AMALIA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5871 · HCAL 1926/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1926/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5871
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1926 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Amalia |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 26 October 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 13 October 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1926_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant was unable to make out her claims
for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the
Board rejected the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of
the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 25 August 2022 and
confirmed the same, which rejected her non-refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. The applicant named the Board and “Non-Refoulement claims Petition
Office” as the putative respondents and “Torture Claims Appeal Appeal
Board Non-Refoulement claims Petition Office” as the putative
interested parties in Form 86, when only the Board should be the
putative respondent, and the Director should be the putative
interested party.
4. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the
Board and should not be named as a putative party at all.
5. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name
of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
6. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
7. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by a loan
shark Hariyanto, who was her friend’s husband, due to the applicant’s
inability to repay a loan in the amount of 300 million rupiah. The
applicant claimed that the loan was obtained in order to pay for the
hospitalization and surgery of her sister who was injured in a car
accident in 2018.
Oral hearing
8. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and her case was heard on 15 October 2026.
9. When this court asked the applicant for the grounds of her intended
judicial review, the applicant replied that she was married to a Hong
Kong resident and was waiting for her dependent visa. She confirmed
that there was no ground for her intended judicial review.
Grounds for judicial review
10. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
11. The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial
review in Form 86, nor in her supporting affirmation dated 26 October
2023.
12. As aforesaid, the applicant only said at the oral hearing before this
court that she was married to a Hong Kong resident and was waiting for
her dependent visa, and she had no grounds for the judicial review
against the Board’s Decision.
Discussion
13. First of all, the fact that the applicant is married in Hong Kong to a
Hong Kong resident is simply irrelevant to the Leave Application.
14. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Comilang & Ors v Director of
Immigration [2019] HKCFA 10, family unity rights were not a bar to
refoulement of foreign nationals without a right of abode, even when
they have a spouse and children who are permanent residents of Hong
Kong. Thus, separation with her husband was not a basis on which the
applicant could establish her non-refoulement claim.
15. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
16. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
17. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 25 May 2023. The applicant was present and hence she
was given the chance to present her case to the Board in person.
18. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had assessed all
the applicant’s claimed risk. The Board’s analysis and consideration
of the applicant’s evidence, and its conclusion based on its findings,
were laid out in paragraphs 32 to 48 and 49 to 61 of the Board’s
Decision respectively.
19. In gist, the applicant could not provide any documentary proof of the
existence of the loan. The Board considered that the applicant’s
claim about her loan, which formed the factual basis of her claim for
non-refoulement protection, could and should have been supported by
medical records of her sister. The applicant was provided with the
opportunity to provide the said records. Despite the Board’s letter
to her before the Board’s hearing and the extension of 30 days given
by the Board at the Board’s hearing, the applicant did not provide
such documents.
20. Moreover, the Board considered it unlikely to the extreme that the
applicant would be able to obtain a huge loan of 300 million rupiah,
which was stated to be unsecured, when she was not earning money or
was earning minimal amounts, and came from a poor family.
21. The Board thus concluded that the applicant had not established that
she obtained a loan in the amount claimed and in the circumstances
claimed, and that the claim was not credible.
22. Furthermore, for the sake of completeness, the Board had given full
reasons in paragraphs 62 to 71 of the Board’s Decision for its
conclusion that even if the applicant had incurred some form of
indebtedness which was not paid off due to the premature termination
of her employment contract in Hong Kong, she would be able to relocate
in Indonesia without any real risk of being traced by a local
moneylender.
23. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s claims for non-
refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the
USM.
24. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including
the assessment of evidence, country of origin information and risk of
harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with the
applicant’s appeal/petition. This court finds nothing wrong or
unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.
25. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
26. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
27. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 21st day of October 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 21/10/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no: |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted |Nil |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |21/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 20911 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes| |QA T/C 717/22 (formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 5000585/22) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1