MUI PO CHU v. MOI OAK WAH

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL

1998, Nos. 85, 89 and 90
(Civil)

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J U D G M E N T

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Mortimer, V.-P. (giving the judgment of the Court) :

1. This is an application by Miss Mui for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against an order made by this Court on 26 June 1998. In that order we ordered that HC Action A11507 of 1997 be struck out with all proceedings in that action save for orders on its costs. Secondly, that a number of appeals which we had heard against orders of Hartmann J should be dismissed.

2. The basis for the application is twofold. First, that we should not have struck out the High Court Action because it was not a separate action. It was only an action taken to enforce an order made by this Court when Miss Mui succeeded in persuading the Court of Appeal that a counter-claim made by the defendant should not have been heard by the judge. Miss Mui has since taken the view that she is owed a sum of $537,048.48. That misconception of hers has caused a number of proceedings which are all completely misconceived. Equally, her application for leave against that striking-out is misconceived. There is no basis upon which this Court can possibly give leave on the ground she advances.

3. The second matter is that, she submits, she has a right of appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on the basis that the matter in dispute amounts to or is of the value of $1m or more under s.22 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance. She works that out by adding together the sum in the misconceived action that was struck out, to all the orders for costs in a multiplicity of proceedings which she has taken and submits that the total is nearly $2 1/2m owed to her by the defendant. She has therefore, she says, an appeal to the Court of Final Appeal as of right.

4. Again, although she is not personally at fault, it is a complete misunderstanding of the basis upon which there is a right of appeal. The application must, therefore, be dismissed.

Before leaving the matter, however, it has become clear that this Court ought now to place before the Secretary for Justice the question whether an application ought to be made under the Mental Health Ordinance (Cap. 136 s.7(1)). As we explained in our previous judgment, we cannot take proceedings of our own motion, but we shall refer the papers to the Secretary for Justice to consider whether any step ought to be taken under the Mental Health Ordinance. Our thinking behind this is that Miss Mui may be assisted by such an application. This would be so if someone were appointed to conduct the litigation on her behalf so that these proceedings may be eventually brought to a conclusion.