香港特別行政區 訴 李彩彬

HCMA 939/2000

香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

高院裁判法院上訴2000年第939號

（原本案件編號：東區裁判法院案件2000年第1016號）

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判 案 書

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1. 上訴人被控一項在沒有版權擁有人的許可下，為交易或業務目的而管有該版權作品的侵犯版權複製品，以期作出侵犯版權的作為，違反香港法例第528章《版權條例》第118(1)(d)及119(1)條。經聆訊後，他被裁定罪名成立而被判處11個月監禁。他就判罪及判刑提出上訴。

案情：

2. 原審裁判官所裁斷的案情如下：於1999年3月25日下午6時10分，便裝海關關員90142及8505到筲箕灣泰安樓地舖執行職務。當時鋪內有許多顧客觀看架上及桌上的光碟， 而上訴人則站在收銀櫃枱後向一名男顧客收取金錢及將一些光碟交給他。關員90142向上訴人表露身份，道明來意，並問他在那處幹甚麼。上訴人回答說他是店主。 關員問他舖內的光碟有否任何版權證明。 上訴人回答說他沒有版權授權書及不能拿出來給關員查看。 關員在店內搜出共3,965隻光碟，其中837隻視像光碟和72隻音樂光碟為侵犯版權的複製品。

判罪上訴：

3. 代表上訴人的蘇大律師指原審暫委裁判官沒有循「案中案」程序裁斷上訴人自稱為店主及沒有版權受權書之招認是否自願， 而把這招認納入證供。這剝奪了上訴人就這口頭招認的自願性作證的權利。 他指原審暫委裁判官也沒有就這口頭招認的自願性在控方結案前作出裁斷， 而竟在辯方結案後在宣判時才作裁斷。所以他的程序不合符常規。

4. 本案的審訊過程稍為特別。在聆訊前的簡短預審階段中，當時代表上訴人的大律師 Mr Boey 向原審暫委裁判官表示他會就控方可能提供的書面會面記錄提出爭議，並已草擬了反對的理由。他又說：

「MR BOEY: 其實法官閣下，主控官同我亦都頭先傾過，就係話控方喺呢單案件入面需唔需要依賴嗰個會面紀錄。

官：係。

MR BOEY: 基本上主控官喺呢個階段個態度，就係話如果佢啲海關關員嘅證供可以畀得令佢滿意，佢可能未必需要呈遞嗰份會面紀錄。

官：I see. 哦，好。

MR BOEY: 所以可唔可以同意我喺 -- 如果真係控方呈遞嗰份會面紀錄嘅時候，先至係.........」

5. 從上述的陳述可見 Mr Boey 完全明瞭控方的案情及可舉的證據。他明確地提出爭議會面記錄的自願性，但卻沒有提及口頭招認的自願性，並建議原審暫委裁判官當控方有需要呈遞會面記錄時，才就「案中案」作安排。

6. 稍後，原審暫委裁判官開始聽取證供。當關員90142述及上訴人所作的口頭招認時，Mr Boey 沒有提出爭議該口頭招認的自願性。 控方也沒有引導關員把會面記錄呈堂。 在盤問關員時， Mr Boey 向他指出上訴人沒有作出他所描述的口頭招認。Mr Boey雖然有向關員指出他的上司曾向上訴人作出恐嚇及利誘， 但卻沒有把恐嚇及利誘與關員所述及的口頭招認扣上關係。

7. 蘇大律師引述 Thongjai & Another v. The Queen [1997] HKLR 678 第690頁 Lord Hutton 以下的判詞：

"It is sufficient to raise the issue of voluntariness for consideration by the trial judge if an allegation of ill-treatment is put to a police officer in cross-examination, even if the defendant does not give evidence in support of the allegation. This is what occurred in MacPherson where the defendant made allegations of ill-treatment in his cross-examination of the police officers, but gave no evidence in support of the allegations and made no reference to the ill-treatment in his statement from the dock. In their judgment Gibbs CJ and Wilson J stated at page 524:

As we have already pointed out, once a real question arises as to the voluntariness of a confession tendered in evidence, the judge has a duty to satisfy himself of the voluntariness of the confession, and usually must hold a voire dire for that purpose, even if the accused does not object to the evidence or seek a voire dire."

他陳述說，基於 Mr Boey 的盤問，該口頭招認的自願性已成為該證供的重要爭議點。所以他認為按照 Lord Hutton 的判詞，原審暫委裁判官應採取「案中案」的程序，及在控方結案前就該口頭招認的自願性作判斷。

8. 本席不認為 Thongjai 一案定下當招認的自願性成為爭議點時，裁判官必須強制地採取「案中案」程序的法律原則。本席此言並非對樞密院不敬，而只是蘇大律師對 Thongjai 一案所定的法律原則有所誤解。在 Lord Hutton 的判詞中，他卻沒有確立一個一成不變的原則。他所援引 R v. MacPherson (1981) 47 CLR 512 一案的判詞中也只認為在這情况下，法官一般應 (usually must) 主持「案中案」程序。每件案件有其獨特性，應否主持「案中案」視乎多項的考慮。

9. 在 HKSAR v. Wong Wai Yip， 刑事上訴案件1995年第287號， 上訴法庭法官司徒冕在考慮過 Thongjai 一案及對 Ajodha v. The State, (1982) AC 204 一案詳加分析後，在第10頁指出代表被告人的大律師有權選擇循「案中案」程序獲取有關會面記錄的自願性裁斷，但這並非必然或必定的抉擇。他說：

"It would, of course, have been open to trial counsel to have conducted a voir dire with a view to obtaining a ruling on the admissibility of Exh.8 in accordance with the usual practice. This was not, however, mandatory.

In Ajodha's case (above), Lord Bridge's judgment helpfully set out four typical situations which practitioners would be most likely to encounter in approaching admissibility, where voluntariness was the issue that had to be decided. These points are set out at page 222A to E:

'(1) The accused admits making the statement (orally or in writing) but raises the issue that it was not voluntary. This is a simple case where the judge must rule on admissibility and, if he admits the evidence of the statement, leave to the jury all questions as to its value and weight. (2) The accused, as in each of the instant appeals, denies authorship of the written statement but claims that he signed it involuntarily. Again, for the reasons explained, the judge must rule on admissibility, and, if he admits the statement, leave all issues of fact as to the circumstances of the making and signing of the statement for the jury to consider and evaluate. (3) The evidence tendered or proposed to be tendered by the prosecution itself indicates that the circumstances in which the statement was taken could arguably lead to the conclusion that the statement was obtained by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage excited or held out by a person in authority. In this case, irrespective of any challenge to the prosecution evidence by the defence, it will be for the judge to rule, assuming the prosecution evidence to be true, whether it proves the statement to have been made voluntarily. (4) On the face of the evidence tendered or proposed to be tendered by the prosecution, there is no material capable of suggesting that the statement was other than voluntary. The defence is an absolute denial of the prosecution evidence. For example, if the prosecution rely upon oral statements, the defence case is simply that the interview never took place or that the incriminating answers were never given; in the case of a written statement, the defence case is that it is a forgery. In this situtation no issue as to voluntariness can arise and hence no question of admissibility falls for the judge's decision. The issue of fact whether or not the statement was made by the accused is purely for the jury.'

In further helpful guidance, the judgment gave an indication as to how practitioners might proceed to deal with these four situations, and it is (2) which is relevant for present purposes. At page 223D, Lord Bridge said this:

'(2) Though the case for the defence raises an issue as to the voluntariness of a statement in accordance with the principles indicated earlier in this judgment, defending counsel may for tactical reasons prefer that the evidence bearing on that issue be heard before the jury, with a single cross-examination of the witnesses on both sides, even though this means that the jury hear the impugned statement whether admissible or not. If the defence adopts this tactic, it will be open to defending counsel to submit at the close of the evidence that, if the judge doubts the voluntariness of the statement, he should direct the jury to disregard it, or, if the statement is essential to sustain the prosecution case, direct an acquittal. Even in the absence of such a submission, if the judge himself forms the view that the voluntariness of the statement is in doubt, he should take the like action proprio motu.' (Emphasis added.)"

10. 更值一提的是， 就 Lord Bridge 在 Ajodha 一案所舉四類常見的錄取會面記錄情况中的第二類，即上訴人指記錄為調查員所虛構，但他卻在不自願的情况下在記錄上簽名， Lord Bridge 也認為辯方律師可基於策略性理由不選用「案中案」程序。這考慮更適用於本案沒有簽名作實的口頭招認情况。

11. 從預審及關員90142舉證過程中可見 Mr Boey 是選擇不採用「案中案」程序。這明顯是基於策略性理由。他認為控方能否成功地把上訴人定罪則取决於關員90142的可信性，所以採用「案中案」程序對上訴人沒有特別幫助。

12. 在 Wong Wai-yip 一案中第11頁，上訴法庭法官司徒冕更認同上訴法庭法官彭亮庭在 R v. Jim Chong-shing (1988) Criminal Appeal No. 79 在第8頁以下的判詞：

"The situation which has arisen in this case is not unusual. Almost exactly the same situation arose in this court in R v. Jim Chong-shing, (1988) Criminal Appeal No. 79, where at page 8 of the judgment Penlington JA said:

'We are quite satisfied that if, at the conclusion at the Crown's evidence, or alternatively when all the evidence had concluded relating to the statement, the judge had been of the view in the absence of any submission that he was not satisfied it was voluntary he would have directed the jury to disregard it. We do not consider that in Ajodha, Lord Bridge meant that in all instances where the second alternative procedure is followed the judge must give a ruling on admissibility whether or not a submission is made, but to do so only when he considers, on the evidence, that he should.' (Emphasis added.)"

13. 雖然原審暫委裁判官沒有選用「案中案」程序，但上訴人已就針對該口頭招認的自願性舉證。 所以原審暫委裁判官已得悉上訴人作出口頭招認時的全部情况， 及控辯雙方有關該口頭招認自願性的爭議點。上訴人已享有「案中案」程序的一切保障。鑑於上訴法庭法官彭亮庭上述的判詞， 本席認為原審暫委裁判官沒有在控方結案前就口頭招認的表面自願性作裁斷並無不妥。

14. 蘇大律師又指控方已從關員90142的盤問中知悉被指控曾向上訴人作出恐嚇及誘使關員的身份， 控方則有責任傳召該關員作證以反駁上訴人的指控。蘇大律師認為在這情况下，原審暫委裁判官不應把口頭招認納入證供。他引用 R v. Wong Kuen [1983] 1 HKC 439及 R v. Tang Yuk Yan, [1991] 2 HKC 214 以支持他的說法。本席不認為上述兩個案例確立了控方必須傳召被指曾作出不恰當行為的警員作反證。其實在 Tang Yuk Yan 一案中，上訴人指一名警長向他作出恐嚇。但控方沒有傳召該名警長作反證。上訴法庭法官鮑偉華在判上訴人上訴得值之餘亦作以下的判詞：

"The objection detailed threats and force by the sergeant and others immediately before the applicant was handed over to the constable who took the statement. The constable who took the statement said that he had received custody of the applicant from the Duty Officer. To discharge its onus, the Crown could have called either the sergeant, if he existed, or the Duty Officer to swear to the circumstances that obtained immediately prior to the taking of the statement. In fact, no evidence was called in this regard. This failure was, in our view, a fatal one."

15. 從上述的判詞可見，控方可憑其他可信的證人以推翻上訴人的指控。

16. 傳召被指曾作恐嚇的關員與否全屬控方的抉擇。若然控方選擇不傳召這證人，控方則負上法庭不接納該記錄的自願性的風險而已。當時的高等法院法官陳兆愷在 The Queen v. Lau Ming Hei, MA 66 of 1996 在第7頁正確地指出：

"When the statement taker was giving evidence, the allegation was however wrongly put to him but this was denied. If the Crown fails to call any witness and in the absence of such evidence a doubt is created, then the Crown runs the risk. The court can make an adverse inference against the Crown. The Crown simply has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the cautioned statement was taken voluntarily. But if the court was not in any way in doubt, the failure to call any one or more witnesses would not matter. It is clear that the prosecution need not call every witness."

17. 經考慮上述案例所列舉的法律原則，本席認為原審暫委裁判官沒有採用「案中案」程序，及沒有在控方結案前，就口頭招認的表面自願性作裁斷並無不妥。 他就該招認的自願性裁斷是基於他對關員90142的可信性評估。本席也認為不宜干預。

18. 蘇大律師又指原審暫委裁判官沒有因關員沒有在現場檢獲出售光碟的貨款作為疑點，也沒有給予恰當考慮。 他認為原審暫委裁判官指該款項可能留在上訴人身上是不當的臆測。這雖屬臆測，但上訴人亦承認在店內工作，所以他有否進行關員所目睹的交易並不重要。重要的是關員沒有在收銀機內檢獲現金一事可否影響原審暫委裁判官對他們的可信性評估。 這也是原審暫委裁判官的事實裁斷，本席不宜干預。本席也認同原審暫委裁判官對關員的可信性評估。若關員存心揑造證供，他們也可以很簡單地稱他們見收銀機內有現金但沒有把它檢獲。

19. 蘇大律師指原審暫委裁判官在法庭把上訴人定罪時引用司法認知指經營售買翻版光碟行業者品流複雜是不恰當。這點本席也同意。但原審暫委裁判官說：

「第一點、你就話你嗰日喺第一日去嗰間舖頭處見工、返工，實際上係第一日返工，換言之，呢個舖頭所謂嗰個東主，如果真係有個咁嘅人存在嘅話，佢同你三唔識七，係咪？咁樣事後大家都發覺，亦都同意店舖賣嘅光碟裡面起碼有一部分係侵犯版權嘅光碟嚟，如果係咁嘅話，佢裡面冚唪唥全部都係貨，都會有錢喺度，值錢。佢同你三唔識七，你前一日見過佢，如果你嘅說話係真嘅話，第二日都係啱啱見唔夠幾分鐘，佢點會喺咁嘅情況之將間舖頭完全 -- 如果被告你講嘅說話又係真嘅話，冇其他人，得你同佢兩支公，佢話行開，然之後叫你睇舖頭，點會一個人完全唔識，可以完全將間舖頭咁信得你過，交託畀你呢？呢一個完全係一啲天方夜譚嘅講法。特別是呢一個亦都可以司法認知，呢一行嘅人多數都係好複雜嘅人流喺度，因此對方係咩嘢身分都係好複雜嘅背景，法庭係唔相信對方一個東主，如果真係有個咁嘅人嘅話， 會咁信得過被告你一個咁樣陌生嘅人畀間店舖畀你去睇，呢個係完全唔可以被接受相信。」

20. 從原審暫委裁判官的判詞可見，「司法認知」與「複雜背景」等均屬虛詞，而全非他不相信上訴人的理由。他不相信上訴人是基於上訴人的說法內在的不可信； 他不相信事情的巧合，及一名店主會將數以萬元貨值的光碟付托予一個完全陌生的僱員。 所以本席認為原審暫委裁判官所出之錯並不影響他的定罪裁斷。

21. 蘇大律師認為原審暫委裁判官沒有充份地考慮上訴人的辯解及沒有明確地指出上訴人未能在平衡可信性的基礎上確立法例所定的免責辯護。原審暫委裁判官是一名極具資歷的執業律師。雖然他沒有說明上訴人所需舉證的水準， 但是辯方於舉證只需達至民事案件的平衡可信性水準是十分基本的法律常識。 本席沒有理由相信這名具資歷的執業律師會對此標準有所誤解。 雖然本席也曾指出原審暫委裁判官於預審時曾把這免責辯護作為「Due diligence」 (應盡努力)，但當時代表上訴人的大律師已引正為第118(3)條的法定辯護。在裁斷陳述書中， 他亦明確地斷定上訴人不是個誠實可信的證人而拒絕接納他的證供。 他不相信上訴人居港20年竟然不知光碟是何物。 上訴人在被盤問及他家內有沒有視像光碟機及有關購置光碟給子女時，他的證詞矛盾，言詞閃縮。所以他裁定上訴人不能證明自己不知道亦無理由相信光碟為侵犯版權的複製品。 這也是基於原審暫委裁判官對上訴人的可信性評估及事實的裁斷。本席不宜干預。

22. 基於上述理由本席裁定原審暫委裁判官的定罪並無不妥，而上訴人亦未能證明法定的免責辯護，所以本席駁回他判罪的上訴。

判刑上訴：

23. 蘇大律師指原審暫委裁判官在判刑時沒有首先定下量刑起點，也沒有考慮上訴人的良好背景與家庭狀况。 他說原審暫委裁判官接納上訴人因控方之耽誤而飽受煎熬達一年才被檢控。 他認為恰當的判刑為3至4個月及緩刑令。

24. 在 The Secretary for Justice v. Choi Sai Lok CAAR 2/1999，上訴法庭已就這類控罪判刑作出明確的指引。總括來說，除非有極為特殊的情况，即時監禁在所難免，而恰當的量刑起點為12至18個月。經營者應服的刑期比僱員為長，而僱員並不可單因作為僱員而獲緩刑。

25. 在該案的第一答辯人在街上帶719隻複製光碟。上訴法庭認為恰當的量刑起點為12個月。本案上訴人的罪責比 Choi Sai Lok 一案中的第一答辯人為高。他們彼此管有的複製光碟數目相若。但上訴人則在商場內的地舖把光碟肆無忌憚地公然出售。若與 Choi Sai Lok 案中的第一答辯人相比，上訴人的恰當量刑起點應為18個月。上訴人經審訊後被定罪，所以不可以享有認罪的減免。他的良好家庭背景及良好刑事記錄，對減刑協助不大。儘管把這些考慮在內，本席認為恰當刑期應為15個月。

26. 原審暫委裁判官沒有明確地說明他所採用的量刑起點。他把控方的耽誤作為減刑理由，而上訴人身為店主作為加刑理由，在對消下他判予上訴人12個月監禁，再於覆核時減為11個月。 所以本席認為他選用的量刑起點為12個月，而因上訴人的背景等減刑為11個月監禁。

27. 在這類案件中，由於涉案光碟的數目及控方需獲版權持有人的核實才可採取檢控，所以延誤是無可避免的。鑑於涉案光碟的數目，調查可長達一年。原審暫委裁判官可能對此沒有認識。但本席認為在這類案件及涉案光碟的數目而言，耽誤檢控不可以作為減刑理由，因為延誤是由於上訴人涉案光碟數目所致。若他想減少耽誤， 他大可以按照《刑事訴訟條例》親自或透過律師以書面作出承認某些光碟為侵犯版權的複製品。由於他減省控方核實的時間及所花的資源，他可因而得到額外減刑折扣。若他同時認罪，本席更建議他可得到高達2份之1的折扣。

28. 雖然本席認為原審暫委裁判官判刑的程序及考慮不恰當，但上訴人亦不可單憑此而獲減刑。本席認為恰當的判刑應為15個月。所以雖然原審暫委裁判官在判刑時的程序及考慮不恰當，他的判刑亦不算高。本席也無意在此增加上訴人的刑期。本席駁回他的判刑上訴。