LATIF FARRUKH v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND ANOTHER

HCAL 1456/2020

[2026] HKCFI 1355

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1456 of 2020

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

1.  The Form 86 be amended on the Court’s own motion by substituting, in relation to the Name and description of proposed respondent, “Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office” in place of “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and by naming only the Director of Immigration as the Putative Interested party; and

2.  The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.  The Applicant is a citizen of Pakistan. By a Form 86 filed on 13 July 2020 (“Form 86”), which was accompanied by a supporting Affirmation also filed on 13 July 2020 (“the Affirmation”), the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of:

(1)  Two decisions of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 28 November 2014 (“Director’s Decision”) and 9 August 2017 (“Director’s Further Decision”); and

(2)  A decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) made on 12 June 2020 (“the TCAB Decision”)[1].

2.  The Applicant sought an oral hearing of his application. He was notified of and attended that scheduled for 21 August 2025, and said he wished to submit further documentation in support of his claim. I issued some directions in relation to such and directed that the hearing be resumed on 16 September 2025. He lodged some documents both before, and after, the resumed hearing. I will deal with such matters below.

3.  I will use the abbreviations and definitions from the TCAB Decision unless otherwise specified herein.

Background

4.  This is set out in the TCAB Decision. While I will not repeat the contents thereof, in summary and in relation to the assessment of his claim:

(1)  The Applicant claimed non-refoulement relief on the basis that if he were sent back to Pakistan, he would be harmed or killed by Syeed Abdullah, the latter’s sons Abbas and Naveed, and Abbas and Naveed’s cousin Syed Asim, as they are Shia Muslims and the Applicant is a Sunni Muslim;

(2)  The claim was assessed on the grounds of Torture Risk[2], BOR 3 Risk[3], and Persecution Risk[4] and was rejected by the Director in the Director’s Decision. The Applicant hence sought relief from the TCAB/NRCPO by way of a Notice of Appeal/Petition dated 15 December 2014;

(3)  On 13 August 2015, the Applicant wrote to the Director and sought protection in relation to BOR 2 Risk[5]. The Director sought additional facts from the Applicant in relation to such, but none were provided. The Director hence determined in the Director’s Further Decision that the Applicant had failed to establish BOR 2 Risk if refouled, and noted that given that the Applicant’s appeal/petition was still pending, the TCAB/NRCPO could determine such on all applicable grounds; and

(4)  The TCAB/NRCPO held a hearing on 4 September 2019 which was attended by the Applicant, who gave evidence at such. The decision-maker then issued the TCAB Decision dated 12 June 2020, in which he held that the Applicant was not entitled to non-refoulement protection on any of the aforesaid grounds and confirmed both the Director’s Decision and the Director’s Further Decision.

Legal Principles

5.  An applicant, even one acting in person, is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly in the Form 86, and to fully and frankly disclose all material facts and potential legal answers (Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, unrep. HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016, Chow J. (as he was then) at §142; Leung Kwok Hung, unrep., HCAL 83/2012, 28 September 2012, Lam J. (as he was then) at §35; Begum Khadija [2018] HKCA 571; Khan Kamran [2020] HKCA 380).

6.  It is trite that the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal, and that the Court should not usurp the role of the TCAB/NRCPO which is (and together with the Director are) the primary decision‑makers. The assessment of evidence, COI materials, and credibility, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the TCAB/NRCPO and the Director, which are entitled to make evaluations based on the evidence available and to decide the weight to be given to them. While the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB/NRCPO. (Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524; Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022; Re Rupinder Singh [2021] HKCA 886).

7.  In order for me to give leave to apply for judicial review, I have to be satisfied that there is an intended ground of review which is reasonably arguable, which is one that enjoys a realistic prospect of success (Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676). As a leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process, I am not expected to give elaborate reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23).

Discussion

8.  The Form 86 contains several grounds:

(1)  Firstly, the following grounds which are said to arise in relation to the “Director’s Decision”, but which for present purposes I have read as being advanced in relation to both the Director’s Decision and the Director’s Further Decision. These have been copied almost word for word (including typographical errors e.g. the use of “complied” rather than “compiled”) from other cases:

i.  “From the Director's Decision, it was evident that the director has failed to appreciate or give the proper importance or weightage to the presence of state Acquiescence in the Applicant’s case. This has indeed led to an unfair outcome of rejecting the Applicants(sic) non‑refoulement claim.”

ii.  “The applicants(sic) was tortured at the Behest of and in full collusion of the Police and the the state law enforcement agencies as well as those in the high ups of political circles. The whole saga of misfortune was a direct result of misconduct of Police officials.

iii.  “It is submitted that the state would be rendered liable to the applicants(sic) by cause of the state and its public officials failing to provide reasonable protection for its citizens under the duty of due diligence.”

iv.  “The Applicant submits that the Director has failed to take such argument into account or that the Director has failed to give enough weight to such argument before reaching the Decision.

v.  “Further, the applicant submits that although the Director had listed relevant COIS which support the Applicants aversions that the police in Pakistan would not be able to protect. The Director failed to consider or give sufficient weightage to those evidence and ruled otherwise.”

vi.  “Surprisingly, the director in his Decision while referring to relevant COIS. Kept including meaning which suited his pre-conceive conclusion. This was a clean case of unfair attitude shown by the Director which in itself is enough to render his Decisions void.”

vii.  “In Fact, the corruption and incompetency of the administration in Pakistan is still a very serious problem. Various human rights organisation has complied reports on the matter which stated testament to the applicants assertions.”

viii.  “Further, the director has failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by the Wednesbury test in the decisions with the arguments put forward above. As such, the decisions of the director should be considered unreasonable in the scope of Public Law.”

ix.  That the Immigration Officer/Immigration Case Officer “couldn’t realised the seriousness of my case”, “just assumed in my case, he didn’t know the real situation and condition of Pakistani culture. Because, my Immigration Officer never visited the Pakistan, spacially(sic) my area and in my case. I am sure, if my case officer visit my country, he will not give this kind of Decision in my case.”

x.  The bare allegation that several asylum seekers had died in Hong Kong but the Director did not approve their claims, and that “Many” other unnamed asylum seekers were “killed, upon returned, by force, of Director of Immigration, in his home countries”.

(collectively, Grounds 1)

(2)  In relation to the TCAB/NRCPO, that it “failed to make sufficient enquiring(sic) before finalizing the determination. The [TCAB/NRCPO] stated that the applicants(sic) has failed to advice(sic) any credible evidence to prove material elements of them(sic) claim. It is to be noted that the applicants(sic) are torture-claimants(sic) whose(sic) has no limited options at his disposal to bring them evidence before the tribunal, and that to when they(sic) are in Hong Kong, under custody at the Immigration Hong Kong. [The TCAB/NRCPO] “has failed to give sufficient chance to the applicants(sic) to arrange relevant evidence to them(sic) non-refoulement claim as well as them(sic) appeal.” (Ground 2)

9.  The Affirmation, but not the Form 86, alleges that the Director’s Decision, the Director’s Further Decision, and the TCAB Decision are all “unreasonable” and that all of the decision-makers “failed to take into account many things and assues(sic).” (the Complaint)

10.  However, once the Applicant had pursued his appeal to the TCAB/NRCPO the Director’s Decision and the Director’s Further Decision were (absent exceptional circumstances, of which none have been suggested to me) no longer susceptible to judicial review (Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549; Yeni Setyawati v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2019] HKCA 1310; Sherpunja Thapa Kul Prasad [2022] HKCFI 2434 §18). Grounds 1, and the portions of the Complaint that relate to the Director, the Director’s Decision, and the Director’s Further Decision, are hence not reasonably arguable and must be dismissed.

11.  Furthermore, Ground 2 is, and the remnants of the Complaint are, entirely inadequate as they are merely generic, vague, and unparticularised assertions using selected keywords and phrases without reference to any underlying facts or matters establishing why, how, and where each of those complaints arise in relation to the TCAB Decision (such as the “many things and [issues]” that it is apparently claimed that the TCAB/NRCPO failed to take into account). Such general assertions or propositions of law without particulars are not effective grounds to support a judicial review and cannot assist an applicant (Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20 at §17; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA 578 at §17; Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626 at §24; Re Salim Ahmed [2020] HKCA 244 at §20; Haider Khalil [2021] HKCA 223 at §16; Akhondo Shakhil, supra, at §15).

12.  Nevertheless, given the seriousness of the issues at hand, I have considered the TCAB Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard and bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness.

13.  The TCAB/NRCPO set out the Applicant’s background, procedural and immigration history, the Applicant’s claims and where they were contained, and outlined how the oral hearing had been conducted (Paragraphs 1 to 63). It then, with regard to relevant principles and evidence before it, assessed the Applicant’s credibility, finding that he was not a witness of truth and that the TCAB/NRCPO was not satisfied that the Applicant had told it the truth in relation to critical elements of his claims. The decision-maker accepted that the Applicant was a Sunni Muslim, but did not accept that the Applicant had a dispute with any Shia people, including Syed Abdullah, his sons, or their cousin, or anyone else in Pakistan. It also did not accept that the Applicant experienced any trouble or harm in Pakistan because he was a Sunni Muslim or for any other reason, that the Applicant was threatened or attacked or shot at as claimed, that the Applicant had a religious dispute prior to leaving Pakistan, or indeed various other core assertions made by the Applicant in relation to his non-refoulement claim as to complaints, negotiations, reports to Police, fleeing due to fear of harm, hiding in Karachi, being framed, or having a warrant for his arrest. On the evidence, it also did not accept that he had left Pakistan for fear of his safety, that he feared returning for reasons claimed, that the Applicant had had a religious dispute prior to leaving Pakistan, that there was anyone in Pakistan who had or has any adverse interest in the Applicant, or that there was a real risk anyone in Pakistan would harm the Applicant for any of the reasons claimed (or for any other reasons) if he were refouled. There was hence no real risk of harm, and no real risk that he would face any of the proscribed forms of harm, if he were refouled (Paragraphs 64 to 109).

14.  The decision-maker then had regard to salient principles relating to each of the four types of risk claimed and, given its findings in the previous section, was not satisfied that any of them were established or substantiated. The Applicant was hence not entitled to non‑refoulement protection, the appeal/petition was refused, and the Director’s Decision and the Director’s Further Decision were confirmed (Paragraphs 110 to 146).

15.  I do not, from my examination and scrutiny, see that the Applicant has any reasonably arguable case that there was procedural unfairness (bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness), an error of law, and/or irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test that is sufficient to vitiate the TCAB Decision and justify the grant of leave. In particular, I do not consider that the allegations in Ground 2 and/or the remnants of the Complaint (whether considered separately or together) raise any such reasonable arguments, or indeed any failure to meet the high standard of fairness as explained in TK v Jenkins & anor [2013] 1 HKC 256, in particular at §§19-27:

(1)  The Applicant was first released on recognizance on 27 November 2008, and after he had subsequently served a prison sentence was, again, released on recognizance on 2 June 2011. Between the latter date and the making of the Director’s Decision he (with the assistance of the Duty Lawyer Service) completed his torture claim form, supplementary claim form, and was interviewed by staff of the Director. Moreover, over 21 months elapsed between the Director’s Decision and the hearing before the TCAB/NRCPO. The Applicant hence had ample opportunity to arrange relevant evidence in support of his claim;

(2)  The Applicant has not provided any specifics of the inquiries that should have been made, or the “relevant evidence” to his appeal that he claims could or should have been arranged if given a “sufficient chance”, or indeed of the “many things and issues” that he says the TCAB/NRCPO failed to take into account. Nor have I been referred to any evidence of any other complaint, request, or application for more time and/or an adjournment to enable the Applicant (or the TCAB/NRCPO) to obtain any further relevant documents and/or make any relevant further inquiries. Moreover, the Applicant has also not explained how any alleged failure to make inquiries, take into account such things and issues, and/or to allow him to arrange evidence, had affected, impeached, or justifies vitiation of the analysis or conclusions reached in the TCAB Decision; and

(3)  I do not see any reasonably arguable case that Ground 2 and/or the remnants of the Complaint (including any alleged complaint of irrationality/Wednesbury unreasonableness) are made out even with reference to rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny of the facts of this case. Rather, the TCAB/NRCPO applied a high standard of fairness, considered the relevant evidence before it, and gave sufficient reasons for its conclusions on salient issues. There is no reasonably arguable public law error sufficient to vitiate (let alone justify the grant of leave in relation to) the assessment, reasoning, and findings regarding the evidence, credibility, and risk of harm which are matters primarily within the province of the decision-making body, or the decision-maker’s consequent conclusions regarding Torture Risk, Persecution Risk, BOR 3 Risk, and BOR 2 Risk.

16.  As I have mentioned, the Applicant sought to submit certain additional documents for my consideration, namely two alleged First Information Reports in Urdu apparently dated 13 April 2022 and 2 June 2025, and English translations thereof apparently signed and made by an Urdu interpreter on 18 October 2025. However, I do not see how any of their contents are relevant to the leave application, given the findings in and my aforesaid analysis of the TCAB Decision, the nature of judicial review proceedings which are not meant to provide a further avenue of appeal, and as the Court of Appeal has, since the resumed hearing on 16 September 2025, clarified that the test in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 does not apply (Chidomere Christian Okechukwu v TCAB [2025] HKCA 694).

17.  I am not therefore not satisfied that there are any reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review which enjoy a realistic prospect of success, or that there is any basis for the court to intervene by judicial review.

Conclusion

18.  In the circumstances I have ordered that the application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed and made the other orders above.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1