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YUNI RITAWATI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
YUNI RITAWATI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5460 · HCAL 1815/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1815/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5460
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1815 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Yuni Ritawati |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
|(|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Background
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 10 October 2023, the applicant applied
for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The
intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 26 September 2023 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the
applicant’s appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 30 March 2021 rejecting the applicant’s non-
refoulement claim based on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s
Decision is set out in the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL001815_
2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. In the Form 86, the applicant named the Board as the proposed
interested party in addition to it having also been named as the
proposed respondent. As the Director should have been the proper
putative interested party, the Form 86 shall be amended accordingly on
the court’s own motion.
3. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Indonesia,
she would be harmed or killed by her ex-husband who demanded the
applicant to repay the loan they jointly borrowed. The reasoning and
findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not
necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall
also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the
Board’s Decision.
4. The applicant has requested for an oral hearing. On 24 August 2026,
the Removal Assessment and Litigation (Removal and Deportation)
Section (1) of the Immigration Department faxed a letter to the court,
informing the court that the applicant would like to withdraw her
judicial review application. Enclosed with the said letter was the
applicant’s signed memo dated 17 August 2026 in the applicant’s native
language together as well as in English. In the memo, the applicant
stated that she would like to withdraw the Leave Application as the
issues at home has been resolved. In the circumstances, this court
will dispose of the Leave Application on paper.
Discussion
5. A leave application operates as a “filtering” process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
6. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. The applicant’s Form 86 provided no such grounds. In the
supporting affirmation, the applicant exhibited a submission, which
averred that the Board had acted unreasonably and was procedurally
unfair by having placed too much reliance on the country-of-origin
information without taking into account the applicant’s personal
background and experience. It was also averred that the Board had
relied on some web news which were not officially recognized.
7. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness, or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the
Board found that the applicant’s evidence in relation to the loan was
inconsistent, unreasonable and illogical, and that she was not a
credible witness. It further found that the past ill-treatment failed
to reach the requisite level of severity. It further found that state
protection and internal relocation would be reasonably available.
These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will
not interfere with subject to there being any public law errors.
8. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the decision of the Board, this court is satisfied that
the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and
observed a very high standard of fairness. The matters the applicant
raised in the written submission are all general allegations without
particulars. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not
reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success such that
would enable this court to grant leave[5].
Withdrawal application
9. Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application referred
to above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the
circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and
hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md
Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471; Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal
Board [2024] HKCA 1140.
Order
10. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
11. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
| | |
|Dated the 6th day of October 2026 |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such | |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 6/10/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Yuni Ritawati |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. no: |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |6/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 17809 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |110/21 (formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |10053/21) (T2I118) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to
the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of
persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified
Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process
claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the
USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3
HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23.
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015,
22 December 2016 at §142.
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v
Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.