RE SANDHU VINNY

CAMP 501/2022, [2026] HKCA 715

On appeal from [2022] HKCFI 2327

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 501 OF 2022

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 673/2019)

________________________

________________________

________________________

J U D G M E N T

________________________

Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 15 November 2023, this court (Chu VP and Barma JA)  handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ KW Lung dated 13 October 2022 refusing to extend time for the applicant to appeal against his decision dated 8 August 2022 by which he refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office refusing the applicant’s application for late filing of a notice of appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim based on the BOR 2 risk ground.

2.  The facts and issues in the applicant’s application, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1]  We will not repeat them here.

3.  The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion filed out of time on 20 January 2025, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  In the Notice of Motion, the applicant contended inter alia that this court erred in failing to apply the “principle of procedural fairness” and “the principle of irrationality”, and that there was “some error in law in [his] decision”.  

4.  In his written submissions lodged on 4 February 2025, the applicant referred to the well-established principles in Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289, R v Home Secretary, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 and R v Home Secretary, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514. 

5.  Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed.

6.  The applicant has proffered no explanation for the inordinate delay in filing his Notice of Motion.  The delay of over 1 year is substantial, and thus the Notice of Motion is liable to be dismissed on this basis alone.  We have however nonetheless proceeded to consider the merits of the application.

7.  The matters stated by the applicant do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised.

8.  The Notice of Motion failed to provide any particulars in the supposed errors in our judgment and it raises no ground that is reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.  

9.  Further, there was no attempt by the applicant to elaborate on whether and, if so, how the trite principles referred to in his written submissions had not been applied in the consideration of his claim and appeal.   

10.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).  

11.  For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 20 January 2025 is dismissed.