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HCAL 514/2026
[2026] HKCFI 2301
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 514 of 2026
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BETWEEN
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Le Thi Hong Phung |
Applicant |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Respondent |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
1. Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and
2. A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.
Observations for the Applicant:
THE APPLICATION
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 5 February 2026 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 1061 of 2025 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
2. The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.
3. The applicant appeared before the Court on 13 April 2026 and admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim.
4. The Director’s Decision was written in Chinese. This Form CALL-1 is written in English because the applicant has submitted her grounds to challenge the Director’s Decision in English.
The procedural history
5. The applicant is a national of Vietnam. She is an illegal immigrant. She has lodged a non-refoulement with the Director of Immigration (“the Director”).
6. Her claim was rejected by the Director because it was not substantiated.
7. She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims (“the Board”). Having considered the evidence, the Board found that the facts did not support any of the applicable risks[1]. The Board therefore dismissed her appeal.
8. The applicant then applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application on 23 October 2025.
9. By letter dated 10 November 2025, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance.
10. By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application.
The subsequent claim application
11. Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.
12. The applicant has submitted additional information to the immigration officer to support her application. Having considered the additional materials, the immigration officer concluded that there was no significant change of circumstances referred to under section 37ZO.
13. The immigration officer therefore found that the applicant failed to satisfy those conditions under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and dismissed her application for her subsequent claim.
The application for leave to apply for judicial review application
14. The applicant has filed Form 86 on 4 March 2026 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.
15. In her affirmation, the applicant has raised the reason below to challenge the Director’s Decision.
a. The Director’s Decision is wrong, unreasonable and unfair, without considering her right to life.
b. The Director failed to consider state acquiescence.
c. The Director has placed too much reliance on the country of origin information without considering her personal background and experience or the relevant evidence before making his decisions.
d. The Director unfairly asked her to answer questions that she was not in a position to offer any response.
e. The Director failed to consider her argument. He also failed to consider the corrupt and incompetent of the administration of the government. His decisions are Wednesbury unreasonable.
Discussion
16. The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).
17. The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that she relied on the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim. However, the applicant submitted that her father had lost in gambling and had agreed to let the creditor take her to Cambodia to work as a prostitute. On enquiry by the Court, she agreed that she did not tell this information to the Director because at that time she had not obtained the information from her mother. By a letter dated 20 April 2026, the applicant submitted a letter from her mother and a letter from herself reporting the above additional information.
18. Since she did not rely on the above ground in her subsequent claim application, it cannot form a reason to impugn the Director’s Decision. If she wishes to rely on this ground for her subsequent claim, she may have to take out another application for the Director to consider.
19. The reasons under paragraph 14 are her bare assertions or personal opinions without any evidence in support. They are not valid to challenge the Director’s Decision[2].
20. I find that there is no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision.
21. There is no realistic prospect of success in the applicant’s subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.
The RPO
22. The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.
23. RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.
24. In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.
25. For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant admitted that she relied on the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim.
26. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say.
27. Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
(1) The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.
(2) All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.
(3) At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.
(4) Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.
(5) All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.
(6) If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.
(7) Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.
(8) Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.
(9) No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.
(10) No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court.
(11) This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.
(12) A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.
DISPOSITION
28. The applicant’s application is dismissed.
29. RPO in terms of paragraph 27 be made against the applicant.
Dated the 29th day of April 2026
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(Allen LEE)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 29/4/2026
Le Thi Hong Phung
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 29/4/2026
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: L/M (35362) in ImmD RA 7/37/C
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] The applicable risks are:
a. risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, (“the Ordinance”) (“Torture risk”);
b. risk of violation of the right to life under Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”) (“BOR 2 risk”);
c. risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (“CIDTP”) under Article 3 of Section 8 of the HKBOR (“BOR 3 risk”); and
d. risk of persecution by reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”) (“Persecution risk”).
[2] The Court of Appeal in Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244 held:
“20. … … general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to the facts of his case: Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20 and Ibrahim v Simon Russell [2019] HKCA 1327.” See also Re Haider Khalil [2021] HKCA 223 [16].”
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