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HCAL 3233/2019
[2025] HKCFI 6201
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 3233 OF 2019
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BETWEEN
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Begum Rani |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board / |
Putative |
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Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
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| Before: |
Deputy High Court Judge To in Chambers |
| Date of Decision: |
18 December 2025 |
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D E C I S I O N
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Introduction
1. This is the Applicants’ application by letter dated 17 November 2025 for extension of time to appeal the order of this Court dated 23 October 2025 (the “Order”) refusing her leave to apply for judicial review (the “leave application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”).
2. Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order. In Jagg Singh and Torture Claims Appeal Board/non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office[1], the Court of Appeal held that in considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted. If the delay is not substantial, it would be readily condoned if there is some credible explanation and an arguable ground of appeal. If the first three factors are resolved against granting leave, there is no need to consider prejudice to the respondent.
Discussion and conclusion
3. By the time the Applicant’s letter was received it is twenty-five days out of time. The Applicant did not give any explanation for the delay. The delay of twenty-five days in an appeal period of 14 days is substantial, but not so substantial that the court would not stop for a while and think if there is any merits in the intended appeal. Thus, without calling for an explanation for the delay, the Court proceeded to consider merits of the Applicant’s intended appeal. In her letter, she reiterated that she could not return to Bangladesh because she would be harmed or killed by her husband and his first wife and she had no support from her maternal family. Basically, she was repeating the factual case on which her claim for non-refoulement protection was based. In effect, she was seeking to challenge the finding of fact by the Board rather than the propriety of this Court’s order refusing her leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision for want of errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s decision. She has not identified what this Court has erred, whether in law or on the facts. Such ground of appeal has no prospect of success.
4. For the above reasons, the Applicant’s application for extension of time to appeal is refused.
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( Anthony To )
Deputy High Court Judge
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The Applicant is not represented
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