Case Details
For Applicant(s):
Mr Jeremy Kwong, instructed by Holman Fenwick Willan
For Respondent(s):
Mr Billy Poon, instructed by K.M. Tang & Co
Listing:
PAKATOWER LTD v. THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF TRANSPORT CITY BUILDING
PAKATOWER LTD v. THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF TRANSPORT CITY BUILDING
[2026] HKLdT 45 · LDBM 75/2019
LDBM 75/2019
LDBM 151/2020
LDBM 152/2020
(Consolidated)
[2026] HKLdT 45
IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO 75 OF 2019
___________________
BETWEEN
|PAKATOWER LIMITED |Applicant |
|and | |
|THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF TRANSPORT CITY BUILDING |Respondent |
___________________
IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO 151 OF 2020
___________________
BETWEEN
|交通城大廈業主立案法團 |Applicant |
|and | |
|PAKATOWER LTD |Respondent |
___________________
IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO 152 OF 2020
___________________
BETWEEN
|交通城大廈業主立案法團 |Applicant |
|and | |
|PAKATOWER LTD |Respondent |
___________________
(LDBM 75/2019, LDBM 151/2020 and LDBM 152/2020 were consolidated and
thereafter be carried on as one action by name of LDBM 75/2019, pursuant to
the Order made by His Honour Judge M Wong on
16 November 2020)
|Before: |Her Honour Judge Michelle Lam |
| |Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal |
| |(paper disposal) |
|Date of Applicant’s Submissions: |14 April 2026 |
|Date of Respondent’s Submissions: |27 April 2026 |
|Date of Applicant’s Reply |18 May 2026 |
|Submissions: | |
|Date of Handing Down of Decision: |18 August 2026 |
_________________
D E C I S I O N
_________________
INTRODUCTION
1. This is an application by the applicant (“Pakatower”) for leave to
appeal against §123(1) and §124 of the Review Decision handed down
by this Tribunal on 4 February 2026[1] (“Review Decision”).
2. In gist, Pakatower now seeks to appeal from this Tribunal’s
dismissal of its application for review of (what Pakatower
purported to be) this Tribunal’s “rejection of the assessment
basing on the Depreciated Replacement Cost method as set out in
Appendix VIII of the valuation report of Pakatower’s expert dated
14 November 2022”[2] (“Cheung’s Report”) (“Dismissal Order”).
BACKGROUND
3. This action involves substantial disputes between the two parties.
After trial, this Tribunal handed down the Judgment on 3 March
2025[3] (“Judgment”). Subsequently, Pakatower applied for review
of two aspects of the Judgment under section 11A of the Lands
Tribunal Ordinance, Cap. 17 (“LTO”) (“Review Application”), ending
up with the handing down of the Review Decision.
4. The background of this action and the many disputes between the
parties have been set out in the Judgment and the Review Decision
which will not be repeated here. For convenience, the definitions
and abbreviations used in the Judgment and the Review Decision are
adopted in this Decision, unless otherwise stated.
5. To understand Pakatower’s grounds of the present application, it
is necessary to set out the litigation history relating to the
Dismissal Order in some more details.
STAGE 1-ORIGINAL CLAIM AT TRIAL
6. In so far as it relates to the Dismissal Order, the underlying
issue in dispute at trial was the assessment of the mesne profits
payable by IO to Pakatower for its unauthorized use and occupation
of the Disputed Premises[4] after the expiry of the Last IO
Tenancy Agreement [5]on the Expiry Date (30 April 2015) until
delivery of vacant possession of the Disputed Premises.
7. For assessment of the mesne profits of the Disputed Premises, two
experts gave evidence at trial, Cheung for Pakatower and Ng for
IO.
8. Cheung adopted Cheung’s Report as his evidence at trial. It was
his evidence that he used the Direct Comparison Method (“DCM”) as
supplemented by the Depreciated Replacement Cost method (“DRC”)
for valuation of the Disputed Premises. He classified and
assessed the 17 premises of the Disputed Premises into 3 groups[6]
as follows:
1. For Group 1 Premises (the 2 spaces underneath the staircases,
(“Two Staircase Spaces”)): Cheung used DCM for valuation.
2. For Group 2 Premises (6 premises): Cheung used DRC for
valuation.
3. For Group 3 Premises (9 premises): Cheung took an average of
DCM valuation and DRC valuation for valuation.
(“Cheung’s Group Valuation”)
9. Based on Cheung’s Group Valuation, Cheung opined that: -
a) the market rents of Group 1 Premises were:-
i) as at 1 May 2015, HK$13.2 per sq ft, in total HK$594;
ii) as at 1 May 2017, HK$12.9 per sq ft, in total HK$581;
iii) as at 1 May 2019, HK$14 per sq ft, in total HK$630;
(iv) as at 1 May 2021, HK$15.9 per sq ft, in total HK$716.
b) The market rents of all Group 2 and Group 3 Premises were:-
i) as at 1 May 2015, HK$5.9 per sq ft, in total HK$11,958;
ii) as at 1 May 2017, HK$6.4 per sq ft, in total HK$12,834;
iii) as at 1 May 2019, HK$6.8 per sq ft, in total HK$13,723;
iv) as at 1 May 2021, HK$6.9 per sq ft, in total HK$13,861.
(c) the total market rents of all of the Disputed Premises were: -
i) as at 1 May 2015, HK$12,552 per month;
ii) as at 1 May 2017, HK$13,415 per month;
iii) as at 1 May 2019, HK$14,353 per month;
iv) as at 1 May 2021, HK$14,577 per month.
(collectively, “Cheung’s Group Assessed Values”)
10. In §218 and §221 of Pakatower’s Opening Submission for trial dated
4 December 2023, Pakatower adopted Cheung’s Group Valuation for
its claim for the mesne profits of the Disputed Premises.
11. In §9.2, §9.6, §9.7 and §12.3 of Pakatower’s Closing Submission
for trial dated 12 March 2024, Pakatower adopted Cheung’s Group
Valuation and Cheung’s Group Assessed Values and prayed for:
“(2) The IO do pay mesne profits on the [Disputed Premises] for
the following periods and at the following rates [B/355]:
a) HK$12,552/ month for the period from 1 May 2015 to 30 April
2017;
b) HK$13,415 / month for the period from 1 May 2017 to 30
April 2019;
c) HK$14,353 / month for the period from 1 May 2019 to 30
April 2021;
d) HK$14,577 / month for the period from 1 May 2021 until
delivery of vacant possession.”
(“Original Claim”)
12. In §§9.7-9.8 of Pakatower’s Closing Submission for trial,
Pakatower emphasized that the Last IO Tenancy Agreement should be
taken into account for assessment of the mesne profits of the
Disputed Premises. It reads:-
“9.7 ……Most importantly, [Cheung’s] valuations are based on
rental transactions in the subject Building itself. In the
case of the 2014 Tenancy Agreement[7] which is adopted as the
comparable, this is a rental transaction on the DPP
[8]itself.
9.8 Where rental transactions at the very Building/ actual
premises are available, they should obviously be taken into
account as comparables. This is because they will, by
definition, be much more reliable as comparables. Hence, for
example, in *Goldbay Fortis Limited v Rich Resource
Development Limited [2021] HKCFI 1684 (unrep., 16 June 2021)
at §§356-363, where the plaintiff’s valuation expert adopted
the actual sale transactions of the very shops being valued
as comparables, whereas the defendant’s expert ignored those
sales completely, K. Yeung J held that the method of the
plaintiff’s expert was much more reliable (§363) and the
comparables were ‘transactions relating to the very Shops we
are concerned with. No good reasons have been shown why they
could be ignored’ (§359).”
13. In §9.13 of Pakatower’s Closing Submission, Pakatower further
criticized Ng to have wrongly ignored the Last IO Tenancy
Agreement in her valuation exercise.
JUDGMENT
14. In §291(3) and §291(6)(a) and (c) of the Judgment, this Tribunal
ordered that:
“§291(3): IO do deliver to Pakatower, within 6 months from the
date of this Judgment, vacant possession of the Disputed Premises
(including the Semi-circle Area and the Disputed Room), save
and except that those Common Facilities of the Building (as
defined in the DMC) which were installed and kept therein at the
time of the execution of the DMC be allowed to remain.
§291(6): IO do pay mesne profits to Pakatower on the Disputed
Premises in the following manner:
a) IO do pay to Pakatower a monthly payment at the rate of
HK$3,307 commencing on 1 May 2015, with the first payment to
be date-backed to 31 May 2015 and thereafter payments to be
made on the last day of each succeeding month until delivery
of vacant possession of the Disputed Premises in the manner as
set out in paragraph (3) above. Such payments are to be
adjusted according to the Rental Indices[9] (“on the first day
of each May of the succeeding years on a yearly basis with the
first adjustment to be made on 1 May 2016.
…
c) IO do pay (or settle) for Pakatower for all those items of
payments set out in Clause 3B of the tenancy agreement dated
24 April 2014 for the period retrospectively dated from 1 May
2015 to the date of delivery of vacant possession of the
Disputed Premises in the manner as set out in paragraph (3)
above.
(In §2(A)(3) of the Review Decision, §291(6)(a) and (c) of the
Judgment above are respectively defined as “Cash Element” and
“Non-Cash Element” and collectively defined as “Judgment Mesne
Profits”)
NB: In §27 of the Judgment, Clause 3B of the Last IO Tenancy
Agreement was cited to have provided that IO shall be
responsible for the management fees, rates, insurance, repair
fees and any other expenses in relation to the rented premises
during the term of tenancy
(“乙方負責有關「承租物業」在租約期內之管理費、差餉、保險、維修費及
其他任何費用。”) (“Clause 3B”).
STAGE 2-REVIEW APPLICATION
15. Departing from its Original Claim at trial, Pakatower, in the
Review Application, purportedly applied for review (“MP Review
Application”) of this Tribunal’s “rejection of the assessment of
the mesne profits basing on DRC as set out in Appendix VIII of
Cheung’s Report” and prayed for mesne profits for the Subject
Premises (being the Disputed Premises excluding the Two Staircase
Spaces, that was, only covered Group 2 Premises and Group 3
Premises)[10] for: -
i) from 1 May 2015 to 30 April 2017, at the rate of HK$13,403 per
month;
ii) from 1 May 2017 to 30 April 2019, at the rate of HK$14,366 per
month;
iii) from 1 May 2019 to 30 April 2021, at the rate of HK$15,214 per
month;
iv) from 1 May 2021 until delivery of vacant possession of the
Subject Premises, at the rate of HK$15,400 per month.
(“Review Claim”)
16. As elaborated in the Review Decision, Pakatower’s allegation of
this Tribunal’s “rejection of the assessment of the mesne profits
basing on DRC as set out in Appendix VIII of Cheung’s Report” did
not only take the ruling in the Judgment out of context, but also
attempted to rewrite Cheung’s Report and further, sought to
reformulate its claim for the mesne profits.
17. In the Review Decision, the Dismissal Order was made (§123(1))
with no order as to costs for the Review Application (§124)
(“Review Costs Order”). In effect, the Judgment Mesne Profits
were confirmed.
STAGE-3: PRESENT APPLICATION
18. By the present Summons dated 11 March 2026, Pakatower now seeks
leave to appeal against the Dismissal Order and the Review Costs
Order.
19. Departing from not only its Original Claim but also the Review
Claim, Pakatower now also seeks to vary the mesne profits for the
Two Staircase Spaces to be nominal[11] (“Appeal Claim”). As an
alternative, it seeks remittance of the claim for mesne profit for
reassessment by a differently constituted Tribunal.
20. In the Draft Notice of Appeal, the present application is premised
on the following two grounds:
1) Ground 1: “The Tribunal erred in law by acting unfairly,
procedurally irregularly and/or made unsustainable findings
without evidence in its rejection of Cheung’s DRC Assessment on
the Subject Premises in [various] respects”.
2) Ground 2: “In rejecting the Applicant’s submission that the Last
IO Tenancy Agreement was not a good comparable and in deciding
to use the Last IO Tenancy Agreement as a sole comparable
(Review Decision at §§63-76, 82-91), the Tribunal failed to take
into account and/ or misunderstood the [various] matters/
evidence:”
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
21. Leave to appeal from the judgment or decision of the Lands
Tribunal lies only on the ground that such judgment or decision is
"erroneous in point of law": section 11(2) LTO. Leave will only be
granted if the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success, or
there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the
appeal should be heard: section 11AA(6) LTO.
22. Reasonable prospects of success involve the notion that the
prospects of succeeding must be reasonable and therefore more than
fanciful, without having to be probable: SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD
125 at §17.
23. A decision is erroneous in point of law if “A decision may be
quashed if it is based on a finding of fact or inference from the
facts which is perverse or irrational; or there was no evidence to
support it; or it was made by reference to irrelevant factors or
without regard to relevant factors. It is not necessary to
identify a specific error of law; if the decision cannot be
supported the court will infer that the decision-making authority
misunderstood or overlooked relevant evidence or misdirected
itself in law.”: Chu Hoi (International) Ltd v Chow Kwok Fong (No.
2) [2024] 4 HKLRD 414 at §§19–21.
24. The relationship between original decision, review and leave to
appeal was elaborated in CLP Power Hong Kong Ltd v Commissioner of
Rating and Valuation [2013] 4 HKLRD 535 which can be summarized as
follows:-
“(1) “There are no statutory limitations as to on what grounds
the decision can be reviewed. In other words, the Tribunal can
review the decision on any factual, evidential and legal basis.”
(§11)
(2) “an appeal is limited to errors of law, while a review can
include any grounds relating to facts or law (including that, on
review, the Tribunal can look at new evidence)”. (§19)
(3) The review decision supersedes the original decision and is
the only operative decision that is subject to appeal. (§§14-16)
(4) In appealing against the review decision, the appellant is
not limited to those grounds raised in the review application.
(§§17-22)
(5) In an appeal against the review decision as a fresh
decision, “the court is entitled to look at and consider two
reasoned judgments (one in relation to the original decision and
the other the review decision) as observed by Godfrey JA in CLP
v Commissioner of Rating and Valuation [1996] RA 475 at 533-534,
where it is said:‘…… This court is concerned only with the
correctness or otherwise of the Lands Tribunal's ultimate
decision, which is its decision as recorded in the second order.
In deciding whether the commissioner is entitled to impeach
that decision, this court must take into account all the
reasoning which the Lands Tribunal employed in arriving at it,
that is to say, the reasons expressed in the ‘judgment’
delivered by the Lands Tribunal in support of the first order
and also those expressed in the ‘judgment’ delivered by the
Lands Tribunal in support of the second order (its ultimate
order).’ ” (§28)
DISPUTED PREMISES
25. It is apparent that the intended two grounds of appeal are
misleading and in complete departure from Pakatower’s pleaded
case, its Original Claim and its own expert’s opinion. For ease
of reference, it is convenient to have a general outline of the
relevant parts of Pakatower’s case, the Judgment and the Review
Decision stated herein. As the whole issue rests heavily on the
peculiar nature of the subject matters for valuation, the Disputed
Premises, I will start with identifying the Disputed Premises as
follows:
A) In Pakatower’s Consolidated Notice of Application, Pakatower
pleaded that: -
i) Pakatower was the owner of the Disputed Premises (which
were defined as “the Disputed Pakatower Premises” as
consisting of “the spaces underneath all staircases (other
than the staircase situate beside Unit 13 as shown on the
Ground Floor Plan annexed to the Deed of Mutual Covenant),
the spaces above the entrance halls on the Ground Floor,
the Transformer Room, the Switch Room, the Meter Rooms, the
Main Distribution Frame Room, the Fire Prevention Room and
other utility room or accommodation (if any) on the Ground
Floor, the Switch Rooms, Meter Rooms and other utility
rooms or accommodation (if any) on the 1st Floor to 8th
Floor.”[12] of an industrial building, comprising of 9
floors and a roof, in Tai Wai, Shatin, New Territories. The
approved building plan and the occupation permit of it were
both issued in 1982. (§1(a) and §9)
ii) Pakatower and IO had entered into a tenancy agreement dated
27 June 1997 (“the 27/6/1997 Tenancy Agreement”) whereby
the Disputed Premises were leased to IO by Pakatower.
(§18(d))
iii) “19. Starting from the 27/6/1997 Tenancy Agreement, and
under further tenancy agreements entered into between the
IO and Pakatower as renewed from time to time, the IO has:
-
a) since 1 May 1997 and until 30 April 2015 been renting
the Disputed Pakatower Premises from Pakatower; and
b) since 1 May 2001 and until 30 April 2015 been renting
the G/F Unit 13 Staircase Space from Pakatower.
(“the IO’s Tenancies”)” (§19)
(iv) “20. Under the IO’s Tenancies, but not otherwise, the IO
was entitled to exclusive use occupation and enjoyment of
the Disputed Pakatower Premises [the Disputed Premises] and
the G/F Unit 13 Staircase Space, as granted to the IO by
Pakatower.” (§20)
B) In Pakatower’s Consolidated Reply and Defence to Counterclaim,
Pakatower further pleaded in §5(c) (i) that: -
“Since 15 April 1994 and up to the end of the IO’s Tenancies on
30 April 2015[13], Pakatower did not have access to the Disputed
Pakatower Premises[14] as exclusive possession of the Disputed
Pakatower Premises was given to the IO under the 1994-1997
Tenancy and the IO’s Tenancies. Paragraphs 17-20 of CNOA are
repeated.” (§5(c))
C) In the List of Agreed Facts dated 18 January 2024, it was agreed
between the parties that: -
i) the Disputed Premises were defined as “Disputed Pakatower
Premises” or “DPP” (§15).
ii) “By a tenancy agreement dated 27 June 1997, the IO agreed
with Pakatower to rent the DPP for 8 years from 1 May 1997
to 30 April 2005” (§22).
iii) “Starting from the 1st 27/6/1997 Tenancy Agreement, and
under further tenancy agreements entered into between the
IO and Pakatower as renewed from time to time, the IO has
been continuously renting the DPP from Pakatower for the
next 18 years from 1 May 1997 until 30 April 2015” (§24).
iv) “28. The last tenancy renewed between the IO and Pakatower
(“Last IO Tenancy”) was pursuant to a Chinese tenancy
agreement dated 24 April 2014 covering both the DPP and the
G/F Unit 13 Staircase Space” (§28).
D) In the Judgment, the Disputed Premises were:
a) defined as having the same meaning of the “Disputed Pakatower
Premises” and “DPP” as stated in Pakatower’s Consolidated
Notice of Application, Consolidated Reply and Defence to
Counterclaim and the List of Agreed Issues as above. (§15(a)
and §16(a))
b) Pakatower agreed that for the order for delivery of vacant
possession of the Disputed Premises, the facilities installed
therein for provision of electricity, telephone, firefighting
and sprinkler systems and fresh and flush water systems, etc.
could remain therein providing that they were regarded as the
Common Facilities under the DMC and that they were installed
and kept therein upon the execution of the DMC (“DMC
Facilities”). (§16(a); §35(c); §38)
c) The last tenancy agreement for renting the Disputed Premises
and the Unit 13 Staircase Space between IO and Pakatower was
the Last IO Tenancy Agreement (dated 24 April 2014), which
contains, inter alia, the following terms:-
i) Clause 3A provided that the term of tenancy shall be one
year, from 1 May 2014 to 30 April 2015, at the monthly rate
of HK$3,600 (“Clause 3A”);
ii) Clause 3B provided that IO shall be responsible for the
management fees, rates, insurance, repair fees and any
other expenses in relation to the rented premises during
the term of tenancy. (“乙方負責有關「承租物業」
在租約期內之管理費、差餉、保險、維修費及其他任何費用。”)
(“Clause 3B”);
iii) under a separate section of “supplementary conditions”,
Clause 4B provided that during the period when IO
is using Pakatower’s premises, Pakatower shall not be
responsible for any expenses of the Building.
(“乙方於使用甲方物業期間,甲方不須負責任何本大廈之任何費用
。”) (“Clause 4B”). (§27).
E) In the Review Decision, the Disputed Premises were, for the
purpose of clarifying the imprecise descriptions advanced by
Pakatower, more precisely described as follows :
i) Cheung described the Disputed Premises as “spaces underneath
staircases” “utility rooms”, which were of “unique nature”,
vastly different from workshops and factory units and the
transaction of premises of such was “very scarce” (§18(a)).
ii) they consisted of 17 parts. The size and description of each
of them were set out in Cheung’s Report (§15-16).
iii) they were located in different floors and in different sizes,
ranging from 10 sq ft to 295 sq ft with one transformer room
at 492 sq ft (§15, §18(a));
iv) some were oddly shaped (§18(b));
v) some were housing the DMC Facilities, which were space-taking
and operating[15]. Pakatower agreed that the DMC facilities
which were kept therein upon execution of the DMC should
continuously be kept in the Disputed Premises (§16, §18).
vi) Other than Class C Premises (said to be housing firefighting
and sprinkler systems and/or fresh and flush water
systems for the common use of the Building), the exact items
and quantities of the DMC Facilities, their whereabouts and
the spaces occupied by them remained unspecified, save that
some photos have captured some incomplete images of some
facilities installed in some of the Disputed Premises (§16,
§18(d)-(e).
vii) the usage of the Disputed Premises were limited and Cheung’s
knowledge about the interior of the Subject Premises were
very limited (§18(f)-(g)).
JUDGMENT MESNE PROFITS
26. After trial, the assessment of the mesne profits was determined in
§§189-221 of the Judgment.
27. Both experts accepted that: -
i) the value of occupation should be valued at open market rent,
which a hypothetical tenant would pay in a competitive
market, taking into account every intrinsic quality of the
tenement, all relevant circumstances, and what the
hypothetical landlord and hypothetical tenant would agree
upon after “higgling of the market” (§189).
ii) the Disputed Premises are a bundle of different parts of the
Building with most of them are utility rooms and spaces which
are not as valuable as a workshop in an industrial building
as agreed by both experts (§192).
Rejection of Ng’s Valuation
28. Ng’s valuation of the Disputed Premises at nominal value was
rejected in §§192-204 of the Judgment for: -
i) “Such valuation was proceeded on the wrong basis that the
Disputed Premises were common parts, and that problematic
comparable were adopted” (§§192-198);
ii) not “making any reference to the Last IO Tenancy Agreement
notwithstanding that that was exactly a rental transaction of
the Disputed Premises.”(§199);
iii) “Her explanation for not adopting it was that she had been told
by IO that such tenancy agreement was made under a mistake that
the Disputed Premises were not the Common Areas. Such
explanation is illogical. IO’s own belief at present could not
have rendered the rental value of the Last IO Tenancy, which
was entered at arm’s length in 2014, unsuitable to be adopted
as a comparable.”(§199);
iv) Ng’s valuation at minimal occupation or rental value did not
sit well with the fact that for the 18 years preceding the
Expiry Date, IO had been renting the Disputed Premises at
meaningful rents (§201).
Rejection of Cheung’s Valuation
29. Cheung’s Group Assessed Values were rejected in §§205-213 of the
Judgment because his valuation was problematic and unreliable for:-
1) the basis of his valuation for Group 2 Premises and Group 3
Premises were fundamentally wrong for: -
a) For Group 2 premises, Cheung had mistakenly regarded them
as not included in the Last IO Tenancy Agreement. He
therefore considered that the Last IO Tenancy Agreement was
not suitable comparable and there was no suitable
comparable for application of DCM, leaving DRC as the only
applicable valuation method which he adopted as the sole
valuation method for Group 2 premises.
b) For Group 3 premises, Cheung mistakenly regarded them as
the only premises covered by the Last IO Tenancy Agreement.
He adopted the Last IO Tenancy Agreement as the only
suitable comparable for DCM. He however said that as there
was insufficient similar comparable, he therefore assessed
Group 3 premises by taking an average of the DCM valuation
and the DRC valuation (§206 of the Judgment).
2) his assessments of Group 2 premises and Group 3 premises were
fundamentally wrong for they were based on the wrong footing,
which went contrary to Pakatower’s own case as well as the
agreed facts of both parties that the entirety of the Disputed
Premises and the Unit 13 Staircase Space were covered under the
Last IO Tenancy Agreement.
3) not only that Group 2 premises were erroneously taken out of the
Last IO Tenancy Agreement and valued separately as Group 2
premises amounted to double-counting, but also that the “average
unit rate on monthly rent” for Group 3 premises (with their
internal floor area erroneously reduced) would be grossly
inflated. (§§210-211 of the Judgment).
4) the unfavourable intrinsic qualities and circumstances of each
part had not been properly evaluated. As shown in the Approved
Building Plans and agreed by Cheung, some of the Disputed
Premises were designated for use as utility rooms which should
have contained space-taking and operating facilities inside.
Such factors took them out of the normal usage and value of the
industrial buildings and tend to significantly reduce their
value and any valuation involving comparable chosen from normal
industrial properties, such as workshop or godown units or
enbloc industrial buildings would be bound to produce incorrect
results (§211 of the Judgment).
5) given Cheung was not aware of the location of and the spaces
taken by the DMC Facilities, neither his valuation basing on DCM
nor DRC was reliable (§213 of the Judgment).
6) Cheung’s selection of the sale transactions of enbloc industrial
buildings without proper adjustment for his assessment under DRC
was inappropriate. He only adopted a “time” adjustment without
any other adjustments (ie usage) to reflect the significant
differences between the Disputed Premises and the comparable
adopted. (§212 of the Judgment)
Last IO Tenancy Agreement
30. Having rejected both experts’ opinions, this Tribunal adopted the
Last IO Tenancy Agreement as the starting point for assessment
because:-
1) both experts’ assessments were fundamentally wrong and
unacceptable, leaving the Last IO Tenancy Agreement the best
evidence before this Tribunal.
2) Cheung also considered it as a suitable comparable and actually
adopted it as the sole comparable for his DCM assessment for
Group 3 Premises, just that his analysis on it was tainted with
the problems as elaborated in §29 above.
3) Ng’s explanation of not adopting it was invalid as set out in
§28 above.
4) it was the best evidence for its rental consideration was for
exactly the same rooms and accommodations together with the same
bundle of facilities therein and between the same parties. All
intrinsic qualities and circumstances should have been taken
into account. There is no evidence to show that it was not an
arm’s length transaction. The tenancy term of it (1 May 2014 to
30 April 2015) was immediately before the date of valuation (1
May 2015).
5) absent any other suitable comparable, the rental consideration
for the Subject Premises itself took on more importance.
(§§214-215 of the Judgment)
31. According to Clause 3 of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement, IO, for
renting the Disputed Premises and Unit 13 Staircase Space from 1
May 2014 to 30 April 2015, had to make two sets of monthly rental
payments: -
1) pay a monthly cash payment of HK$3,600 to Pakatower under Clause
3A; and
2) settle all payments for the specified items for Pakatower
under Clause 3B.
(§216 of the Judgment)
32. Taking the two sets of payment under Clause 3A and Clause 3B as a
starting point, adjustments were made firstly to deduct a sum of
HK$638 from the monthly cash payment of HK$3,600 to reflect the
agreed mesne profit of the Unit 13 Staircase Space, making up a
total of HK$3,307 for the year commencing on 1 May 2015, and
secondly, further adjustment on time was made to reflect the
rental market during the period concerned, making reference to the
Rental Indices, which has long been regarded (as Cheung confirmed)
as the most reliable indicator in reflecting the overall sale and
rental transaction market condition of industrial premises in Hong
Kong (§§217-219 of the Judgment).
33. As to Clause 3B, Pakatower confirmed that IO had settled all those
payments for it and it had never been asked for such payments
during all the tenancy terms in the past until the deterioration
of the relationship between the parties and the dispute relating
to the counterclaim arose. Given Clause 3B was part of the rental
consideration of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement, it should also
form part of the mesne profit to be borne by IO from 1 May 2015 to
the date of delivery of the vacant possession of the Disputed
Premises (§221 of the Judgment).
REVIEW DECISION
34. In the MP Review Application, Pakatower applied for review of
(what Pakatower alleged to be) this Tribunal’s rejection of
Cheung’s assessment basing on DRC as set out in Appendix VIII of
Cheung’s Report (confined to the Subject Premises as no review was
sought for the Two Staircase Spaces). However, such proposition
was misleading. It has neither put Cheung’s opinion nor this
Tribunal’s ruling into proper context, but instead, changing its
pleaded case, Original Claim and expert opinion by way of counsel
submissions (§3(1), §5 of the Review Decision). I should not
repeat the Review Decision in full but just highlight some points
for ease of reference.
35. First, it was not Cheung’s evidence in trial to base his valuation
on Appendix VIII of Cheung’s Report. The MP Review Application in
fact differs from Cheung’s opinion and Pakatower’s own case at
trial as elaborated in §§6-11, 13-15, 25 and 27 above.
36. It was indeed Cheung’s opinion in Cheung’s Report and in Court
that (which was adopted by Pakatower at trial) the mesne profits
of the Disputed Premises should be assessed: -
1) in accordance with Cheung’s Group Valuation (§§3 & 5 of the
Review Decision).
2) according to its original approved state (their original
intended use) with reference to the approved building plans.
(§20 of the Review Decision).
3) by market approach (DCM) if adequate comparable exist (§§19-20
of the Review Decision).
4) by adopting the Last IO Tenancy Agreement as suitable comparable
for DCM with only time adjustment made, making reference to the
Rental Indices, which was the most reliable indicator in
reflecting the overall sale and rental transaction market
condition of industrial premises in Hong Kong (§20 of the Review
Decision).
5) as the Last IO Tenancy Agreement was the sole suitable
comparable for DCM, he used DRC as supplement (§20 of the Review
Decision).
6) by adopting the definition of DRC in HKIS Standards to mean an
estimate of:-
“the current cost of replacing an asset with its modern
equivalent asset less deductions for physical deterioration and
all relevant forms of obsolescence and optimisation.”.
37. Second, Cheung’s valuation was rejected because: -
1) his valuation was based on the wrong footing that Group 2
Premises were excluded from the Last IO Tenancy Agreement, which
went contrary to the fact that the entirety of the Disputed
Premises and the Unit 13 Staircase Space had actually been
covered (§20 of the Review Decision).
2) such mistake had led to double-counting for Group 2 Premises as
well as grossly inflated value for Group 3 Premises (§§23-24 of
the Review Decision).
3) Cheung had failed to give sufficient regard to the unfavourable
intrinsic qualities and circumstances of the Subject Premises
(§25 of the Review Decision).
38. Third, Pakatower’s Review Application for adoption of Cheung’s DRC
Assessment for valuation of the Subject Premises were rejected
because:-
1) even though Pakatower confined its application for review to
purportedly this Tribunal’s rejection of Cheung’s assessment
basing on the DRC as set out in Appendix VIII of Cheung’s
Report, its actual application was to adopt DRC as the sole
valuation method for all of the Subject Premises (Group 2
Premises and Group 3 Premises) (§29).
2) such proposition and application was not supported by Cheung’s
Report as alleged but a clear departure from Cheung’s opinion
because: -
a) it in effect sought to reformulate Cheung’s opinion in Court and
rewrite Cheung’s Report by arbitrarily removing all his opinions
on the importance of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement and DCM and
replacing them by, singling out Cheung’s DRC valuation as the
sole valuation method and further, expanding it to cover all of
the Subject Premises. (§31).
b) it paid no regard to Cheung’s opinion that: -
i) DCM should be preferred if suitable comparable is available
and DRC should only be used where no recent useful
transactions for reference is available.
ii) the Last IO Tenancy Agreement was the sole suitable
comparable and he actually used it for DCM. It was just
because of his mistaken belief that it did not cover Group
2 Premises and therefore did not use it for assessing the
value of Group 2 Premises (§64-65).
3) it is erroneous to adopt DRC for valuation of the Subject Premises,
being utility rooms and accommodation of a mutli-storey buildings,
in principle and in practice, because : -
a) even though Cheung said that Cheung’s DRC assessment was based on an
estimate of “the current cost of replacing an asset with its modern
equivalent asset less deductions for physical deterioration and all
relevant forms of obsolescence and optimisation” as defined in the
HKIS Standards and “A property market yield is adopted to decaptialise
the effective capital value to arrive at the rental value”, Cheung’s
DRC Assessment was in fact not a true assessment as such because it
was not actually an estimate of the cost of replacing the Subject
Premises with their equivalent assets (§35).
b) Instead, Cheung’s DRC Assessment was premised on an estimate of the
cost of replacing the entire industrial building as a whole, but not
just the Subject Premises, being just some peculiar parts of the
Building (§35 & 36).
c) Cheung’s DRC Assessment was based on the estimated total cost of the
land element and building element for construction of the whole
building (but not just the Subject Premises) and then averaged out the
estimated total unit cost per sq ft generally, ending up with
multiplying such general average unit cost per sq ft by the areas of
the Subject Premises to determine the value of the Subject Premises
(§36).
d) the Subject Premises were not the whole Building but merely 15
“utility rooms” (as described by Cheung) which only formed a small
peculiar part and parcel of a 9-storey industrial building. (§32).
e) the Subject Premises were unique and very different from other parts
of the Building in nature, layout, configuration, size, location and
accessibility, but also that they themselves varied sharply. The use
of them were very limited (§33).
f) as opined by Cheung, the Subject Premises should be valued according
to the Approved Building Plans, which had primarily designated them
for use as utility rooms. As agreed by the parties, at least some of
them had contained DMC Facilities inside, which had been taking up
space and operating (§33).
g) all such unfavourable factors had taken the Subject Premises out of
the normal usage and value of the industrial buildings, which tend to
push the value of occupation significantly down. Any valuation
involving comparable chosen from an industrial building as a whole, or
normal industrial properties as workshops, factory units or godowns
would be bound to produce incorrect results, bearing in mind that the
value of the specialized properties are intrinsically linked to their
nature, layout, configuration, size, location, use and accessibility,
etc as admitted by Cheung (§34).
h) without giving any regards to the uniqueness of each of the Subject
Premises in terms of nature, layout, configuration, size, location,
accessibility, headroom, etc, which were significantly different from
the other parts of the building, Cheung’s DRC assessment was based on
the wrong footing for the construction cost and the depreciation rate
of the Subject Premises as well as the costs of the common areas and
common parts to be apportioned to each premises of the Subject
Premises could not be the same as the other parts of the building as
lobbies, corridors, staircases, car parks, lifts, common structures,
roof, "workshops and factory units, etc. (§37).
i) the construction cost and the depreciation rate of each
premises of the Subject Premises could not be the same as
each other in view of their many inherent differences.
Similarly, the sharing of the cost of the common areas and
common parts among different parts/ owners of the building
and how such apportionments should be made had not been
dealt with by Cheung (§38).
j) Cheung’s oversimplified board-brush approach for DRC by simply taking
a general average unit cost (per sq ft) of the total hypothetical
replacement cost of the whole building as the “estimated Total Unit
Cost/ sq ft” of the Subject Premises could not have properly reflected
the true value of the Subject Premises. It has neither accounted for
the unfavorable peculiar features of the Subject Premises, nor has it
distinguished the Subject Premises from the different parts of the
building, which, in reality, would have incurred different
construction costs, depreciation rates and cost-sharing of the common
areas and parts of the building (§39).
k) Cheung’s DRC assessment was problematic in principle and in practice,
without giving due regards to the limitation of DRC. While DRC may be
used where there is no useful evidence of recent transactions due to
the specialized nature of the premises, DRC is not an appropriate
valuation method for strata title properties because of the issues of
common land and shared building facilities (§40).
l) neither Pakatower nor Cheung has been able to come up with any decided
cases or authorities that DRC had ever been accepted for valuation of
just a particular part of a multi-storey building or multi-units
building, other than for the whole building or the whole structure as
a specialized plant or an equipment asset, ie oil plant, machinery
plant, power station (§41).
m) solely for the reasons aforesaid, Cheung’s DRC Assessment
was bound to be rejected (§42).
39. Fourth, even though “solely for the reasons aforesaid, Cheung’s
DRC Assessment was bound to be rejected”, a brief summary of its
deficiencies and problems was provided as illustration “for
completeness sake” as follows (§42): -
1) Firstly, Cheung’s analysis on the “land element” was
inappropriate for obvious reasons (§48) : -
a) no adjustment (other than time adjustment) to reflect
the sharp differences between the Subject Premises and
his three comparable sales transactions of enbloc
industrial buildings, i.e. no adjustment to reflect the
sharp different locations of the Subject Premises in Tai
Wai, Shatin and those three comparable sites respectively
located in Tsuen Wan, Tuen Mun and Fanling, (§48).
b) no adjustment (other than time adjustment)/ proper
analysis for a proper accommodation value analysis to
address the sharp differences between the three
comparables in terms of sales consideration, site area
and plot ratio, resulting in a misleadingly similar
accommodation value (purchase price per square foot of
gross floor area) of them (§48) with the accommodation
value derived from the Fanling comparable being
exaggerated (§44-46).
c) no proper consideration to the wide varieties in the
type and size of buildings that could be erected upon the
sites in differing localities and of different sizes,
causing the value of ground-floor premises varies greatly
for accommodation values analysis (§48).
d) no due regards to the fact that the Subject Premises
comprised meter rooms, fire prevention room, transformer
room, switch room, pump room etc, which are usually
disregarded in calculation of gross floor area, instead,
his accommodation value was straightly calculated on the
basis of the amount of gross floor area permissible, not a
like-to-like comparison exercise (§47).
e) it was wrong to adopt an oversimplified averaging exercises
to average the sale prices of the unadjusted or improperly
adjusted comparable (other than time adjustment), which
eliminated the effect of the individual peculiarities of
those in the transactions and without comparing and
addressing the sharp differences of the comparable and the
land of the Subject Premises (notwithstanding that there
was nothing objectionable to average the properly adjusted
values of the comparable)(§§50-51).
2) Secondly, Cheung’s analysis on the “building element” was
also unreliable for obvious reasons as follows:-
a) According to the Approved Building Plans as adopted by
Cheung, most of the Disputed Premises were primarily
designated for use as utility rooms (some with operating
DMC Facilities contained therein), which were out of the
normal usage and value of the industrial buildings and
intrinsically less valuable than workshops and factory
units (§58-59).
b) His estimate on the building element was based on the IFA
multiplied by the unit rate in building costs and then
adjusted for depreciation, professional fees and finance
charges (§52).
c) For the unit rate in building costs, his adoption of the
general approximate average construction costs of
“Landlord, High Rise” Industrial Building provided by RLB
(“RLB Costs”) was problematic without giving due regards to
the facts that:-
i) the RLB Costs were based on prices obtained by
competitive tendering for lump sum fixed price
contracts, without distinguishing, still less of
specifically basing on, the features or
characteristics of the Subject Premises (being just
the utility rooms and accommodation) from other
elements comprised in those construction costs, (§§53-
54).
ii) the RLB Costs did not capture the costs of a “bare
shell” as Pakatower alleged. It was impossible to
apportion those construction costs to just the
utility rooms and accommodation of a building as the
Subject Premises (§§53-54).
iii) his omission in accounting for the construction cost
of the common parts apportioned to the different
parts of the building (§55).
iv) his adoption of a general approximate average rate
for construction cost and a general depreciation rate
only provided for a general reference of the average
replacement costs for a building as a whole which did
not cater for accommodations or utility rooms which
borne the same or similar features and
characteristics of the Subject Premises (§56).
v) no adjustment (other than adjustment for time) for
assessing the building element is inadequate (§57).
vi) his application of the same average unit rate to all
of the Subject Premises without any adjustments to
reflect the unfavorable qualities, characteristics
and features of each premises is problematic (§57).
3) Thirdly, Cheung’s cross-check exercise by making reference to
Space B on G/F, Unit 6 on G/F, Unit 12 and the Roof Unit for
drawing conclusion that his valuation assessment was
reasonable was unhelpful due to the sharp differences in
nature, usage, location, size, layout, configuration,
accessibility, etc. (§61).
40. In conclusion, this Tribunal rejected Cheung’s DRC assessment for
it failed to give a true and fair market value assessment of the
Disputed Premises. It was unbelievable that a user or occupier
would be willing to pay an average cost of constructing the whole
building as the average cost for just some fragmentary parts of a
building (§§59-61).
41. Fourth, this Tribunal adopted the Last IO Tenancy Agreement as a
starting point for assessment of the mesne profits for:
1) both expert’s valuations were unreliable, leaving the Last IO
Tenancy Agreement to be the best evidence (§26, §63).
2) Cheung also found it the best comparable and actually adopted it
as the only comparable for DCM (§26).
3) the tenancy agreement was for exactly the same premises with the
same bundle of facilities therein, between the same willing
parties, covered the tenancy term immediately preceding the
assessment day. No evidence that it was not an arm’s length
transaction. Accordingly, it took on more importance for all
intrinsic qualities and circumstances of the Disputed Premises
should have already been taken into account (§26, §69).
4) both the Cash Element under Clause 3A and the Non-cash Element
under Clause 3B, being the rental consideration of it, should be
taken into account (§§27-28).
5) Cheung’s opinion that DCM should be preferred over DRC if
suitable comparable is available. The Court has always been open
and ready to adopt one single comparable for DCM especially if
it was of good quality as highly resemble to the subject matter
for valuation as demonstrated in a series of decided cases (§§65-
69).
6) Pakatower’s many new arguments to challenge the adoption of the
Last IO Tenancy Agreement were bound to fail as follows:-
A) Its new argument that the Last IO Tenancy Agreement did not
cover all the Disputed Premises (because the wordings of
“Transformer Room, Switch Room, Main Distribution Frame
Room, other utility rooms or accommodation on Ground Floor
(except the Disputed Semi-Circle Area)” were not contained
therein) was hopeless for the following reasons: -
i) Pakatower was debarred from making such new
allegation, which was contrary to its pleaded case,
List of Agreed Issues and stated case in trial (§79).
ii) it was contrary to the fact-finding of the Judgment,
to that Pakatower had not sought to review (§§77-78).
iii) Pakatower had neither adduced any concrete evidence in
support nor allowed IO a reasonable opportunity to
respond to such new allegation. It should not be
allowed to slip in such new allegation through the
back door, not to mention that Pakatower had confirmed
that it would not adduce new evidence in the Review
Application (§§77-80).
iv) In light of the long tenancy history between the
parties and the fact that IO had been continuously
occupying and using all the Disputed Premises
(including the Subject Premises) from 1997 until the
Expiry Date, Pakatower had not adduced any credible
evidence to show how and why it had continuously
allowed IO to be so occupied and used all the Disputed
Premises until the Expiry Date if not because of the
Last IO Tenancy Agreement, or that it had ever changed
its long-term tenancy relationship with IO by changing
the subject matter of the tenancy during the said
period. Pakatower’s new allegation is unbelievable and
unacceptable (§81).
B) Pakatower’s argument that the rental of the Last IO Tenancy
Agreement was unreasonably low was unjustified because it
was:
(i) not justified with any convincing evidence;
(ii) inconsistent with the uninterrupted tenancy history
(adopting a consistent pattern of rental
consideration containing both Cash Element and Non-
Cash Element with a gradual rent increase pattern)
between the parties from 1 May 1997 to the Expiry
Date (§§70-72);
(iii) not correct for Pakatower to overemphasis the Cash
Element but silent on the Non-Cash Element of it
(§§73-76, 90-91).
(iv) not proper for Pakatower to make reference to its own
unilateral offer to IO after the expiry of the Last
IO Tenancy Agreement, which was rejected by IO (§89).
(v) not right for the Counsel or factual witness of
Pakatower to arbitrarily adopt the assessment
calculations, end results and end figures of some
particular premises in some decided cases for
valuation of the Subject Premises in the absence of
expert evidence in support bearing in mind that each
case depends on its own facts and Pakatower’s
suggestions were neither supported by any solid
evidence nor canvassed at trial (§92-94).
C) Pakatower’s another new argument that the first tenancy
agreement was formed between Pakatower and IO as part of
the global settlement of all the 1996-1997 Disputes and
therefore should not be in Pakatower’s favour was
unacceptable for lack of valid evidence in support,
instead, on balance, the evidence tended to disprove
Pakatower’s present allegation that the rentals were not
arm’s length transaction or not in its favour (§82).
D) Pakatower’s assertion of not having obtained legal advice
or valuation before its execution of the Last IO Tenancy
Agreement was devoid of valid evidence in support, and even
if true (which was not so found), it was a decision of its
own which would not render the transaction freely entered
into not an arm’s length transaction or that the rental
freely agreed upon not market rent (§83).
E) Pakatower’s another new suggestion of those tenancy
agreements were tainted with concessionary rental rates due
to bulk-tenancy discount was another pure speculation
without any slightest evidence in support and was
undesirable to be raised in a review application (§83).
F) The reference made by Pakatower, in the Review Application,
to a written request of IO in 2006 did not assist
Pakatower. Such request was made for Pakatower’s
acceptance of the then existing rent as opposed to the
market rent for the renewal of the tenancy due to IO’s
financial distress. It was an one-off request made 18
years before the Last IO Tenancy Agreement, which could not
assist Pakatower’s case, but rather, it proved that both
parties were used to negotiate the tenancy terms freely
with the market rent in mind (§84-85).
G) Pakatower’s argument that the Disputed Premises were leased
to IO without sight of their internal condition and
therefore not leasing knowledgeably was unconvincing for: -
(i) a decision of its own choice would not render those
freely negotiated tenancy agreements not arm’s length
transactions, the rentals agreed not market rents or
the agreements not formed knowledgeably (§86);
(ii) it was unbelievable that Pakatower would have no
knowledge at all about the facts that some of the
Subject Premises had been housing the DMC Facilities
in light of Pakatower’s dealings of the Subject
Premises before and after its acquisition of the
Subject Premises for so many years (§87-88).
42. It was undesirable for Pakatower to put up a number of unjustified
arguments in the Review Application, which were unsupported by any
evidence or even not canvassed at trial (§94).
43. Pakatower’s complaints that this Tribunal should not make
observations on matters that have not been put to Cheung at trial
were unsubstantiated for the following reasons:-
1) Such complaints had put the cart before the horse. They
neglected the fact that Pakatower’s MP Review Application
seeking to subject all of the Subject Premises to the purported
Cheung’s DRC Assessment was a complete change of its case and a
departure from Cheung’s Report (§§95-96).
2) In the Judgment, Cheung’s assessment was wholly rejected due to
his fundamental mistake of taking out Group 2 Premises from the
Last IO Tenancy Agreement, which undermined the whole basis of
his assessments, be that on DRC or DCM, be that on the Group 2
Premises or the Group 3 Premises, as well as some other errors
(§96).
3) In the Review Application, Pakatower dramatically changed its
position from trial, seeking to rewrite Cheung’s Report by
expanding Cheung’s DRC Assessment to be the sole valuation
method to cover all of the Subject Premises with DCM and the
Last IO Tenancy Agreement completely buried by Counsel’s
submissions (§§97-98).
4) Such change of position also unfairly deprived IO of a fair
chance to adduce expert evidence or factual evidence in
response. The prejudice was serious and should not be allowed
(§98).
5) Such change of position after trial should not be allowed, not
to mention that there was no expert evidence in support. The
observations made by this Tribunal in the Review Application
were to address such new contentions by referring to the
evidence available at trial and basing on commonsense and
general principles. The materials referred to were provided to
the parties with reasonable opportunities for them to respond
(§99).
6) Pakatower’s new application to subject all the Subject Premises
to the purported Cheung’s DRC Assessment was also rejected due
to its fundamental problem in principle and lack of valid
evidence in support. The problems were not just a matter of
degree for adjustment by expert, but, the whole assessment was
fundamentally wrong in principle and filled with omissions of
crucial matters that could not be rectified or resurrected by
Cheung at trial (§§100-101).
7) In the premises, there was no basis to have such matters
confronted with Cheung in any precision or dealt with in full in
the Judgment, but for Pakatower’s MP Review Application, which
departed from Cheung’s Report, its pleaded case and its stated
case at trial, by raising a number of new matters, even new
factual allegations, and slipping in comparable figures and
assessment methods by putting forward factual witness affidavit,
Counsel’s submissions and judgments of decided cases, despite
Pakatower’s confirmation that it would not adduce any new
evidence in the Review Application. Pakatower’s change of
position necessitated further elaborations of the deficiencies
and limitations of Cheung’s DRC Assessment, which were not
directly necessary for the purpose of resolving the issues in
dispute at trial (§101).
8) It was not the role of the Tribunal to assist Pakatower to prove
its claim against IO, rectify the defects or supplement the
deficiency of its expert evidence. This Tribunal was empowered
to form its own view with the evidence available (§§102-103).
INTENDED GROUNDS OF APPEAL
44. In the present Draft Notice of Appeal and Pakatower’s submissions,
much has been said by Pakatower that the assessments of the mesne
profits were so problematic necessitating a revisit of the
Judgment Mesne Profits or a re-trial for assessment. However,
Pakatower’s complaints are unjustified and tended to complicate
the matters by taking matters out of context, mixing up factual or
legal matters or reversing its burden of proof.
GROUND 1
45. Ground 1 is bound to fail for the following reasons.
CHANGE OF CASE
46. First, Pakatower was bound by its own case and Original Claim in
trial that its application for the mense profits of the Disputed
Premises was based on Cheung’s Group Valuation (in that the Last
IO Tenancy Agreement was expressly adopted as suitable comparable
and DCM was used) and prayed for Cheung’s Group Assessed Values as
in its pleadings, stated case at trial and opening submissions and
closing submissions as elaborated in §§6-13, 15-16, 18-20, 25 and
27 above. As such, it was not entitled to change its case and its
claim in the Review Application and to add further changes in the
intended appeal to ask for a reassessment of the mense profits
solely by its purported Cheung’s DRC Assessment and for the Review
Claim, and further, revised the Review Claim in the intended
appeal. The prejudice caused to IO is fundamentally serious that
should not be allowed.
47. Pakatower’s contention that this Tribunal had misunderstood its
Review Application, which was said to be “addressed what the
proper valuation approach should be after the Tribunal had
rejected both expert’s valuation in the Original Decision [the
Judgment] and adopted the Last TA as the starting point for
assessment on the limited evidence before it” (§55, Pakatower’s
submission) is bound to be rejected. Plainly, Pakatower was
debarred from changing its case and its claim after its original
case and claim had been rejected in trial. Strictly, no second
bite of the cherry should be allowed.
48. Second, much has been said by Pakatower that it “sought only to
overturn the Tribunal’s rejection of Cheung’s DRC Assessment for
the Subject Premises, but not his DCM valuation (based on the
express wording of the Last IO TA) which had been rejected by the
Tribunal” and that Cheung's report always contained separate
standalone DRC (§55 of Pakatower’s submission). Such proposition
is an attempt to misinterpret Cheung’s opinion at trial as well as
to take the ruling of the Judgment out of context to suit its new
purpose.
49. Pakatower’s so-called Cheung’s “assessment basing on the
Depreciated Replacement Cost method as set out in Appendix VIII of
the valuation report of Pakatower’s expert dated 14 November 2022”
was not the actual valuation opined and adopted by Cheung in his
Cheung’s Report or in trial for the assessment of the mesne
profits of the Disputed Premises, and in fact, goes contrary to
Cheung’s expert opinion. As elaborated in §§8-9 above, it was
Cheung’s unequivocal evidence that the mense profits of the
Disputed Premises should be assessed basing on Cheung’s Group
Valuation and the Last Tenancy Agreement was suitable comparable
and DCM should be used.
50. Pakatower was not allowed to rewrite Cheung’s expert’s report and
reformulate its own expert’s opinion by just picking up an
appendix to the Cheung’s Report (being Appendix VIII which was
just added for simple illustration of the calculation of DRC, but
was not adopted by Cheung as the basis of his valuation in trial),
singling out the DRC and further, extending and expanding the DRC
to cover all of the Disputed Premises/ Subject Premises, with
Cheung’s adoption of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement and the DCM
completely removed by way of counsel’s submissions and affidavit
of factual witness, and then justified such prejudicial exercise
by saying that the Judgment had rejected Cheung’s valuation of
Group 2 Premises and Group 3 Premises, bearing in mind that
Cheung’s valuation was not rejected because of the adoption of the
Last IO Tenancy Agreement and the use of DCM but his confusion as
to the subject matters of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement (in that
he mistakenly considered Group 2 Premises were not covered
therein).
51. Strictly, Pakatower was debarred from having partially lost its
case with its expert evidence being rejected after a full trial,
asking for completely changing its original case and its Original
Claim and putting forward a completely new case and new claim by
rewriting its own expert’s report through Counsel’s submissions
and factual witness affidavit, which goes contrary to its own
expert’s evidence in the Cheung’s Report and in trial with his
original opinion basing on Cheung’s Group Valuation and the Group
Valuation Assessed Value completely removed. Hence, Pakatower’s
present application is plainly an attempt to get the second bite
of the cherry and is bound to fail.
52. Third, all Pakatower’s complaints about this Tribunal’s rejection
of Cheung’s DRC Assessment are doomed to fail for the fundamental
reason that Cheung’s DRC Assessment was inherently unable to give
a proper, true and fair valuation of the Disputed Premises, being
just some utility rooms, accommodations and spaces of a multi-
storey building as opposed to the whole multi-storey building. As
repeatedly emphasized, this Tribunal had no disagreement that DRC
could be used for valuation of the whole multi-storey building or
the whole structure as a specialized plant or an equipment asset
but not just some particular parts of a multi-storey building as
the Disputed Premises by simply taking a general averge unit cost
of the total hypothetical replacement cost of the entire building
as the estimated costs of the Disputed Premises due to the
inherent deficiencies and limitations of Cheung’s DRC method as
elaborated in §§32-62 of the Review Decision).
NEW CRITICISM & NEW MATERIALS
53. Fourth, solely for the reasons aforesaid, Ground 1 is hopeless.
For completeness sake, I will now turn to concisely deal with
Pakatower’s other arguments under ground 1, which focus mainly on
complaining this Tribunal to have raised “new criticisms” on
“Cheung’s DRC Assessment” by making reference to some “new
materials”, which deprived it and Cheung of a fair chance to deal
with them.
54. Fourth, solely for Such arguments are unmeritorious. In the
Judgment, this Tribunal simply did not need to rely on such “new
criticisms” or “new materials” in rejecting Cheung’s expert
evidence and Pakatower’s Original Claim. It was only because of
Pakatower’s dramatic attempts to change its case, claim and
Cheung’s expert evidence in the Review Application by counsel’s
submissions and factual witness affidavit, seeking to rely solely
on the so-called Cheung’s ”assessment basing on the Depreciated
Replacement Cost method as set out in Appendix VIII of the
valuation report of Pakatower’s expert dated 14 November 2022” to
assess the mesne profits of all of the Subject Premises with
Cheung’s use of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement and DCM for
assessment completely removed that made it appropriate, for
completeness sake, to elaborate further as to how and why Cheung’s
DRC Assessment should not be used as the sole method for assessing
all of the Subject Premises.
55. §1(3), §1(6) and §1(7) of Ground 1 can be dealt with together.
They complained this Tribunal to have introduced “new criticisms”
(as defined by Pakatower in §1(2) of Ground 1 to have included
§§32-41, 43-51, 53-62 of the Review Decision) and “new materials”
during or after the Review Hearing. It said that those were
matters of valuation opinions being introduced in the Review
Decision as the so-called “well established basic principles” or
“commonsense and logics” without expert opinion in support or
sufficient analysis and had never been canvassed at trial and
consequentially, depriving Pakatower of a fair chance to deal with
them with proper expert evidence from Cheung.
56. Such complaints are unacceptable and indeed an attempt to shift
the burden of proof as well as to side-track the real issue that
it was Pakatower who initiated the change of its case, claim and
expert evidence necessitating a detailed analysis as to how and
why such new attempts should not be allowed and Cheung’s DRC
Assessment could not properly, truly and fairly assess the mense
profits of the Disputed Premises/ Subject Premises as newly
advanced by Pakatower in the Review Application for such
complaints simply ignored the fact that the so-called “new
criticisms” and “new materials” were not strictly necessary for
determination of the issues in dispute at trial as the Judgment
now stands but for Pakatower’s new attempts to change its case,
claim and expert opinion under the guise of “Cheung’s Report”
through counsel’s submissions and factual witness evidence in the
Review Application that gave rise to the needs of elaborating
further how the purported Cheung’s DRC Assessment should not be
adopted for valuation of all the Disputed/ Subject Premises.
57. Pakatower can seek no support from Deluxe Ascent Ltd v The
Director of Lands [2024] 1 HKLRD 260. That was a case that only
in the application for leave to appeal, the Tribunal entertained a
new issue for valuation exercise ie whether site coverage be
limited to 20% in order to be marketable and competitive. Such
issue was neither an issue in the pleadings, list of issues,
opening submissions or opinions of either expert, nor a matter of
commonsense or a matter under judicial notice. It however was a
fundamental point which would render the parties’ debate on
abutment entirely academic (§§56-60).
58. On the contrary, in the present case, the “new criticisms” and the
“new materials” were raised by this Tribunal not for putting
forward a new issue for valuation exercise or calculation but
strictly for responding to Pakatower’s new claim, new case and new
reformulation of its expert evidence so as to state why
Pakatower’s new attempts were unacceptable. They were not raised
in an application for leave to appeal but in the review
application. Reference was made to them not to put forward a new
positive issue for re-valuation of the Disputed Premises but to
give general references to illustrate some general principles as
an aid to demonstrate how and why Pakatower’s new attempts were
improper, illogical and prejudicial which were contrary to general
principles and were an affront of commonsense.
59. The 5 items being complained of in the Notice of Appeal were just
one decided case and 4 small footnotes, which were added to the
Review Decision to give general references of some long-
established general principles as follows:
i) §66 of the Review Decision was the well-known decided case,
Winland Property Limited v Chang Sai Ho [2024] HKLdT 27, which
served to reiterate the general principles on adopting DCM for
valuation. §§119-125 of it highlighted the Court’s general
approach to be open and ready to adopt one single comparable for
DCM assessment so long as the comparable is of good quality,
especially when that single comparable is highly resemble to the
subject matter for valuation.
ii) footnote [2] to §40 of the Review Decision was a small section
in p.5 of the Professional Excellence Bulletin[16]. It just
repeated the general principle that DRC is not an appropriate
valuation method for strata title properties because of the
impossibility of apportioning the cost to different parts of the
multi-storey building as well as of sharing of the cost of the
common land and shared building facilities.
iii) footnote [3] to §45 of the Review Decision referred to pp. 48-49
of the Valuation of Development Land in Hong Kong[17] (1981
edition) (“PJR Book”). It just provided a simple example to
illustrate the general principle that the accommodation value
approach is just a rule-of-thumb calculation for simplifying
comparisons between different sites and it could not replace
detailed analysis of the potential of a site. Such reference
was added to the Review Decision purely to demonstrate the
straight forward interrelationship between site areas, gross
floor areas, plot ratios, sales prices and accommodation value
to demonstrate the theoretical limitation and deficiency of the
accommodation-value approach, without involvement of any
analysis touching on the classification of “zones”. Hence,
Pakatower’s submission that “Zones I, II, III” as referred to in
the 1975 edition of the book has since been updated in its 2001
edition to “Residential Zones” 1, 2 and 3, which are different
from the industrial site in the present case is irrelevant and
unnecessary.
iv) Likewise, Pakatower’s suggestion that §49 of the Review Decision
“appears to be based on another passage from” the 2001 edition
of the book at p. 59 is a baseless and unnecessary speculation.
§49 was just to illustrate how Cheung’s analysis on the
accommodation value was unreliable in reality for the types and
sizes of buildings that could be erected upon sites in differing
localities and of different sizes vary greatly and a site which
offers construction of buildings with extensive site coverage on
the ground floor generally attracts more value due to the many
benefits apparently peculiar to the ground floor.
v) footnote [6] to §50 of the Review Decision referred to three sub-
paragraphs of Land Compensation & Valuation Law in Hong Kong[18]
at [23.98-23.100]. It just repeated the simple principle that it
is wrong to average the values of unadjusted or improperly-
adjusted comparable.
vi) footnote [5] to §47 of the Review Decision just recited Practice
Note for Authorized Persons, Registered Structural Engineers and
Registered Geotechnical Engineers APP-2 that meter room, fire
prevention room, transformer room, switch room, pump room etc
are disregarded in the calculation of gross floor area. It was
footnoted to show that such general principle has been well-
recognized and codified as a practice note in the industry for
decades.
60. A fair reading of the Review Decision will find that the “new
criticisms” were actually matters of logic and commonsense drawn
from the evidence adduced at trial, well-established general
principles and decided cases. They were to demonstrate that
Pakatower’s new attempts in the Review Application was bound to
fail for Cheung’s DRC Assessment was inherently deficient and
illogical for it only provided the costs for a hypothetical
industrial building as a whole but not specifically for the
Disputed Premises, not to mention that it’s calculation of the
costs for the entire hypothetical industrial building was also
problematic and unreliable. The “new materials” were just added
as footnotes or supplementary notes for providing general
references, and, the removal of them would not render the
reasonings of the Review Decision illogical or irrational as
summarized in §§34-43 above.
61. All of the “new materials” (except one) had been provided to the
parties for their consideration and submissions long before the
determination of the Review Application. To that, Pakatower was
invited to and actually put in lengthy supplemental skeleton
submissions and list of authorities in response and reply[19].
The complaint of lack of a fair opportunity to deal with the new
materials is unjustified.
62. Thus analyzed, Pakatower’s complaints that the inclusion of such
“new criticisms” and “new materials” amount to an error of law and
a breach of natural justice, necessitating the intervention of the
Appellate Court is without merit.
63. As to §1(4) of Ground 1, the general complaint of “other new
criticisms on Cheung’s DRC Assessment were not referable to any
identifiable materials at all” is neither here nor there.
64. In essence, one of the crucial reasons for rejecting Pakatower’s
MP Review Application basing on Cheung’s DRC Assessment was that
DRC is not suitable for assessment of just a particular part of a
multi-storey building or multi-units building. As elaborated in
§§34-43 above, the so-called “new criticisms” just listed out the
inherent deficiencies and fundamental limitations of Cheung’s DRC
Assessment which were so obvious as a matter of general
principles, logics and commonsense.
65. Besides, the so-called “new materials” only served as
supplementary notes to provide general references of those general
principles. They did not bring in or add anything to the
valuation exercise or calculation of Cheung’s DRC Assessment.
They just pointed out the inherent deficiencies and fundamental
limitations of Cheung’s DRC Assessment, which were so obvious as a
matter of logics and commonsense. The problems were inherent
which were not matters of degree or weight that could be adjusted
or remedied by experts in trial. The absence of them would not
have rendered the analysis of the relevant paragraphs
unsubstantiated as demonstrated in §§34-43 above.
66. In light of the nature of and the circumstances giving rise to the
so-called “new criticisms” and “new materials” in the Review
Application as set out above, Pakatower’s complaints of being
deprived of a fair chance to deal with them by it or its expert at
trial amounting to an error law is unwarranted.
INHERENT DEFICIENCIES
67. As explained in §§35-36 of the Review Decision, the inherent
deficiency and fundamental limitation of Cheung’s DRC Assessment
was that even though Cheung purportedly based his DRC on an
estimate of “the current cost of replacing an asset with its
modern equivalent asset less deductions for physical deterioration
and all relevant forms of obsolescence and optimization” and “A
property market yield is adopted to decaptialize the effective
capital value to arrive at the rental value”, Cheung’s DRC
Assessment was in fact not a true valuation as such because it was
not actually an estimate of the cost of replacing the Subject
Premises with their equivalent assets.
68. Instead, Cheung’s DRC Assessment was premised on an estimate of
the cost of replacing an industrial building as a whole, but not
just the Subject Premises. It wrongly based on the estimated total
cost of the land element and building element for construction of
(not only the Subject Premises but) the entire hypothetical
building with a deduction at a selected standard rate for
deterioration and another for decapitalization and then averaged
out the estimated total unit cost per sq ft generally, ending up
with multiplying such general average unit cost per sq ft by the
areas of the Subject Premises to determine the mesne profits of
the Subject Premises.
69. It was such inherent deficiency and fundamental limitation of
Cheung’s DRC Assessment, in principle and in practice, that
rendered Cheung’s DRC Assessment unreliable for it could not have
properly, truly or fairly reflected the true values of the
Disputed Premises/ Subject Premises. It is not a matter of degree
or weight that can be remedied by adjustment by expert in trial.
70. Thus considered, Pakatower’s argument (making references to a
number of decided cases) that DRC has long been recognized as a
valuation method in Hong Kong and this Tribunal has erred in
rejecting such a well-recognized valuation method and Cheung’s DRC
assessment is a red herring attempting to detract from the
inherent limitation and fundamental deficiency of Cheung’s DRC
Assessment aforesaid.
71. Suffice it to say that in §§40-41 of the Review Decision, this
Tribunal specifically confirmed that this Tribunal had no
disagreement that DRC might be used where there was no useful
evidence of recent transactions due to the special nature of the
premises and that DRC had been used for valuation of the whole
building or the whole structure as a specialized plant or an
equipment asset, ie oil plant, machinery plant, power station in a
number of decided cases, DRC however was not an appropriate
valuation method for strata title properties.
NO DECIDED CASES
72. In the premises, Pakatower’s present attempts to mount the same
arguments by making reference to a number of decided cases are
fruitless for the crucial reason that the subject matters for
valuation by DRC in all those decided cases were not a particular
part of a multi-storey building or multi-units building and the
DRC valuation used was not by way of taking an average of the
estimated total cost of the entire hypothetical building.
73. Suffice it to say that up until now, neither Pakatower nor Cheung
has been able to refer to any decided cases or authorities that
DRC has been found to be a true, proper and fair valuation of just
a particular part of a multi-storey building or a multi-units
building still less of valuation by way of taking an average of
the estimated total cost of the entire hypothetical building.
74. Pakatower’s complaint that Pakatower and its valuation expert
could not have appreciated the need of providing any decided cases
in support and that they had not been asked for such at trial does
not assist it in explaining out its failure to come up to proof.
No doubt, solely the absence of a precedent case will not
automatically justify a rejection of the use of DRC for a
particular part of a multi-storey building. That said, in this
particular case, Pakatower is unable to logically or sensibly
elaborate as to how Cheung’s DRC Assessment can truly, properly
and fairly evaluate just the Disputed Premises instead of an
entire industrial building.
75. Viewed in this light, the fact that neither of them was able to
refer to any decided cases or authorities directly on this point,
locally or overseas, notwithstanding both of them have referred to
a number of decided cases and authorities in support of their many
arguments, further points to the fact that DRC could not be used
as a suitable valuation method for just a particular part of a
mutli-storey building or multi-units building.
LAND ELEMENT
76. In light of the matters set out above, §1(1) of Ground 1 does not
assist Pakatower. It contends that this Tribunal’s “main
criticism” was that Cheung had adopted enbloc industrial buildings
as comparables and such complaint was invalid due to this
Tribunal’s misunderstanding of the methodology of DRC by confusing
the land element with the building element. Such contention is
incorrect and is an oversimplification of the many main reasons
for rejection as summarized in §§205-213 of the Judgment and §§30-
62 of the Review Decision which should not be repeated here.
77. Further, the contention that this Tribunal has misunderstood the
difference between the land element and the building element by
taking into account of the “usage” of the to-be-demolished
building of the enbloc-building-theory adopted by Cheung for the
land element is misconceived. It is a misinterpretation of §§205-
213 of the Judgment and §§42-51 of the Review Decision and a
neglect of Cheung’s evidence under cross-examination[20] as
summarized in §212 of the Judgment.
78. Under Cheung’s adoption of the sales transactions of some
industrial redevelopment sites with to-be-demolished enbloc
buildings as comparables for the land element, the issue of
“usage” is still relevant when considering his accommodation value
approach as elaborated in §§47, 49-51 of the Review Decision. In
fact, under cross-examination, Cheung confirmed that he was not
sure whether the utility rooms inside the enbloc building were
normally not calculated within the GFA. He also confirmed that
even if they are calculated within the GFA, a very substantial
part of the enbloc industrial building would be normal workshop or
factory units and these would be intrinsically be more valuable
than the utility rooms in those buildings. This also demonstrated
why Cheung’s accomodation value approach for the valuation of the
Disputed Premises/ Subject Premises, being just utility rooms and
accomodation and spaces, is problematic.
79. After all, this matter was just one of the many problems of
Cheung’s DRC Assessment and in any event could not have rectified
the inherent deficiencies and fundamental limitation of Cheung’s
DRC Assessment as aforesaid.
80. Likewise, Pakatower’s other complaints about the reasons for
rejection of Cheung’s evidence in the Judgment are just repetition
of its arguments in the Review Application, which have been dealt
with in the Review Decision. Pakatower fails to demonstrate how
such rulings were wrong in law.
81. Pakatower’s complaints about this Tribunal’s rejection of Cheung’s
analysis on land element were dealt with in §§42-51 of the Review
Decision, in that his selection of the three comparables as well
as his accommodation value approach were found unreliable for
various reasons set out therein. In essence, his oversimplified
average-taking of the three comparables with materially different
plot ratio without proper adjustment cannot be treated as
reliable.
82. In particular, Cheung’s accommodation value exercise was
oversimplified in circumstances where his selected three
comparables had differing site sizes, plot ratios and permissible
gross floor areas. Not only that the Fanling site comparable was
out of line from the other two sites and his accommodation value
approach was problematic, but also that no proper adjustments
(other than time adjustment) had been made to reflect the peculiar
features of each site. All such factors have rendered Cheung’
analysis unsafe.
83. Amongst, comparable L3 (the Fanling site), with a plot ratio of
only 3.5 compared to the other two comparable at 9.5, had a
materially different efficiency profile from the other two
comparables. Applying a simple average of the accommodation value
exercise of all three without proper adjustment had distorted the
result. The reference of the PJR book was just to illustrate the
general principle of the accommodation value approach cannot
replace detailed consideration of the potential of a site and the
straight forward mathematical logic that “the greater the ratio
between salable floor space and gross floor area, the higher will
be the accommodation value”.
84. Pakatower’s bare assertion that the other two comparable sites
“might offset” or “balance the comparison”, that the subject site
should be considered as “midpoint position” to address the
differences identified or that the Fanling site should be
disregarded are unrealistic which cannot address the problems
identified, bearing in mind that the remaining two comparable
sites in different locations are insufficient and inadequate
comparable not to mention that no appropriate adjustments had been
made to address the obvious differences between them and the
Building (other than time adjustment).
85. Pakatower’s complaint that there is no expert evidence to suggest
that adjustment on location is required is no bar to this
Tribunal’s finding that such omission has rendered the valuation
unsound for the obvious reasons that the sharp differences between
the four locations of the four sites concerned were something that
this Tribunal can take judicial notice of. The Tribunal is
entitled to make its own findings basing on general knowledge,
logics and commonsense and will not be bound by the inaction or
omission of experts. Further, the fact that accommodation value
has been generally recognized as a method for valuation (to this
this Tribunal has no disagreement) is no excuse for Pakatower to
make an inappropriate application of such method.
86. This Tribunal’s criticism of Cheung’s oversimplified-averaging
methodology was based on simple logic that it was wrong to average
unadjusted or improperly adjusted comparables. Lands and
compensation n valuation law in Hong Kong at §23.98 was just
referred to in recognition of such simple logic. Given the three
comparables adopted by Cheung differed materially from the Subject
Premises, his averaging of the unadjusted or improperly adjusted
values has undoubtedly produced incorrect result.
BUILDING ELEMENT
87. Likewise, all Pakatower’s arguments relating to the “Building
Element” are fruitless due to Cheung’s adoption of the RLB
approximate average construction costs (“RLB Cost”) and the
uniformed depreciation rate, etc. was fundamentally problematic
for they were not catered for the Subject Premises. His adoption
of the RLB cost (which only provide average costs for construction
of an entire building, not for specific parts of the building as
the Disputed Premises) and the uniformed depreciation rate was
regardless of the individual characteristics, features or
qualities of the Disputed Premises. It was an oversimplification
which produced incorrect result. Therefore, the series of argument
advanced by Pakatower in this area are bound to fail. I should be
brief in dealing with them as follows.
88. §§36-40 of Pakatower’s skeleton submissions is an example of
Pakatower taking the ruling of the Review Decision out of context
and reversing its burden of proof. It was Pakatower who adopted
the RLB cost in Cheung’s DRC Assessment as well as contended that
such cost were only the cost of “bare shell” in its submissions in
the Review Application. It was to such submissions that this
Tribunal disagreed with in the Review Decision.
89. Pakatower now turned to resort to Cheung’s evidence that the
building element represented the costs of the “shell of the
structure” as well as this Tribunal’s reference to the fact that
RLB tables included the costs of E&M Rooms in §53 of the Review
Decision to argue that the RLB tables do not state that the
figures only apply to construction of the entire building but
explicitly state to cover E&M Rooms, and on such basis, changed to
contend that there is no expert evidence that the construction
costs of E&M Rooms should differ from the RLB tables, and further,
complained that the finding that the approximate average
construction costs did not capture only the costs of a “bare
shell” was against its own position in the Review Application.
90. It is undesirable for Pakatower to have kept changing its position
whenever it finds fit. Such argument neglects the full analysis
of the issue in §53-60 of the Review Decision. It was Pakatower
who failed to discharge its burden of proof to justify how the RLB
cost, which were construction costs basing on prices obtained by
competitive tendering for lump sum fixed price contracts for
construction of entire buildings and not specifically based on the
features or characteristics of the Subject Premises, even though
they also cover “E&M rooms” but no evidence that those “E&M Rooms”
were equivalent to the Subject Premises, could properly represent
the building costs for only the Disputed Premises/ Subject
Premises.
91. Pakatower’s another argument in §42 of the Skeleton Submission
that “any equivalent replacement of the Subject Premises (which
are utility rooms in a multi-stores building) would necessarily be
constructed as part of a multi-storey building and cannot be built
on a standalone basis without the building’s foundations, lifts,
common structural frame, external envelope and other common parts,
e.g. a meter room on 8/F cannot be built alone without these
common parts” lends no support to Pakatower but rather, fully
supports this Tribunal’s view and points to the true fact that DRC
is inherently unsuitable and indeed, impossible to be used for
valuation of just a particular part of a multi-storey building and
in particular, the utility rooms, accommodation and spaces.
Plainly, the RLB cost cannot represent the construction cost for
the Subject Premises. That is precisely where the inherent
deficiencies and fundamental limitation of Cheung’s DRC Assessment
lie, which Pakatower cannot resolve.
92. Pakatower complains this Tribunal to have assumed the RLB
construction costs include other elements as “foundations, lifts,
windows, external rendering and waterproofing etc” without
evidence in support is unmeritorious and is a result of its
ignorance of the nature and composition of the RLB table.
93. Pakatower’s argument in §43-44 of the Skeleton Submission is
without merit. It has confused the basic concepts of construction
cost for the entire building as opposed to those for just the
Disputed Premises/ Subject Premises, being just some utility
rooms, accommodation and spaces owned by an owner. It also ignored
the importance of and the differences between the construction
costs of different parts of the building and the apportionment of
the construction costs of the common areas and common parts of the
building to the other parts of the building. It further mixed up
with the ownership of the Disputed Premises/ Subject Premises and
that of the common areas and common parts of a building. Those
were the problems that Cheung’s DRC Assessment had not accounted
for and obviously could not address to due to the inherent
limitation of DRC. The RLB cost plainly has not catered for the
construction cost for just the Disputed Premises/ Subject Premises
but the whole building. Pakatower failed to explain how its
suggestion of a broad-brush adjustment could be made when the
whole valuation basis was wrong.
94. In §45 of the Skeleton Submission, Pakatower argues that Cheung
was right in applying the same depreciation rate to all the
Disputed Premises/ Subject Premises for both experts had rated the
Subject Premises to be in “fair” or “reasonable” condition. Such
argument oversimplifies the matter and without taking into account
of the fact that depreciation varies according to intrinsic
qualities and peculiar nature of each of the Subject Premises as
elaborated in §15-18 and §38 of the Review Decision.
95. In §46 of the Skeleton Submission, Pakatower complains that this
Tribunal had misunderstood Cheung to have only adopted time
adjustment without any other adjustment for assessment of the
building element was wrong because the RLB tables, depreciation
rates and market yields used by Cheung had been updated. Such
argument has again ignored the intrinsic qualities and the
peculiar characteristics of each premises, which could not be
properly reflected by the general RLB tables, uniformed
depreciation rates and market yields.
96. Pakatower’s complaints in §§47-49 of the Skeleton Submissions are
some more examples of taking the reasons for the ruling out of
context and tend to change its case to serve its purpose. §§33-34
and §§58-59 of the Review Decision should not be read out of
context from §§32-39 and §§52-60 of the Review Decision, which
elaborated the general principle that the value of the specialized
properties are intrinsically linked to their intrinsic qualities
and special natures and features, hence, the unfavourable factors
of the Subject Premises have taken the Subject Premises out of the
normal usage and value of the industrial buildings and
accordingly, Cheung’s DRC Assessment which involved comparable or
general costs of replacing an industrial building as a whole (but
not only the Subject Premises) chosen from normal industrial
properties produced inaccurate outcome and was bound to be
rejected.
97. Further, Pakatower’s complaints in §§(1) to (5) of §47 of the
Skeleton Submissions must fail for the following reasons. First,
Pakatower is debarred from making the complaints in §47(1) and (2)
for they run counter to Cheung’s evidence that the Subject
Premises should be valued according to the Approved Building Plan
and his confirmation in court to the effect that his
interpretation of the Approved Building Plans was that the Meter
Rooms should be regarded as designated “Meter Rooms” in the
Approved Building Plans and he actually valued those rooms as
“meter rooms” in Cheung’s Report, as also recorded in §15 and §32-
33 of the Review Decision.
98. Pakatower’s complaints in §§(3) to (5) of §47 of the Skeleton
Submissions are contrary to the factual evidence in trial as
recorded in the fact-findings in §16 of the Review Decision that
Class D premises were only categorized by Pakatower/ Cheung as the
premises that “had or might have been housing articles and/ or
the equipment and facilities purportedly for provision of
electricity, telephone.” as well as §18(e)-(g) of the Review
Decision that “despite Class D Premises were broadly said to be
housing systems, equipment or articles arranged or authorized by
IO, the exact items contained therein remained unclear. No one
could actually tell, still less of concrete evidence for proof,
that they did not contain the DMC Facilities, despite repeated
inquiries of this Tribunal at trial. The list prepared by IO’s
witness was said to be incomplete.” and “Pakatower had never
gained access to the Subject Premises. As to Cheung, it was his
evidence that his knowledge about the interior of the Subject
Premises was limited…..” (emphasis added).
99. After all, in view of the undisputed facts that the Subject
Premises borne peculiar and unfavourable features as set out in
§§15-18 of the Review Decision as well as the agreed facts that
some of the Subject Premises did contain DMC Facilities, which
occupied spaces and were operating, Pakatower’s arguments in §§47-
49 of the Skeleton Submissions do not advance Pakatower’s position
for such peculiar features have distinguished the Subject Premises
from the other premises of the Building and the valuation of the
Subject Premises could not be based on the general average unit
costs of the whole building as in Cheung’s DRC Assessment.
100. Pakatower is not entitled to change its case again in this leave
to appeal application by putting forward some more new arguments
basing on its unjustified new allegations of “absence of user
restriction” and “highest and best use” as advanced in §48 of the
Skeleton Submissions, which were neither supported by Cheung’s
Report nor properly canvassed at trial. The prejudice caused to
IO was serious and should not be allowed.
ALLEGATION OF MISUNDERSTANDING
101. As to §2 of Ground 1, Pakatower’s complaints that this Tribunal
had misunderstood and failed to take into account its submissions,
authorities and Cheung’s evidence are unjustified for the reasons
set out above. For completeness sake, it’s specific complaints
under (1) to (6) therein will be succinctly dealt with as follows.
102. The complaint under §2(1) of Ground 1 that this Tribunal erred in
holding that it is “the well-established principle that DRC is
conceptually unsuitable for use as the sole or primary valuation
method for valuation, still less of just for a particular part of
a multi-storey building’ which appeared to be solely based on the
Canadian Bulletin” “when the position in Hong Kong is more
properly governed by the Valuation Standards issued by the HKIS
and Best Origin Ltd v Commissioner of Rating and Valuation (2012)
15 HKCFAR 816 (“Best Origin”), which clearly recognized the
methodology of DRC for non-income producing assets, including
portions of a tenement” is a non-starter.
DECIDED CASES
103. Pakatower’s complaint that the Canadian Bulletin was a non-binding
bulletin in Hong Kong is misconceived. The reference was made to
it purely to illustrate the rationale for the general valuation
principles on DRC, which also applies in Hong Kong.
104. Suffice it to say that as elaborated in §§72-75 above, none of the
cases referred by Pakatower was for DRC valuation of a particular
part of a multi-storey building by taking a general average cost
of the entire hypothetical building. I shall not repeat my
findings in §§40-41 of the Review Decision that this Tribunal had
specifically recognized the use of DRC for valuation of the whole
building or the whole structure as a specialized plant or an
equipment asset as the subject matters in a number of decided
cases but not for a particular part of a multi-storey building or
multi-units building as elaborated above.
105. Much reliance has been placed by Pakatower upon Best Origin Ltd v
Commissioner of Rating and Valuation (2012) 15 HKCFAR 816 to argue
that it has been recognize that in evaluating an undertaking, it
can be divided into portions directly productive of profits and
portions only indirectly productive of profit, and the latter is
to be assessed using DRC. Such proposition does not lend any
support to Pakatower for that was a case clearly distinguished
from the present case. That case concerned the assessment of
Government rent payable under Government leases of land which is
in course of construction for development or redevelopment. The
subject matter was the development site and the construction of
the site and the building thereon has yet been completed. It is
not a case for valuation of a particular part of a multi-storey
building as the present case.
106. Likewise, in Kwong Fat Loong Shipyard v Commissioner of Rating and
Valuation, LDRA 5/ 1988 unreported, 9 January 1990, the subject
property was divided into four items for valuation. Three of them
were valued by DCM and only the slipway, being the whole structure
of a special nature as “is principally a non-moveable fixture,
analogous to the permanent way of a railway.” was valued by DRC
separately and individually from the other parts of the subject
property (§5, 15, 16, 22, 23-25, 38). It is not a case of
adopting DRC for valuation of a particular part of a multi-storey
building equivalent to the Disputed Premises.
107. Rather, that is a case that expressly confirmed the preference for
DCM as “the comparable method is to be preferred to the
contractor's method. However, the comparable method depends on the
availability of adequate comparables and in their absence recourse
may have to be made to more subjective and notional based
alternatives such as the contractor's method or the profits
method.” (§15). Given that was my ruling and fact-finding with
valid reasons that Cheung’s DRC Assessment was inherently
deficient and fundamental limited and that the Last IO Tenancy
Agreement was an adequate comparable of high quality, no recourse
could be made to the “more subjective and notional based
alteratives” as Cheung’s DRC Assessment.
108. Under §2(2) of Ground 1, Pakatower complains this Tribunal to have
misunderstood Mobil Oil Hong Kong Limited v Commissioner of Rating
and Valuation [1993] HKDCLR 77 as authority for the proposition
that DCM should be preferred over DRC even where the only
available comparable was a “previous” tenancy agreement of the
subject property but in fact in that case, the comparable was the
“prevailing” tenancy of the subject property which was in force as
at the valuation date and the Tribunal recognized the danger of
relying on a sole comparable and accordingly revised down the DCM
valuable by reference to DRC.
109. Such argument does not advance Pakatower’s position any further.
In that case, the Tribunal expressly confirmed the general
preference for DCM even though the risk of relying on only one
comparable was stated. The said risk was further qualified as
“unless there is other supporting evidence, it is normally
unsatisfactory to rely on one comparable.”[21] Reference should
also be made to §§63-67 of the Review Decision for the proper
proposition extracted from Mobil Oil, in that not only the danger
of relying on a sole comparable and the sole comparable used was
an earlier agreement in respect of 36.7% of the subject tenement
some 3 years earlier were specifically noted, it was emphasized
that that was a case for determination of rateable value. The fact
that the Court revised down the DCM valuation by reference to the
DRC valuation was made on the peculiar facts of that case and no
general principle could be drawn therefrom.
110. In the present case, there was sufficient supporting evidence and
valid reasons as elaborated in §§214-221 of the Judgment and §§63-
103 of the Review Decision for this Tribunal to find the Last IO
Tenancy Agreement was the best evidence before me for assessment
of the mesne profits and Cheung’s DRC Assessment was plainly wrong
and inapplicable. There was no room for Pakatower’s suggestion of
revising down the DCM valuation by reference to DRC valuation.
111. References have also been made by Pakatower to other decided cases
including Tai Ping Restaurant Limited v Director of Lands
(LDLR1/2013, unreported, 8 December 2014) to argue that three
comparables were used for DCM as well as Nelson Plant Hire Ltd v
Dawn Bunyan (VO) [2022] UKUT 309 (LC) to argue that while a single
tenancy was adopted as the sole comparable for DCM, a cross-check
with DRC would usually be conducted.
112. For the same reasons aforesaid, I fail to see how the many decided
cases cited by Pakatower could lend any support to Pakatower.
None of them are cases for valuation of a particular part of a
multi-storey building equivalent to the Disputed Premises.
Instead, some of those cases actually adopted a single tenancy as
the sole comparable for DCM. In fact, the risk of adopting a
single comparable for DCM valuation and a cross-check with
alternative method was promoted in those cases was specifically
noted in the Review Decision as highlighted in §§65-69 of the
Review Decision.
113. The problem in the present case is that due to the inherent
deficiency and fundamental limitation of Cheung’s DRC Assessment,
there was no room for any application of Cheung’s DRC Assessment,
be that as a part of the valuation, a cross-check or an overall
adjustment of the DCM Valuation.
114. By reason of matters set out above, Pakatower’s argument in §64
of its skeleton submissions that none of the authorities relied
upon by this Tribunal concerns similar facts of the present case,
being the assessment of market rent by reference to a previous
tenancy of the same premises between the same parties, with only
time adjustment applied over a valuation period exceeding 10 years
and this Tribunal failed to address the sole comparable concern
identified by Cheung is unmeritorious and of no assistance to
Pakatower.
115. Reference has also been made by Pakatower to a Canadian case of
Saskatchewan Assessment Management Agency and Temple Gardens
Mineral Spa Inc v Moose Jaw (city), 2013 SKMB 010 and an English
case of Bunyan (Valuation Officer) v Acenden Ltd [2023] UKUT 17
(LC) to argue that DRC could be applied to the ancillary utility
areas of a multi-storey/ unit building. However, such contentions
are misconceived.
116. In the former case, DRC was used for valuation of the parkade, spa
and pool facilities of a hotel complex individually and separately
from the main portions of the complex which were valued using an
income approach. In the latter case, it only suggested that if a
hereditament comprised an office and industrial complex for areo
engineering, and some unique facility was constructed in the
grounds of the complex, it might be appropriate to value the
offices and industrial elements by DCM and to value the bespoke
unique facility using DRC.
117. Such two cases do not assist Pakatower but rather, support §41 of
the Review Decision that “The truth is neither Pakatower nor
Cheung has been able to come up with any decided cases or
authorities that DRC has been applied for assessment of just a
particular part of a multi-storey building or multi-units
building, other than for the whole building or the whole structure
as a specialized plant or an equipment asset, ie oil plant,
machinery plant, power station.”. They fall squarely into the
situation where DRC has been applied for assessment for “the whole
structure as a specialized plant or an equipment asset” separately
and individually. Kwong Fat Loong Shipyard case aforesaid is
another example in that the subject matter was divided into four
items. Only the slipway, being the whole structure of a special
nature, was valued by DRC individually and separately from the
other three items (which were valued by DCM). It is completely
different from Cheung’s DRC Assessment in that the Subject
Premises were valued by averaging the costs of the entire
building.
118. In gist, no matter how Pakatower tried to refer to the decided
cases, Cheung’s Report or some valuation principles in support of
its case or to challenge the reasons for the Judgment or Review
Decision, it in any event failed to discharge its burden of proof
of Cheung’s DRC Assessment was the current cost of replacing the
Disputed Premises/ Subject Premises (instead of the whole
building) with its modern equivalent asset less deductions for
physical deterioration and all relevant forms of obsolescence and
optimisation” as defined in the HKIS Standards and “A property
market yield is adopted to decaptialise the effective capital
value to arrive at the rental value”, Cheung’s DRC assessment was
in fact not a true assessment as such because it was not actually
an estimate of the cost of replacing the Subject Premises with
their equivalent assets (§35).
119. The problem was obvious. That was the inherent deficiency and
fundamental limitation of Cheung’s DRC Assessment. Notwithstanding
that a large amount of legal authorities and decided cases have
been cited, Pakatower still failed to refer to any case that DRC
had been found to be suitable valuation method for just a
particular part of a multi-storey building or a mutli-units
building.
ACCOMMODATION VALUE
120. Under §2(3) of Ground 1, Pakatower’s complaints that this Tribunal
had ignored several matters when criticizing Cheung’s use of the
accommodation value approach are unjustified for the reasons set
out in §§76-86 above. I should be brief in dealing with its
further arguments under this ground.
121. The complaint that this Tribunal had failed to consider the
approach of adopting accommodation value is well-recognized as a
legitimate basis for analyzing land comparables is undermined by
§45 of the Review Decision, in that this Tribunal specifically
pointed out that such approach has been recognized just as a rule-
of-thumb calculation for simplifying comparisons between different
sites, just that it cannot replace detailed analysis of the
potential of a site.
122. The complaint that the observation in pp. 48-49 of the Valuation
of Development Land as summarized in footnote [3] of the Review
Decision concerned residential sites rather than industrial sites
is a misread of footnote [3]. Reading footnote [3] in its proper
context by referring to §45 of the Review Decision will find that
footnote [3] was added purely to illustrate the general principle
that accommodation value approach does not cater for varying site
areas and the ratio of saleable floor space to gross floor area,
for the greater the ratio between saleable floor space and gross
floor area, the higher will be the accommodation value. It
centered on the illustration of the theory but not whether it was
residential or industrial site.
123. As to the complaint that any issue concerning a particular
comparable was a matter of weight or adjustment and this Tribunal
had misdirected itself by treating disagreement with adjustments
to particular comparable as a basis for rejecting the
accommodation value methodology as a whole, such argument is
unconvincing and without giving due regards to §42-51 of the
Review Decision. The problem of Cheung’s treatment to his three
comparable for the Land Element was not merely a matter of weight
or extent for adjustment but his failure to apply adequate
adjustment other than time adjustment. Further, this failure was
just one of the many factors contributing to the rejection of
Cheung’s accommodation value approach as explained in §§44-51 of
the Review Decision and §§76-86 above.
124. Under §2(4) of Ground 1, Pakatower complains that this Tribunal’s
reliance on Practice Note for the proposition that certain utility
rooms are usually disregarded in the calculation of gross floor
area was unsupported by any finding as to the actual accountable
and non-accountable gross floor area of the Building, as to how
the total of these GFA compares to the permissible GFA of the
Building, or by any analysis of whether and how such a general
guideline applied to the Building. Such complaint has ignored the
fact that it was Pakatower that borne the burden of proof and that
the Practice Note is applicable to the buildings completed in 1982
(see Footnote [5] of the Review Decision). Not only that Pakatower
has not adduced any evidence for proof of Cheung’s consideration
of the Practice Note in his accomodation value approach for
conducting his DRC valuation in Cheung’s Report, but also that
Cheung’s confirmation under cross-examination that he indeed was
not sure whether the utility rooms inside the enbloc building were
normally not calculated within the GFA as elaborated in §78 above.
Pakatower’s complaint is an attempt to put the cart before the
horse.
CROSS-CHECK
125. Under §2(5) of Ground 1, Pakatower complains that this Tribunal’s
rejection of Cheung’s cross-check exercise with four other
premises in the same Building as “comparing apples and oranges”
was a misapprehension of the purpose of the exercise which was to
test the DRC-derived unit cost against observable market reality
within the Building. In addition, further arguments have been
made in §§50-54 of the skeleton submissions that this Tribunal had
conflated the two cross-check exercises in Cheung’s Report, one
being the unit price of three other sale transactions in the
Building to test the reasonableness of the unit costs as
calculated in DRC and the other was the comparison between the RVD
yield adopted in DRC and the yield of four other sales
transactions in the Building to test the reasonableness of the
yield adopted in DRC.
126. Such arguments are illusory having an effect of shifting the focus
from the crux of the ruling. The crux of the ruling was that all
of Cheung’s selection of transactions of the premises of the
Building, being a space underneath staircase (Space B on G/F),
two factory units and the Roof Unit for comparison with the
Subject Premises (not including the Two Staircases) were
unreliable for they were not like-to-like comparisons due to the
fact that all those premises were sharply different from the
Subject Premises in nature, usage, location, size, layout,
configuration, accessibility, functions and intrinsic qualities as
summarized in §61 of the Review Decision. The ruling focused on
the inappropriateness of all such comparables for comparisons
which rendered all of Cheung’s cross-check analysis in these areas
unsustainable. Thus considered, Pakatower’s present arguments are
misplaced.
127. Plainly, the fact that Space B was a part of the “Other” Unit
could not make it a suitable comparable for the Subject Premises
bearing in mind that it was a space on the ground floor of a more
prominent location, layout and size which had all along been used
as the management office of the Building (as opposed to the use of
the Subject Premises for housing facilities or storing
miscellaneous items, etc) and generated much higher rent in the
past. It could not be regarded as suitable comparable to the
Subject Premises. Commonsense dictates that industrial workshops
and a space fit for commercial use were vastly different from the
Subject Premises which could hardly be a suitable comparable for a
like-to-like cross-check exercise.
128. Pakatower further argues that this Tribunal was bound by the fact-
finding that Space B and Roof Unit had commanded meaningful rents
and Ng was criticized to have failed to conduct any cross-check
exercise. Such argument is futile. It is difficult to see how
purely a rental-generated premises or the other expert’s omission
would have made Space B, the Roof Unit and the industrial
workshops suitable comparables for the Subject Premises.
PAKATOWER’S APPLICATION APPROACH IN REVIEW APPLICATION
129. Under §2(6) of Ground 1, Pakatower complains this Tribunal to have
erred in rejecting its Review Application as trying to rewrite
Cheung’s Report, simply because they were not on all fours with
Cheung’s opinion and in doing so, this Tribunal had misunderstood
Pakatower’s submissions, which were directed at the question of
what was the proper approach to be adopted in terms of valuation,
following the Tribunal’s rejection in the Judgment of both
parties’ valuation, including Cheung’s DCM analysis, and its
adoption of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement as the starting point.
It was on such basis that at the review stage, it sought to
overturn the Tribunal’s rejection of Cheung’s DRC Assessment, and
submitted that, instead of rejecting the totality of Cheung’s
valuation, Cheung’s DRC Assessment should still be adopted.
130. Such argument is unacceptable for reasons set out in §§46-52
above. In gist, such argument does not sit well with Pakatower’s
Review Claim and its submissions in the Review Application as
elaborated in §§15-16 above. Second, Pakatower’s denial of its
attempts to re-write Cheung’s Report is bound to be rejected for
the reasons set out in §§6-13, 15-16, 18-20, 25 and 27 above.
Third, the MP Review Application was in substance an attempt to
have a second bite of the cherry which must not be allowed for the
reasons set out in §§34-43 above.
131. Fourth, Cheung’s evidence was rejected due to various reasons as
set out in the Judgment and the Review Decision, inter alia, his
adoption of DRC was rejected due to the inherent deficiency and
fundamental limitation of Cheung’s DRC Assessment whereas his
adoption of DCM and the Last IO Tenancy Agreement was rejected not
because of any inherent deficiency or fundamental limitation of
the methodology of DCM or the quality of the Last IO Tenancy
Agreement but due to Cheung’s mistake of excluding Group 2
Premises from the Last IO Tenancy Agreement.
132. Given the basis upon which the DRC, DCM and the Last IO Tenancy
Agreement were rejected was different, the former went to the
fundamental root of the methodology whereas the latter was just
caused by the application of them to the mistaken facts. Thus
analyzed, it is wrong for Pakatower to ask for removal of DCM and
the Last IO Tenancy Agreement leaving the inherently problematic
DRC to be the sole assessment method and further, expanding it to
cover all of the Disputed Premises.
133. Pakatower’s complaint that the rejection of Cheung’s DRC
Assessment was in lack of evidence in support and without
identifying what evidence was needed and how such evidence could
be gathered is an attempt to reverse its burden of proof and bound
to fail.
THE NON-CASH ELEMENT
134. Under §1(5) of Ground 1, Pakatower complains that “the Tribunal
raised a new reason in §72 of the Review Decision that the “Non-
Cash Element” of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement could and should be
taken into account in the consideration of whether the Last IO
Tenancy Agreement reflected market rent, despite that there was no
factual or expert evidence on the quantum of such element Non-Cash
Element”. Such complaint is misleading and contrary to the fact-
finding in the Judgment that the Non-Cash Element formed part and
parcel of the consideration of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement and
accordingly, had actually been taken into account for valuation
and finally, adopted as part of the mense profits together with
the Cash Element:
135. The fact that there was no factual or expert evidence on the
quantum of the Non-Cash Element lends no support to Pakatower’s
argument bearing in mind that there is no trite law that rental
consideration and/ or mense profits must be quantified by exact
figures. The Non-Cash Element has been adopted by the parties to
form part and parcel of the consideration of the tenancy
agreements between the parties for decades. Their intentions and
the arrangements for such term were well-reflected in Clause 3B.
Such term had been carried out for more than a decade and
Pakatower admitted that it had all along enjoyed such benefits and
had never been asked to make those payments until the relationship
between the parties deteriorated and the dispute over the
counterclaim surfaced.
136. Further, Pakatower’s another argument that there was no actual
evidence for proof of the quantum under Clause 3B since 1997 until
now does not take Pakatower’s case any further. In view of the
fact that the Building is an industrial building with its
occupation permit and approved building plan issued in 1982, that
it contains nine floors and a roof and filled with workshops,
factory units, loading and unloading bays, car parks, utilities
rooms and utilities, that the DMC contains express terms obliging
Pakatower to pay its share of contribution to the management fees
and other payments and expenses “of the Building” according to its
shares of contribution allocated to the Disputed Premises under
Clause 46(4), 48(a) and the Third Schedule of the DMC (§8 & 225 of
the Judgment), it is an affront to commonsense that the payments
under Clause 3B were not significant and varied from time to time.
GROUND 2
137. Ground 2 of the Draft Notice of Appeal that “in rejecting the
Applicant’s submission that the Last IO Tenancy Agreement was not
a good comparable and in deciding to use the Last IO Tenancy
Agreement as a sole comparable (Review Decision at §§63-76, 82-
91), the Tribunal failed to take into account and/ or
misunderstood the following matters/ evidence” are without merits
for the following reasons.
LAST IO TENANCY AGREEMENT
138. First of all, such ground is unmeritorious for Pakatower failed to
justify how and why it was entitled to completely change its
original case and its Original Claim from basing the Last IO
Tenancy Agreement as comparable for valuation to asserting that
the “Last IO Tenancy Agreement was not a good comparable” after
trial and in the Review Application and further, complains the
Tribunal to have rejected such unjustified change of position.
139. This Tribunal’s adoption of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement was a
fact-finding exercise basing on an assessment of all the relevant
evidence before me and the reasons of such finding were set out in
§§214-221 of the Judgment and §§63-103 of the Review Decision.
Merely disagreement with fact-finding does not constitute an error
of law for appeal.
140. Pakatower’s complaint in §3(1) of Ground 2 is a misinterpretation
of §65 of the Review Decision by mixing up and reading in more
words to the said paragraph. The relevant part of §65 was that
“It cannot be denied that Cheung expressly confirmed that DCM
should be preferred if suitable comparable is available and that
DRC should only be used where no recent useful transactions for
reference is available. Such position is supported by Mobil Oil
Hong Kong Limited v Commissioner of Rating and Valuation [1993]
HKDCLR 77 (“Mobil Case”) in that DCM was preferred over DRC even
where the only available comparable was a previous tenancy of the
subject property being valued, so long as that tenancy was
adequate comparable.” (emphasis added)
141. Properly interpreted, it was in clear terms that Cheung’s position
was that DCM should be preferred if suitable comparable is
available. The Mobil Case was then cited to support such position.
It was only in discussing the ruling of the Mobil Case that this
Tribunal further pointed out that on the peculiar facts of that
case, the Court found that DCM was still preferred over DRC “even
where” the only comparable was a previous tenancy of the subject
property providing that “so long as that tenancy was adequate
comparable”. Pakatower’s present complaint that this Tribunal had
misunderstood Cheung to have opined that DCM should be preferred
even if there was only a single suitable comparable available by
mixing up Cheung’s position and the ruling of the Mobil Case is
unwarranted.
142. Such complaint also neglects §19 of the Review Decision, in that
Cheung’s opinion of “In practice, market approach is generally
preferred if adequate suitable comparable exist.” (emphasis added)
was specifically cited. What actually stated in the Review
Decision was the real fact that Cheung found the Last IO Tenancy
Agreement a suitable comparable and actually adopted it as the
sole comparable for DCM, notwithstanding that he then took an
average of DCM and DRC for valuation of Group 3 Premises.
143. After all, even if this Tribunal takes Pakatower’s own stance to
the highest that “Cheung’s evidence was merely that DCM is
generally preferred if adequate suitable comparables exist.” as
set out in §61 of the skeleton submissions, the fact of this case
duly satisfied this requirement for reasons set out in §§214-221
of the Judgment and §§63-103 of the Review Decision.
NG’s EVIDENCE
144. In §3(2) of Ground 2, Pakatower argues that “Ng was equally of the
view that the rental of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement should not
be taken as a comparable.”. Such argument is a non-starter for it
kept silence on the reasons given by Ng was that “I consider the
rental of 2014 Tenancy Agreement [Last IO Tenancy Agreement] does
not reflect a market rent as stated in Para. 30 of Mr. Lee’s
Statement, the Respondent entered the agreement not under
‘knowledgeably’ condition. This violate the definition of Market
Rent and the rental should not be taken as a comparable.”.
145. Besides, Pakatower also ignored this Tribunal’s analysis on Ng’s
explanation in §192 and §199 of the Judgment. In all, she was
under the misconception (as told by IO) that the Disputed Premises
were common parts and that IO had been misled into believing that
it had to rent the Disputed Premises from Pakatower for its use
and occupation of those premises that made her believe the Last IO
Tenancy Agreement to be an unsuitable comparable (§192 and §199 of
the Judgment).
146. It is noteworthy that referring to the Land Compensation and
Valuation Law in Hong Kong and some decided cases[22], Ng also
reiterated that “Market Approach is considered as the best
approach in valuation” “the comparative method is universally
regarded as the best method valuation.” and she considered DRC as
not appropriate.
ERROR IN INCREMENT
147. Pakatower’s complaint in §3(3) (a) of Ground 2 that this Tribunal
had erred in finding that there had been gradual rent increase
during the period between 1 May 1997 to 30 April 2013 in §§12, 70-
72 of the Review Decision does not advance Pakatower’s position
for the following reasons:
1) §§12, 70-72 of the Review Decision were only some of the reasons
for rejecting Pakatower’s proposition in the Review Application
that the rental of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement was
unreasonably low.
2) §12 of the Review Decision sets out the tenancy history of the
Disputed Premises (with or without Unit 13 Staircase Space) and
the figures of the monthly cash payments of each tenancy between
Pakatower and IO from 1 May 1997 to the Expiry Date on 30 April
2015, in addition to the Non-cash Benefits.
3) The only error in §12 of the Review Decision was that the
tenancy for the period between 1 May 2010 and 30 April 2011
covered the Disputed Premises together with Unit 13 staircase
space were stated as without Unit 13 Staircase Space. That is,
from 1 May 1997 to 30 April 2013, there was no increment of the
monthly cash payments for the Disputed Premises.
4) Be that as it may, such minor error did not give any material
impact on the findings in §§12, 70-72 of the Review Decision
that: -
a) from 1 May 1997 to the Expiry Date, their tenancy relationship
over the Disputed Premises had all along adopted a consistent
pattern of rental consideration containing both Cash Element and
Non-Cash Element. Even though the monthly cash payments for the
Disputed Premises were unchanged from 1 May 1997 to 30 April 2013,
there were significant increments from HK$2,100 to HK$2,600 for
the tenancy between 1 May 2013 and 30 April 2014 and further to
HK$3,600 for the tenancy between 1 May 2014 and 30 April 2015.
The facts remained to be both parties had adjusted and
significantly increased the monthly cash payments for the 24
months immediately preceding the Expiry Date.
b) Coupled with the fact that Pakatower’s non-cash benefit as
arranged and agreed between the two parties which would have been
varied from time to time, the fact that there had been no
increment in monthly cash payments from 1 May 1997 to 30 April
2013 was not valid basis to suggest that the Last IO Tenancy
Agreement did not represent the market rent upon the expiry of the
Expiry Date.
c) Pakatower’s contention that the parties had difficulties to
ascertain the market rental at the time of leasing due to the
unique nature of the utility rooms was mere speculation or bare
assertion without solid evidence in support.
NON-CASH BENEFITS
148. Pakatower’s complaint in §3(3) (b) of Ground 2 that this Tribunal
had erred in relying on the “Non-Cash Element” of the Last IO
Tenancy Agreement in §§72, 90-91 of the Review Decision is
unfounded due to the following reasons:-
a) §§72, 90-91 of the Review Decision were just some of the reasons
for rejecting Pakatower’s proposition that the rental of the
Last IO Tenancy Agreement was unreasonably low.
b) In §2(A)(3) (b) of the Review Decision, all items of payments
under Clause 3B of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement were defined as
the “Non-Cash Element”.
c) Clause 3B was set out in §27(b) and §216 of the Judgment as well
as §13(b) of the Review Decision.
d) §216 of the Judgment as repeated in §13 of the Review Decision
stated that Clause 3 of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement stipulated
that IO, for its use and occupation of the Disputed Premises and
the Unit 13 Staircase Space from 1 May 2014 to 30 April 2015,
had to make two sets of payments to and for Pakatower: -
1) Clause 3A provides that IO has to make a monthly payment of
HK$3,600 to Pakatower.
2) Clause 3B (“Clause 3B”) provides that IO (as 乙方) shall be
responsible for making management fees, rates, insurance
fees, repair fees and any other expenses in relation to the
rented premises during the term of tenancy for Pakatower as
“乙方負責有關「承租物業」在租約期內之管理費、差餉、保險、維修費
及其他任何費用。”.
e) The fact that Pakatower had enjoyed the benefits under Clause 3B
by IO having settled all those payments for it was confirmed by
Pakatower during trial and recited in §220 of the Judgment.
f) This Tribunal made a finding that Clause 3B was part and parcel
of the rental consideration, which should be adopted together
with the monthly cash payments to form the mesne profit was
elaborated in §221 and §291(6) of the Judgment.
g) No where in the Judgment nor the Review Decision has found
Clause 4B as part and parcel of the rental consideration
provided in the Last IO Tenancy Agreement (as opposed to
collateral agreement), or adopted it as an element to be part of
the mesne profit.
h) The findings and the rulings aforesaid were repeated and adopted
in §§2(A), 13, 27-28 of the Review Decision.
i) Clause 3B was an unequivocal contractual term which imposed
obligation on IO to settle all designated payments relating to
the Disputed Premises under it for Pakatower. It should be read
in light of Pakatower’s obligation to pay its share of
contribution to the management fees and other expenses “of the
Building” as an owner of the Disputed Premises under the DMC (§8
& 225 of the Judgment).
j) In light of the clear fact-findings and rulings in the Judgment
as repeated in the Review Decision as summarized above,
Pakatower’s present complaints under §3(3) (b)(i) of Ground 2
that this Tribunal had ‘relied instead on the non-cash benefits
of “being exempted from costs and expenses of the Building which
would have been varied year by year’ (Review Decision §72) and
the “significant” non-cash benefits being “all the fees costs
and expenses payable by Pakatower to IO: (Review Decision §90)
respectively. Such non-cash benefits do not fall under Clause
3B of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement, but Clause 4B which had
been held in the Original Decision §§263-265 to constitute a
collateral agreement (concerning the use of all of the
Applicant’s premises by the Respondent, and not just the Subject
Premises: Original Decision §27(c)) separate from the tenancy.
The Tribunal had conflated distinct contractual provisions and
mischaracterized the basis of the alleged “non-cash element”’
are baseless but taking the rulings out of context. Such
arguments are unhelpful but tend to complicate the matters.
149. For the reasons aforesaid, Pakatower’s complaints under §3(3)
(b)(ii) of Ground 2 that there was no evidence at trial on the
total monetary value or the variation of such expenses under
Clause 3B and that such expenses “would have been varied year by
year” or were “significant” in §§72, 90 of the Review Decision
were not open to the Tribunal are unjustified. Regards should
also be given to Pakatower’s own admission at trial that it was
duty-bound to pay its share of contribution to the management fees
and other payments and expenses “of the Building” according to its
shares of contribution allocated to the Disputed Premises under
Clause 46(4), 48(a) and the Third Schedule of the DMC (§8 & §225
of the Judgment), that the Building was a ninth-floor industrial
building and a roof unit with the Occupation Permit issued in 1982
(§8 & §225 of the Judgment), that there were resolutions of
occasional repair works of the Building at substantial costs
(§224(a) & (c)) of the Judgment, that commonsense dictates that
the costs and expenses incurred under Clause 46(4) of the DMC for
such an industrial building of such peculiar features could not be
minimal or unchanged from year to year.
150. In further consideration of the fact that the Non-Cash Element was
part of the rental consideration of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement
(not to mention that both parties had adopted such a contractual
term consistently and continuously in their previous tenancy
agreements throughout the years), that the Non-Cash Element was in
monetary value, significant but not minimal and varied according
to the reality under Clause 46(4) of the DMC from time to time,
and that Cheung had failed to take into account of the implication
and significance of the Non-Cash Element in his analysis,
Pakatower’s complaints are devoid of merit.
151. For reasons aforesaid, Pakatower’s argument under §3(3) (b)(iii)
of Ground 2 that it was internally inconsistent for the Tribunal
to rely on the alleged variability of the “Non-Cash Element” to
dismiss Cheung’s expert evidence, but assess mesne profits solely
by reference to the cash contract rent under Clause 3A without
quantifying the Non-Cash Element and without considering whether
the total of the Cash Element and the Non-Cash Element aligned
with the market variation during the period of wrongful occupation
is based on a misinterpretation of the nature and implication of
the Non-Cash Element and is pointless. I should not repeat my
reasons for rejection of Cheung’s opinion and for adoption of both
the Cash Element and the Non-Cash Element of the Last IO Tenancy
Agreement as the mesne profits as set out in my analysis in §§205-
221 of the Judgment and §§30-103 of the Review Decision.
152. Pakatower’s complaint under §3(4) of Ground 2 that this Tribunal
erred in failing to address the sole comparable concern identified
by the experts, in that none of the authorities relied upon by the
Tribunal concerns the assessment of market rent by reference to a
previous tenancy of the same premises between essentially the same
parties, with only time adjustment applied over a valuation period
exceeding 10 years and that the application of just a time
adjustment is misconceived. Properly interpreted, the legal
principle drawn from the authorities set out in §§65-69 of the
Review Decision was that while it is not common for valuation to
rely on one comparable for DCM, the Court has always been open and
ready to adopt one single comparable for DCM assessment so long as
the comparable is of good quality. The crux is the quality of the
comparable should be good. The proof of it does not depend on
whether there is a decided case of exactly the same set of facts.
It has been recognized that the single comparable which is highly
resemble to the subject matter for valuation takes on more
importance.
153. The time adjustment on the Cash Element according to the Rental
Indicies should not attract criticism bearing in mind that such
adjustment was expressly recognized and in fact adopted by Cheung.
DEDUCTION OF THE AGREED MESNE PROFITS
154. Pakatower’s complaint under §3(5) of Ground 2 that this Tribunal
erred in treating the Last IO Tenancy Agreement as a comparable
which “covered exactly the Subject Premises” with the same bundles
of facilities in §26 and 69 of the Review Decision but the Last IO
Tenancy Agreement in fact covered the Disputed Premises together
with Unit 13 Staircase Space is misleading and without giving due
regard to §§12, 13, 23, 27 and 70 of the Review Decision in that
the fact that the Last IO Tenancy Agreement covered the Disputed
Premises together with Unit 13 Staircase Space has been set out at
the outset and the analysis in §§26 and 69 of the Review Decision
were confined to specifically deal with the assessment of the
mesne profits of the Subject Premises as sought by Pakatower in
the Review Application.
155. Further, the analysis in §26 of the Review Decision, which focused
on the analysis of the Disputed Premises, was followed and
supplemented by §27 to deal with the impact of Unit 13 Staircase
Space under the Last IO Tenancy Agreement and the assessment of
the mesne profit by taking into account such factor. Thus viewed,
there is no room giving rise to such complaint.
156. Pakatower further complained that this Tribunal was arbitrary in
deducting HK$638 (being the agreed mesne profits for Unit 13
Staircase Space) from the Cash Element of HK$3,600 and treated the
remainder as the rental value of the Disputed Premises, without
analysis of the deduction in the context of the contractual rent
history. Such complaint is baseless for the deduction exercise
was conducted basing on the agreed fact of the two parties, which
was the best evidence before me.
157. Not only that Pakatower was bound by its own agreed facts, but
also that it was unable to challenge its own agreed fact by
referring to any concrete evidence to show what actual contractual
rent was attributable to Unit 13 Staircase Space in trial. Its
present complaint that this Tribunal has failed to regard to the
history of the contract rent where Unit 13 Staircase Space was
only leased at a monthly rent of HK$100 is a mere speculation
bearing in mind that such rent was valid up to 2008 only and no
meaningful reference can be drawn from such fact happened for
seven years ago, not to mention that there had been substantial
increment of the monthly cash payment from 1 May 2013 to 30 April
2015.
158. It is noteworthy that the deduction solely rested on the agreed
mesne profits for Unit 13 Staircase Space agreed by the parties
but not Cheung’s valuation of the staircase space as Pakatower
suggested. In any event, even if Pakatower argues that such
agreed mesne profits were derived from Cheung’s valuation, it was
an agreement that bound the parties and Cheung’s valuation basis
of such item was DCM (but not DRC), which was made individually
and separately from his mistaken valuation of Group 2 and Group 3
Premises. Thus considered, the deduction was made on valid basis.
159. Pakatower’s complaint under §3(6) of Ground 2 that this Tribunal
erred in concluding that the Last IO Tenancy Agreement was the
best comparable in §26 and §69 of the Review Decision, without due
consideration to the general principle that rents for long-
standing tenants may not be comparables and require further
analysis/ testing against market evidence and consideration of its
contractual context before being treated as determinative is
unsubstantiated with valid proof and without due consideration of
the reasoning giving in §§192-221 of the Judgment and §§63-103 of
the Review Decision.
160. Besides, Pakatower neglected the analysis that the rental
consideration for the Disputed Premises had been reviewed and
adjusted twice by the parties with significant increment in the
monthly cash payments in the two years immediately preceding the
Expiry Date. After all, Pakatower failed to refer to any reliable
“market evidence” or solid “contractual context” which were
available at trial that merited further analysis and testing.
161. Under §3(7) of Ground 2, Pakatower complains that this Tribunal
had, in §§77-81 of the Review Decision, misunderstood its
submission at the review stage as a “new[factual] allegation”
contradicting its pleaded case is unfounded. It now denies that it
had sought to argue that the Tribunal should have found that the
Last IO Tenancy Agreement did not cover Group 2 Premise and argues
that it only put forward the argument that “given that there was
dispute at trial over the scope of the Disputed Premises (which
form the subject of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement) (§§41(2), 83,
206(b) of the Original Decision; §§15(#16), 21(II)) of the Review
Decision), the reliability of the Last IO Tenancy as a comparable
for valuation purpose was in doubt, since a transaction cannot
serve as a reliable comparable where the scope of the premises
comprised in it is itself uncertain or request judicial
determination”.
162. Such argument is indeed, another attempt to change its position
and slip in new evidence and argument through the back door.
First, such argument is inconsistent with its submissions in the
Review Application. Second, it is also contrary to its pleaded
case, stated case and skeleton submissions in trial. Third, it
was debarred from changing its position under the guise of “there
was dispute at trial over the scope of the Disputed Premises made
by its expert report”.
163. In fact, there was no dispute at trial over the scope of the
Disputed Premises of the Last IO Tenancy Agreement between the two
parties. The scope had already been mutually agreed and reduced
into the “Agreed List of Issues” in writing and the trial was
proceeded on such basis as elaborated in §§6-13, 15-16, 18-20, 25,
27, 30-33 and 41-43 above. It was merely Cheung who had made an
unilateral mistake of excluding Group 2 Premises from the Last IO
Tenancy Agreement. Pakatower was prohibited from taking advantage
of the mistake made unilaterally by its own expert and on such
basis, not only to shifting the blame but also inflating and
misdirecting its own expert’s unilateral mistake to be a common
dispute, and further, seeks to slip in a new case and new claim
for getting the second bite of the cherry.
OTHER GROUNDS
164. In this application, this Tribunal has considered each and every
contention and argument put forward by Pakatower. The fact that I
have not dealt with each of them specifically in this Decision
should not be interpreted as giving no regard to them. Suffice it
to say that all of them are without merit and I should not further
burden this lengthy decision with further details on those
unmeritorious arguments. In all, the question of assessment of
mesne profits for the Disputed Premsies/ Subject Premises is fact-
sensitive and does not raise any question of general importance or
principle warranting the intervention of the Court of Appeal.
165. Looking at all the matters in the round, this Tribunal draws the
conclusion that neither of the grounds of the present application
advanced by Pakatower discloses any arguable error of law, still
less of having any reasonable prospect of success. All of its
arguments are without merit. There is no other reason in the
intersts of justice why leave to appeal should be granted. I
refuse to grant leave to appeal against the Dismissal Order and
the Review Costs Order and the present Summons should be dismissed
accordingly.
DISPOSITION
166. Having considered all the submissions of both parties and all the
relevant evidence and documents before me, I order that
Pakatower’s Summons for leave to appeal be dismissed.
COSTS
167. Taking into account the outcome of this application and all the
relevant circumstances, there is no reason why costs should not
follow the event in this application.
168. I make a Costs Order Nisi that: -
1) Pakatower do pay the costs of the pressent application to
IO, with certificate for counsel, to be summarily assessed
on a party and party basis, on the District Court Scale.
2) For summary assessment of costs, IO shall lodge and serve
its statements of costs within 14 days from the date hereof.
Pakatower shall lodge and serve its statements of objection
within 7 days thereafter. The summary assessment of costs
shall be conducted on papers thereafter no matter whether
Pakatower has lodged any statement of objection. The
assessed costs shall be paid by Pakatower within 7 days
after the summary assessment.
3) This Costs Order Nisi shall become absolute in the absence
of application to vary by filing of Form 1 within 14 days
from the date hereof.
|(Michelle Lam) |
|Presiding Officer |
|Lands Tribunal |
Mr Jeremy Kwong, instructed by Holman Fenwick Willan, for the Applicant
Mr Billy Poon, instructed by K.M. Tang & Co, for the Respondent
-----------------------
[1] [2026] HKLdT 6
[2] Cheung’s report was finalized after the joint statement compiled by
both experts dated 17 October 2022.
[3] [2025] HKLdT 7
[4] as defined in §15(a) of the Judgment and adopted in §1 of the Review
Decision. That is, “the spaces underneath all staircases (other than the
staircase situate beside Unit 13 as shown on the Ground Floor Plan annexed
to the said Deed of Mutual Covenant), the spaces above the entrance halls
on the Ground Floor, the Transformer Room, the Switch Room, the Meter
Rooms, the Main Distribution Frame Room, the Fire Prevention Room and other
utility room or accommodation (if any) on the Ground Floor, the Switch
Rooms, Meter Rooms and other utility rooms or accommodation (if any) on the
1st Floor to 8th Floor.”
[5] a Chinese agreement dated 24 April 2014 signed between the two parties
on 24 April 2014 in that Pakatower leased the Disputed Premises and the
Unit 13 Staircase Space to IO for one year, from 1 May 2014 to 30 April
2015: §27 of the Judgment.
[6] §§7.2.3-7.2.6, 8-9 of Cheung’s Report
[7] being the Last IO Tenancy Agreement
[8] being the Disputed Premises
[9] an abbreviation of the “rental indices of the Private Flatted Factories
– Rental and Price Indices” published by the Rating and Valuation
Department: §2(A)(3)(a) of the Review Decision.
[10] as defined in §3(1) of the Review Decision to be “all premises of the
Disputed Premises save and except the Two Staircase Spaces, that is, to
cover all of the Group 2 Premises and the Group 3 Premises”. The Two
Staircase Spaces being Unit 6 Staircase Space and Unit 10 Staircase Space.
[11] The Two Staircase Spaces were the only premises that IO had reiterated
its agreement that Pakatower was entitled to exclusive possession of them
at trial.
[12] same as the “Disputed Premises” as defined in §15(a) of the Judgment
which was also adopted in the Review Decision.
[13] being the Last IO Tenancy Agreement
[14] being the Disputed Premises
[15] whereas some of them housing electricity, telephone and internet
service by service providers engaged by IO and/or individual owners.
[16] [PP-16-E] September 1995 revised January 2007
[17] by Philip James Roberts Hong Kong University Press 3ed. 1981
[18] Gordon N. Cruden & Liza Jane Cruden, 4th Ed. 2017 at [23.98-23.100]
[19]
)8<=EGHIJg?¼½ËññññÞÍÞ½©ñ’€€dE3#hÜ |ChÜ |C5?CJPJaJnHtH=hÜ |ChÜ
|C5?B*CJ^JaJehmH phÿrÊÿsH 6hÜ |ChÜ |CB*CJPJ^JaJehOn 2 June 2025,
Pakatower’s skeleton submissions: a total of 96 paragraphs with other sub-
paragraphs and 19 legal authorities and valuation authorities.
On 7 July 2025 directions were issued to the parties to address 3
authorities, if found fit, which were identified by the Tribunal during
the hearing.
On 14 July 2025 directions were issued to the parties to address 4
additional authorities, if found fit.
On 4 August 2025, Pakatower submitted supplemental written submission: a
total of 68 paragraphs with other sub-paragprabs and 22 legal authorities
and valuation authorties, making up a total of 41 authorities.
[20] in the morning session of 23 January 2024
[21] p. 106 lines 1-20
[22] page 9 of the Joint Statement and section 6.3 of Ng‘s report dated 14
November 2022
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