce the
Arbitration Agreement in seeking to stay the present proceedings in favour
of arbitration.
It is common ground that the Plaintiff had in principle agreed to have the
matter stayed in favour of arbitration on 16 February 2026. However, the
Parties were unable to agree on costs in that the Plaintiff refused to
consent to the payment of costs on an indemnity basis.
The Summons was scheduled to be heard on 26 June 2026 and the Parties have,
prior to the hearing, consented to stay the proceedings with the question
of costs to be determined by this Court by way of Paper Disposal.
The Parties’ Respective Position
In short, the Defendant’s stance is that the disputes between the Parties
in this action are subject to the Arbitration Agreement (as contained in
Clause 16 of the DMC) and the Plaintiff’s commencement of the present court
action was an abuse of process of the Court.
Ms. Tse for the Defendant relied on Silver King China Limited v Huy Yun
Shiu & Ors DCCJ 3 960/2021, Grand Pacific China Holdings Ltd v Pacific
China Holdings Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2012] 4 HKLRD 569, and Chimbusco
International Petroleum (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Fully Best Trading Limited
HCA2416/2014, and submitted that the Defendant is entitled to costs on an
indemnity basis.
The Plaintiff argued that as the Plaintiff has never opposed to a stay,
there is no basis for costs to be awarded on an indemnity basis.
The Plaintiff sought to distinguish the authorities cited by Ms. Tse and
submitted that all those authorities concern (unsuccessful) challenges to
arbitral awards or (unsuccessful) resistance to the enforcement of
arbitration agreements.
It was argued that the rationale underlying such costs orders is that
parties who unmeritoriously challenged the arbitration agreement to avoid
their agreed arbitral bargain should ordinarily bear the costs consequences
on a higher basis.
The Plaintiff refers to Lau Lan Ying v Top Hill Co and Another [2021] HKCFI
290 where Marlene Ng J made the following observation:
"I note that in the Stay Summons, TP prayed for such costs to be in
the cause of the arbitration to be commenced. This might have been a
commendable course to adopt if D2 did not resist the Stay Summons and
agreed to forthwith commence arbitration proceedings. But as D2 chose
to resist the Stay Summons until adjudication herein, I see no reason
why costs should not follow event”.
Discussion
The Plaintiff was not wrong to note that all the authorities relied on by
Ms. Tse concerns unsuccessful challenges to arbitral awards or unsuccessful
resistance to the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
However, upon careful reading of the authorities, I am not able to agree
with the Plaintiff that indemnity costs should only be ordered for such
unsuccessful attempts.
Chimbusco was recently applied by Deputy High Court Judge Jonathan Wong in
A v. B HCCT 125/2024.
In A v. B, the plaintiff commenced court proceedings against the defendant
on 17 October 2024. By a summons dated 4 February 2025, the defendant
applied to stay the proceedings in favour of arbitration, which application
was eventually acceded to by the plaintiff and an order was made to that
effect on 25 August 2025 shortly before the substantive hearing of the
summons on 1 September 2025.
The plaintiff in A v. B did not dispute that it should pay costs to the
defendant, it was argued that costs should not be taxed on an indemnity
basis but should be taxed instead on a party-and-party basis. The
defendant sought costs of the summons (but not costs in relation to the
action) on an indemnity basis.
Deputy High Court Judge Wong cited (in paragraph 5.1 of his Decision) the
following passages in Chimbusco and ordered costs on an indemnity basis:
“13. As emphasized by the arbitration judge in A v R (Arbitration:
Enforcement) and as endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Gao Haiyan v
Keeneye Holdings Ltd (No 2), the objectives of the Civil Justice
Reform must also be borne in mind when the question of costs is
considered. In Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd v Pacific China Holdings
Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2012] 4 HKLRD 569, the Court of Appeal referred
in its judgment to the decisions of the Victorian Court of Appeal, as
to whether indemnity costs are wrong in principle, and came to the
considered view that the Hong Kong Court should give effect to and
recognize the practice of specialist judges in charge of the
Construction and Arbitration List to order indemnity costs in
proceedings arising out of or in connection with arbitral
proceedings. In connection with this practice of ordering indemnity
costs save in special circumstances, Tang VP observed:
“16. Nor do I believe that this practice is wrong in principle. It
might be regarded as wrong in principle, if notwithstanding Civil
Justice Reform and its implications, indemnity costs could only be
awarded when special circumstances are established. However, I
believe indemnity costs may be awarded under O 62 r 5 (1) in an
unsuccessful application to set aside an arbitral award or to resist
enforcement “to ensure fairness between the parties”. Unless such
practice is wrong in principle, we cannot interfere.
17. Nor can I agree that such practice amounts to an abrogation of
discretion. The practice has left room for special circumstances;
what are special circumstances in this context have to be worked out
in due course. However, I cannot accept that the fact that the
challenge was reasonably arguable is a special circumstance. That
would neutralize the practice.”
14. I see no reason at all to differentiate between unsuccessful
attempts to resist enforcement of an arbitral award made under an
arbitration agreement, and unsuccessful attempts to resist
enforcement and recognition of the arbitration agreement itself. The
reasons and observations made by Reyes J in A v R, that recourse
should not be made to the Court, that parties should comply with
arbitration awards made under the arbitration agreement, all apply
with equal force to a case where a party to the arbitration agreement
unmeritoriously seeks to challenge the arbitration agreement, and
refuses to refer the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the
agreement. Parties to an arbitration agreement should expect that
the Court will recognize and enforce the arbitration agreement, and
if they take the risk of instituting court proceedings in breach of
such an agreement, they should expect to pay costs on a higher scale
if they fail in their attempt to impeach the agreement.
15. The observations made by Reyes J and the Court of Appeal as to
the need to further the objectives of the CJR are equally applicable,
as justification for awarding costs on an indemnity basis where there
are challenges to an arbitration agreement. Unmeritorious challenges
to an arbitration agreement, and the use of court proceedings when
the parties have agreed to have their rights and disputes resolved by
arbitration cannot be conducive to the underlying objectives of the
CJR, bearing in mind the duties of the parties, and their lawyers ,
to assist the Court in the cost-effective and efficient resolution of
a dispute, and to ensure the fair distribution of the resources of
the Court.”
(emphasis added)
Ms. Tse has recited the same passages in her Reply Submissions.
In Grand Pacific, the Court of Appeal has considered Reyes J’s decision in
A v. R. [2009] 3 HKLRD 389. Tang V.P. held:
“15. Given that the parties had agreed to arbitration, I believe it
is fair that if a party was unsuccessful in setting aside or
resisting enforcement of the arbitral award, in the absence of
special circumstances, he should pay costs on an indemnity basis.
Reyes J said in A v R, and I respectfully agree:
"67. Parties should comply with arbitration awards. A
person who obtains an award in his favour pursuant to an
arbitration agreement should be entitled to expect that the
Court will enforce the award as a matter of course.
68. Applications by a party to appeal against or set aside an
award or for an Order refusing enforcement should be
exceptional events. Where a party unsuccessfully makes such
application, he should in principle expect to have to pay
costs on a higher basis. This is because a party seeking to
enforce an award should not have had to contend with such type
of challenge.
69. Further, given the recent introduction of Civil Justice
Reform (CJR), the Court ought not normally to be troubled by
such type of application. A party unmeritoriously seeking to
challenge an award would not be complying with its obligation
to the Court under Order 1A Rule 3 to further the underlying
objectives of CJR, in particular the duty to assist the Court
in the just, cost-effective and efficient resolution of a
dispute.
70. If the losing party is only made to pay costs on a
conventional party-and-party basis, the winning party would in
effect be subsidising the losing party's abortive attempt to
frustrate enforcement of a valid award. The winning party
would only be able to recover about two-thirds of its costs of
the challenge and would be out of pocket as to one-third.
This is despite the winning party already having successfully
gone through an arbitration and obtained an award in its
favour. The losing party, in contrast, would not be bearing
the full consequences of its abortive application."
18. It was submitted on behalf of PCH that Reyes J had in mind
unmeritorious challenges which are not reasonably arguable and
abusive. That is what Reyes J said in A v R:
"71. Such a state of affairs would only encourage the
bringing of unmeritorious challenges to an award. It would
turn what should be an exceptional and high-risk strategy into
something which was potentially 'worth a go'. That cannot be
conducive to CJR and its underlying objectives.
72. Accordingly, in the absence of special circumstances, when
an award is unsuccessfully challenged, the Court will
henceforth normally consider awarding costs against a losing
party on an indemnity basis. The respondent will here pay the
applicant’s costs on an indemnity basis."
19. When these words are read in context (see para 0 above), it is
clear Reyes J did not have in mind as suitable for indemnity costs
only those cases where the challenges were not reasonably arguable,
or abusive.”
Upon careful reading of Chimbusco and Grand Pacific (both citing A v. R),
it is clear that the basis for award for costs on indemnity basis is that
“the parties to an arbitration agreement should expect the Court will
recognize and enforce the arbitration agreement” and “parties should comply
with arbitration award”.
The fact that the Plaintiff commenced the present proceedings is a total
disregard (and therefore breach) of the arbitration agreement as contained
in Clause 16 of the DMC.
As said by Mimmie Chan J in paragraph 15 of Chimbusco, “the use of court
proceedings when the parties have agreed to have their rights and disputes
resolved by arbitration cannot be conducive to the underlying objectives of
the CJR”.
It is a misuse of the judicial facilities which should be discouraged and
hence a harsher costs order is called for.
It matters not that the stay itself is not contested (and hence the
question of successful and unsuccessful challenge to the arbitration
agreement is irrelevant).
I also find that Plaintiff has failed to show any “unusual circumstances”
that the Court should depart from the general rule that costs should be
ordered on an indemnity basis.
This is an appropriate case to award costs to the Defendant on an indemnity
basis.
Order
The Defendant asked for summary assessment of costs in the Summons.
I note that the Defendant has submitted Statement of Costs (up to 6 July
2026) and apparently it did not take into Ms. Tse’s Reply Submissions dated
26 July 2026 and any costs incurred by the Defendant between 6 and 26 July
2026.
Further, the Plaintiff has yet to raise her objection (if any) to the
Defendant’s Statement of Costs.
Instead of summarily assessing the Defendant’s costs, I order that costs in
this action and of this application be paid by the Plaintiff to the
Defendant forthwith on an indemnity basis, with certificate for counsel, to
be taxed if not agreed.
(Rebecca Lee)
Deputy District Judge
Messrs. Cedric & Co. for the Plaintiff
Ms. Tania Tse, instructed by Messrs. Keith Lam, Lau & Chan, for the
Defendant
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