NGUYEN VAN DUONG v. THE DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 2464/2025

[2026] HKCFI 1379

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2464 OF 2025

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D E C I S I O N

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A. Introduction

1.  By my Decision dated 18 November 2025 [2025] HKCFI 5594 (“Decision”), I dismissed the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review.

2.  The Applicant’s application related to the Director of Immigration (“Director”)’s Decision dated 17 September 2025 informing the Applicant that, after careful consideration of the Applicant’s letter dated 2 September 2025, the proposal (of asking the Director to withdraw and cancel the prosecution against him) as set out in that letter could not be acceded to, and the ongoing prosecution and charge against the Applicant would be maintained and proceeded with.

3.  I refused the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review on the basis that the application has no merit, essentially because:

(1)     there was no proper identification of any specific or proper grounds of review, in the identification of any alleged public law wrong;

(2)     the subject of the intended challenge is directed at a prosecutorial decision, which are not susceptible to judicial review on conventional administrative law grounds, and it was made without putting forward any ground of review, let alone any ground of unconstitutionality of the prosecutorial decision.

4.  Pursuant to Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, the Applicant had 14 days to appeal from my Decision to the Court of Appeal, had he wished to do so.  That period expired on 2 December 2025.

5.  By Summons dated 3 March 2026 (“Summons”), the Applicant has sought an extension of time to appeal from my Decision.

6.  Having considered the materials, it seems to me that this application can appropriately be dealt with on paper.  This is my Decision.

B.     Analysis

7.  The application for extension of time to appeal has no merit.

8.  The Applicant’s affirmation filed in support of the Summons, also dated 3 March 2026 merely states (in the original English) that:

I did not receive any letter from the High Court, so I did not know my appeal had been refused.  As a result, I missed the appeal deadline.  Furthermore, I do not speak English or Chinese, so I had to seek help from my friends to help him submit his appeal to the High Court.

9.  It is trite that it is entirely in the discretion of the Court to grant or refuse an extension of time, and that the factors normally taken into account in deciding whether or not to grant an extension of time include: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the merits of the proposed appeal; and (4) the degree prejudice to the potential respondent if the application is granted.  Of course, the Court will also consider all the circumstances and decide whether the overall justice of the case requires the exercise of the discretion to extend time.

10.  First, in this case, the delay before the Summons was issued was a period of approximately three months, which is a substantial delay compared with the original 14-day period permitted under the rules for lodging an appeal.

11.  Secondly, the Applicant’s reasons for the delay are far from compelling.  According to the records in the Court files, the Decision had been duly handed down and a copy was sent to the Applicant by post with no record of returned mail as at the date of this decision.  There is no basis for the Applicant to suggest that he did not know that his application for leave to apply for judicial review had been refused.  As to the alleged issue of neither speaking English nor Chinese, I am aware that the Form 86, the Summons, and the supporting affirmations and materials filed by the Applicants were all prepared and filed in English, which shows that there is no language barrier or disadvantage as allegedly caused to the Applicant.

12.  Thirdly, as canvassed in my Decision, there was no merit in the application for leave to apply for judicial review.  The Applicant did not identify any public law grounds of review.  Now the Applicant has not identified any intended grounds of appeal.  It is trite that an appeal is not simply the opportunity of the Applicant to re-run the same arguments again, without demonstrating where the first instance decision went wrong.

13.  Hence, there is no point in granting an extension of time for lodging a proposed appeal with no merit.

14.  In the above circumstances, it would not be necessary for me to consider any potential prejudice caused to the respondent to any appeal.

C.     Result

15.  In short, I see no proper basis upon which I would exercise my discretion to give an extension of time for the Applicant to appeal from the Decision.

16.  In the circumstances, and for the reasons identified above, the application is dismissed.

17.  I make no order as to costs.