Case Details
For Applicant(s):
Mr Chiu; Ms Nicole CHUI, instructed by H. Y. Leung & Co. LLP
For Respondent(s):
am of the view that granting the injunction seeks by the Plaintiff carries the lowest risk of injustice. Balance of convenience tips in favour of ordering the Defendant to do what it was supposed to do for a very long time. As I set out about, Mr Tam; Mr Jeffrey TAM, instructed by TITUS
Listing:
QIAN YUANYING v. SHUANGYING SECURITIES LTD (formerly known as BERKSHIRE CAPITALS LTD)
QIAN YUANYING v. SHUANGYING SECURITIES LTD (formerly known as BERKSHIRE CAPITALS LTD)
[2026] HKCFI 6266 · HCA 405/2026
Court of First Instance
HCA 405/2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 405 OF 2026 ____________ BETWEEN ____________ Before: Mr Recorder William Wong, SC in Chambers Date of Hearing: 3 September 2026 Date of Reasons for Decision: 13 November 2026 ____________ REASONS FOR DECISION ____________ INTRODUCTION By the Plaintiff’s Summons dated 10 March 2026 (the “Summons”), she applies for an interlocutory injunction against Berkshire Capitals Limited to direct it to take steps to arrange for the Secured Shares (as defined below) to be registered in the names of YY Holdings and Praise Fortune (as applicable) in the terms of the Summons (the “Injunction”). At the hearing on 3 September 2026, I made an order in terms of the Summons and gave brief reasons for my decision due to the urgency of the matter. Now I give my detailed reasons. I also made an order in terms of the Plaintiff’s Summons dated 28 August 2026 for leave to file the 4th affirmation of Qian Yuanying dated 28 August 2026 (“Qian 4th”). Qian 4th was filed to correct an exhibit filed in Qian 1st. As there is no opposition from the Defendant, I made an order in terms of the same. MATERIAL FACTS YY Holdings Limited (“YY Holdings”) and Praise Fortune Limited (“Praise Fortune”) are the beneficial owners of 707,179,200 and 3,000,000 shares respectively in China Rare Earth Holdings Limited (中國稀土控股有限公司) (“ListCo” and, together, the “Secured Shares”). The Plaintiff, through YY Holdings and Praise Fortune, controls these Secured Shares. On 16 June 2024, the Plaintiff as a borrower with her husband (“Jiang Senior”), entered into (i) a loan agreement (the “Commercial Agreement”) with lenders to borrow a loan of RMB250M; and (ii) a tripartite share custodian agreement with the lenders and the Defendant (as custodian) to deposit the ListCo Shares as collateral for the loan (the “Share Custodian Agreement”). As the ListCo Shares were previously deposited in CCASS, they were registered in the name of HKSCC Nominees Limited (“HKSCC Nominees”). There is no dispute that upon the Defendant’s receipt of the ListCo Shares pursuant to the Share Custodian Agreement, the Defendant failed to register the ListCo Shares in the name of YY Holdings and Praise Fortune, leaving the latter unable to exercise its shareholding rights. Clause 2.1 the Share Custodian Agreement expressly provides that all rights in and associated with the ListCo Shares remain with the borrowers (i.e. through YY Holdings and Praise Fortune) unless and until they are in breach of the Commercial Agreement. The Plaintiff’s case is that it is necessary or obvious that the Share Custodian Agreement contains an implied term that upon the Defendant’s receipt of the shares certificates evidencing the ListCo shares deposited with the Defendant by Entrusting Party A (i.e. the borrowers in the Commercial Agreement) and such shares are registered in the name of a person who does not/cannot act in accordance with the instructions of YY Holdings or Praise Fortune, the Defendant shall, as soon as reasonably practicable, take all necessary steps within its power, to procure the registration of the shares in the names of their beneficial owners (i.e. YY Holdings or Praise Fortune as applicable). Mr Chiu for the Plaintiff submits that the Plaintiff has a high degree of assurance as to the merits of her case. Even if she does not, the Injunction should nevertheless be granted because the balance of convenience tilts so much in her favour or because the Injunction is not expensive to comply with, reversible and does not pre-empt a trial. It is also the Plaintiff’s submission that the Defendant’s failure to effect the registration has deprived them or Entrusting Party A of the ability to exercise rights attached to the Secured Shares, including the crucial right to vote. The Defendant’s pleaded case is that after it obtained the share certificates of the Secured Shares, it had contacted the Plaintiff and Jiang Senior (Entrusting Party A under the Share Custodian Agreement) on 4 July 2024 to bring the company chop and requisite authorisation letter to effect the registration. It appears to this Court that steps have already been taken to dilute the Secured Shares (from over 30% to 26.1% in ListCo). Ms Chiu for the Plaintiff submitted that further steps may be taken to continue the dilution and to cause the Plaintiff irreparable damage. Ms Chiu also submitted that damages would not be adequate and the Plaintiff will suffer grave injustice if the Injunction is not granted because: The Plaintiff (through YY Holdings and Praise Fortune) is deprived of her right to vote, receive dividends, and enjoy other economic benefits expressly reserved to Entrusting Party A under the Share Custodian Agreement; The Plaintiff’s indirect controlling stake in ListCo is being diluted by a hostile faction and she faces the imminent and irreversible loss of her negative control (i.e. dropping below 25% required to veto special resolutions); It is practically impossible for a court to retrospectively unwind the corporate actions of a publicly listed company (such as the issuance of new shares to third parties or the election of hostile directors) via a damages award at trial; The Secured Shares constitute a large, highly illiquid block that is unique and cannot be replaced or repurchased on the open market. Further, ListCo has been suspended from trading since 18 June 2025. The Defendant is an SFC regulated entity, and since 5 January 2011, held type 1 and type 2 licence for dealing in securities and dealings in futures contract; and an Exchange Participant and a direct clearing participant of HKSCC. On 16 June 2024, Jiang Senior and the Plaintiff (as borrower) entered into a loan agreement with Mr Zhang Qinghua (“Zhang”) and Mr Yang You (“Yang”) (as lenders) to borrow a loan of RMB250M at an interest of 10% p.a. (the “Loan”) for a term of 12 months and a repayment date on or before 30 June 2025, the Commercial Agreement. As security for the Loan, Jiang Senior and the Plaintiff (as Entrusting Party A) entered into a share custodian agreement with Zhang and Yang (as Entrusting Party B) and D (as Custodian) in respect of 725,179,200 shares in ListCo held indirectly through YY Holdings and Praise Fortune, the Share Custodian Agreement. Clause 2 of the Commercial Agreement, entitled “Handling Breach of Contract” (“違約處理”) refers to 3 scenarios: Prior to the Repayment Date: if the Borrowers confirm prior to the Repayment Date that they are unable to repay the Outstanding Amount, to avoid further accrual of interest, the Borrowers can unilaterally notify and authorise the Custodian to set off the Collateral against the Outstanding Amount and the Lenders will not pursue the Borrowers for the Outstanding Amount. After the Repayment Date: if the Borrowers default or are in breach of the Commercial Agreement because they are unable to repay the Outstanding Amount at the Repayment Date, the Borrowers’ Collateral will be offset against the unpaid Outstanding Amount and the Lenders will not pursue the Borrowers for the Outstanding Amount. The rights of the Lenders: the Lenders can exercise rights to the Collateral in accordance with the terms of the Share Custodian Agreement signed by both parties and Defendant on the same day. Importantly, Clause 2.1 of the Share Custodian Agreement states that, prior to 30 June 2025, all rights associated with (“所有權”) the Secured Shares shall remain solely with Entrusting Party A. The Secured Shares shall only be disposed of if Entrusting Party A breaches the Commercial Agreement, whereupon the voting rights, dividend rights, and related economic interests arising from the Designated Shares shall be enjoyed and assumed by Entrusting Party B (“指定股份的所有權,在2025年6月【30】日前,只由委託方A 擁有。只有在委託方A違約未履行《商業協議》中的條款前提下才會執行處置指定股份,因指定股份而產生的投票權、分紅權及相關經濟權益才可以由委託方 B 享有並承擔。”). Clause 3.1 states that the collateral is provided by Entrusting Party A to enhance Entrusting Party B’s confidence in extending the loan under the Commercial Agreement. Prior to Entrusting Party A fulfilling its contractual responsibilities under the Commercial Agreement, and absent the consent of Entrusting Party B, the Custodian and Entrusting Party A have no right to pledge or entrust the Collateral to any third party (other than Entrusting Party B), nor may they dispose of the Collateral by any other means, including by way of investment or exchange (“ 指定股份乃是委託方 A 為提高委託方 B 對本次資金支持的信心交予委託方 B 的被動擔保物,在委託方A 未依照《商業協議》履行合約責任之前,未經委託方B 同意,受託方及委託方A 無權將指定股份質押或託管予委託方 B 以外的其他單位及個人,或以投資、置換等任何其他方式處置指定股份。”). Clause 3.2 provides that during the term of the agreement, without receiving the unanimous agreement of the Entrusting Parties, the Custodian is prohibited from dealing with the Collateral (including any sale). If Entrusting Party A breaches the Commercial Agreement, Entrusting Party B can unilaterally instruct the Custodian to deal with the Collateral and the Entrusting Party A irrevocably agrees to such arrangement (“在協議期限內,受託方在未收到委託方一致指示時,指定股份禁止做包括買賣在內的任何動作;若委託方A違約,委託方 B 可單方面指示受託方處置指定股份,委託方A 不可撤銷地同意此安排。”). Following the execution of the Commercial Agreement and Share Custodian Agreement, on 21 June 2024, Jiang Senior and the Plaintiff procured the transfer of 3,000,000 ListCo Shares beneficially owned by Praise Fortune (“Praise Fortune Shares”) to the Defendant. On 26 and 27 June 2024, YY Holdings authorized the Defendant withdraw the 707,179,200 ListCo Shares beneficially owned by YY Holdings (the “YY Holdings Shares”). On 27 and 28 June 2024, the Defendant withdrew the YY Holdings Shares. The share certificate numbers of the YY Holdings Shares (which are referred to in Summons §1) are reflected in the 2 stock withdrawal receipts dated 27 and 28 June 2024 listing the Defendant and YY Holdings’ name. It is to be noted that the stock withdrawal receipts were also stamped with a note reminding the beneficial owner to promptly cause the securities withdrawn from CCASS to be registered in its own name. On 4 July 2024, the Defendant sent an email to Jiang Senior and P stating that the paper share certificates had been withdrawn and asking them to bring the company chop to collect the share certificates (“D’s 4 July 2024 Email”). However, neither the Plaintiff nor Jiang Senior saw this email. Pursuant to the Commercial Agreement, Zhang and Yang provided a principal sum of HKD16,926,667 to Get Nice Securities and the Defendant (i.e. as the Plaintiff’s designated bank accounts). However, on 9 October 2024, Yang informed the Plaintiff by way of WeChat that Zhang had withdrawn from the investment and that he did not have the ability to continued investing. If new funding could not be confirmed soon, to recover the initial funds already invested. Zhang wished to realise the secured collateral. The Plaintiff therefore exercised her right to early repayment pursuant to Clause 1 of the Commercial Agreement. The Plaintiff’s solicitors informed Zhang, Yang and the Defendant that the borrowers of the Commercial Agreement were exercising the right to make early repayment of the outstanding sum and required the release of the YY Holdings Shares and Praise Fortune Shares (together the “ListCo Shares”) upon repayment. However, Zhang and Yang refused to accept the Plaintiff’s proposal or return the ListCo Shares. The amount outstanding under the loan was disputed between the parties (Zhang and Yang claimed it was around RMB107 million and the Plaintiff claimed that it was around HKD15.88M). On 24 January 2025, the Plaintiff commenced HCA 158/2025 against Zhang, Yang, the Defendant and Jiang Senior seeking a declaration that the amount owed was HKD16,926,667, an order that upon payment of the owed amount, the Defendants do all acts necessary to return the ListCo Shares to YY Holdings and Praise Fortune. At the time when the 710,179,200 Secured Shares were transferred to the Defendant’s physical custody in late June 2024, they constituted around 30.3% of ListCo. Presently, it is the Plaintiff’s case and grave concern that Zhang and Yang (the lenders under the Commercial Agreement), Mr Yu Jiang (“Yu”), Ms Ong Shing Lan (“Ong”) and the Defendant have been conspiring together to seize control of ListCo and dilute the controlling stake beneficially owned by YY Holdings and Praise Fortune. First, the Double Bay Subscription by Yu which diluted the Plaintiff’s indirect shareholding in ListCo (through the 710,179,200 ListCo Shares and other shares held by Praise Fortune) (the “Controlling Stake”) from 31.1% to 30.5%:- On 16 April 2025, the ListCo announced the subscription would be made by Double Bay Capital Limited (“Double Bay”) for around 2.1% of ListCo’s shares (the “Double Bay Subscription”) at a significant discount to its closing price. On 17 April 2025, the HKEX raised concerns that ListCo’s announcement, (contrary to HKEx’s newsletter) failed to disclose the ultimate beneficial owner of Double Bay, the limited background disclosed about Double Bay and questioned the need for funding at a discount to the benchmarked price given ListCo had substantial cash reserves. On 30 April 2025, ListCo announced that the ultimate beneficial owner of Double Bay is Yu, who was described to have met Jiang Senior in around November 2024. On 8 May 2025, the ListCo announced completion of the Double Bay Subscription, which took place on 8 May 2025, and the dilution of the Controlling Stake from 31.1% to 30.5%. P has since learned from Jiang Senior that Jiang Senior and Yu had been acquainted since at least 7 August 2023 (not November 2024 as claimed in ListCo’s announcement of 30 April 2025) when Yu acted as the financial advisor to Jiang Senior, Zhang and Yang and gained in-depth knowledge about ListCo’s financial status. Secondly, the acquisition of tungsten bars from Multiple View (the “Tungsten Acquisition”) which further diluted the Controlling Stake from 30.5% to 26.1%: On 28 May 2025, ListCo announced that its wholly-owned subsidiary Wealthy Energy had entered into an agreement with Multiple View (whose sole shareholder and director is Ong) to acquire 1,600 kg of tungsten bars for HK$150M to be satisfied by the allotment and issuance of 400M shares in ListCo at the discounted issue price of HK$0.375 per share. On 11 June 2025, ListCo further announced that ListCo became acquainted with Ong through the introduction of Double Bay and Yu and mutual business connections. On 16 June 2025, ListCo announced that the condition precedents under the Tungsten Acquisition Agreement were completed and 400M shares in ListCo, representing c. 14.3% of ListCo as enlarged, have been allotted to Ong as consideration and that the Controlling Stake was further diluted from 30.5% to 26.1%. In around June 2025, Jiang Senior provided the Plaintiff with the June 2025 HKEx Complaint in which Jiang Senior and Mr Jiang Da Wei (a director of ListCo) highlighted significant irregularities and a lack of due diligence regarding the Tungsten Acquisition. These included a valuation report prepared based on representations made by ListCo’s management who was not authorised by the board, a lack of physical inspection of the tungsten bars, reliance on a test report dated 8 years prior and addressed to a third party. On 8 December 2025, ListCo issued an announcement claiming that Jiang Senior and Mr Jiang Dawei’s complaints had no substance as an independent forensic investigator had conducted a review. However, the Plaintiff maintains serious reservations about the Tungsten Acquisition given the investigation report was not disclosed. Thirdly, on the 20 June 2025 AGM of ListCo: Jiang Senior’s concerns that the 400M ListCo shares purportedly issued to Ong were invalid and the voting rights attached thereto could not be exercised, were ignored and Ong’s votes were counted in the results; YY Holdings and Praise Fortune were unable to exercise their voting rights attached to the Controlling Stake since the Defendant had not re-registered the ListCo Shares in their respective names, leaving HKSCC Nominees entered in the ListCo’s register of members as the holder of the shares. The resolution to re-elect the Plaintiff’s preferred directors, Ms Huang Liu and Mr Huang Chunhua was defeated; The resolution to give directors a general mandate to allot, issue and deal with unissued shares not exceeding 20% of ListCo’s issued shares was passed; The resolution to give directors a general mandate to repurchase ListCo shares not exceeding 10% of ListCo’s issued shares was passed; The resolution to extend the general mandate granted to the directors to allot, issue and deal with the additional shares of an amount not exceeding the amount of shares repurchased by ListCo was passed. On 29 June 2025, YY Holdings attempted to requisition an EGM to consider the passing of resolutions including the appointment of various individuals as director (e.g. Ms Huang Liu and Mr Huang Chunhua), the removal of various individuals as directors and the establishment of an independent investigation committee to investigate the Tungsten Acquisition. However, no response was received. On 11 July 2025, the Plaintiff visited the Defendant’s Office to ascertain the circumstances of her indirect shareholding in ListCo. The Defendant’s Responsible Officer, Mr Liu, informed the Plaintiff that the Zhang and Yang had previously asked the Defendant to transfer the ListCo Shares to them, but he decided not to proceed and to maintain custody of the shares until a Court order was made, and that the registered shareholder on the relevant share certificates is HKSCC Nominees. It is the Plaintiff’s case that she has recently obtained evidence showing that the Defendant is likely not a passive independent custodian but has been acting with or taking part in the scheme of Ong, Zhang, Yang, and Yu to a goal to seize control of ListCo and dilute the Plaintiff’s indirect controlling shareholding in ListCo. I do not find it necessary to resolve this issue at this stage. It suffices for this Court to note that because of the Defendant’s inaction, in particular, its failure to register the ListCo Shares in the names of YY Holdings and Praise Fortune, the Secured Shares are in a state of limbo in which no voting rights could be exercised. The Defendant contests the existence of the pleaded implied term. It also runs the defence that the Plaintiff is barred from seeking equitable relief because she has not come to equity with clean hands. It is said that the Plaintiff knew Jiang Senior, Zhang and Yang had advanced competing claims in respect of the Secured Shares in HCA 158/2025 but still proceeded with this Action against the Defendant alone (the “Clean Hands Defence”). The Defendant further submitted that even if the implied term exists, the Plaintiff cannot have breached the same as the Defendant had, on 4 July 2024, requested the Plaintiff and Jiang Senior collect the share certificates. The Plaintiff did not request re-registration prior to 9 March 2026. As such, the Plaintiff has, by words, conduct, silence or delay, waived her right to insist on re-registration of the Secured Shares and/or the Plaintiff is estopped from alleging the Defendant is in breach (the “Waiver Defence”). Finally, it is also submitted that the Plaintiff’s claim for equitable relief is barred by laches and/or acquiescence (the “Laches or acquiescence Defence”). ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION The applicable legal principles on the grant of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are set out in Music Advance Ltd v Incorporated Owners of Argyle Centre Phase I [2010] 2 HKLRD 1041 at §12 per Ma J (as he then was). I have perused and studied the parties’ detailed written submissions and considered both parties’ oral submissions. I am of the firm view that the Plaintiff has a very strong case on merits. I cannot see any reason why the Defendant can withhold the registration when pursuant to Clause 2.1 of the Share Custodian Agreement, prior to 30 June 2025, all rights associated with (“所有權”) the Secured Shares shall remain solely with Entrusting Party A. I agree with Ms Chiu for the Plaintiff that upon a proper construction of Clause 2.1 of the Share Custodian Agreement, the right to exercise all voting rights and enjoy all economic benefits (including dividends) associated with the ListCo Shares during the period of the Defendant’s custody remains squarely with Entrusting Party A (i.e. the Plaintiff and Jiang Senior through YY Holdings and Praise Fortune). Secondly, Ms Chiu for the Plaintiff also helpfully referred this Court to the HKEx Operating Guide for Investor Participants explicitly states that beneficial owners should “promptly re-register the withdrawn share certificates in their own names before the next book-close date”. The Stock Withdrawal Receipts provided to the Defendant upon their withdrawal of the YY Holdings Share says the same. I agree that without such registration of shares withdrawn from CCASS, the beneficial owner is left in a state of administrative limbo, unable to exercise voting rights or directly receive dividends, as the share certificates and the company’s register of members will continue to reflect HKSCC Nominees as the legal or registered owner. The Defendant is a SFC regulated entity with type 1 and type 2 licence for dealing in securities and futures contracts. It is also a Direct Clearing Participant of HKSCC with an HKSCC or CCASS account (e.g. see the Stock Withdrawal Receipts for the YY Holdings Shares). I am of the view that it is only right that the Defendant should comply with its own legal duties to register the Secured Shares in the name of the beneficial owner. Thus, I am of the view that there is a very strong case that the Plaintiff’s case on the pleaded implied term is going to prevail at the end of the trial. I do not seek to repeat the comprehensive arguments set out in Ms Chiu’s very helpful submissions save to say that I agree with her analysis. Mr Tam relies heavily on clause 3.2 of Share Custodian Agreement, and specifically on the sentence - "在協議期限內,受託方在未收到委託方一致指示時,指定股份禁止做包括買賣在內的任何動作." Mr Tam submits that, properly construed, it means that within the terms of the Share Custodian Agreement, unless the custodian, i.e. the Defendant, receives a joint instruction from Entrusting Party A and Party B, no acts can be done to the shares, including buying and selling. I disagree. First, Clause 3.2 of the Share Custodian Agreement deals with disposal of shares and, therefore, it says including buying and selling. That does not mean that the registration of the shares according to the usual custom and practice of the stock exchange is thus restricted. Secondly, it would also defeat the proprietary right of the Plaintiff under Clause 2.1. I am of the view that if the parties really intend that Entrusting Party A's property right under Clause 2.1 should be restricted by way of a veto right granted to Entrusting Party B, they could have set that out clearly. That has not been done, and Entrusting Party A's property rights are clearly preserved. Clause 3.2 only shows that in relation to a disposal of shares, it should receive joint instructions from Entrusting Party A and Party B. That makes commercial sense because, for the selling and disposal of shares, it would affect the rights of Entrusting Party B before the performance of the commercial agreement. However, that does not defeat the proprietary right of Entrusting Party A under Clause 2.1. Thirdly, as far as the issue that the Share Custodian Agreement governs the period before 30 June 2025, I agree with Ms Chui that this date has to be construed together with the Commercial Agreement which stipulated that the repayment date is 30 June 2025 or before. Therefore, it was anticipated that after 30 June 2025, the Share Custodian Agreement would no longer be in existence. However, factually, the Share Custodian Agreement has not been terminated because the Defendant is still holding on to the shares qua custodian. If the agreement had indeed, as Mr Tam submitted to this court, already expired pursuant to Clause 4.1, then there is all the more reason why the voting rights should be revested into the Plaintiff. Therefore, I am of the view that, as a matter of construction, Clause 2.1 does give the Plaintiff the right to have the shares duly registered so the attached voting rights can be properly exercised. That exercise of voting power would not prejudice the rights of Entrusting Party B because the security to the shares is still preserved intact. Further, I also note that Entrusting Party B has not commenced any action to sue on any breach of the Share Custodian Agreement, albeit that it is a party to it. Hence, the exercise of Entrusting Party A's right should not be further delayed. I should also mention that I fully take on board Mr Tam's submission that the decision of this court at this stage would effectively dispose of the entire action and, therefore, the court should adopt a higher threshold. I bear that in mind, but even applying the higher threshold, I am of the view that, as a matter of construction, this case is more or less open and shut. I am of the view that the Plaintiff's right under Clause 2.1 is not subject to the qualification under Clause 3.2 or, in any event, affected by the flux of time such that after 30 June 2025, the Plaintiff does not have any rights at all to exercise their votes in a properly convened meeting of the listed company. Thirdly, I do not consider any of the Defendant’s defences negate the Plaintiff’s strong prime facie case. First, in respect of the Clean Hand’s Defence, the Defendant’s case is basically that the Plaintiff knew of Jiang Senior, Zhang and Yang’s competing claims and assertions in respect of the Secured Shares in HCA 158/2025; (ii) the Plaintiff knew that the Defendant was an independent share custodian under the Share Custodian Agreement, and yet despite this knowledge, the Plaintiff commenced this action against the Defendant alone and has “sought impermissibly to circumvent the rights and positions of the other defendants in [HCA 158/2025]”. I am of the view that it is perfectly proper for the Plaintiff to commence the present action to direct the Defendant to comply with its legal obligations. The Defendant does not seek to strike out the Plaintiff’s case in the present case. The other parties are aware of the present proceedings. If they like, they are at liberty to seek to intervene or to be joined in the present proceedings but they chose not to. I also note that the relief sought in HCA 158/2025 is (i) a declaration regarding the amount owed under the Commercial Agreement; and (ii) an order for specific performance for the return of the ListCo Shares themselves. This is entirely different to that sought in the present action which is (i) merely the re-registration of the ListCo Shares in the names of YY Holdings and Praise Fortune, without which Entrusting Party A is deprived from its rights pursuant to the Share Custodian Agreement; (ii) while the share certificates continue to remain in the Defendant’s physical custody. I agree with Ms Chiu for the Plaintiff that the reregistered share certificates would remain in the Defendant’s physical custody, and no one’s rights have yet been adjudicated upon in HCA 158/2025, there is no “impermissible circumventing” of anyone’s rights. If the Defendant truly thought that the relief sought in this action is identical or substantially similar to that in HCA 158/2025, it has at all times been open to the Defendant to apply for consolidation of the 2 actions, apply for the 2 actions to be heard together or one after the other. The Defendant has so far not done so. There is no abuse on the part of the Plaintiff. Secondly, I am of the view that the Waiver Defence cannot even get off the ground. The Defendant’s reliance on silence and inaction on the Plaintiff’s part to demand against the Defendant, a re-registration of the Secured Shares in the names of YY Holdings and Praise Fortune, including in HCA 158/2025, in my view, is misplaced. Factually, I accept that the Plaintiff did not see the Defendant’s email dated 4 July 2024, was informed by Liu of the Defendant on 11 July 2025 that the Secured Shares remained registered in HKSCC’s Nominee’s name and did not understand until January 2026 that this was why YY Holdings and Praise Fortune were unable to exercise their right to vote. Therefore, prior to January 2026, the Plaintiff was not aware of her legal right to enforce the Implied Term. Even if I am wrong on the above factual assessment, there is no clear and unequivocal representation by the Plaintiff that it would not enforce her right to have the Secured Shares registered under its beneficial owners. Silence and inaction are of their nature equivocal as there can be more than one reason why the person was silent and inactive: Allied Marine Transport Ltd v Vale Do Rio Doce Navegacao SA [1985] 1 WLR 925at 937D-E and 941A-C per Robert Goff LJ (as he then was). Mere delay in prosecuting a claim cannot amount to a promise not to do so in the future. Inactivity, even if prolonged, is as likely to be attributable to carelessness as an intentioned act and pure inactivity will almost always be equivocal. Silence and inaction would only be sufficient where the law imposes a duty to disclose facts or to clarify a legal relationship and the party under the duty fails to perform it. I also agree that there is no reliance by the Defendant. It only claims that in reliance on the Plaintiff’s conduct, silence and/or delay, it “continued to hold the ListCo Shares Certificates as custodian and refrained from taking any step inconsistent with the Share Custodian Agreement or the positions taken by the parties in HCA 158/2025”. The Defendant’s pleaded reliance is no more than the discharge of its pre-existing contractual obligations, and so is incapable of constituting the change of position that reliance requires. See United Overseas Bank Ltd v Gracewood International Ltd [2021] HKCFI 2950 at §31 per DHCJ Leung. Reliance requires a causal link and a material influence on the representee’s conduct. The defence of promissory estoppel would fail where the representee would not have acted any differently from what he otherwise would have done: Great Pacific Investments Ltd v 张华荣 [2024] HKCA 1147 at §26 per Kwan VP. In the present case, it is a fact that the Defendant would have continued to hold the Secured Shares as custodian as it was contractually bound to do so under the Share Custodian Agreement. There is no qualifying reliance on the part of the Defendant. Thirdly, I do not consider that there is any delay that amounts to laches or acquiescence on the part of the Plaintiff. The Defendant complains that disputes between the Plaintiff, Zhang and Yang had arisen by October 2024 and HCA 158/2025 was commenced on 24 January 2025 without asserting contemporaneous claim that the Defendant was in breach of the Share Custodian Agreement. The Plaintiff only requested the Defendant re-register the Secured Shares on 9 March 2026. The Plaintiff’s silence and inaction caused prejudice as the Defendant continued to maintain the Secured Shares in safe custody, refrained from taking steps inconsistent with the Share Custodian Agreement and acted by reference to the contractual regime and the issues in HCA 158/2025. It would be unjust after the Plaintiff’s delay and acquiescence, to now seek equitable relief against the Defendant. First, although the Plaintiff could have commenced the present application much earlier, I do not consider the said delay constitutes laches or amounts to acquiescence on the part of the Plaintiff. The Defendant informed the Plaintiff on 11 July 2025 that the Secured Shares were registered in HKSCC Nominees’ name. To understand more, Jiang Senior, YY Holdings, the Plaintiff and the Defendant were engaged in correspondence from July to October 2025 to obtain documents the Defendant had in relation to the Share Custodian Agreement/which had been signed by the Plaintiff. In January 2026, the Plaintiff sought legal advice on the position and rights of the Plaintiff, YY Holdings and Praise Fortune, and then understood that ListCo would not look behind the legal shareholding of the Secured Shares. The Plaintiff also commenced without prejudice negotiations with the Defendant. In March 2026, the Plaintiff issued this Action and the Summons. There was no inordinate delay. Importantly, I do not find that there is any prejudice caused to the Defendant by it keeping the share certificates in its custody and has acted in accordance with the contract and the live issues in HCA 158/2025. It is not as if the Defendant would have agreed to register the Secured Shares in the name of their beneficial owners. In the final analysis, I do not see what prejudice the Defendant could possibly suffer if it were ordered by this Court to discharge its legal obligations in terms of the draft order as submitted by the Plaintiff. Fourthly, I am of the view that granting the injunction seeks by the Plaintiff carries the lowest risk of injustice. Balance of convenience tips in favour of ordering the Defendant to do what it was supposed to do for a very long time. As I set out about, Mr Tam for the Defendant has not advanced any loss or damages to be suffered by the Defendant for it to comply with an order of the Court. On the other hand, there is no reason why the Plaintiff should continue to suffer or be derived of the right to vote on the Secured Shares. There is also not basis as to why a substantial shareholding of the ListCo should be deprived from expressing its views in any general meetings of the ListCo. Such shareholding should not be life in a state of legal limbo. Shareholders’ democracy, the right to vote for one’s economic rights is an important facet of the property interests protected in our jurisdiction. There is no justifiable reason as to why such right should be deprived of. I also agree that on the facts of the present case, damages would not be an adequate remedy for the loss the Plaintiff would suffer if the injunction is not granted. It is trite that a shareholder’s voting rights which stem from shares owned by him are proprietary in nature. The infringement of a shareholder’s voting rights cannot be compensated in damages: Pacific Telecom & Navigation Ltd v Ye Lei [2020] HKCFI 586 at §§30, 34 per DHCJ M K Liu. Where a specific quantity of shares in a listed company is not readily obtainable in the market, specific performance may be granted, as damages would not be an adequate remedy in that scenario: Sky Motion Holdings Ltd v China Create Capital Ltd [2019] HKCFI 2408 at §32. The Secured Shares cannot simply be repurchased by the Plaintiff on the open market: (i) given the Secured Shares represent 26.1% of ListCo, they are highly illiquid so there is no real option to buy replacement shares in the market; and (ii) ListCo’s shares are currently suspended from trading with no end date in sight. Damages are manifestly inadequate to compensate for the loss or dilution of this specific block of ListCo shares. Importantly, what is at stake is not merely the arithmetic dilution of the Secured Shares (such that any loss P may suffer can be quantifiable by reference to the percentage of dilution and the stock price), but the loss of the control threshold. It was recognised by G Lam J (as he then was) in 張才奎所託管中國山水投資有限公司股份相關員工 v 張才奎 [2017] 5 HKLRD 240 at §31 that: Dilution of shares which would remove a shareholder’s ability to block a special resolution is one which is difficult to quantify in monetary terms; The jeopardy or risk of jeopardy of dilution has to be assessed qualitatively having regard to the matters that evidence the character, conduct and proclivities of the sole trustee (who was alleged in that case to be acting in disregard of the beneficiaries’ interests) and the pressure the plaintiffs faced to give up their claims; These were not matters that can, or ought to be relegated to be, redressed by damages. I note that the Plaintiff’s indirect shareholding in the ListCo currently sits perilously close to the 25% threshold. I agree that if the Plaintiff remains disenfranchised pending trial, any further dilutive events, which the hostile Board is now fully empowered to execute under the June 2025 general mandates, will push her indirect stake below 25%. This will cause the Plaintiff to irretrievably lose the right to veto special resolutions. Whilst I do not propose to go into the details of the Plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy involving the Defendant save to say that those are factual issues to be further investigated at the trial, I agree that any further dilution of the ListCo Shares will render it impossible for the Plaintiff to significantly influence the outcomes of ordinary resolutions. No award of damages against the Defendant at trial would be able to restore the Plaintiff’s indirect controlling stake or retrospectively unwind the corporate actions taken by a publicly listed company while the Plaintiff remains wrongfully disenfranchised from voting. On the other hand, as the Defendant proffers to be neutral in relation to the underlying disputes, I do not find that the Defendant is likely to suffer any loss and/or damages as a result of simply discharging its legal obligations and complying with orders of this Court. I also note Ms Chiu’s submission that the Plaintiff confirms she is willing and able to give (i) an undertaking as to damages to protect the Defendant against any loss they may suffer if it turns out the injunction is wrongly granted and (ii) an undertaking to indemnify the Defendant for all costs and expenses reasonably incurred in procuring the registration of the Secured Shares in the name of YY Holdings and Praise Fortune upon the Defendant’s production of documentary proof of payment to the Plaintiff’s solicitors. I agree that this provides additional protection to the Defendant against any perceived prejudice it may suffer. I also accept Ms Chiu’s submission that by contrast, the Defendant has not adduced any evidence of its financial means at all, to show that it would be in a position to pay damages to the Plaintiff should the injunction be wrongly refused. Fifthly, I also agree that the Injunction is not expensive to comply with, not irreversible, nor would it effectively pre-empt the trial. The Injunction sought is not dispositive; it requires that D carry out the administrative step of re-registering the Secured Shares in the names of YY Holdings and Praise Fortune. It does not seek possession of the share certificates; the share certificates reissued in the names of YY Holdings and Praise Fortune would remain in the Defendant’s custody. Finally, I agree that there is a great deal of utility in such granting the Injunction. First, YY Holdings’ and Praise Fortune’s beneficial ownership of ListCo remains above 25% and the ability to, inter alia, veto special resolutions still remains. I am convinced that there is a present need for the injunction sought, so that YY Holdings and Praise Fortune are able to exercise their ownership rights of the Secured Shares (as envisaged by the Commercial Agreement and Share Custodian Agreement), whether by requisitioning EGMs, exercising its voting rights at AGM/EGM, or bringing derivative actions on behalf of the ListCo, as the case may be. There are no persuasive reasons to frustrate the beneficial owners of the Secured Shares from exercising their proprietary rights. DISPOSITION For all the reasons stated above, I made an order in terms of the draft order as set out in Annex A of the Plaintiff’s Skeleton Submissions. I also make a costs order nisi that the Defendant should pay forthwith the costs of and occasioned by the Summons to the Plaintiff, to be taxed on a party-to party basis, if no agreement can be reached. The costs order nisi will be made absolute within 14 days herein unless an application is taken out to vary the same within the said 14-day period. Finally, I thank counsel for their helpful assistance to this Court. (William Wong SC) Recorder of the High Court Ms Nicole CHUI, instructed by H. Y. Leung & Co. LLP, for the Plaintiff Mr Jeffrey TAM, instructed by TITUS, for the Defendant