THAM NARAYAN IWA LIMBU v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 1182/2021

[2021] HKCFI 3041

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1182 of 2021

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only; or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

1.  Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.  A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the Applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.  This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 2 August 2021 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after his earlier claim had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all applicable grounds.   

2.  The Applicant is a 39-year-old national of Nepal who entered Hong Kong illegally on 7 August 2009 and was arrested by police on the same day.  After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Nepal he would be harmed or killed by people of the Limbuwan Party for refusing to join their movement for an autonomous Limbuwan state in Nepal.

Previous Non-Refoulement Claim

3.  By a Notice of Decision dated 25 March 2015 and a Notice of Further Decision dated 22 May 2017 the Director rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

4.  In his decisions the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from the Limbuwan people upon his return to Nepal as low due to the absence of or low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there was no evidence of any actual harm had been inflicted on the Applicant or his family prior to his departure from Nepal, that in the absence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Nepal with a large population of 30 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 147,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of Nepal away from his home district in large cities such as Kathmandu where it would be difficult if not impossible for those Limbuwan people to locate him.

5.  The Applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decision was dismissed by the Board on 1 February 2018 after hearing him in evidence and submissions and upon finding no merits in his claim or his appeal, and that it also confirmed the Director’s decisions.

6.  The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decisions of the Director and the Board was then refused by this court on 28 February 2019 upon finding none of the proposed grounds for his intended challenge reasonably arguable, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Director or the Board or in their decisions, and that there was no prospect of success in his intended application (HCAL 245/2018 [2019] HKCFI 183).

7.  The Applicant’s subsequent appeal against the court’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 10 July 2019 (CACV 107/2019 [2019] HKCA 756).

8.  The Applicant’s notice of motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 16 September 2019 ([2019] HKCA 1037), and then by the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal on 13 November 2020 under Rule 7 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Rules, Cap 484A.

Request To Make Subsequent Claim

9.  On 5 January 2021 the Applicant in writing to the Immigration Department requested to make a subsequent claim on the basis that the Limbuwan people are still looking for him everywhere and have even discovered his whereabouts in Hong Kong.  

10.  There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a

“(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –

(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.

(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.

(5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”

11.  Accordingly, on 13 April 2021 the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of his request within 14 days, which he subsequently did after the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) had refused legal representation for him but an interview had been conducted by the Immigration Department for his request.

12.  By a Notice of Decision dated 2 August 2021 the Director refused to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim upon finding that the basis thereof was essentially the same as that of his previous claim, and that he failed to provide sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since his previous claim was determined, or that those changes when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of his previous claim would give his subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success.

13.  On 23 August 2021 the Applicant filed another Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, and in his supporting affirmation filed on the same day he put forth the following grounds for his intended challenge:

(a) That the Director erred in determining that there is no realistic prospect of success by placing an unnecessarily high threshold in determining the realistic prospect of success as human lives are at stake;

(b) That the Director had failed to take the Applicant’s unique situation into account fairly or carefully;

(c) That the decision not allowing the Applicant to make a subsequent claim is erroneous and biased in purely targeting him for a situation that the Director had not experienced first-hand;

(d) That the Director merely repeated what had been decided by the Board against the Applicant in refusing his request to make a subsequent claim;

(e) That it was unjust that the DLS refused to provide legal representation for his request to the Director for his subsequent claim;

(f) That the Director’s decision was biased and was made based on wrong case management power as it was merely trying to dispose of his case as quickly as possible and therefore did not carefully consider all the information and evidence available; and

(g) That it was procedurally unfair that he was not given the opportunity to first seek to appeal to the Board as the Director’s decision should be subsect to review by the Board regardless of the nature of decision.   

14.  These grounds are however just mainly bare assertions of the Applicant without any details or particulars or elaboration of how they applied to his case or how the Director had erred in his decision, or in what way was the Director biased against him or that his decision was unfair or unjust, or why would the refusal of legal representation from DLS be relevant to the Director’s decision, or how did the Director fail to take into account of his unique situation.  None of these assertions were elaborated or presented with any particulars or specifics by the Applicant, while his complaint that he could not first bring an appeal to the Board against the Director’s decision to refuse his request to make a subsequent claim is without legal basis as such an appeal to the Board is simply not provided under Section 37ZR of the Immigration Ordinance.  As such I do not find any of these grounds reasonably arguable for his intended challenge.   

15.  In the premises and having considered the decision of the Director with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the decision or any failure to apply high standards of fairness in the consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s request for subsequent claim, and as I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I accordingly refuse his leave application.

Restricted Proceedings Order

16.  Given the facts that the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim has already been finally and conclusively determined in the previous proceedings, ending with the order of the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal dated 13 November 2020, but that the Applicant is still trying to re-litigate his case by making this subsequent claim based on essentially the same facts and basis as before, I shall next consider whether it would be appropriate to make a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against him.

17.  Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 provides as follows:

“Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings

(1)  The Court of First Instance may, on the application of the Secretary for Justice or an affected person, make an order that –

(a)  no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by the person against whom the order is made; and

(b)  any legal proceedings instituted by that person in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)   The Court of First Instance may not make an order under subsection (1) unless –

(a)  it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; and

(b)  it has heard the person against whom the order is to be made or given him an opportunity of being heard.

(3)  An order made under subsection (1) –

(a)  may be made on such terms and conditions as the Court of First Instance thinks just; and

(b)  may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.

…”

18.  In Etik Iswanti v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2021] HKCFI 1589, Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) examined the relevant principles for making an order under Section 27 against a non-refoulement claimant to prevent him or her from commencing vexatious legal proceedings which sought to

19.  His Lordship in the subsequent case of Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 (again sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) went on to hold that apart from Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, the court has an inherent jurisdiction which it can exercise on its own motion to make a RPO to prevent similar abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants, as the underlying purpose of the court’s jurisdiction to make a RPO is the prevention of abuse of process ([9] – [10]).

20.  In the present case, it is clear from the above that the Applicant’s conduct in seeking persistently to re-litigate his non-refoulement claim without viable grounds amounts to an abuse of process, and that unless a RPO is made against him, he will likely continue to do so and thereby wasting further precious time and resources of the Judiciary.

21.  Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1) The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, without leave of the Court of First Instance;

(2) All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;

(3) At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with his said application for leave;

(4) Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;

(5) All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct;

(6) If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

(7) Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;

(8) Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;

(9) No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months;

(10) This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order; and

(11) A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

Disposition 

22.  The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

23.  A RPO in terms of paragraph 21 be made against the Applicant.  

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1