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CACV 32/2026, [2026] HKCA 930
On appeal from [2025] HKCFI 6389
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 32 OF 2026
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1321 OF 2020)
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| Before: |
Hon Chu VP and Hon Eugene Fung J in Court |
| Date of Judgment: |
15 May 2026 |
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Chu VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):
Introduction
1. This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Y.W. Hew (“the Judge”) given on 31 December 2025[1] refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision dated 9 June 2020 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”). By its decision, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision dated 9 August 2018 of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim having regard to the torture risk[2], BOR 3 risk[3], persecution risk[4] and BOR 2[5] risk grounds.
Background
2. The applicant is a national of Pakistan born in 1987. He entered Hong Kong illegally and surrendered to the Immigration Department on 17 April 2016. He raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Pakistan, he would be harmed or killed by members of the Pakistan Muslim League (N) (“PML(N)”) because he and his family support the opposition party Pakistan Muslim League (Q) (“PML(Q)”) and he had refused to join their party. Details of the applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting his appeal have all been set out in the Board’s decision[6].
3. The applicant’s application for leave to judicially review the Board’s decision was refused by the Judge. The grounds advanced by the applicant in support of his application and the Judge’s reasons for refusing leave were set out in [12] to [15] of the Form CALL-1. We will not repeat them.
The appeal
4. On 14 January 2026, the applicant, acting in person, filed a Notice of Appeal to appeal the Judge’s decision to this Court. In summary, his stated grounds of appeal are: (1) the Director’s decision was unfair in that he failed to give sufficient weight to the presence of state acquiescence and referred only to the country-of-origin information which suited his pre-conceived conclusion; and (2) the Board failed to make sufficient inquiry with the applicant and did not give him sufficient opportunity to arrange relevant evidence before determining his appeal. The applicant has not put forward any ground to challenge the Judge’s decision.
5. The appeal was listed to be heard on 9 March 2026. Upon the applicant’s failure to lodge a written submission, the hearing date was vacated. On 13 March 2026, upon the application of the applicant, who was then legally represented, the time for the applicant to lodge written submissions was extended to 27 March 2026 and the appeal was re-listed to be heard on 28 April 2026. The applicant’s written submissions were lodged on 27 March 2026. By a letter dated 20 April 2026[7], the applicant indicated that he has decided to go back to Pakistan and requested to withdraw his appeal.
Discussion
6. The legal principles on dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases are well established: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13]; and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11]; and Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022. Relevantly, assessment of evidence, country-of-origin information, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director as they are the primary decision makers. Judicial review does not operate as a further avenue of appeal, and the Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. In the determination of an appeal against the refusal of leave by the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal will only examine the judge’s decision in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. It is not the role of this Court to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if the appeal were a fresh application for judicial review.
7. In the present case, at the hearing before the Board, despite the Board’s indication that it wished to clarify certain aspects of his claim, the applicant refused to answer questions put by the Board and chose to only rely on the submitted materials. The Board had no alternative but to proceed to determine his appeal on the basis of the materials before it. In so doing, the Board correctly reminded itself of the need to proceed on the basis that the applicant’s case is plausible if no adverse finding of credibility could be made on his claim: Re Hidayah [2018] HKCA 595.
8. For the reasons given in its decision, the Board found material aspects of the applicant’s case to be vague and inconclusive, such as his political involvement in PML(Q), his escape from gunfire as a wanted political enemy, and the status of his siblings who are apparently in Hong Kong. The Board did not consider the applicant’s case to be plausible, and found that the evidence did not support the applicant’s claim that he would face a real risk of harm from the supporters of PML(N). The Board also found state protection and internal relocation options to be reasonably available, which would negate or reduce any risk of harm that the applicant might face. The Board accordingly concluded that the applicant has failed to substantiate his claim on any of the applicable grounds.
9. These are findings of fact open to the Board based on the materials before it and for the reasons it gave. The applicant’s complaints that the Board failed to make inquiry before determining his appeal and did not afford him sufficient opportunity to arrange his evidence are simply not borne out by the facts in the case. Contrary to his assertion, the applicant was in fact afforded full opportunity to present and clarify his case at the hearing before the Board. It was his decision not to testify or answer the Board’s questions. In any event, the applicant has not identified what are the matters that the Board should have, but had failed to enquire into.
10. In our view, the applicant has failed to show any reasonably arguable public law error in relation to the Board’s decision. We agree with the Judge that the applicant’s intended judicial review has no reasonable prospect of success. As noted above, the applicant has not pointed to any error in the reasoning and decision of the Judge.
11. For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal has no merits. In the circumstances and noting that the applicant does not wish to continue with the appeal, we order that the appeal be dismissed.
| (Carlye Chu) |
(Eugene Fung) |
| Vice-President |
Judge of the Court of First Instance |
Mohnani & Associates for the applicant.
[1] [2025] HKCFI 6389
[2] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.
[3] This refers to risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
[5] This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[6] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2020/HCAL001321_2020_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
[7] The letter was faxed to the Court by the applicant’s solicitors on the same day.
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