X (a minor, suing by her father and next friend, CHEUNG CHIM JIMMY) v. TAM HIU FAI

DCPI 2536/2022

DCPI 2537/2022

DCPI 2538/2022

(Heard Together)

[2026] HKDC 248

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 2536 OF 2022

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 2537 OF 2022

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 2538 OF 2022

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DECISION ON COSTS

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The 3 Actions

1.  These 3 court actions, DCPI 2536/2022 (“[2536]”), DCPI 2537/2022 (“[2537]”) and DCPI 2538/2022 (“[2538]”), arose out of a traffic accident which occurred on 14 August 2021 (“Accident”) in which the 3 Plaintiffs (“Ps”), a family of 3, namely the father Cheung Chim Jimmy (“Father”), the mother Chow Suk Yee (“Mother”) and the daughter X, a minor then aged 3 (“Minor”), allegedly suffered injuries.

2.  The parties, having settled all claims by way of Ps’ acceptance of the sanctioned payments made by the Defendant (“D”) separately in the 3 actions, cannot agree on costs.

3.  The name of the Minor is redacted in this Decision for privacy reasons. I further order that search/inspection of or access to the court files of action DCPI 2536/2022 shall not be allowed without leave of the court.

The Settlement Summons in [2536]

4.  The 3 actions were first brought to the attention of this Court upon the Minor’s Summons filed on 4 July 2025 in [2536] under O80 rr 10&12 of the Rules of the District Court (“RDC”) for approval of infant settlement (“Settlement Summons”).

5.  My immediate attention was caught by the extremely modest settlement sums of all 3 actions, the grossly inflated claims and the disproportionately high costs that must have been incurred.

6.  Numerous requisitions were raised by this Court such as compliance of the pre-action protocols enhancing settlement before litigation, the reasons for commencing 3 separate actions in respect of the same traffic accident involving common issues of liability, details of financial assistance already received by Ps under the Traffic Accident Victims Assistance Scheme (“TAVA Payment”) from the Social Welfare Department (“SWD”) before commencement of proceedings, etc. for the purposes of the O80 Settlement Summons in [2536].

7.  The hearing of the Settlement Summons took place on 25 August 2025. I approved the infant settlement in [2536] but not the usual costs order for an O80 settlement that costs of the action be to the infant plaintiff on the common fund basis (on the District Court scale) sought by the Minor. I made an order to reserve costs of the whole action and gave directions for the parties to make written submissions with proposed costs orders.

8.  In respect of the other 2 actions [2537] and [2538] respectively commenced by the Father and the Mother, the usual costs order that D should pay the Plaintiffs’ costs upon the latter’s acceptance of sanctioned payments was agreed to take effect. The parties agreed to submit to summary assessment by this Court.

9.  Messrs Yu Sun Yau Mak & Lawyers (“YSYM”) act for Ps and Messrs Johnson Stokes & Master (“JSM”) act for D in all 3 actions.

10.  In considering costs of the 3 separate actions, I have perused and considered the following written submissions and documents filed by the parties on various dates:-

(1)  In [2536]: YSYM’s written submissions filed on 18 August 2025 and 22 August 2025, the Minor’s Statement of Costs filed on 18 August 2025, written submissions filed on 22 September 2025 and reply submissions filed on 3 November 2025, and JSM’s written submissions filed on 21 August 2025 and 20 October 2025;

(2)  In [2537]: The Father’s Statement of Costs filed on 18 August 2025 and re-submitted on 20 October 2025 (setting out further details and breakdown on professional work pursuant to this Court’s direction given at the hearing held on 25 August 2025), JSM’s submissions and List of Objections filed on 14 November 2025 and YSYM’s reply filed on 28 November 2025; and

(3)  In [2538]: The Mother’s Statement of Costs filed on 18 August 2025 and re-submitted on 20 October 2025 (setting out further details and breakdown on professional work pursuant to this Court’s direction given at the hearing held on 25 August 2025), JSM’s submissions and List of Objections filed on 14 November 2025 and YSYM’s reply filed on 28 November 2025.

The 2 Cars/Family of 3

11.  The Accident involved two cars in a minor collision, the minor extent of which is in my view material and relevant to the court’s consideration of costs herein, and will be elaborated in detail below in this Decision.

12.  The Father was the driver of private car bearing registration number JM 1224 (“Ps’ Car”). The Mother and the Minor were passengers on board, sitting in the rear left and right passengers’ seats respectively, with the Minor safely strapped in a car seat.

13.  D was the driver of the other private car bearing registration number VA 1896 (“D’s Car”) involved in the collision.

14.  As a result of the Accident, the Minor, the Father and the Mother all sustained injuries allegedly. They claim in the 3 separate actions [2536], [2537] and [2538] respectively damages for personal injuries against D whose negligent driving had, according to Ps, caused the Accident.

15.  Liability was highly contested by D who was all along adamant that the Accident was, contrary to Ps’ pleaded case, caused by the negligent driving of the Father.

16.  In [2536] and [2538], D issued Third Party Proceedings against the Father for contribution/indemnity of the claims by the Minor and the Mother.

THE CLAIMS/THE SETTLEMENT/PS’ CLAIMS FOR COSTS

The Minor’s Action [2536]

17.  In [2536], it is pleaded in the Statement of Damages filed on 28 July 2022 that as a result of the Accident, the Minor suffered a neck sprain injury. A provisional diagnosis of neck pain and abnormal gait was made and she was granted intermittent sick leaves totalling 61 days during the period from 15 April 2021 to 25 July 2021.

18.  The Minor claims damages in the total sum of $783,577 plus interest on the following heads of claim:-

PSLA	$400,000
Post-trial loss of earnings & MPF	$327,222
Pre-trial expenses	$6,355
Post-trial expenses	$50,000
	$783,577

19.  All 3 actions proceeded through the pleadings stage, discovery, exchange of witness statements and filing of the respective Re-Revised Statements of Damages on 3 September 2024 and the Answers thereto on 29 November 2024, D’s applications for security for costs against all Ps (on the ground that Ps were ordinarily resident out of Hong Kong) filed on 23 October 2024 (“D’s Summons for security for costs”) and Third Party Proceedings issued by D against the Father (in [2536] and [2538]), until all 3 actions were ready for setting down for trial. Substantial legal costs had been incurred by both parties.

20.  In [2536], D made a sanctioned payment on 6 March 2025 in the sum of $39,000 in respect of the whole of the Minor’s claim. A Notice of Acceptance was filed on 24 March 2025.

21.  Court approval of settlement of the Minor’s claim in [2536] was sought by way of the Settlement Summons under O80 rr10&12 of the RDC.

22.  Records show that on 16 April 2021, ie 2 days after the Accident, Ps had taken prompt steps to apply to the SWD under the Traffic Accident Victims’ Assistance Scheme for TAVA Payment. The Minor had received TAVA Payment of $32,013 before issue of the Writ. It is stated in the Settlement Summons under the proposed apportionment and payment out order that of the settlement sum of $39,000, $32,013 would be paid out to Ps’ Solicitors YSYM for repayment of TAVA Payment previously received. In other words, the nett benefit gained by the Minor in action [2536] that had proceeded for almost 3 years would only be $6,987.

23.  The Minor’s claim for costs in [2536], as stated in YSYM’s Statement of Costs filed on 18 August 2025, comes to a highly disproportionate sum of $440,860.30.

24.  At the hearing of the Settlement Summons on 25 August 2025, the settlement was approved by this Court, with the costs of the whole action reserved for arguments.

The Father’s Action [2537]

25.  In [2537], it is pleaded in the Statement of Damages filed on 28 July 2022 that as a result of the Accident, the Father suffered injuries causing neck, right shoulder and upper back pain. He was granted intermittent sick leaves totalling 103 days from 15 April 2021 to 23 October 2021. He claims PSLA of $500,000 and substantial losses of earning capacity and post-trial earnings, and pleads a total claim of $1.92 million plus interest.

26.  After lengthy court proceedings, D made a sanctioned payment on 6 March 2025 in the sum of $68,000 in respect of the whole of the Father’s claim. A Notice of Acceptance was filed on 24 March 2025. From the settlement sum, he had to repay TAVA Payment of $38,269 which he had received from the SWD before issue of the Writ, leaving a nett sum of $29,731.

27.  The action [2537] was settled; what is left for this Court’s decision is summary assessment of the Father’s costs agreed to be payable by D.

28.  The Father’s claim for costs, as stated in YSYM’s Statement of Costs re-submitted on 20 October 2025, comes to a total of $369,099.80.

The Mother’s Action [2538]

29.  In [2538], it is pleaded in the Statement of Damages filed on 28 July 2022 that as a result of the Accident, the Mother suffered injuries resulting in neck, left anterior chest and arm pain. She continued to seek treatment and was granted intermittent sick leaves totalling 139 days during the period from 15 April 2021 to 24 September 2021. She claims PSLA of $400,000 and substantial losses of earning capacity and post-trial earnings, and pleads a total claim of $1.96 million plus interest.

30.  After lengthy court proceedings, D made a sanctioned payment on 6 March 2025 in the sum of $83,000 in respect of the whole of the Mother’s claim. A Notice of Acceptance was filed on 3 April 2025. The whole settlement sum would have to be repaid to the SWD as the Mother had received prior to issue of the Writ TAVA Payment of $84,499 as a result of the Accident.

31.  The action [2538] was settled; what is left for this Court’s decision is summary assessment of the Mother’s costs agreed to be payable by D.

32.  The Mother’s claim for costs, as stated in YSYM’s Statement of Costs re-submitted on 20 October 2025, comes to a total of $385,428.40.

Ps’ Other Court Actions

33.  As pleaded in Ps’ Statements of Damages and stated in their witness statements filed in the 3 actions, the family of 3 had met another traffic accident on 6 November 2021, a few months after the Accident, and all allegedly sustained injuries.

34.  Evidence shows that Ps had applied for and received TAVA Payments as well shortly after this latter traffic accident that occurred on 6 November 2021. They also commenced 3 separate personal injuries actions, which were settled in the course of the present actions.

35.  It is pleaded in the Minor’s Statement of Damages filed in [2536] that she had sustained injuries of pain at T5 & T6 and low back pain as a result of the latter traffic accident.

36.  It is stated in the Father’s Statement of Damages and witness statement filed in [2537] that other than the latter traffic accident dated 6 November 2021, he had met an earlier accident at work on 3 March 2021, ie in the month prior to the Accident. It had allegedly resulted in various disabilities including persistent low back pain, urinary incontinence and impotence. In respect of this accident at work, he had commenced an employees’ compensation action and a related personal injuries action. The actions were settled.

37.  As for the Mother, it is stated in her Statement of Damages and witness statement filed in [2538] that other than the latter traffic accident dated 6 November 2021, she had met an accident at work a few months thereafter on 4 March 2022. She allegedly sustained low back injuries and pain radiating to both lower limbs in these 2 other accidents. She had also commenced an employees’ compensation action and a related personal injuries action in respect of the subsequent accident at work.

38.  In all these, a total of 10, employees’ compensation and personal injuries actions, the family of 3 were represented by the same firm of Solicitors YSYM.

39.  The above information on other accidents and court actions commenced by Ps is set out herein by way of background. Whether such other alleged accidents, injuries and claims of Ps had had any bearing on the court processes and settlement in the present actions [2536], [2537] and [2538] are not issues before this Court. I need not go into or consider details of the other litigations.

40.  For the purposes of this Decision, I would focus on the costs arguments in the present 3 actions [2536], [2537] and [2538].

THE ARGUMENTS ON COSTS

The Minor’s Action [2536]

41.  In [2536], the parties agree that:-

(1)  the Minor should have costs of the main action (subject to the costs of D’s Summons for security for costs and P’s Settlement Summons disputed by D);

(2)  the Third Party Proceedings be discontinued with no order as to costs; and

(3)  all costs to the Minor be summarily assessed on paper.

42.  The parties dispute on the following:-

(1)  The Minor seeks costs against D of the main action on the common fund basis on the District Court scale;

(2)  D argues that the appropriate scale should be that similar to those recoverable at the Small Claims Tribunal level only;

(3)  D argues that there should be no order as to costs of D’s Summons for security for costs filed on 23 October 2024 against the Minor;

(4)  D argues that there should be no order as to costs of the Minor’s Settlement Summons filed on 4 July 2025; and

(5)  D argues that counsel fees incurred by the Minor should all be disallowed.

43.  The main issue is thus whether costs of the main action, agreed to be payable by D, should be assessed on the District Court scale or at a level similar to Small Claims costs. In considering this question, one would have to look into the detailed circumstances and impact of collision of the vehicles in the Accident, and the extent of the Minor’s injuries suffered as a result thereof as shown in the medical evidence.

The Father’s Action [2537]; The Mother’s Action [2538]

44.  The 2 actions [2537] and [2538] were settled upon acceptance by the Father and the Mother of the respective sanctioned payments made by D. It has been agreed that costs of the actions [2537] and [2538] be to the Father and the Mother respectively, payable by D, to be summarily assessed by the court on paper.

45.  In the Father’s Statement of Costs re-submitted on 20 October 2025, he claims total costs of the action at $369,099.80.

46.  D argues that costs have been substantially duplicated in the 3 actions, in particular on the common issues of liability. By his List of Objections filed on 14 November 2025, D raises substantial objections and argues that the appropriate costs that should be apportioned to and allowed in [2537] should be no more than $46,367.97.

47.  In the Mother’s Statement of Costs re-submitted on 20 October 2025, she claims total costs of the action at $385,428.40.

48.  By his List of Objections filed on 14 November 2025, D also argues on substantial duplication of costs. He raises substantial objections and argues that the appropriate costs that should be apportioned to and allowed in [2538] should be no more than $46,595.04.

The Accident

49.  There is no dispute that the Accident occurred at about 6:23 pm on 14 April 2021 at Tseung Kwan O Tunnel Road (heading towards Kwun Tong) involving Ps’ Car and D’s Car.  Immediately before the Accident, they were travelling in the 2^nd left (middle) and 3^rd left (right) lanes respectively.

50.  Ps’ pleaded case on liability, identical in the Statements of Claim and Witness Statements filed in the 3 actions, is that the collision occurred when D’s Car travelling on the 3^rd left lane (to his right) suddenly accelerated to about 40 to 50 kph and cut into the middle lane closely in front of Ps’ Car in a fast and dangerous manner. The Father was then forced to brake and stop abruptly Ps’ Car which jerked forward, but could not prevent the left rear of D’s Car to ram into the right front of Ps’ Car. As a result, both vehicles were damaged and Ps all sustained personal injuries.

51.  D pleads in the Defence filed in the 3 actions a totally different account of the collision: The Accident location was near the entrance to Tseung Kwan O Tunnel where the left 3^rd/right lane merges into the 2^nd left/middle lane. At the material time D’s Car was travelling in the 3^rd left lane, ahead of Ps’ Car in the 2^nd left lane. Upon approaching the merging point, D slowed down, switched on the left turn indicator, had ensured sufficient clearance, and slowly swerved and cut into the left 2^nd lane ahead of Ps’ Car in a safe manner. Ps’ Car suddenly accelerated, as a result the right front of Ps’ Car collided with the left rear of D’s Car.

52.  The tunnel staff and the police who arrived at the scene shortly after the Accident made enquiries with the parties. No report of injury was made and no medical assistance was required at the scene. Ps’ Car and D’s Car left the scene after initial report to and investigation by the police.

Damage to Vehicles/Car Camera Footage

53.  Photographs taken at the scene showing the damage to Ps’ Car and D’s Car resulted from the collision are telling: They show a horizontal scratch without any obvious dent, at the right front wheel cap of Ps’ Car. D’s Car had damage of slightly more extensive horizontal scratches, again without dent, around its left rear wheel cap.

54.  The photographs show, consistent with the parties’ pleaded cases, that upon collision, the right front of Ps’ Car had come into contact with the left rear of D’s Car.

55.  The damage to Ps’ Car and D’s Car was minor – this is consistent with the car camera footage from D’s Car (“Car Camera Footage”) capturing clearly D’s manner of driving at the time of the Accident.

56.  I have viewed the Car Camera Footage. It shows that immediately before the Accident, traffic in both the 2^nd and 3^rd left lanes had slowed down following the lines of busy traffic (at the usual rush hour after 6 pm) entering (Kwun Tong-bound) Tseung Kwan O Tunnel upon approaching the merging lanes. Ps’ Car also proceeded slowly, following another white vehicle in the 2^nd left lane, to the left of D’s Car. D’s Car was proceeding in the 3^rd left/right lane slowly, which I observe to be at a speed of no more than 10 to 15 kph (or 10 kph as pleaded in the Defence), coming to an almost stop intermittently following the busy traffic in front for about 50 seconds. Closer to the merging point, the left turn indicator of D’s Car was switched on (as can be seen in the blinking reflection from the car ahead) and it proceeded into the 2^nd left lane slowly. When the front of D’s Car had encroached into the 2^nd left lane, it came to a stop suddenly, apparently upon collision near its left rear wheel by the right front of Ps’ Car which was moving up from behind in the 2^nd left lane.

57.  It is noteworthy that there is no diving dotted line between the 2^nd and 3^rd left lanes where the 3^rd left lane merges into the 2^nd left lane. The vehicles in the 2 lanes as shown in the Car Camera Footage took turns to drive into the merged lane – D’s Car followed the pattern and proceeded into the 2^nd left lane following the white vehicle in front of Ps’ Car, then the collision occurred.

58.  D contests liability and argues that the Car Camera Footage evidence totally contradicts Ps’ account/pleaded case, and that the Accident was actually caused by the Father’s negligent driving. Hence D’s issue of Third Party Proceedings seeking indemnity/contribution against the Father in [2536] and [2538].

59.  The evidence supports no more than a minor collision resulting in damage of scratches only to the 2 cars. It was not surprising that no one was injured as reported to the police at the scene and during the latter’s investigation.

60.  On the other hand, the Father’s pleaded case is that due to the sudden cutting of D’s Car into his lane at a high speed ahead, he had to brake hard in order to stop Ps’ Car in time and avoid a serious collision, thereby causing a sudden forceful jerking of Ps’ Car. As a result the Father and the Minor sustained injuries resulting in neck pain, and the Mother neck, left anterior chest wall and right arm pain (as pleaded in their respective Statements of Damages).

61.  Having viewed the Car Camera Footage, I am of the firm view that Ps’ account of the Accident that “D’s Car suddenly cut into the 2^nd left lane at a high speed of 40-50kph close to Ps’ Car in a dangerous manner” is wholly contradicted and incredible. Both Ps’ Car and D’s Car were seen to be proceeding slowly with intermittent stop following the line of traffic in their respective lanes for some 50 seconds immediately before the Accident. Ps’ Car was following the slow traffic and the preceding white vehicle in its lane at a slow speed of no more than 10-15 kph. It could not have braked hard in order to stop nor caused any forceful jerking as alleged.

62.  Ps’ pleaded case is also inconsistent with the parties’ report to the police of nil injury during the latter’s investigation.

63.  During police investigation of the Accident, both the Father and D were required to attend the police station on 22 April 2021 to give their respective cautioned statements in respect of the suspected offence of Careless Driving.

64.  As a result of police investigation, no criminal prosecution was contemplated and nil report of injury was made by the parties involved, as stated in a police report dated 9 September 2021.

65.  The objective evidence surrounding the circumstances of the Accident does in my view raise serious doubts as to the real tortious party whose negligent driving had caused the Accident. Liability is highly uncertain to say the least.

66.  However, for the purposes of this Decision, it would not be necessary for this Court to come a conclusion on the issue of liability.

67.  In considering the main question whether District Court or Small Claims costs should be payable by D to the Minor in [2536], I only need to consider the severity of the injuries, if any, and the likely level of the Minor’s claim.

68.  Other than the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the Accident detailed above, I have considered in detail the medical evidence, in particular contemporaneous medical records.

The Minor’s Injuries/Medical Evidence

69.  Despite the parties’ report to the police at the scene of the Accident that no one was injured, the family of 3 all sought treatment on the night of the Accident at Gleneagles Hospital.

70.  The Minor was attended by Dr Ronald Wong at around 20:42 hrs. The relevant medical report dated 5 August 2021 records: “On examination, her general condition was good. She was cheerful and not distressed. She moved and walked normally. No injury was identified. Heart rate and oxygen saturation were normal”.  Despite the lack of injury or any abnormal findings, the doctor granted 7 days of sick leave to the Minor “because both of her parents suffered injuries, making it difficult for them to bring her to school” (!)

71.  I have reviewed further medical reports adduced in evidence on the Minor including the following:-

(i)  Medical report dated 18 May 2023 by Dr Cheung Wang Chung of Haven of Hope Bradbury King Lam Clinic in respect of medical consultations on 22 April 2021, 11 June 2021 and 18 June 2021: No abnormal findings despite the report of neck pain; 

(ii)  Medical report dated 17 July 2021 by Dr Gavin Lau of Quality HealthCare in respect of medical consultation on 30 April 2021: Report on neck pain but no abnormal findings and “good range of movement of neck and limbs...No tender spots were found…” and an incidental finding of “chronic abnormal gait of in-turning toes…request for referral to Paediatric Orthopaedic SOPD…”;

(iii)  Medical report dated 3 September 2021 by Dr Tsim Koon Lan of Tsueng Kwan O Po Ning Road GOPC in respect of medical consultation on 4 May 2021: The Mother reported that the Minor did complain of neck pain after (the Accident) but it soon subsided”. On examination the Minor was noted to be “happy and active…no complaint of neck tenderness…neck was supple on passive movement…able to perform a full active range of neck movement”. No abnormal findings;

(iv)  Medical report dated 12 July 2022 by Dr K W Chik in respect of medical consultation on 21 May 2021 and 28 June 2021: Examination “showed tenderness over the neck area” without other abnormal findings;

(v)  Medical report dated 14 July 2023 by Dr Chan Kwok Keung Aldous in respect of medical consultation on 19 July 2021: “Her parents reported that she had been complaining of discomfort in her neck…On observation, the patient appeared comfortable. She responded affirmatively when asked if she felt any pain in her neck… However, her neck movements were normal, with no apparent restrictions.”

72.  The overall medical evidence, other than subjective complaints of tenderness, does not support any objective findings of, let alone a serious, neck injury.

73.  The Minor’s pleaded case of provisional diagnosis of neck pain and abnormal gait in the Statement of Claim is misleading given the chronic abnormal gait of in-turning toes (noted during consultation with Dr Gavin Lau on 30 April 2021) was apparently an incidental finding not related to the Accident.

74.  As stated in YSYM’s written submissions, the Minor rely heavily on the long intermittent sick leaves of a total of 61 days granted as a result of the Accident as proof of severity of the Minor’s injuries.

75.  In my view, the need for the long sick leaves is questionable bearing in mind the views of Dr Ronald Wong (who examined the Minor immediately after the Accident) that no injury was identified and that sick leave was granted to the Minor not for her injury, but for the reason that the parents reported injured making it difficult for them to take her to school.

76.  It is recorded, and indeed understandable, given the tender age of the Minor, that the neck symptoms or discomfort were mainly reported by the parent(s), as recorded in some of the medical reports, who accompanied her to the consultations. Examinations all revealed nil abnormal findings. Despite so, intermittent short sick leaves, totalling 61 days, were granted by the doctors upon every consultation, likely upon the requests of the parents as was in the consultation with Dr Ronald Wong.

77.  The only medical report of the Minor recording positive findings is one dated 12 September 2021 by Dr Tuet On Sang: “Physical examination revealed neck muscle spasm and rigid”. Curiously no examination date is stated in this report, and the doctor records examination of a boy and that “He was given analgesics…”.

78.  The evidence raises doubt on the veracity of this report. No reasonable tribunal would accept such evidence against the overall medical evidence of nil medical findings, in particular upon consideration of the orthopaedic expert evidence detailed below, and the circumstances of the Accident all indicative of nil or at most an extremely minor neck injury.

Orthopaedic Expert Evidence

79.  Single joint expert (“SJE”) in orthopaedics Dr Danny Tsoi (“Dr Tsoi”) was engaged by the parties to examine the Minor on 27 October 2023, more than 2.5 years after the Accident.

80.  As set out in the SJE reported dated 7 November 2023 (“SJE Report”), at the time of examination, the Minor still complained of multiple areas of tenderness over vertex, occiput and posterior neck and scapular regions, which however were noted by Dr Tsoi to be inconsistent when asked again later in the examination.

81.  On the other hand, Dr Tsoi noted the Minor to be a very active and cheerful girl. Physical examination confirmed full range of motion in full directions of the neck without problem and no abnormal findings were made.

82.  It is apparent that Dr Tsoi did not accept the Minor’s complaints made during examination of tenderness of the multiple areas. Upon consideration of the medical records and the medical examination, Dr Tsoi concludes and states that in summary, if there were any neck injury suffered by the Minor in the Accident, it should be of very mild degree. She should be able to return to school after taking rest of one week. No objective disability is observed, and she has recovered completely from the minor sprain neck. Nil permanent impairment was assessed. It is apparent that Dr Tsoi did not accept the Minor’s complaints of tenderness of multiple areas to be genuine.

83.  It is also clear that Dr Tsoi does not accept or find the long sick leaves of 61 days granted reasonable. He concludes on the other hand a rest of one week should be sufficient and reasonable.

The Duplicated Litigations/Disproportionate Costs

84.  Against the background of one and the same minor Accident detailed hereinabove which must have raised serious doubts on any or any serious injuries caused to the passengers on board Ps’ Car, Ps had commenced 3 separate actions of claims pleaded at $780,000 by the Minor, $1.92 million by the Father and $1.93 million by the Mother.

85.  I am of the firm views that the claims are wholly unreasonable and grossly inflated in light of in the Car Camera Footage and the Minor’s medical evidence adduced and discussed above, and the ultimate extremely modest settlement sums.

86.  Faced with Ps’ highly inflated pleaded claims, D took a hard line in denying and fighting liability. In the Defence filed in the actions, D pleads details of the circumstances of the Accident and the Car Camera Footage, denial of liability and that the Accident was wholly caused and/or contributed to by the negligent driving of the Father. In [2536] and [2538], D issued Third Party Proceedings against the Father upon filing the Defence.

87.  The 3 actions and the Third Party Proceedings proceeded actively for more than 2 years through various stages of pleadings, discovery, exchange of witness statements, and filing of the Certificates of Time Estimates for Trial; the actions were ready for setting down for trial.

88.  It was not until 22 May 2024 when the parties filed a consent summons seeking consolidation of the 3 actions for the issues of liability to be tried together.

89.  Ps’ Solicitors submit that these proceedings were lengthened and substantial costs were incurred due to the complex issues on liability and D’s aggressive attitude in denying liability.

90.  I do not accept Ps’ arguments that complex issues on liability were involved in these actions, which in my view arose out of a simple and straightforward minor traffic accident as shown in the Car Camera Footage.

91.  Had complex issues on liability been involved, it would have made more sense to deal with them in one action rather than duplicating the proceedings and arguments on liability in 3 separate actions. In any event, I do not accept that any complex issues on liability could arise from the simple and minor Accident. The evidence of the Car Camera Footage and photographs taken at the scene speak for themselves.

92.  On 23 October 2024, D issued a Summons under O23 r1(a) of the RDC in all 3 actions seeking security for D’s costs up to the end of trial for the sum of $1,135,280 in each of the 3 actions on the ground that Ps were ordinarily resident out of Hong Kong. Evidence revealed, as stated in D’s Affidavit in support, that the Father and the Mother had on 15 March 2023 established a cleaning company in the UK; they are the directors of the company and their country of residence is stated to be the UK.

93.  Arguments ensued on the issue whether Ps were ordinarily resident out of Hong Kong. Ps engaged a senior counsel for advice on the issue and merits of D’s Summons for security for costs, for which Ps had incurred and paid counsel fee of $90,000.

94.  It was later transpired and as confirmed by Ps’ solicitor during the hearing on 25 August 2025 that Ps had left Hong Kong for the UK in around mid-2023 on the strength of British National (Overseas) immigration visas. As shown in the previous exchange of correspondences between the Solicitors, Ps had only returned to Hong Kong briefly to attend medical assessment by SJE Dr Tsoi in October 2023. They had no concrete plans of returning to Hong Kong as at the time of the hearing though denying any firm plans of staying in the UK.

95.  After substantial arguments in correspondences and exchange of affirmations/affidavits, at the hearing before Master Charmaine Lo on 5 February 2025 of D’s Summons for security for costs, Ps consented to provide security in the sum of $150,000 in each case. Costs of the Summons for security for costs was ordered to be in the cause (as the court had not heard arguments nor made a decision on the Summons).

96.  On 6 March 2025, D made sanctioned payments in the 3 actions in the respective sums of $39,000 in [2536], $68,000 in [2537] and $83,000 in [2538] in settlement of the whole of Ps’ claims. The sanctioned payments were accepted thereby settling all actions.

97.  Before settlement, Ps had engaged a junior counsel for advice in all 3 actions on merits and quantum, for which advice $10,000 was paid in [2536], $10,000 in [2537] and $15,000 in [2538]. In [2536], another junior counsel was engaged to advise on settlement and settling papers for seeking court approval of settlement of the Minor’s action, to whom another $25,000 was paid.

98.  As a result counsel fees of a total sum of $155,000 were incurred and paid to 3 counsel in the 3 actions.

99.  Criticisms were made by D’s Solicitors JSM on the commencement of 3 separate actions arising out of the same Accident resulting in substantial duplicated costs on the common issues of liability.

100.  Ps’ Solicitors YSYM on the other hand argue that the prolonged litigation and disproportionately high costs were resulted from D’s unreasonable and aggressive stance of denying liability altogether from the pre-action stage, issue of Third Party Proceedings against the Father and through the litigations, and D’s failure to make any constructive settlement attempts, reasonable reply or counter-offer to Ps’ “without prejudice” offers of settlement.

101.  It was in my view understandable that D took a hard stance in defence in view of the highly uncertain liability shown in the circumstances of the Accident discussed above. It is not known as there is no evidence whether the other court actions in respect of other accidents met by Ps a few months apart would have prompted further investigations in defence or deterred settlement.

102.  I do not find justified Ps’ criticisms on D’s failure to settle early thereby lengthening court proceedings and incurring substantial costs. I accept D’s arguments that Ps’ criticisms are based on the wrong footing that liability against D was clearcut or that the defence was wholly unmeritorious and a waste of costs and time.

103.  On the question of Ps commencing 3 separate actions arising out of one and the same Accident, it is obvious and in my view no more than common sense that substantial costs were duplicated in the 3 actions on the commons issues of liability on P’s identical pleadings, discovery, Third Party Proceedings and witness statements.

104.  I cannot accept YSYM’s convoluted arguments that by proceeding Ps’ 3 claims in one action, procedural complication would be caused in that court documents would be unnecessarily lengthened or that it would be difficult to extract information in relation to a particular plaintiff’s claim.

105.  I reject YSYM’s submissions that commencing Ps’ claims in 3 separation actions would bring many advantages to the conduct such as enhancing focus on a particular plaintiff’s case, or that the settlement process (rather than dealing with Ps’ 3 claims in one action) would be simplified or expedited, or that it would be more effective and efficient for the Trial Judge to peruse 3 separate trial bundles rather than one set of consolidated bundles at trial.

106.  Ps’ Solicitors rely on a Judgment on assessment of damages of HHJ Andrew Li in the cases of Chan Tsz Wing v Wong Wing Kwong, Ma Kwan Tung v Wong Wing Kwong and Chan Mei Ling v Wong Wing Kwong (DCPI 671/2012, DCPI 673/2012 and DCPI 675/2012, 16 September 2013) (“Chan Tsz Wing 3 actions”) in which 3 plaintiffs, all passengers of the same taxi, were involved in a traffic accident and commenced 3 separate actions claiming damages for personal injuries. Mr Michael Sun of YSYM submitted at the hearing held on 25 August 2025 that the Judge had endorsed the practice in those cases as he had not taken issue on duplicated costs of the separate actions when awarding costs to the plaintiffs pursuant to assessment of damage.

107.  I have no hesitation rejecting these arguments. The authority does not in my view assist Ps nor justify commencement of 3 separate actions in the cases of Chan Tsz Wing 3 actions (supra): The issue of duplicated costs on liability did not arise at all in those 3 cases in which interlocutory judgment on liability had long been entered against the defendant shortly after issue of proceedings. The 3 actions proceeded separately on the issue of quantum, and were ultimately ordered to be heard together in one assessment of damages hearing.

108.  In the circumstances of the present 3 cases, lengthy and highly contested proceedings on the common issues of liability had proceeded for more than 2 years. On the other hand, the issues of quantum, judging from the extremely mild injuries of Ps as shown in the medical evidence, are simple and uncomplicated. I accept JSM’s arguments that substantial duplicated costs on liability have been unjustifiably and unnecessarily incurred by Ps in commencing 3 separate actions. Those costs should not be allowed nor become the responsibility of D.

109.  Practitioners should note the possible costs consequences and sanctions in incurring duplicated costs of proceedings on common facts and issues unnecessarily and unjustifiably.

110.  I also found it improper for YSYM, despite JSM’s written alert before issue of the Third Party Proceedings, to continue to act for Ps in the 3 actions after the Father was made a Third Party and upon D’s pleaded case of negligent driving against the Father. There was a clear potential conflict of interest rendering it inappropriate for the Father to continue to act as the Next Friend of the Minor or be represented by the same Solicitors YSYM.

The TAVA Payments

111.  Evidence shows that 2 days after the Accident, Ps made applications on 16 April 2021 to the SWD and received (before issue of the Writs in the 3 actions) TAVA Payments (against the ultimate modest settlement sums in brackets) as follows:-

The Minor:    $32,013   (settlement sum $39,000)

The Father:    $38,269 (settlement sum $68,000)

The Mother:   $8 4,499 (settlement sum $83,000)

112.  Upon receipt of damages agreed in the court actions arising out of the Accident, Ps would have to repay to the SWD the TAVA Payments previously received.

113.  It becomes apparent immediately that the nett benefit/gain from the court actions of Ps would be left with only $6,987 to the Minor, $29,731 to the Father and nil damages to the Mother.

114.  On the other hand, disproportionately high legal costs, as set out YSYM’s 3 Statements of Costs, totalling $1.2 million have been incurred on behalf of Ps. Counsel fees alone came to $155,000 in total.

115.  There is no question that a tortious party should bear the responsibility of personal injuries claims which should include any TAVA payments required to be returned to the public funds via the SWD.

116.  However, in cases where the medical evidence justifies extremely modest claims, it should be imperative for the legal representatives to critically assess the claims and the evidence, and properly advise the lay claimants on the requirement to repay TAVA payments from damages ultimately received and the likely nett benefit to be gained before embarking on bitter and costly litigations.

117.  The risks on costs were obvious in the present case given the highly uncertain liability in light of the evidence of the Car Camera Footage and photographs showing the cars’ damage.

Costs of the Minor’s Action [2536]

Whether District Court Scale or Small Claims Costs Applicable?

118.  Much has been argued and explained by Ps’ Solicitors YSYM in their submissions that the disproportionately high costs claimed by the Minor (of $440,000) versus the extremely modest settlement (of $39,000) were resulted from the unreasonably aggressive litigation conduct of D.

119.  In considering whether the Minor should be entitled to costs on the District Court scale or Small Claims costs, one should focus on and examine the circumstances when the action was commenced in order to come to a decision on its reasonableness.

120.  As stated by Seagroatt J in his decision in B+B Construction Co v B+B Construction Co. Ltd. & Ors [2003] 3 HKLRD 192 at §21: The test to be applied in deciding whether High Court or District Court scale of fees is appropriate is: Whether the plaintiff had a reasonable prospect of recovering damages in excess of the District Court jurisdiction of $1,000,000, on full liability, at the time when the writ was issued.

121.  The test was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Cheung Yu Tin Alvin v Ho Hon Ka [2006] 2 HKLRD 674 at §§26 & 27:-

“This is similar to the question posed by Glynn-Jones J in Hopkins v Rees and Kirby Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 740, the principle of which was accepted by Seagroatt J in Lai Ki v B+B Construction Co Ltd & Ors, HCPI 63/2001 (24 June 2003, unreported):

“I think that the only question for me is: putting myself, as far as I can, in the position of the plaintiff at the time when he issued the writ, am I satisfied it was then obvious that this was a county court action or was it an action which, when tried by one judge rather than another, might have resulted in an award of £400 [the ceiling of the County Court monetary jurisdiction]?”

[emphasis added]

122.  In that case, after trial in the District Court, total damages of $27,260 with interest plus costs on the District Court scale were awarded to the Plaintiff.

123.  Upon appeal on the costs order by the defendant, the Court of Appeal, having canvassed the medical evidence, found that a reasonable assessment properly made would not have justified any claim close to the then prevailing Small Claims ceiling of $50,000. It was unreasonable for the plaintiff to have commenced the action in the District Court, which would unjustifiably put the burden of footing the legal costs bill on the defendant.

124.  The Court of Appeal further rejected the arguments by the plaintiff’s counsel that the nil response from the defendant to the plaintiff’s letters before action would have the effect of justifying the plaintiff in brining the action in the District Court. The lawyer was duty bound to advise the plaintiff of the costs implications of suing in the District Court in light of the extremely minor injury.

125.  The Court of Appeal overturned the order awarding costs to the plaintiff on the District Court scale and substituted it with a scale similar to that of the Small Claims Tribunal, stating in §33:-

“…the proper scale of costs of the action including the hearing for assessing the quantum of damages should be that similar to that of the Tribunal, which will fairly reflect the amount of damages awarded and have the desirable effect of discouraging litigants from unreasonably selecting the District Court as the forum for a claim of damages that are well under the Tribunal’s jurisdictional limit.”

[emphasis added]

126.  The main consideration should thus be the nature and extent of the Minor’s injury sustained in the Accident.

127.  As set out earlier in this Decision, I have examined the circumstances of the Accident which in all fairness was no more than a minor collision causing superficial scratch damage, not even a dent, to the 2 vehicles involved. Immediately before the Accident and upon collision, both Ps’ Car and D’s Car were caught in busy traffic in 2 merging lanes into one entering the tunnel, and were travelling at an extremely slow speed. It was highly unlikely as is obvious from the Car Camera Footage that the Father had to brake hard Ps’ Car resulting in forceful jerking. In those circumstances, it was highly unlikely that the Minor, safely strapped in a car seat in Ps’ Car, would suffer any, let alone any serious, neck injury.

128.  The overall medical evidence, in particular the expert evidence of SJE Dr Tsoi, suggests nil or at most a very minor neck injury of the Minor, without any objective abnormal findings indicative of any serious injury all along.

129.  The intermittent sick leaves totalling 61 days, heavily relied upon by Ps’ Solicitors to be supportive of severity of the Minor’s injury, is contradicted by the expert opinion of Dr Tsoi who suggests a sick leave of a week would be sufficient. Indeed the initial sick leave of 7 days was granted by Dr Ronald Wong on the night of the Accident not for the Minor’s injury, but for the reason that the parents were injured and no one could take her to school as stated in the medical report.

130.  The pleaded claim of $400,000 for PSLA is grossly inflated. The claim for post-trial loss of earnings in the sum of $327,222 in the case of the 3-year-old Minor is wholly unsustainable. The claim for post-trial medical expenses of $50,000 also lacks basis, against the medical evidence showing full recovery.

131.  A reasonable claim should comprise no more than items of (i) damages for PSLA and (ii) reimbursable expenses incurred and paid as a direct result of the Accident.

132.  In considering the appropriate award for PSLA, reference is made to authorities involving minor neck injuries as follows:-

(1)  In Lai Ka Yin v Chan Yiu Kei (DCPI 453/2008, 7 January 2009), the plaintiff sustained neck and back injuries when her vehicle was crashed from behind. She was hospitalized for 3 days, had physiotherapy and continuous follow up treatment, and was granted sick leaves for more than 8 months. HHJ Mimi Chan (as she then was) considered the soft injuries minor despite the alleged on and off lingering pain. An award for PSLA was made at $50,000.

(2)  In Cheung Yu Tin Alvin (supra), the plaintiff, a passenger on board a double decker bus, sustained soft tissue low back injuries upon collision of the bus by a taxi. He continued to suffer tightness and pain upon weather changes and on prolonged sitting and standing some 2 years after the accident. Medical expert evidence suggests 1% permanent whole person impairment and recovery was normally expected between 2 weeks and 2 months. An award for PSLA was made at $25,000 at trial.

As summarised above, upon appeal by the defendant on costs, the Court of Appeal overturned the order awarding costs to the plaintiff on the District Court scale and substituted it with a scale similar to that of the Small Claims Tribunal.

133.  A reasonable assessment of the Minor’s claim at the time of issue of the writ, even taken into account the full medical and other expenses of $6,355 as pleaded in the Statement of Damages, would not in my view be anything near the ceiling of the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Tribunal of $75,000.

134.  Applying the test stated in Lai Ki (supra) as endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Cheung Yu Tin Alvin (supra), I accept D’s submissions that at the time of issue of the writ on 28 July 2022 which was more than 15 months after the Accident, there was no reasonable prospect for the Minor to have a claim, on full liability, anywhere near the District Court jurisdiction.

135.  Upon this conclusion, I would have considered it reasonable to award costs to the Minor at a level similar to that adopted in the Small Claims Tribunal.

136.  However, in the present case, given the Minor was allegedly injured in the Accident together with the Father and the Mother, it would be reasonable and would enhance efficient and effective case management to commence the Minor’s action in the District Court together with those of her parents, particularly when they were legally represented by the same solicitors. On that basis, I accept that District Court scale costs, on the usual common fund basis, in the case of a minor should be awarded in [2536].

137.  I am also aware of the authorities stating that a minor/mentally incapacitated person must sue by a next friend who must act with legal representation, hence an action within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Tribunal should be transferred to the District Court. See [2022] HKCFI 890[1] at §11 and [2018] HKCFI 52[2] at §4. However, as neither party in the present case has raised this issue, I need not deal with it.

Whether the Minor Should Have Costs of the Whole Action?

138.  Upon the Minor’s acceptance under O22 r20 of the RDC of the sanctioned payment made by D, she would normally be entitled to her costs of the proceedings up to the date of serving notice of acceptance, unless the Court otherwise orders.

139.  The prima facie rule may be displaced when the court considers it necessary and orders otherwise. The court retains full discretion to do so, but the discretion should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances that clearly warrant a different costs order.

140.  The court has full discretion as to costs pursuant to section 53(1) of the District Court Ordinance (Cap 336).

141.  Also as provided under O62 r5 of the RDC, the court in exercising its discretion as to costs shall, to such extent, if any, as may be appropriate in the circumstances, take into account, inter alia, the underlying objectives set out in O1A r1 and the conduct of the parties, and be guided by O 62 r2.

142.  D argues that the Minor should not be entitled to the costs of D’s Summons for security for costs and costs of the Minor’s Settlement Summons.

143.  On the overall evidence, I consider that there are exceptional circumstances in this case, ie the highly uncertain liability, the nil or extremely minor injury suffered by the Minor, Ps’ highly inflated claims prompting antagonistic court processes in defence and the low settlement sum which collectively may justify departure from the general rule that the Minor should have costs of the action up to the date of accepting sanctioned payment.

Costs of D’s Summons for Security for Costs

144.  Evidence shows that (i) Ps had left Hong Kong for the UK in around mid-2023 on the strength of BN(O) emigration visas and (ii) the Father and the Mother had established a business in the UK and reported to be ordinary residents there. The position was confirmed by Ps’ Solicitor at the hearing held on 25 August 2025. Ps had no definite plans of returning to Hong Kong in the near future.

145.  On such evidence and in the light of the highly contested liability issues, the likelihood of a bitter-fought trial, and the substantial costs that had already been/would likely be incurred, I accept D’s submissions that his issue on 23 October 2024 of the Summonses for security for costs against Ps were reasonable in the circumstances.

146.  Ps’ arguments on D’s highly exaggerated claims for security in the sum of $1,135,280 in each case would not in my view render the issue of the applications unreasonable or that D should be penalised on costs. Ultimately Ps consented to provide security of $150,000 in each case. I would be inclined that the usual costs consequence should follow the event, making Ps liable to such costs.

147.  On the other hand, more substantial costs of arguments of the summonses had likely been incurred in light of D’s unreasonably high claims for security.

148.  To conclude, I accept D’s submissions and consider it reasonable to make no order as to costs of D’s Summons for security for costs.

Costs of the Minor’s Settlement Summons

149.  The Settlement Summons was filed on 4 July 2025 under O80 rr10 & 12 of the RDC seeking approval of settlement and costs against D on the common fund basis, with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed (on the District Court scale).

150.  Substantial arguments ensued on the Minor’s entitlement and the applicable scale of costs.

151.  In light of this Court’s conclusion that the Minor’s claim was highly inflated and was well within the Small Claims jurisdiction of $75,000 and the decision of no order as to costs of D’s Summons for security for costs, I consider it reasonable to also make no order as to costs of the Minor’s Settlement Summons filed on 4 July 2025.

Summary Assessment of the Minor’s Costs in [2536]

152.  I have considered the Minor’s Statement of Costs filed on 18 August 2025, which sets out the total costs claimed at $440,860.30.

153.  Following from my decisions above, I would discount from the Statement of Costs those costs relating to the Third Party proceedings, D’s Summons for security for costs and the Minor’s Settlement Summons.

154.  In conducting summary assessment of costs, I have taken into account the substantially duplicated costs on liability incurred in the 3 separate actions, and borne in mind the principles and the application of O62 r28(2) of the RDC, the equivalent of the Rules of the High Court as discussed in the Court of Appeal judgment of Poon Shu Fan v Wong Tin Yan & Anor [2012] 5 HKLRD 512, under the holding:-

(2) …in a summary assessment, party-and-party costs were allowed only if they were “necessary or proper” for the attainment of justice or for enforcing or defending the rights of the receiving party. Pursuant to Practice Direction 14.3, the court adopted a broad-brush approach to ensure the final figure assessed was not disproportionate and/or unreasonable having regard to the nature and circumstances of the application or matter and the underlying objectives stated in O.1A of the RHC, even if there was no challenge to individual items. (See paras.5–13.)

(3) A summary assessment required a two-stage approach. If total costs claimed appeared proportionate, then all that was normally required was that each item should have been reasonably incurred and the cost reasonable. If the overall costs appeared disproportionate, then the court would have to be satisfied that each item was necessary and its cost was reasonable. A sensible standard of necessity should be adopted allowing fully for the different judgments which those responsible for litigation could sensibly come to as to what was required. While the threshold was higher than that of reasonableness, it should be achievable by a competent practitioner without undue difficulty. The conduct of the other party was relevant, since a cooperative party could reduce costs, but an uncooperative party could render necessary costs which would otherwise be unnecessary (Lownds v Home Office [2002] 1 WLR 2450 applied). (See paras.15–17.)”

[emphasis added]

155.  The basis of common fund costs is a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred (See Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025 at 80/12/14). I however take the view that counsel’s fees incurred in the total sum of $65,000 were not reasonably incurred. Counsel’s advice should not be required for this simple and straightforward traffic accident case, and the costs would highly likely, as it ultimately turned out, to become wholly disproportionate to the extremely modest claim. I do not accept that the supervising partner, Mr Michael Sun, admitted in 1997, could not have undertaken or supervised the advice work. The engagement of a senior counsel to advise on D’s Summons for security for costs, in particular whether Ps were “ordinarily resident” outside Hong Kong, is unwarranted against the background that Ps had left Hong Kong since mid-2023 on the strength of emigration visas, as confirmed by their solicitor in court.

156.  I therefore consider counsel’s engagement wholly unnecessary and the fees not reasonably incurred, and do not allow the same.

157.  I also disallow the disbursements in respect of the fees incurred in obtaining medical expert reports, such being wholly disproportionate to the minor injury and small claim, and not reasonably incurred.

158.  Discounting the Third Party Proceedings and costs relating to the 2 summonses as set out in §§144-151 hereinabove, and the substantial duplicated costs on the issues of liability in the 3 actions as stated in the 3 Statements of Costs, I consider it reasonable to allow (i) $1,000 for manual work; (ii) $40,000 for attendance, correspondence and professional work; and (iii) $10,000 for disbursements, making a total award for costs of $51,000.

159.  I further order that such costs shall be paid within 28 days from the date of this order.

Costs of the Father’s Action [2537]

160.  The Father’s claim for costs amounts to a total of $369,099.98 as set out in his Statement of Costs re-submitted on 20 October 2025. It is highly disproportionate to the ultimate settlement of sum of $68,000 from which the Father had to repay TAVA Payment of $38,269, leaving a nett gain of $29,731.

161.  I do not allow counsel’s fees incurred which I consider not reasonably necessary and were wholly disproportionate to the modest claim.

162.  Evidence raises the suspicion that the Father’s claim herein overlaps that arose out of his injury at work accident which occurred just a month prior to the Accident.

163.  On the costs of professional work, the claims for drafting pleadings set out in the Statement of Costs including 5 hours on the Writ of Summons, 7 hours on the Statement of Claim, 8 hours on the Statement of Damages, 4 hours on the 7-page Reply, 9 hours on the Father’s relatively simple and straightforward witness statement, 6 hours on the agreed trial and mediation bundles indices and 4 hours on the Revised Statement of Damages (absent any change of medical conditions or circumstances of claim) are in my view unreasonably high in light of the relatively simple and straightforward Accident and minor injuries. The claim of 5 hours for preparing the joint instruction letters to SJE Dr Tsoi is also unreasonable.

164.  The items of professional work duplicate substantially those listed in the Mother’s Statement of Costs discussed in §172 hereinbelow.

165.  The total attendance of more than 140 hours by 3 solicitors of different seniority, including Mr Michael Sun, and the 150+ letters in exchange of correspondence with D’s Solicitors JSM, resulting in total costs claimed of $295,000, is wholly unreasonable.

166.  I have considered JSM’s List of Objections filed on 14 November 2025 and the submissions regarding the substantial duplication of work of P’s Solicitors in the 3 cases, the unnecessary and duplicated arguments and correspondences, and D’s proposal that total costs and disbursements should be allowed at $46,367.97 only. I accept JSM’s submissions on the duplicated and disproportionately high costs claimed and that the Father’s entitlement to costs should be substantially cut down.

167.  Taking a broad-brush approach, I would allow (i) $1,000 for manual work; (ii) $35,000 for attendance, correspondence and professional work; and (iii) $25,000 for disbursements (agreed by D), making a total award for costs of $61,000.

168.  I further order that such costs shall be paid within 28 days from the date of this order.

Costs of the Mother’s Action [2538]

169.  The Mother’s claim for costs amounts to a total of $385,428.40 as set out in her Statement of Costs re-submitted on 20 October 2025. It is highly disproportionate to the ultimate settlement sum of $83,000. She would be left with nil gain from the litigation given she had received previously TAVA Payment of $84,499, hence would have to repay the whole settlement sum to the SWD.

170.  This case demonstrates the importance for legal practitioners to critically assess the claim and the evidence, before resorting to litigation thereby incurring unreasonable and disproportionately high costs.

171.  The bitter and aggressive litigation was no doubt intensified resulting in unusually high costs in light of the grossly inflated claims of Ps pleaded in the Statements of Damages.

172.  On the costs of professional work, the claims for drafting pleadings and court documents set out in the Statement of Costs including 2 hours on the Writ of Summons, 5 hours on the Certificate on fee arrangement, 5 hours on the Statement of Damages, 4 hours on the 7-page Reply, 5 hours on the Third Party Defence, 4 hours on the Revised Statement of Damages and 4 hours on the Re-Revised Statement of Damages (absent any change of medical conditions or circumstances of claim), 9 hours on the Mother’s relatively simple and straightforward witness statement and 6 hours on the agreed trial and mediation bundles indices are in my view unreasonably high in light of the relatively simple and straightforward Accident and minor injuries. The claim of 5 hours for preparing 2 joint instruction letters to SJE Dr Tsoi is also unreasonable.

173.  The total attendance of a total of about 130 hours by 3 solicitors of different seniority, including Mr Michael Sun, and the 150+ letters in exchange of correspondence with D’s Solicitors JSM, resulting in total costs claimed of $307,000, is wholly unreasonable.

174.  The substantial duplication on items of professional work, attendance and correspondence in the 3 cases is obvious as shown in the 3 Statements of Costs.

175.  I have considered JSM’s List of Objections filed on 14 November 2025 and the submissions regarding the substantial duplication of work of P’s Solicitors in the 3 cases, the unnecessary and duplicated arguments and correspondences, and D’s proposal that total costs and disbursements should be allowed at $46,595.04 only. I accept JSM’s submissions on the duplicated and disproportionately high costs claimed and that the Mother’s entitlement to costs should be substantially cut down.

176.  Taking a broad-brush approach, I would allow (i) $1,000 for manual work; (ii) $35,000 for attendance, correspondence and professional work; and (iii) $25,000 disbursements (agreed by D), making a total award for costs of $61,000.

177.  I further order that such costs shall be paid within 28 days from the date of this order.

ORDER

178.  I therefore make orders in the 3 actions as follows:

179.  In the Minor’s action DCPI 2536/2022, subject to the undertaking of Ps’ Solicitors to waive and not to recover from the Minor plaintiff further costs not recoverable from D,

(1)  There be no order as to costs of D’s Summons for security for costs filed on 23 October 2024;

(2)  There be no order as to costs of P’s Summons on settlement and costs filed on 4 July 2025;

(3)  By consent, leave be granted to D to discontinue the Third Party Proceedings with no order as to costs between P, D and the Third Party;

(4)  Save for the costs provided in (1), (2) and (3) hereinabove, D do pay P’s costs of the action, on the common fund basis, summarily assessed at $51,000; and

(5)  Such assessed costs shall be paid by D to P within 28 days from the date hereof.

180.  In the Father’s action DCPI 2537/2022,

(1)  D do pay P’s costs of the action, summarily assessed at $61,000; and

(2)  Such assessed costs shall be paid by D to P within 28 days from the date hereof.

181.  In the Mother’s action DCPI 2538/2022,

(1)  D do pay P’s costs of the action, summarily assessed at $61,000; and

(2)  Such assessed costs shall be paid by D to P within 28 days from the date hereof.

182.  I further order that the security for costs paid into court on 3 March 2025 by Ps in the sum of $150,000 in each of the 3 actions (together with interest accrued thereon, if any) be released to Ps through their Solicitors forthwith.