HKSAR v. MA ZHIFANG

DCCC 550/2025

[2025] HKDC 2199

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NO 550 OF 2025

----------------------------

----------------------------

---------------------------------------

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

---------------------------------------

1.  Ms Ma pleaded guilty before me to two charges of Dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indicatable offence, contrary to section 25(1) and (3) of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, Cap 455.

2.  Particulars are that she, between A and B, both dates inclusive, in Hong Kong, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that property namely a total sum of C Hong Kong currency in the bank account with D, account number E, in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence, dealt with the said property.

3.  For Charge 1, A is 7 May 2024; B is 3 June 2024; C is $2,365,289.77; D is Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited; E is 01267720510354.

4.  For Charge 2, A is 7 May 2024; B is 29 June 2024; C is $709,253.38; D is Citibank (Hong Kong) Limited; E is 53075765.

Facts admitted by Ms Ma

5.  Ms Ma was and is a two-way permit holder.

6.  PW1 fell prey to a WeChat scam whereby he was duped by a scammer claiming to be a staffer of WeChat and telling PW1 that he needed to pay HKD2,000 insurance fee to protect his money in WeChat account.  PW1 did not want to pay it so the scammer directed him to a website in order to contact the customer service officer.  PW1 did so and was asked by another fraudster to transfer a total sum of HKD399,860 to Ms Ma’s bank account with the Bank of China (particulars specified under Charge 1) before the insurance could be cancelled.  After remitting the funds, he was asked to remit more money.  He then realized he was conned so he reported the case to the police.

7.  In summary, PW1 remitted a total of HKD399,860 to Ms Ma’s Bank of China account on 3 June 2024.

8.  PW2 and PW3 also fell prey to an investment scam whereby they were duped by scammers into opening an investment account on some bogus cryptocurrency investment platforms.  They were asked to remit funds to various bank accounts one of which was Ms Ma’s bank account with Citibank (particulars specified under Charge 2).  When they tried but failed to recover the sums invested, they realized they were conned so they reported their cases to the police.

9.  In summary, on 6 June 2024, PW2 and PW3 remitted the total sums of HKD695,000 and HKD10,000 respectively to Ms Ma’s Citibank account.

The Bank of China account

10.  The Bank of China account was opened by Ms Ma in person on 6 May 2024. She was the sole signatory.  Fund flow analysis showed between 7 May and 3 June 2024, the account recorded a total deposit of HKD2,365,289.77 (including the said sum of HKD399,860 from PW1) over 19 transactions and a total withdrawal of HKD2,364,144.47 on 27 occasions.

11.  On the account opening mandate, Ms Ma claimed to be a manager, making CNY25,000-50,000 per month; she provided a correspondence address in Shenzhen. She submitted her China ID card and two way permit copies during the opening process.  She provided an email address and a mobile number.  Ms Ma was provided with an ATM card, online banking service and bank statements by the bank.

12.  On 2 October 2024, Ms Ma was arrested on entering Hong Kong.

Citibank account

13.  The Citibank account was opened by Ms Ma in person on 7 May 2024.  She was the sole signatory.  Fund flow analysis showed between 7 May and 29 June 2024, the account recorded a total deposit of HKD709,253.38 (including the said sums from PW2 & PW3 amounting to HKD709,000) over 33 transactions, and a total withdrawal of HKD708,776.14 on 36 occasions.  Fund flow analysis also showed that the Citibank account had at least three transactions with Ms Ma’s other bank account(s) including a Hang Seng Bank account.

14.  On the account opening mandate, Ms Ma reported to be a manager, earning HKD34,000 per month and she provided a correspondence address in Shenzhen.  She submitted her China ID card and two way permit copies during the opening process.  She provided a similar email address and the same mobile number.  Ms Ma applied for online banking and she was provided with bank statements by the bank.

15.  On 8 October 2024, Ms Ma was arrested at the Tai Lam Centre for Women.

16.  Analysis of both the Bank of China account and the Citibank account showed that soon after the funds were remitted into the accounts, they were siphoned off within the same day, leaving behind a low daily balance.  Hallmark of money laundering was sighted and each of the two accounts was used as a temporary repository of funds.

17.  Ms Ma now admits she was always in control of the two subject accounts and that she dealt with the funds in those accounts.

Criminal record

18.  Ms Ma has a clear record in Hong Kong.

Antecedents

19.  Ms Ma is aged 53 (52 at the time of the offences), educated to secondary school level in Mainland, was a cleaner at the time of arrest.  Ms Ma is married and was living in Shenzhen.

Mitigation

20.  Ms Nicole Chun of counsel assigned by the Director of Legal Aid mitigated on behalf of Ms Ma.  The following is a summary of the mitigation submissions.

21.  Ms Ma has a clear record in Hong Kong and Mainland.

22.  Ms Ma was born in Shaanxi.  She underwent a major operation in 2023. She also experiences chronic stomach pain and gallstones.

23.  Ms Ma separated from her husband in 2018.  Since then, Ms Ma has been the sole caregiver for their two children (21 and 15, both studying) and the sole breadwinner of the family.  Ms Ma also supports her elderly parents financially.

24.  Prior to arrest, Ms Ma worked as a casual cleaner, earning around RMB3,000 per month.

25.  Ms Ma committed the present offences for a reward of RMB1,000.  Ms Ma had reasonable grounds to believe the monies in the accounts represented proceeds of offences.  There is no evidence she knew of the predicate offences nor any of the victims.  The sums involved were not exceptionally large; the duration of the offences was approximately two months.

26.  During detention since her first arrest, Ms Ma has reflected on her wrongdoing.  She deeply regrets her actions.  She feels ashamed and remorseful, and wishes to apologize to all the victims.  She pledges to reform and to refrain from future criminal conduct.

27.  Ms Ma’s strongest plea for leniency rests on her early guilty plea.

28.  Ms Chun asked for a lenient sentence for Ms Ma so that the latter may return home as soon as possible.

29.  There is no fixed sentencing tariff for money laundering offences, as each case depends on its own facts.  The relevant sentencing principles are laid down in:

(a) HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi [2010] 5 HKLRD 545;

(b) HKSAR v Boma Amaso [2012] 2 HKLRD 33; and

(c) HKSAR v Lam Hing Wan [2018] HKCA 686, CACC 387/2016, at para 30.

30.  In respect of the request by the prosecution for enhancement of sentence under OSCO, Ms Chun raises no objection.

31.  However, on the subject of extent of enhancement, Ms Chun submits that while the harm caused to the community by money laundering offence is still substantial, Table B (pp 6-7 of CIP Li’s statement) shows a sharp downward trend from 2022 to 2025 (up to September) in:

(a) The number and amount of “ML cases” (item (2));

(b) The number and amount of “Deception and ML cases” (item (3)); and

(c) The number, amount, and proportion of “Cases with Stooge Account(s)” (item (4)).

32.  In HKSAR v Leung Yiu Fai CACC 100/2014, the Court of Appeal stated at para 56 that sentence enhancement under section 27(11) of OSCO should be determined by the judge at his discretion based on the specific circumstances of each case.

33.  In HKSAR v Fong Chi Yam [2019] HKCA 121, CACC 411/2017, the Court of Appeal held that (additional) punishment should not be imposed for offences in which the defendant had neither knowledge nor participation.  There, the sentence enhancement under OSCO due to prevalence of deception cases was found to be erroneous and was set aside.

34.  Here, there is no evidence that Ms Ma had knowledge of or participated in the predicate deceptions.  Ms Chun invited the court to consider the statistics of “ML cases” and “Stooge”, but not “Deception cases” in CIP Li’s statement.

35.  Ms Chun draws the court’s attention to the overlapping periods of the two offences and urges the court to apply the totality principle and order the sentences to run concurrently.

36.  Ms Chun submitted on behalf of Ms Ma one mitigation letter written by Ms Ma herself in Chinese.  The contents generally are that Ms Ma has reflected upon her mistakes; that she is very remorseful and apologizes to the Hong Kong public; that she will not re-offend; that she will on release tell his relatives and friends not to lend bank accounts to others.  Ms Ma asked the court for a chance to reform and a lenient sentence so she may re-unite with her family earlier.

37.  Upon enquiry by the court, Ms Chun after taking instructions submitted that Ms Ma did make the false representation in the account opening mandates about her job and income.

Sentence

38.  Money laundering is a serious offence.  A deterrent sentence is always called for.

39.  The case has the following features.  Charge 1 involves about HK$2.4 million laundered within just under one month.  Charge 2 involves about HK$700,000 laundered within just over 7 weeks.  There were 19 deposits and 27 withdrawals under Charge 1.  There were 33 deposits and 36 withdrawals under Charge 2.  Ms Ma not only opened the bank accounts for the purpose of money laundering, she actually dealt with the funds herself.  Ms Ma exercised deceit on the banks when she represented herself to be a manager earning a substantial monthly salary at the time of account opening.  Ms Ma admitted in mitigation that she received a reward of RMB1,000 for her labour.

40.  There is no evidence of international dimension.  There is no evidence of knowledge on the part of Ms Ma of the nature of the predicate offences of deception.

41.  From what the prosecution told me about Ms Ma’s travel records, I formed the view that Ms Ma came to Hong Kong on 6 and 7 May 2024 specifically to open the two subject accounts.  This is an aggravating factor.

42.  I bear in mind para 15 of HKSAR v Wan Kwok Keung [2012] 1 HKLRD 201 when determining the appropriate starting points of sentence for Ms Ma.

43.  For Charge 1, I adopt a starting point of 3 ½ years’ imprisonment.  For Charge 2, I adopt a starting point of 2 years 9 months’ imprisonment.

44.  Ms Ma pleaded guilty in good time earning for herself the full 1/3 sentencing discount.  There are no other mitigating factors of weight to justify another sentence reduction.

45.  Prosecution sought to furnish a witness statement of CIP Li Yiu Nam dated 31 October 2025 under section 27(2) of OSCO, Cap 455, with a view to requesting sentence enhancement.  With the information in the statement, prosecution sought to show (a) the prevalence of money laundering offence and; (b) the nature and extent of any harm, whether direct or indirect, caused to the community by recent occurrences of money laundering offence.

46.  Ms Chun did not object to the reception of the statement.  I therefore received the statement.

47.  The case of Fong Chi Yam relied on by Ms Chun does not assist Ms Ma.  In Fong, although the applicant was charged with and convicted of two charges of money laundering, the basis upon which the enhancement of sentence was made was prevalence of “telephone deception” (see para 93 of the Reasons for Judgment).  Here, in Ms Ma’s case, the basis is completely different: enhancement of sentence is sought on the basis of prevalence of money laundering offence, and the harm caused to the community by recent occurrences of money laundering offence.

48.  From Table A on page 5 of CIP Li’s statement, it can be seen that the total number of stooges (ie those who opened stooge account(s)) arrested for the whole of 2025 (projected figure) would be 5,538 as compared to the figure of 7,883 for 2024.  This represented a drop of 30%.  Although a dropped figure, it still is a substantial number as compared with the previous years: 6,485 for year 2023, 3,708 for year 2022, 2,220 for year 2021, and 760 for year 2020.

49.  I am satisfied that the use of stooge accounts, and by implication the occurrence of money laundering offences, is still prevalent.

50.  From Table B on pages 6 and 7 of CIP Li’s statement, it can be seen, where there was use of local stooge accounts, that the amount of reported losses (both local and overseas) and/or proceeds laundered locally for the whole of 2025 (projected figure) would be 1,208.65M.  The corresponding number of cases (projected figure) would be 1,226.  The amount figure represented a drop of 73% from the year 2024 (4,466.39M).  The case number figure represented a drop of 66.6% from the year 2024 (3,675).  The decrease could not be said to be insignificant.

51.  However, the relevant amount and the number of cases are not the only yardsticks with which to measure the harm caused to the community.

52.  CIP Li in para 18 of his statement (pages 5 and 6) laid out how the anti-money laundering regime in Hong Kong is hampered by the prevalence of stooge accounts as follows:

(a) It interferes with the normal operation of the banking system, having a negative effect on the reputation of Hong Kong as a well-known international financial hub;

(b) It forms multiple layers of “shields” concealing the identity of the masterminds behind, making it difficult, if not impossible, for police to identify the masterminds behind;

(c) It substantially facilitates the commission of crimes and in turn leads to more crimes being committed, as the mastermind could easily get away from their criminal liability;

(d) It makes money laundering easier, which allows culprits to make use of their ill-gotten gains to extend their sphere to engage in a wider range of illegal activities;

(e) It means that law enforcement agencies have to put in more investigation efforts and resources; and

(f) People with low income or less awareness of the consequences of selling their bank accounts are more likely to be lured by the culprits to take the risks of commission of crimes to surrender their accounts for monetary reward.

53.  I am satisfied that the nature and extent of harm, whether direct or indirect, caused to the community, by recent occurrences of money laundering offence is still substantial.

54.  I am therefore empowered by section 27(11) of OSCO, Cap 455, to enhance the sentences of Ms Ma.  Given the trend of the statistics, I am of the view that an enhancement of 20% is sufficient in all the circumstances.  I will ignore decimal places in the final calculation of the sentences in terms of months.

55.  Although I recognize an overlapping period between the two offences, one cannot deny that they were separate offences relating to different bank accounts.  However, I will allow a certain degree of concurrency in the sentences on application of the totality principle.

56.  I will pass individual enhanced sentences for the two charges and make an appropriate order to arrive at a final aggregate sentence for Ms Ma.

(Ms Ma, please stand)

57.  For Charge 1, the sentence is 33 months’ imprisonment.

58.  For Charge 2, the sentence is 26 months’ imprisonment.

59.  I order that 7 months of the sentence on Charge 2 do run consecutively to the sentence on Charge 1, making an aggregate sentence for Ms Ma of 40 months’ imprisonment.