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CACV 131/2026, [2026] HKCA 733
On Appeal From [2026] HKCFI 591
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 131 OF 2026
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1347/2021)
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| Before: |
Hon Barma JA and Leung J in Court |
| Date of Hearing: |
1 April 2026 |
| Date of Judgment: |
22 April 2026 |
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Leung J (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Philips Wong (“the Judge”) dated 6 February 2026[1] (“the Leave Decision”) refusing to grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review[2] was that of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 25 August 2021 (“the Board’s Decision”) whereby the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 9 April 2021 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim was dismissed.
2. The applicant is an Indonesian national. Her personal background, basis of claim and the Board’s reasons were set out in the Board’s Decision[3] (see also the Leave Decision at [4]). They will not be repeated.
3. After considering the documents filed by the applicant as well as the applicant’s oral submission made at the hearing of the leave application, the Judge dismissed the application for the reasons stated at [5]-[9] of the Leave Decision.
Appeal to this court
4. In her Notice of Appeal filed on 13 February 2026, the applicant stated that she would “face hardship” if refouled. She complained that the Board relied on “source of news which is not officially recognised or is simply hearsay” and “some cases which are outdated considering the dramatic changes”. Hence groundless speculations on the part of the Board. However, no particular was given.
5. In her written submission dated 27 February 2026, the applicant referred to, amongst other things, the principles in ST v Director of Immigration (sic)[4] [2014] 4 HKLRD 277, Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289, R v Home Secretary, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 and R v Home Secretary, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] AC 514. They are all well-established principles, but the applicant did not say at all how they had not been applied or properly applied in the circumstances of her case.
6. The applicant defaulted in appearing at the hearing of her appeal on 1 April 2026. Nevertheless, this Court proceeds to dispose of her appeal on paper.
Discussion
7. The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non‑refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.
8. The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review. Nor is an appeal the occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which could and should have been raised but were not raised before the judge. In the determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and the Court will only reverse that decision if an appellant could demonstrate that the judge made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before the judge or was otherwise plainly wrong.
9. In this appeal, assertions by the applicant of fear, if refouled, do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. In any event, the assertions have been considered by the Director and the Board. The assessment of evidence, Country of Origin information, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director. The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there is an error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022 at [13].
10. Whilst the Board was prepared to accept part of the applicant’s case (such as the fact that her husband had on one occasion in 2014 ill-treated and harmed her when she returned to Indonesia for holidays), it found, amongst other things, that the extent of her past injuries suffered at the hands of her husband did not reach the required minimum level of severity; that such ill-treatment was private in nature; and that her husband no longer had the means to locate (nor was he still interested in pursuing) her (Board’s Decision, [60]-[74]).
11. As for the applicant’s fear arising from a threat of harm by her loan sharks, the Board did not accept that the applicant’s husband was threatened at her family home by two men in 2020, and found that even if such incident did occur, the applicant’s family was left unharmed. Further, the Board found no evidence to suggest that the incident was connected to an act or omission by the Indonesian government, and that adequate state protection was available to the applicant in order to minimise the risk of harm, if any (see Board’s Decision, [75]-[85]).
12. These were factual findings open to the Board on the evidence, and were sufficiently canvassed and considered by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [7]-[8]. We see no basis to interfere.
13. The applicant has failed to demonstrate how the Board had acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its decision, or how such decision could be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable. As mentioned, there was no attempt by the applicant to elaborate how the trite principles referred to in her written submission had not been applied or properly applied in the processing of her non-refoulement claim or in the consideration of her leave application by the Judge.
14. The applicant advanced no viable grounds of appeal against the Judge’s decision, and there is also no merit in the appeal. We dismiss the appeal accordingly.
(Aarif Barma)
Justice of Appeal
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(Simon Leung)
Judge of the Court
of First Instance
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The applicant was not represented and did not appear
[1] [2026] HKCFI 591
[2] Per the amendment of the applicant’s Form 86, as ordered by the Judge.
[3] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL001347_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
[4] The correct citation should be ST v Betty Kwan.
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