SHUCHI SINGH v. ANAMIKA CHHAWAL AND OTHERS

HCA 728/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO. 728 OF 2013

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DECISION ON COSTS

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1.  The plaintiff (“Singh”) commenced the present action against the 1^st defendant (“Chhawal”), the 2^nd defendant (“Tolani”) and the 3^rd defendant (“Rezonance”) for their publications by email and on their facebook pages of matters allegedly defamatory of her since 28 April 2013.

2.  By inter parties summons filed on 2 May 2013 and amended on 7 June 2013 (“the Summons”), Singh seeks interlocutory injunction:

(1) to restrain the defendants from further publishing or causing to be published the defamatory statements or similar words defamatory of her; and

(2) to compel the defendants to remove the above defamatory statements or similar words defamatory of her from facebook.com.

3.  The defendants appeared in person; and Rezonance by Chhawal, its director.

4.  On 15 October 2013, I handed down the written decision (“the Decision”). As to the costs, I gave leave to the parties to make submissions in view of the Decision; for the plaintiff to do so in writing in 14 days and for the defendants to do so in response in 14 days upon service of the plaintiff’s submission on costs.  Costs order would then be dealt with on paper.

5.  Written submissions on costs have been filed on behalf of Singh; but none of the defendants has filed any.  Their deadline for doing so expired on 11 November 2013.

6.  This decision should be read in conjunction with the Decision.  I also do not propose to repeat the terms of the interim injunction made.

7.  Mr Reynolds acknowledged that costs is a matter of the court’s discretion.  He submitted that by granting the interim injunctive relief, restrictive and mandatory, in respect of 2 out of 3 categories of defamatory statements complained about, the court must have been satisfied that there were no defence to that extent.  In the circumstances, his client has been vindicated in pursuing her application.

8.  Mr Reynolds submitted that his client should have costs of the application.  Alternatively I should order costs of the application to be his client’s costs in the cause.

9.  In the Decision, I refused Singh’s application on what was put forward as the primary ground of contempt.  On the ground of defamation, the 2 out of 3 categories of defamatory statements mentioned above actually refer to 3 out of 29 instances of alleged defamation (some of them repetitive).  The extent of success of Singh, in its interim sense, should thus be gauged accordingly.  Notwithstanding the interim relief, the question of vindication is really yet to be resolved at trial.

10.  In the circumstances, I think it is fair that Singh is entitled to half of her costs of and occasioned by the application, which will be her costs in the cause.  I so order.  That would include the costs of and occasioned by this decision on costs.