|
DCCJ2539/2005
IN
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2539 OF 2005
____________
BETWEEN
| |
WONG JACK KEUNG VICTOR |
Plaintiffs |
| |
LAM ANITA |
|
| |
and |
|
| |
WAI PING LUEN |
Defendants |
| |
WONG CHOY KAU |
|
____________
Before: Her Honour District Judge Marlene Ng in Chambers (Open to
Public)
Date of Hearing: 6th December, 2005
Date of Handing Down Judgment: 19th December,
2005
_______________
J U D G M E N T
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Introduction
1.
The Defendants
were/are the owners of a property known as Unit 1 on the 6th
Floor of Block 40, Heng Fa Chuen, No.100 Shing Tai Road, Hong Kong (the “Property”).
The following facts are not disputed.
2.
The Provisional Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 19th
February 2005 on its face states that it was made by the Defendants as vendors and the Plaintiffs
as purchasers (the “Agreement”) and that the Defendants agreed to sell and the Plaintiffs
agreed to purchase the Property for the price of HK$5,080,000.00. On the same day, the Plaintiffs
paid to the Defendants a cheque in the sum of HK$160,000.00 as initial deposit
and part payment of the purchase price (the “Cheque”).
3.
The Agreement
provides as follows :
“THIS AGREEMENT is made on 2005年02月19日 BETWEEN
the first party [the Plaintiffs] (holder of Hong
Kong Identity Card No./Business Registration No. [2 identity card numbers
stated] of _________ (hereinafter called “the Vendor”) and;
the second party [the Defendants] (holder of Hong Kong
Identity Card No./Business Registration No. [2 identity card numbers stated]
of _________ (hereinafter called “the Purchaser”) and;
the third party CENTURY 21 Poperty Agency Limited
(holder of Business Registration No. 30390405 and Estate Agent Company
Licence No. C-016997-(A004)) of Shop 140, 1/F., Paradise Mall, Heng
Fa Chuen H.K. (hereinafter called “the Agent”)
NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS :
……
2. The purchase
price of the said Premises shall be HK$5,080,000.00 which shall be paid
by the Purchaser to the Vendor in the manner as follows:-
a) HK$160,000.00
shall be paid upon signing of this agreement as initial deposit
b) HK$348,000.00
shall be paid upon signing of the Formal Agreement for Sale and Purchase on or
before 2005年03月04日 as further deposit
c) HK$4,572,000.00
shall be paid on completion on or before 2005年04月22日 as balance of purchase
price.
* All
deposits payable by the Purchaser shall be paid to the Vendor’s solicitors as
stakeholders who may release the same to the Vendor provided that the balance
of the purchase price is sufficient to discharge the existing charge.
……
6. The Vendor
and the Purchaser agree that they shall separately appoint their own
solicitors. The Vendor shall be represented by Messrs. Benson Li & Co.
Whereas the Purchaser shall be represented
by Messrs. TO BE CONFIRMED.
Each party shall pay its own legal costs.
Subject to clause 7 hereof, all stamp duty shall be borne by the Purchaser
solely.
7. Should the
Vendor after receiving the initial deposit paid hereunder fail to complete the
sale in the manner herein contained, the Vendor shall
immediately compensate the Purchaser with a refund of the initial deposit
together with a sum equivalent to the amount of the initial deposit as
liquidated damages and the payment of stamp duty of this Agreement, and the
Purchaser shall not take any further action to claim for damages or to enforce
specific performance.
……
*13. It
is hereby declared that the Agent is the Agent for both the Vendor and the
Purchaser/for the Vendor only/for the Purchaser only.
……
15. This
Agreement supersedes all prior negotiations, representation and understanding
of the parties hereto.
…… For & on behalf of
[the 2nd-named Defendant]
(signature of the 1st-named
Defendant)
|
(signature of
the 1st-named Defendant)
|
For and on behalf of the Agent
(signature and
company chop)
|
(2 signatures)
|
|
Signed by the Vendor |
Signed by the Agent |
Signed by the Purchaser |
|
Name: [the Defendants] |
Name: TIN WAI
KONG |
Name: [the Plaintiffs] |
|
I.D. No.: [2
identity card numbers stated] |
Licence No.:
[number stated] |
I.D. No.: [2
identity card numbers stated] |
|
|
|
|
Received from the Purchaser the initial deposit in
the sum of HK$160,000.00 (Cheque No. 497844 bank 恆生) |
Signed by the Vendor (signature of the 1st-named
Defendant)
Name : [1st-named Defendant]
I.D. No.: [identity card number stated]
|
4.
By a letter
dated 21st February 2005 to the Defendants’ solicitors, the Plaintiffs’
solicitors stated they act for the intended purchasers of the Property (ie the Plaintiffs)
and “understand that you act for the Vendors thereof”. They enclosed a copy of
the Agreement and asked for the Defendants’ solicitors’ draft Formal Agreement
for Sale and Purchase and all the title deeds and documents for their approval
and perusal on behalf of the Defendants.
5.
By a letter
dated 4th March 2005 to the Defendants’ solicitors and pursuant to clause
2(b) of the Agreement, the Plaintiffs’
solicitors sent their cheque in the sum of HK$348,000.00 being the further deposit and part payment
of the purchase price of the Property in
favour of the Defendants’ solicitors as stakeholder.
6.
By a letter
in reply on the same day, the Defendants’ solicitors said they were
instructed by “the Vendor” (referred to in the caption of the letter as the 1st
and 2nd-named Defendants) that “the Vendor” would not proceed with
and complete the sale of the Property under the Agreement “and the same be
cancelled”. The Defendants’ solicitors also returned the
cheque for the sum of HK$348,000.00.
7.
By a letter
dated 8th March 2005 to the Defendants’ solicitors, the Plaintiffs’
solicitors claimed that the Defendants’ failure to proceed with and
complete the sale of the Property amounted to a repudiation of the Agreement
and the Plaintiffs thereby accepted such repudiation. The Plaintiffs’
solicitors then demanded payment in the sum of double deposit pursuant
to clause 7 of the Agreement and requested the Defendants’ solicitors to tender
their draft Cancellation Agreement for approval.
8.
By a letter
dated 14th April 2005 to the Defendants’ solicitors, the Plaintiffs’
solicitors demanded the return of the Cheque forthwith.
9.
By a letter
dated 21st October 2005 (ie after
the Plaintiffs issued the
present summary judgment application) to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors, the Defendants’
solicitors stated that the Defendants had just found the Cheque and they were instructed to
forward it to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors for return to the Plaintiffs.
The
present proceedings
10.
The Plaintiffs
claims that the Defendants have wrongfully repudiated the Agreement and the Plaintiffs are entitled to the
sum of HK$160,000.00 as liquidated damages pursuant to clause 7 of the
Agreement. By a summons dated 30th September 2005, the Plaintiffs
apply for summary judgment.
11.
Apart from
verifying the Plaintiffs’ claim as aforesaid, the 1st-named
Plaintiff in his affirmation dated 29th September 2005 confirms that the 2nd-named
Plaintiff is his wife and that he met
the 1st-named Defendant twice at the Property. The first
time was on/about 16th
February 2005 when through the service rendered by the estate agent Mr Tin
Wai Kong (“Mr Tin”) the 1st-named Defendant was introduced to
the Plaintiffs as the intended purchaser of the Property. The second time was on
19th February 2005 when the Plaintiffs met the 1st-named
Defendant again in Mr Tin’s presence during inspection of the Property prior to
signing the Agreement.
12.
The Defendants
filed their Defence on 2nd July 2005. They filed the affirmation of the 1st-named
Defendant to oppose the summary judgment
application. The Defendants rely on the following defences : (a) misrepresentation by Mr Tin as the Plaintiffs’
agent, (b) non est factum and (c) the stipulated sum in clause
7 of the Agreement is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss at the time of
contract. The 2nd-named Defendant further claims she has
not authorised the 1st-named Defendant to enter into the Agreement. Mr Ng, counsel for the Defendants, abandons the defence of collateral
contract at the hearing. The Plaintiffs has not filed any affirmation in reply.
Law on summary judgment applications
13.
There is no dispute as to the relevant principles for summary
judgment applications. A plaintiff may invoke the procedure under Order
14 of the Rules of the District Court where there is no valid defence to his
claim or otherwise a triable issue. The rationale is set out in Hong Kong
Civil Procedure 2004 Vol.1, para.14/4/1 at p.159 as follows :
“The underlying policy
of the summary procedure is to prevent a defendant from delaying the plaintiff
from obtaining judgment in case in which the defendant clearly has no defence
to the plaintiff's claim: Man Earn Ltd v. Wing Ting Fong [1996] 1 H.K.C.
225. “Order 14 proceedings for summary judgment when there is no defence to a
claim are an important feature of the legal process. It enables
plaintiffs in cases where there is no defence to obtain expeditious summary
judgment to avoid unnecessary delay. When applied for, it is for the
defendant to show that there is a triable issue or an arguable defence if he is
to be allowed his day in court. To deny him his day in court, if he shows
a triable issue or an arguable defence, is indeed a fearful injustice. On
the other hand, if he has no defence and he obtains leave to defence, equally,
there is injustice to the plaintiff.” Per Mortimer J.A. in Manciple
Ltd. v. Chan On Man [1995] 3 H.K.C. 459 at 466. The machinery of O.14
works on the basis that if the plaintiff's application is properly constituted,
he is prima facie entitled to judgment unless the defendant shows cause to the
contrary or the application is dismissed.”
14.
In Ng Shou
Chun v Hung Chun San [1994] 1 HKC 155, Godfrey J noted that it was not
appropriate to embark on a mini-trial of the action on affidavit
evidence. The court should ask itself the question whether what the
defendant says is credible or believable. If so, he must have leave to
defend; if not, the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment.
Misrepresentation
defence
(a) Defence and
relevant affirmation evidence
15.
The Defendants claim as follows :
(a) In the middle of February 2005, Mr Tin
told the 1st-named Defendant that an intended purchaser wished to
inspect and purchase the Property. The Property has been vacant since about
January 2005 and an appointment had to be made with the 1st-named
Defendant to gain access to the Property for inspection. The 1st-named
Defendant expressly told Mr Tin over the telephone that the cheque for the
initial deposit must be drawn personally in favour of the Defendants otherwise
the Defendants would not sell the Property (the “Condition”). The 1st-named
Defendant imposed the Condition since the Defendants were in need of money for
their personal reasons.
(b) The 1st-named Defendant denied
having met the 1st-named Plaintiff on 16th February 2005.
Through Mr Tin’s arrangement, the intended purchaser came to inspect the
Property on/about 19th February 2005. After the inspection, the 1st-named
Defendant again told Mr Tin that if the intended purchaser was interested in
purchasing the Property, the cheque for paying the initial deposit should be
drawn in the favour of the Defendants. Mr Tin said he would ask the intended
purchaser to do so.
(c) In about the late afternoon of about 19th
February 2005, Mr Tin telephoned to ask the 1st-named Defendant to
attend his office to sign a provisional agreement for sale and purchase of the
Property. When he arrived, Mr Tin presented him with and urged him to sign a
blank provisional agreement for sale and purchase by representing that the 1st-named
Defendant could trust him to negotiate good terms for the Defendants in respect of the
deal (the “1st Representation”). Mr Tin did not mention or
explain to the 1st-named Defendant the terms of the blank provisional
agreement for sale and purchase or the terms to be inserted therein.
(d) “Relying on the representation of Mr Tin”
and due to pressure from Mr Tin, the 1st-named Defendant reluctantly
signed the blank provisional agreement for sale and purchase. But before he did
so, he reminded Mr Tin of the Condition. Before the 1st-named
Defendant left Mr Tin’s office, Mr Tin asked him which solicitors’ firm would
represent the Defendants in the sale and purchase. The 1st-named Defendant
said their lawyers would be “Benson Li & Co”. The 1st-named
Defendant never told Mr Tin the cheque for the initial deposit was to be drawn
in favour of their solicitors.
(e) In the evening of 19th February
2005, at Mr Tin’s request, the 1st-named Defendant met Mr Tin at his
office again. Mr Tin told the 1st-named Defendant that the intended
purchaser had signed the Agreement. He took out such document and pressed the 1st-named
Defendant to initial it at several places. Mr Tin did not mention or explain
the terms of the Agreement to the 1st-named Defendant or the purpose
in initialling it. Due to pressure from Mr Tin, the 1st-named
Defendant reluctantly initialled the Agreement at several places.
(f) Mr Tin then took out the Cheque for the
initial deposit. The 1st-named Defendant noted that the Cheque was
drawn in favour of the Defendants’ solicitors. He immediately rejected the
Cheque since he had told Mr Tin the Condition. Mr Tin represented to the 1st-named
Defendant that after the solicitors’ firm presented the Cheque for payment,
such firm could immediately draw a cheque for the sum of the initial deposit in
favour of the Defendants and it would not have made any difference (the “2nd
Representation”). Relying on the 2nd Representation, the 1st-named
Defendant reluctantly took the Cheque.
(g) On about 20th February 2005,
after seeking legal advice, the 1st-named Defendant realised that
according to the Agreement, the Cheque was to be held by the solicitors’ firm
as stakeholder until it could be shown that the balance of the purchase price
of the Property was sufficient to settle the existing mortgage debt, so the
Cheque could not be released to the Defendants immediately. The 1st-named
Defendant immediately telephoned Mr Tin to ask the intended purchaser to issue
another cheque for the initial deposit in favour of the Defendants to replace
the Cheque, failing which the Defendants would not sell the Property.
(h) On 22nd February 2005, Mr Tin
told the 1st-named Defendant that the intended purchaser refused to
issue the requested replacement cheque. The 1st-named Defendant
immediately told Mr Tin that the Defendants would not sell the Property and
that the Agreement was cancelled and “of no effect”.
(i) The Defendants did not present the Cheque
for payment or give it to their solicitors to do so. The 1st-named
Defendant said that due to unhappiness and dispute over the sale of the
Property, he put the matter aside and forgot where he put the Cheque. Later,
when he found the Cheque, he asked the solicitors to return it to the
Plaintiffs.
16.
Although the Defendants in their Defence
claim that they have never met the Plaintiffs nor have any contact, discussion
or correspondence with the Plaintiffs and that they “totally did not know the
Plaintiffs”, the 1st-named Defendant in his affirmation accepts he
met the 1st-named Plaintiff on 19th February 2005.
Although there is some conflict between the parties as to the number of
occasions they met, there is no evidence of any direct negotiations or
discussions between the parties.
(b) Issues
17.
The Defendants argue that since the 1st-named
Defendant was induced by the misrepresentations of Mr Tin, the Plaintiffs’
agent, to sign and initial the Agreement, there is no binding contract between
the parties or alternatively the Agreement ought to be rescinded.
18.
Mr Ng and Ms Wong, counsel for the Plaintiffs,
agree the misrepresentation defence raises the following issues :
(a) what is the alleged representation;
(b) whether the alleged representation is
sufficient to support a plea of misrepresentation;
(c) whether the alleged representation was
made by Mr Tin on behalf of the Plaintiffs;
(d) whether the Defendants were induced to
enter into the Agreement by the alleged representation.
I bear in mind that at this stage it is sufficient to show an arguable
or triable issue or, to put it in any way, a believable or credible case on the
above issues.
(c) Representation
19.
Even on the affirmation evidence adduced by the Defendants, there is dispute between the parties as to what is the
representation that led the Defendants to enter into the contract for the sale
and purchase of the Property.
20.
Mr Ng submits that the negotiations for
the sale and purchase of the Property took place over a very short period. The 1st-named Defendant told Mr Tin about the
Condition once in mid-February 2005 and twice on 19th February 2005,
so Mr Tin must have known the Condition was the Defendants’ fundamental
requirement. Mr Ng tries to explain why the Defendants imposed the Condition,
but the affirmation evidence does not give further elaboration than it was for
their personal reasons. Mr Ng submits that Mr Tin must have by (a) putting together the deal for the parties, (b) urging the 1st-named Defendant to sign the
blank provisional agreement for sale and purchase without mentioning or explaining
its terms, (c) promising to negotiate good terms for the Defendants in respect
of the deal, (d) urging the 1st-named Defendant to initial the
Agreement without explanation and (e) revealing the Cheque only after the 1st-named
Defendant had initialled the Agreement made an implied representation that the
Condition would be fulfilled and become part of the Agreement (the “Implied
Representation”).
21.
In support thereof, Mr Ng refers to Spice Girls Ltd v Aprilia World Service BV
The Times, April 5, 2000, Ch D (reversed in part on other grounds [2002] EWCA
Civ 15) cited in Chitty on Contracts
29th ed Vol.1 para.6-009 at p.433 as follows :
“…… Thus in Spice Girls Ltd v
Aprilia World Service BV it was held that a pop group had made an implied misrepresentation
when they continued with arrangements to publicise the defendant’s products
when they knew that one member of the group was intending to leave the group
shortly, which would prevent the contract being carried out and the defendants
deriving any benefit from the arrangement. It has been held that a description
of premises as “offices” may amount to an implied representation as to the
availability of the appropriate planning consents. The essential issue is
whether in all the circumstances it has been impliedly represented that there
exists some state of facts different from the truth. In evaluating the effects
of the statement or conduct in such circumstances, a helpful test is whether a
reasonable representee would naturally assume that the true state of facts did
not exist and that, had it existed, he would in all circumstances necessarily
have been informed of it.”
22.
Ms Wong submits that the affirmation of
the 1st-named Defendant does not support the Implied Representation.
She argues that it would not have been necessary for the 1st-named Defendant
to repeat the Condition to Mr Tin several times if the Implied Representation
was the relevant representation that induced the Defendants to enter into the
contract for the sale and purchase of the Property.
23.
Ms Wong says that at best the affirmation
evidence merely suggests that the 1st-named Defendant signed the
blank provisional agreement for sale and purchase because Mr Tin allegedly made
the 1st Representation. But to support a plea of misrepresentation,
Ms Wong says the representation relied on must be a false statement of fact,
past or present, made to the representor or his agent which operates on the
representee’s mind to induce him to enter into a contract (Chitty on Contracts 29th ed. Vol.1 paras.6-004 and
6-031). It is said that here the 1st Representation is a mere promise by Mr Tin of a future event, so it cannot constitute any misrepresentation (Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th
ed Vol.31 para.1009 at p.619). Ms Wong further submits that the Implied
Representation is merely
counsel’s submission, which is unsupported by
evidence.
24.
Mr Ng confirms at the hearing that the 1st
Representation is merely background information and is not the representation
the Defendants rely for their misrepresentation defence. In the circumstances,
there is no need for me to consider whether the 1st Representation
is arguably capable of supporting a plea of misrepresentation. I now turn to
the Implied Representation.
25.
It is true that the affirmation of the 1st-named
Defendant states that he signed the provisional agreement for sale and purchase
in blank in reliance of the 1st Representation and as a result of
pressure from Mr Tin. Ms Wong seems to suggest such evidence means the 1st-named
Defendant did not rely on the Implied Representation at the time it entered
into the contract for the sale and purchase of the Property, so that I can
safely ignore the Condition which the 1st-named Defendant told Mr
Tin both before and after his signing thereon.
26.
I bear in mind that for the purpose of the
present application, the factual matters set out in the affirmation of the 1st-named
Defendant are largely uncontroverted. I do not consider it is appropriate to
adopt the narrow view of the affirmation evidence or of the Defence as
contended by Ms Wong. The relevant time for consideration is the time when the
contract was actually concluded or made (see Chitty on Contracts 29th ed Vol.1 para.6-018 at
pp.439-440). At the time when the
1st-named Defendant signed the provisional agreement for sale and
purchase in blank, the Plaintiffs had not yet signed such document. The 1st-named Defendant in signing such document is
arguably making an offer and not a concluded contract for sale and purchase of the Property. The Plaintiffs then signed the Agreement, but they did
not accept the terms of the Agreement in their entirety. It is arguable that
they made a counter-offer by deleting and initialling some of the express
provisions in the Agreement, so that the contract for the sale and purchase of
the Property was only made or concluded when the 1st-named Defendant
acknowledged such counter-offer by initialling the Agreement. In those
circumstances, having regard to the material facts as pleaded in the Defence
and deposed in the affirmation of the 1st-named Defendant, and the
Defendants’ assertions in
respect of the dealings that led up to the contract,
I find the assertions in
respect of the existence of the Implied
Representation and that it
amounts to a representation that is capable of supporting a plea of misrepresentation arguable.
27.
I note also from the affirmation
evidence that Mr Tin on 19th February 2005 assured the 1st-named
Defendant he would ask the intended purchaser to fulfil the Condition (thereby
implicitly to make it a term of the contract for the sale and purchase of the Property). The Defendants further claim that later on the same day, Mr Tin, knowing the Cheque was made payable to the
Defendants’ solicitors despite the assurance he gave to the 1st-named
Defendant, still asked the 1st-named Defendant to initial the Agreement
already signed by the Plaintiffs without drawing the 1st-named Defendant’s
attention to the stakeholder provision in clause 2 of the Agreement and/or the name of the payee of the
Cheque. The 2nd Representation made by Mr Tin to the 1st-named
Defendant (even though it was made after the latter initialled the Agreement)
is arguably itself a representation made with a view to buttress the Defendants’
belief that they could get their hands on the initial deposit, which was the
goal of the Condition.
(d) Mr Tin’s
authority
28.
Since the Implied Representation and/or 2nd
Representation were made by Mr Tin and not by the Plaintiffs directly to the 1st-named Defendant, establishing the existence of the above-mentioned representations cannot carry the Plaintiffs’ case very far unless it can also be shown that Mr
Tin made those representations on behalf of the Plaintiffs.
29.
The following propositions are not disputed :
(a) In Hong Kong, estate agents were usually
brokers earning commission from both parties to the sale and purchase of
property and acting for both the vendor and purchaser (Cheng Kwok Fai v Mok Yin Wah [1999] 2 HKLRD 440).
(b) Whether an estate agent acts for either
the vendor or the purchaser in a sale of land depends on the facts of the case
and one has to consider the role of the estate agent at different stages of the
negotiation leading to the signing of the contract (Cheng Kwok Fai’s case (supra)).
(c) The estate agency company (ie Mr
Tin’s company) was a party to the Agreement and was the estate agent to both
parties, ie rendering service to and taking commission from both of them (clause 13 of the Agreement).
(d) The available
affirmation evidence suggests it was the 1st-named Defendant who
instructed Mr Tin to enquire whether the Plaintiffs would be willing to fulfil
the Condition, so in making that enquiry Mr Tin was acting as the agent of the
Defendants and/or the 1st-named Defendant.
30.
However, the parties dispute Mr Tin’s role in making the Implied
Representation and/or the 2nd Representation. Mr Ng submits that Mr Tin was acting as the Plaintiffs’ agent. He points out there is no evidence of direct
negotiations between the parties, so Mr Tin must have negotiated the sale of the Property on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Ms Wong submits that there is no sufficient evidence to support any
arguable or triable case that Mr Tin was acting for the
Plaintiffs when he made the Implied Representation and/or the 2nd
Representation.
31.
The
authorities cited by both counsel illustrate that the role and authority of the
estate agent in making any representation turn on the factual circumstances.
32.
In Welltech
Investment Ltd v Easy Fair Industries Ltd [1996] 4 KC 711, the purchaser
sought to rescind the agreement for sale and purchase of the suit property on the ground that it was induced to enter into the contract
by the vendor’s representation (through the estate agent) in relation to rights over the green area shown on the plan. The vendor contended that
the estate agent was the purchaser’s agent and the representations were not
within the scope of the estate agent’s authority as the vendor’s agent. The estate
agent said (and it was not
challenged) that whatever information and assurances
she gave to the purchaser were made on the vendor’s instructions. It was held that
the vendor chose to instruct the estate agent to offer the
property for sale, so the estate agent was the vendor’s agent. It was further held that the estate agent
made the representation within the scope
of her authority, actual or ostensible, as the vendor’s agent.
33.
In Cheng Kwok Fai’s case (supra), the estate
agent gave the purchaser a sketch of the property produced from the estate
agent’s own records and not from the vendor. The sketch misrepresented the area
of the suit property. It was held that the representation was not made on the vendor’s
behalf since the estate agent did not have actual or ostensible authority to
supply the purchaser with the sketch from his own records. In
doing so, the agent was acting on behalf of the purchaser.
34.
In Green
Park Properties Ltd v Dorku Ltd [2000] 1 HKLRD 400, the purchaser sought to rescind the agreement for sale and purchase of the suit property on the ground
that the vendor misrepresented that the backyard was part of the suit property by
conduct, by a tenancy plan shown by the estate agent and by breaching the duty
of disclosure. The vendor argued that even if there were such misrepresentation, the estate agent did not make such representation on
its behalf since inter alia
it acted as broker for both parties. The court held that there was a misrepresentation and
the estate agent acted as agent for the vendor
at the inspections and the subsequent discussions. Whilst the estate agent might well have been acting for the purchaser in presenting the offer, it did not
preclude it from being the vendor’s agent before that.
35.
In Tai
Sang Kung Ltd v Paraking Ltd & Anor [2001] 4 HKC 61, the purchaser failed to establish that the vendor and/or its estate agent misrepresented (a) the floor area of the suit property and (b) that part of the common area was owned by the vendor. Chung J endorsed the role
of estate agents in Hong Kong
as stated in Cheng
Kwok Fai’s case (supra) and found that the subject estate agent to be
nothing more than an introducer of the suit property. There the estate agent disclosed all the relevant facts to the purchaser and the decision
whether to purchase the suit property and on what terms rested with the purchaser.
36.
It is
therefore necessary to turn to the factual evidence adduced by the Defendants to see
whether there is any arguable or triable case on this issue to be left for
trial. It is necessary to bear in mind that an estate agent may assume
different roles at different stages of the negotiation leading to the
transaction and the question of fact at hand is whether an estate agent was
acting for a particular party at a particular stage of the negotiating process
(Green Park Properties Ltd’s case (supra) and Yili Concepts (HKG)
Limited v Lee Wai Chuen & anor HCA12911/1997 Deputy Judge S Kwan (as
she then was) (unreported, 29th September 2000) at paras.47 and 51
as approved in Jopard Holdings Limited v Ladefaith Limited & anor
HCA3775/2001 Recorder B Yu SC (unreported, 12th November 2004)).
37.
Such approach
is also echoed in Empire Trend Enterprises Ltd v Double Mind Co Ltd [2001] 1 HKC 302, a
case cited by Ms Wong. In that case, the parties
conducted preliminary inspections and negotiations through their respective
estate agents (ie different staff
members of the same estate agency company that represented both vendor and purchaser). An issue arose over some
unauthorised structures. The vendor claimed there was a collateral agreement whereby the purchaser agreed to
demolish the structures at its own expense, so the purchaser
accepted the suit property with a defect in title. The negotiations
mainly took place over one evening with the estate agents constantly receiving instructions by telephone
from the purchaser’s director who finally agreed to the terms. The provisional
agreement for sale and purchase was signed that evening. It was held that the purchaser’s director was
unlikely to have been aware of the structures
or their extent until after the agreement and that the estate
agents were nothing more than a go-between to relay offers and proposed terms.
38.
Deputy Judge Woolley said at pp.312-313 as
follows :
“ Estate
agents do not as a general rule have authority to bind their principals in any
event, unless they are given such authority in clear and unambiguous terms.
This must particularly be so where the agents, as here, are acting for both
vendor and purchaser, albeit by different members of the staff. An estate
agent's function is to find either a purchaser for property, or property for a
potential purchaser, and introduce the proposed vendor and purchaser. He may
assist them to arrive at an agreement satisfactory to both, but he cannot
contract on their behalf without clear authority to do so, or give any
warranty. As Diplock LJ said in Hill v Harris [1965] 2 QB 601, at
p. 616:
...it
is, I apprehend, clear law that the ostensible authority of an estate agent
invited to find a purchaser for premises or a lessee of premises, does not
extend to entering into any contractual relationship in respect of the premises
on behalf of the person instructing him. It may well be that he has authority
to make representations as to the state of the premises, but representations
are a very different matter from warranty.
There
is no evidence here that the agents had any authority to make any agreement on
behalf of their principals. As there is equally no evidence that the parties
communicated directly, and I can look only at the written agreements to see
what the terms were that they agreed.”
39.
Turning to
the Defendants’ Defence and the affirmation of the 1st-named
Defendant, there is no evidence of any actual authority granted by the Plaintiffs
to Mr Tin to make the Implied Representation and/or 2nd
Representation. Is there an arguable or triable case that Mr Tin had apparent or ostensible
authority from the Plaintiffs in making those representations? I find there is
no sufficient evidence to establish an arguable or triable case that the
Plaintiffs have clothed Mr Tin with any such apparent or ostensible
authority. The facts the Defendants rely on are that the Plaintiffs accompanied Mr Tin to
inspect the Property on 19th February 2005 and that they signed the
Agreement. Although Mr Ng says that Mr Tin must have
negotiated the sale of the Property on behalf of the Plaintiffs, there is no evidence of to and fro
negotiations on the price and other terms of the sale and purchase of the
Property.
40.
Neither counsel refers to the Estate Agents Ordinance Cap.511 or the
Estate Agents Practice (General Duties and Hong Kong Residential Properties)
Regulation. There is no evidence that the authority of Mr Tin and his estate agency company, purportedly licensed estate agents according to the licence
numbers stated in the Agreement, went further than the statutorily prescribed
Property Information Form and the Estate Agency Agreement for Sale of
Residential Properties in Hong Kong to cover
the Implied Representation and/or 2nd Representation.
41.
I also note the printed
stakeholder provision in clause 2 in the Agreement that was placed before the 1st-named Defendant for signing. He
complained in his affirmation that he was not told or explained about the
contents of the Agreement, but he did not expressly say he did not or was unable to read the document or clause 2 therein. Further, although the Plaintiffs have seen fit delete
and initial certain printed provisions of the Agreement, they have not done so vis-à-vis
the printed stakeholder provision, which remained
intact when the Agreement signed by the Plaintiffs was again presented to the 1st-named
Defendant for initialling. Again the 1st-named
Defendant claimed in his affirmation that he was
not told and explained the terms or the effect of his initials, but he did not expressly say he did not or was unable
to read the document or clause 2 therein.
42.
The Plaintiffs’ conduct in (a) not
deleting the stakeholder provision in the Agreement and returning such signed version
of the Agreement to Mr Tin to show to the vendor and (b) issuing
the Cheque on the same day making it payable to the Defendants’ solicitors and
giving it to Mr Tin to forward to the vendor speak
against the Plaintiffs having clothed Mr Tin with apparent or ostensible
authority to make the Implied Representation and/or 2nd
Representation to the 1st-named Defendant. There is also no evidence
of conduct on the part of the Plaintiffs to
ground any reasonable belief on the part of the 1st-named Defendant that
the Plaintiffs have clothed Mr Tin with such authority.
43.
For the above
reasons, the evidence adduced by the Defendants at best shows, as Mr Ng
suggests, that Mr Tin was authorised to go between the parties to put together the deal in respect of the
Property. The Defendants have not begun to establish any arguable or triable
case that the Plaintiffs have clothed Mr Tin with apparent or ostensible
authority to make the Implied Representation and/or 2nd
Representation. It is different in Welltech Investment Ltd’s case
(supra) where there is uncontradicted evidence that the information and
assurances given by the estate agent was on the instructions of the vendor and
in Green Park Properties Ltd’s case (supra) where the vendor was aware
that the tenancy plan might be misleading but it still allowed
inspection of the suit property without disabusing the estate agent of the
apparent impression that the yard was part of the suit property itself.
44.
Ms Wong
further submits that the Implied Representation and/or 2nd
Representation are outside the scope of Mr Tin’s authority as an estate agent because
the Condition (which removes the protection of the stakeholder clause) is
detrimental to the Plaintiffs, so the Plaintiffs are not bound by such
representations (Bowstead
and Reynolds on Agency 17th ed paras.3-008 – 3-009 at pp.95-96).
I need not consider this
argument in detail, but suffice to say it lends strength to the
above conclusion that there is no believable or credible evidence that Mr Tin has been clothed with
apparent or ostensible authority from the Plaintiffs to make the Implied
Representation and/or 2nd Representation.
45.
Ms Wong
further submits that the alleged misrepresentation defence is incredible. There
is no mention of such defence in the correspondence between the parties’
solicitors prior to the filing of the Defence. There is also no
explanation for such reticence. Even when the Defendants’ solicitors wrote on 4th March 2005 to say “the Vendor” would not proceed with and complete the sale of the
Property under the Agreement, there was no reference of such misrepresentation
defence. This must be considered in the context of the 1st-named
Defendant’s assertions that he discovered the truth upon receiving legal advice
on 20th February 2005 and that he even proceeded to cancel the
Agreement by so informing Mr Tin on 22nd February 2005. There is
also no protest even when the Plaintiffs’ solicitors by letter dated 8th March 2005 claimed that the Defendants repudiated the Agreement.
These matters also lend strength to the conclusion that there is no
credible or believable misrepresentation defence.
(e) Inducement
46.
Mr Ng submits
that the evidence shows that the 1st-named
Defendant relied on the Implied Representation (later shown to be false) when
he signed and initialled the Agreement. When the 1st-named Defendant
discovered such falsity upon taking legal
advice, he immediately demanded a replacement
cheque to be made payable to the Defendants and when informed
that the Plaintiffs refused to do so, he immediately refused to sell the
Property. However, given my
conclusion above in respect of the scope of Mr Tin’s authority, there is no
need to consider this issue.
(f) Summary
47.
In the circumstances, the Defendants have
failed to establish any arguable or triable misrepresentation defence.
Non est factum
defence
48.
The
Defendants rely on the defence of non est factum. In the context of the
present case, such defence raises two issues : (a) whether such plea is still maintainable where the Defendants understood the character
and nature of the Agreement and (b) the effect of the 1st-named
Defendant signing the provisional agreement for sale and purchase in blank.
49.
Mr Ng submits that the 1st-named
Defendant was misled into signing the blank provisional agreement for sale and
purchase which was essentially different from what he intended to sign. He
relies on the following passage from Chitty
on Contracts 29th ed Vol.1 para.5-090 at pp.418-419 :
“The plea of non est factum is
likewise potentially applicable where one person signs a document in blank and
hands it to another, leaving him to fill in the details and complete the transaction.
However, where erroneous details are inserted which are not in accord with the
instructions of the person executing the document, he may yet be liable if
the transaction which the document purports to effect is not essentially
different in substance or in kind from the transaction intended. Moreover, the
onus is on the person signing the document to show that he has acted carefully,
and if he fails to discharge that onus he will be bound.” (my emphasis)
50.
The 1st-named
Defendant in his affirmation claims that he was not told or explained the terms
of the blank provisional agreement for sale and purchase. Mr Ng submits that the 1st-named Defendant was given only a short time to sign
the blank provisional agreement for sale and purchase and he was not given a
chance to read it. There is,
however, no direct evidence on these matters although the 1st-named
Defendant claims Mr Tin pressed him to sign the document. The 1st-named
Defendant claims that later on in the same evening, he was asked to initial the
Agreement without being told or explained the terms (but again he did not expressly say he did
not or was unable to read it). It was
only after he signed/initialled the Agreement that he discovered the Cheque was made out to the Defendant’s solicitors in breach of the Condition. But he was persuaded to accept the Cheque by Mr Tin’s further misrepresentation, ie
the 2nd Representation.
51.
In essence, the
complaint is that the payment terms of the
Agreement (particularly in
relation to the stakeholder provision) were materially different from the Condition imposed by the 1st-named Defendant. Mr Ng submits that in
the absence of countervailing evidence on the above factual matters, it amounts to strong support for the
Defendants’ contention that there was
lack of intention on the part of the 1st-named Defendant to enter
into the contract as shown by the Agreement.
52.
In my view,
the factual evidence relied by the Defendants are insufficient to raise a plea
of non est factum. As is apparent from the italicised part of the
extract from Chitty on Contracts (supra) referred to in paragraph 49 above and in
para.5-089 at p.418, it must be shown that the party asserting such defence
signed the document mistaking its true nature. Such defence is not available
when the party knew the nature of the transaction he was entering into. Lord
Reid in Saunders v Anglia Building Society [1971] AC 1004, 1016 said as follows :
“The
plea cannot be available to anyone who was content to sign without taking the
trouble to find out at least the general effect of the document. Many people do
frequently sign documents put before them for signature by their solicitor or
other trusted advisers without making any inquiry as to their purpose or
effect. But the essence of the plea non est factum is that the person signing
believed that the document he signed had one character or one effect whereas in
fact its character or effect was quite different. He could not have such a
belief unless he had taken steps or been given information which gave him
some grounds for his belief. The amount of information he must have and the
sufficiency of the particularity of his belief must depend on the circumstances
of each case.
……
We
find in many of the authorities statements that a man’s deed is not his deed if
his mind does not go with his pen. But that is far too wide.. ……”
Viscount Dilhorne also said at p.1022 as follows :
“I
agree …… that the difference between what a document is thought to be may be in substance or in kind. It will not suffice if the signer thought that
in some respect it would have a different legal effect from what it was; nor
will it suffice if in some respects it departs from what he thought it would
contain. The difference, whether it be in kind or substance, must be such that
the document is signed entirely …… or fundamentally different from that which
it was thought to be, so that it can be said it was never the signer’s intention
to execute the document.”
53.
In Kincheng
Banking Corp v Kao Yu Kuei [1986] HKC 242, the Court of Appeal held that
whether the guarantor understood all the contents of the document was not
relevant. The burden was on the guarantor to show that he thought he was
signing a document of a different nature; it was not for the other party to
establish that the guarantor did not know the contents of the document. In that case, the guarantor admitted that
he was a guarantor and he had signed a guarantee. He claimed he did not know that
a guarantor was liable to repay, but it was held he knew by the document that
he was undertaking an obligation in relation to a liability of the principal
debtor although he did not appreciate its full legal effect. Huggins
VP held that the guarantor’s ignorance of the precise effect of the document
was a very different thing from non est factum : it did not constitute a defence to the action.
54.
In Chiu Kam Shum v Chak Choi Kwan and anor HCA4895/1992, Deputy Judge Pang (as he then was) (unreported, 8th December 1995), the attorney for the owner signed the provisional
agreement for sale and purchase of the suit property. He claimed he thought the
document was for receiving a deposit for the property, which assertion the
court found to be unconvincing. The attorney was a serving police officer and was
expected to be careful in appending his signature to any document. The document
clearly stated it was a provisional agreement for sale and purchase in both
Chinese and English languages and the attorney received a
cheque of HK$50,000.00 at the same time. There were discussions about the sale
of the property, so it would have been clear to the attorney that he
was creating a legal relationship with the purchaser for the sale
of the property.
55.
Here, the 1st-named
Defendant admits he was aware that he was signing and initialling a provisional
agreement for the sale and purchase of the Property. The 1st-named
Defendant plainly knew that the subject transaction handled by Mr Tin was for the sale of the
Property. He said Mr Tin invited him to his office on 19th February
2005 for signing a provisional agreement for sale and purchase. The Agreement
is titled “臨時買賣合約PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT FOR SALE AND PURCHASE”
and there is no suggestion that the 1st-named Defendant is
illiterate. Mr Tin even asked the 1st-named Defendant the name of
the Defendants’ solicitors for handling the sale of the Property. These facts
plainly show there could not have been any mistake on the part of the 1st-named
Defendant as to the nature of the document. At best, the parties were not ad idiem on
the payment terms and according to the above authorities, it is quite
insufficient to support a plea of non est factum.
56.
But assuming that the 1st-named Defendant did not read the
provisional agreement for sale and purchase on the two occasions when he signed
in blank and initialled it, the available facts before me suggest that he has
been careless or negligent. The printed Agreement (even in
blank form) contains the stakeholder provision in clause 2. Had the 1st-named Defendant read the Agreement, he would have realised there was the stakeholder
provision and it had not been deleted. Ma J (as he then was) held in Wing Hang Bank Ltd
v Liu Kam Ying & ors [2002] 2 HKC 57
that there was no reason why a
man of full age and capacity should not be bound by the terms of the guarantee
which clearly stated his liability on a personal basis when there was no
allegation that he was unaware that what
he was signing was a guarantee
and he was negligent in not reading the terms. In Sun Hung Kai Credit Ltd v Szeto Yuk Mei
& ors [1985] 1 HKC 345, it was held that
although the guarantor was mistaken as to the nature of the document he was
signing, he was not illiterate and was extremely careless in signing a blank
form without looking at the rest of the document. Had he cast his eye over the
other pages of the document, it would have alerted him to the fact that the
document was not one that solely dealt with the transfer of ownership of the
vehicle in question. The plea of non est factum failed in both of these
cases. I find that the Defendants in the
present proceedings have not
discharged the onus of establishing an arguable or triable defence of non
est factum. Rather the factual evidence before me suggest that the 1st-named
Defendant has been careless or negligent in signing the Agreement in blank (Saunders’
case (supra) and Chitty on Contracts 29th ed. Vol.1 para.5-091
at p.419).
57.
Both counsel
refer to the case of Mercantile Credit Co Ltd v Hamblin [1965] 2 QB 242, which I do not find helpful in supporting
a plea of non est factum in the context of the present case.
58.
In that case, a motor dealer was supplied
by a finance company with its standard hire purchase proposal forms. The
defendant asked the motor dealer if he could obtain a loan on the security of
her car. The motor dealer agreed to make enquiries and gave a blank cheque for
her to fill in if she agreed to the terms of the proposed loan that he would inform her after his enquiries. He suggested that the
necessary documents be signed first in order to avoid unnecessary delay. The
defendant signed certain forms handed to her by the motor dealer’s wife in blank
without reading them in the belief that they were mortgage documents and she
left them with the motor dealer pending his enquiries. It turned out that they were
hire-purchase documents and the motor dealer filled in the blank particulars on
the forms to certify inter alia that he as supplier had absolute title to the car. The finance company accepted
the hire purchase proposal and paid the defendant and the motor dealer for the purported
sale. The defendant refused to pay the instalments.
59.
It was held “[on]
the peculiar facts of this case” (per Pearson LJ at p.275) or “in the
special circumstances of this case” (per Salmon LJ at p.279) that the
defendant was not negligent. The defendant was well acquainted with the motor
dealer, who was apparently respectable, solvent and prosperous, and the blank
cheque given to the defendant gave her confidence she could rely on his
due performance of the arrangements they had made. The defendant had every
reason to trust and not doubt the motor dealer.
60.
I was
referred to the judgment of Salmon LJ at pp.279-280
as follows :
“As to non est factum, to my mind such a defence is relevant only when
the document in question is a document which, as signed, imposes some liability
on the person who signs it, e.g., a guarantee, a conveyance, or a binding offer
to buy or sell. If the signatory can prove that his signature was procured by a
misrepresentation as to the character and class of the document, he is not
bound by it: Mushkam Finance Ltd. V.
Howard. But when, as in the present case, the document is in blank when
signed, the signatory cannot be liable on it unless he has expressly or
impliedly authorised someone to complete it on his behalf or is precluded from
denying the authority of whoever it was who purported to complete the document
on his behalf. If he gave authority or is precluded from denying that he did
so, he is liable but not otherwise. ……” (my emphasis)
It should be noted that Salmon LJ’s view,
namely, that non est factum was inapplicable because it was only relevant
when the supposed document as signed created some liability on the signatory
and could not apply to documents signed in blank, was the minority view. Pearson LJ (whose
judgment Sellers LJ endorsed) at pp.267-268
referred to Mushkam
Finance Ltd’s case (supra), which drew a
distinction between misrepresentation of the character and class of the
document in question and misrepresentation simply as to its contents, the
latter of which was insufficient to support a plea of non est factum. He held that there was no real misrepresentation in
that case because the defendant did not have any positive belief that the
documents she signed were mortgage documents, and that those documents were of
the class and character which she had in mind, being documents capable of being
used for raising money on the security of the car.
61.
In the present circumstances,
irrespective of whether the 1st-named Defendant by signing the
provisional agreement for sale and purchase in blank authorised Mr Tin, either
expressly or impliedly, to complete the document for him, there is no arguable
or triable plea of non est factum since there is no evidence that the 1st-named
Defendant misunderstood the class, nature or character of the Agreement.
Genuine
pre-estimate of loss at the time of contract
62.
Although this has not been raised in
either the Defence or in the affirmation of the 1st-named Defendant,
Mr Ng alternatively argues that the sum fixed in clause 7 of the Agreement (ie HK$160,000.00 or 3.14% of
the purchase price of the Property) is not a
genuine pre-estimate of loss at the time of contract. He refers to Sihombing
and Wilkinson, Hong Kong Conveyancing
(2003) Vol.2(D) para.[61.7] at pp.XV 662-663 as follows :
“Most provisional agreements enable the vendor to terminate the contract
on repaying the initial deposit (1%) and a sum equivalent thereto, and denying
any further remedy to the purchaser. This sum represents liquidated damages for
the vendor’s breach. ……”
63.
I do not
understand from Mr Ng’s submissions that the Defendants dispute the viability
of a clause in the provisional agreement for sale and purchase of property
similar to the formulation as clause 7 of the Agreement. In my view, this
stance is correct (Wong Lai-fan v Lee Ha [1992] 1 HKLR 125 and Chiu Wai Ling v Chan Yau Chi & anor (Centaline
Property Agency, third party) [2002] 2 HKC 154). It was held in Wong Lai-fan’s
case (supra) that parties to a provisional agreement for sale and purchase of
property might limit their damages for non-completion provided a correct
formula for drafting was adopted. The Court of Appeal in that case further held
that the true and proper construction of the relevant clause (similar to clause
7 of the Agreement) was that it provided the vendor with the option of
immediately paying the amount stipulated instead of completing and upon doing
so it was not open to the purchaser to take action either to claim damages or
to seek specific performance.
64.
Such practice
of asking for compensation in the sum of double deposit is also referred to in Sung
Wai Kiu and anor v Wong Mei Yin HCA3979/1994, Yeung J (as he then was)
(unreported, 17th January 1997) as follows :
“…… Regardless of
actual loss, either contractual party is entitled to forfeit the deposit of the
other party who is in breach of contract, or ask for compensation in the sum of
double deposit, but the deposit concerned shall usually not exceed 10% of the
purchase price of the premises. This flexibility is derived through long-term
practice under the common law. Hong Kong has all along been following this
practice. ……”
Such view was endorsed
by Chan CJHC (as he then was) when he delivered the appeal judgment of the
Court of Appeal (Li Pui Wan v Wong Mei Yin [1998] 1 HKLRD 84).
65.
It appears
that Mr Ng’s objection is that the quantum of the compensation or liquidated
damages provided in clause 7 of the Agreement suggests that the clause is a
penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss.
66.
Ms Wong
submits that the first instance and appeal judgments in Sung Wai Kiu’s
case (supra) suggest it was established common practice that forfeiture of a
deposit or compensation that amounted to not more than 10% of the purchase price
was
not a penalty and was deemed reasonable. However, the facts of that case concerned the sale and
purchase of New Territories small houses. The parties entered into an oral
agreement whereby the vendor sold to the purchaser certain share in a property
with the exclusive right, use and enjoyment of part of a small house to be
erected on the property for the price of HK$500,000.00. The purchaser paid a
total sum of HK$400,000.00 on 4 successive occasions as deposit. It was held
that such sum was not a true deposit but a partial payment of the purchase
price.
67.
In that case,
the provisional agreement did not provide for the signing of a formal agreement
for sale and purchase, so it is not surprising that the court
compared the compensation sum against the usual and reasonable practice
of fixing the deposit at 10% of the purchase price (normally payable at the
time of the signing of the formal agreement of sale and purchase). Further, the
parties did not mention, let alone agree upon, how much either party should
compensate the other in case of breach. Since the parties had no agreement as
to setting the deposit at 10% of the purchase price nor did they agree to take
10% of the purchase price as reasonable liquidated damages, the purchaser’s
claim for compensation in the sum of double deposit could not succeed.
68.
I do not
consider either the first instance or appeal judgments of Sung Wai Kiu’s
case (supra) of assistance in the context of the present case save for the
following guidance from Chan CJHC (as he then was) at p.92 :
“……The most
important factor which requires consideration is whether the agreed deposit was
truly regarded by the parties as a reasonable compensation for anticipated
loss.”
After all, the Agreement in the present proceedings expressly provides for the payment of the initial deposit at the signing of the Agreement and for a further deposit (which together forms 10% of the purchase price) upon
the signing of the formal agreement for sale and purchase 14 days after the
date of the Agreement. The
Agreement also expressly sets out the formulation for compensation in the event
of default by either party. In such
circumstances, I find Chiu Wai Ling’s case (supra)
cited by Mr Ng more pertinent.
69.
In Chiu Wai Ling’s case (supra), the vendors and purchaser entered into a provisional agreement for the
sale and purchase of the suit property. Requisitions were not answered and the purchaser accepted the
vendors’ repudiatory breach. The purchaser brought an action for inter alia the return of the deposit and liquidated damages under a clause similar to clause 7 of the
Agreement. It was held that the sum fixed under the said clause being a sum
equivalent to 10% of the purchase price was not a genuine pre-estimate of the
loss at the time when the parties signed the provisional agreement. H H Judge
Lok referred to Sung Wai Kiu’s case (supra) and held that the court would not blindly enforce a contractual term
which required the defaulting party to pay a sum which was equivalent to 10% of
the purchase price as liquidated damages. Ultimately, that remained a question
of fact in each individual case, and the court had to inquire whether such sum
was a genuine pre-estimate of the loss agreed by the parties.
70.
In Chiu Wai Ling’s case (supra), the undisputed evidence of the estate agent clearly showed that it was
customary to ask an intended purchaser to pay 1% to 3% (but not as high as 10%)
of the purchase price as an initial deposit. This was because a formal sale and
purchase agreement would usually be signed by the parties 7 to 14 days after
the date of the provisional agreement and the clause gave an option to the
parties to back out, so the sum fixed as “liquidated damages” would only have been intended by
the parties to cover any fluctuation in value of the property during this short
period of time. Further, there was no evidence that the parties had actually
discussed the issue.
71.
Here, there is
express provision in the Agreement for agreed compensation in the sum of double
deposit and the amount of the initial deposit is also expressly stipulated. The
onus of proving that a stipulated sum is a penalty rather than liquidated
damages is upon the party against whom the stipulated sum is claimed (McGregor on Damages 17th
ed. para.13-012 at pp.424-425).
72.
With the
above principles and onus of proof in mind, I now turn to the available
pleadings and affirmation evidence before me. The sum of HK$160,000.00 amounts to 3.14% of the purchase price. What is clear from Chiu Wai Ling’s
case (supra) is that an initial deposit close to 10% of the purchase price
cannot be a genuine pre-estimate of loss unless there are special
circumstances. But it does not say that a lesser sum will necessarily attract
criticism of being a penalty. McGregor on Damages 17th
ed. para.13-014 at pp.425-426 suggests that a realistic approach should be
taken. So long as it is not extravagant, having regard to the range of losses
that it could reasonably be anticipated it would have to cover at the time the
contract was made, it can still be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate of loss.
73.
There is no evidence that an initial
deposit of slightly over 3% of the purchase price is out of the usual line in
the market for sale of residential properties in about February 2005. In fact,
it is roughly in line with the range of 1% to 3% contemplated in Chiu Wai Ling’s case (supra). Indeed, Wong Lai-fan’s case (supra) suggests
the stipulated sum in the present case is not inappropriate. In that case, the purchase price of the suit property was
HK$2,450,000.00 and the initial deposit paid upon the signing of the
provisional agreement for sale and purchase was HK$80,000.00 (ie 3.27% of the
purchase price). The vendor defaulted the agreement. The Court of Appeal upheld his conduct in forwarding a cheque for
HK$160,000.00 to the purchaser in full and final settlement and refused specific
performance.
74.
Recent authorities also show it is not unknown to
find stipulations for initial deposits in provisional agreements for sale and
purchase of property of about or in excess of 3% (see Tak Cheong Electronics
(Holdings) Co Ltd v Sun Dexiang (孫德香)
DCCJ2483/2005 Deputy Judge J Ko (unreported, 29th November 2005), Poon
Mee Kuen v Chan Kam Tim & ors HCMP1431, 1432 & 1433/2004 Sahkrani J
(unreported, 18th January 2005) and Hondon Development Ltd &
anor v Powerise Investments Ltd & anor (Centaline Property Agency Ltd &
anor, third parties) [2005] 3 HKLRD 605 (the latter case being in respect
of shop premises)).
75.
The Defendants have not adduced evidence
before me to arguably demonstrate that 3.14%
of the purchase price cannot be a genuine estimate of loss. Mr Ng recognises the lack of such evidence as he submits there is an
absence of information from Mr Tin and on the current status of the property
market. I do not see how the
current status of the property market is relevant. In fact, Mr Ng in paragraph 8 of his written supplemental submissions
accepts that the relevant time for considering this issue is when the parties
signed the Agreement. Further, there is no information that Mr
Tin is unavailable or unwilling. Given that the onus is on the Defendants to
adduce evidence to prove that the stipulated sum is a penalty and the burden is
also on them to establish an arguable or triable defence in answer to the
summary judgment application, the absence of such evidence does not diminish
the strength of the Plaintiffs’ position.
76.
Mr Ng reminds that the stipulated
compensation of HK$160,000.00 should be considered in the context of the 1st-named
Defendant being asked to sign the Agreement in blank and to initial it without being told or explained the terms. He submits this means that
the 1st-named Defendant was not given the opportunity to consider
whether such stipulated sum was a genuine pre-estimate of loss. I do not accept such suggestion. The 1st-named Defendant knew and
accepted that the initial deposit was HK$160,000.00. When he was shown the
Cheque, all he complained about was the payee. There was no complaint about the
value of the Cheque and when he demanded a replacement cheque, he never asked
for a different amount. A careful study of the 1st Defendant’s
affirmation shows that whilst he claims Mr Tin has not told or explained to him
the contents of the Agreement, he does not expressly say he did not or was unable to read the Agreement when it was presented to him to sign or initial (ie he had two occasions to read the printed Clause 7 of the Agreement if he had wished to do so). I note that the Defendants have not raised the
penalty point even after the 1st-named Defendant obtained legal
advice since 20th February 2005 and it does not feature in the
Defence. Moreover, it has never been suggested in the affirmation of the 1st-named
Defendant that he was previously unaware of the provision for compensation in
the sum of double deposit and that he now wishes to resile from such provision
since he has never agreed to it. In my view, to raise this argument now is incredible and unbelievable.
77.
In the
circumstances, I find the Defendants have not established any arguable or
triable case that the stipulated sum in clause 7 of the Agreement is a penalty
and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss.
The authority of
the 1st-named Defendant
78.
There is no dispute that the 1st-named
Defendant signed the Agreement on behalf of his wife, namely, the 2nd-named
Defendant. There is no evidence before me that she dealt with Mr Tin or
participated in the transaction at all. The 1st-named Defendant
admits in his affirmation that he has not told the 2nd-named
Defendant about the intended sale of the Property and the signing of the
Agreement and that the 2nd-named Defendant never gave him any
direction, authority, consent or agreement to sign the Agreement on her behalf.
Mr Ng therefore suggests the Agreement is not binding on the 2nd-named
Defendant.
79.
This raises the question of whether there
is any potential conflict of interest between the 1st-named and the
2nd-named Defendants and whether they can or should be represented
by the same solicitors. Both counsel confirm to me at the hearing that they
will not take such issue for the purpose of the summary judgment application.
80.
Mr Ng draws my attention to Chiu Kam Shum’s case (supra). In that case, the 2nd defendant, an attorney of the owner
of the suit property (the 1st defendant) pursuant to a power of
attorney, put the suit property up for sale. The power of attorney did not
include such powers. The purchaser entered into a provisional agreement for
sale and purchase of the suit property. The sale fell through and the purchaser
sued for specific performance. The court held that the 1st defendant
did not authorise the 2nd defendant to effect a sale of the suit
property and there was no unequivocal evidence that the 1st
defendant expressly affirmed the contract or ratified the 2nd
defendant’s otherwise unauthorised acts.
81.
Mr Ng acknowledges that each case turns on
its own facts, but argues the above case suggests that a determination on
whether a purported agent has the requisite authority to bind his purported
principal can only be made after a full trial upon examination of the witnesses
and the surrounding factual circumstances.
82.
On the affirmation evidence before me,
there is an arguable case that the 2nd-named Defendant has not given
any direct authority to the 1st-named Defendant to effect a sale of
the Property on her behalf. Ms Wong informs me that for the purpose of the
summary judgment application, the Plaintiffs do not intend to rely on any
apparent or ostensible authority of the 1st-named Defendant. Ms Wong
submits that, even assuming that the 1st-named Defendant did not have
the requisite authority to bind the 2nd-named Defendant, the Defendants
are still liable for the following reasons : (a) the 1st-named Defendant
in purporting to act for the 2nd-named Defendant impliedly warranted
that he had authority to do so, thus rendering him personally liability for any
loss and damages suffered by the Plaintiffs (Young v Toynbee [1910] 1 KB 215 and Chiu Kam Shum’s case (supra)), and (b) the 2nd-named Defendant
had ratified the unauthorised acts of the 1st-named Defendant as
evidenced by the letter from the Defendants’ solicitors to the Plaintiffs’
solicitors dated 4th March 2005.
83.
In respect of (a), I do not consider such
argument carries the matter much further since I have concluded above that the
1st-named Defendant, having failed to establish any arguable defence
or triable issue, is personally liable to the Plaintiffs.
84.
In respect of (b), Ms Wong refers to the
case of Gimex Development Ltd v Cua Wai
tak & ors [2000] 1 HKC 241. In that case, the appellant acquired
the suit property from the
developer with a husband and wife couple as
confirmors. The wife gave the
husband a general power of attorney to enter into an agreement for the purchase
of the property and to dispose of it on her behalf. The husband granted a
similar power of attorney to a third party and entered into a deed of
substitution appointing the third party to act for the wife in substitution for
himself. Cheung J (as he then was) said at pp.253-254 that :
“Although ratification must be clear and
must bear distinct reference to the facts of the particular case, it need not
necessarily be proved by positive acts of adoption. In certain cases it is
sufficient evidence of ratification that the intended principal, having all material facts brought to his
knowledge and knowing that he is being regarded as having accepted the position
of the principal, takes no steps to disown that character within a reasonable
time, or adopts no means of asserting his rights at the earliest possible time ……”
(my emphasis)
85.
Cheung J (as
he then was) held there was a clear case of
ratification. He found the
substitution understandable since the couple lived in the Philippines whereas the
transaction was to take place in Hong Kong. Even if the wife had not authorised
the third party to act on her behalf at all, she had not taken any steps to
protect and assert her right. Keith JA held that the absence of any evidence
that the wife knew how her husband had purported to divest her of her interest
in the property should not prevent the doctrine of ratification from applying,
provided that she knew that her husband had purported to dispose of her
interest in the property. He further held that the wife had ratified the purported
disposal of her interest in the property (even though she did not know it had
been disposed of) when, having known that her husband had purported to dispose
of it, she took no steps to disown the purported disposal.
86.
It appears from the above that the crux that persuaded
the court in Gimex Development
Ltd’s case (supra) on the
ratification issue was the general power of attorney giving the husband the
right to dispose of the suit property on her behalf and the evidence that the
wife knew the husband did purport to dispose her interest therein. It was in
such circumstances that the inactivity on her part amounted to ratification of
her husband’s unauthorised act.
87.
Turning to
the factual evidence before me, there is no
direct evidence of similar knowledge on the part of the 2nd-named Defendant.
But Ms Wong submits that the letter of the Defendants’ solicitors of 4th
March 2005 provides good evidence in this respect. She points out that the
caption of such letter describes inter
alia the Property and “Vendor:- Wai Ping Luen & Wong Choy Kau” and the
body of the letter states that they were “instructed by the Vendor”. Ms Wong
argues that since the Defendants’ solicitors acted for “the Vendor” who must
necessarily include the 2nd-named Defendant and the letter refers to
“the sale of the Property under [the Agreement] in relation to the above
Property”, the 2nd-named Defendant must be taken to have ratified
the Agreement.
88.
However, such submission ignores the
reality that the letter clearly refers to the refusal by “the Vendor” to
complete the sale of the Property
and that the Agreement be “cancelled”. There is
therefore at the very least an arguable case that such conduct amounts to
disowning rather than endorsing the Agreement. In Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 17th ed para.2-073 at
p.70, it is said that “[express] ratification will however be comparatively
rare, and a ratification will more often be implied from words or conduct. Such
words or conduct must be unequivocal:
they must not be such that they could be accounted for by other interpretations
…… Such reasoning is necessary to protect the principal against too easily
being held liable as having ratified ……” (my emphasis)
89.
In the circumstances, I am of the view
that the 2nd-named Defendant has established an arguable defence or
triable issue on the basis of lack of authority and the issue of her liability
in relation to the Plaintiffs’ claim should be left for trial.
Some other reason
for trial
90.
Mr Ng submits that it is not fair and just
to enter summary judgment against the Defendants without having the opportunity
to cross-examine Mr Tin. It is said that Mr Tin is a vital witness and his
evidence is pivotal, so that the factual dispute between the parties cannot be
resolved without his testimony. Mr Ng submits that the Defendants shall
endeavour to arrange for Mr Tin’s attendance at the trial as a witness, whether
on a voluntary basis or under subpoena.
91.
There is no evidence before me as to what
attempts have been made so far to seek out Mr Tin or to ascertain how his
evidence will assist the Defendants. Further, I do not understand Mr Ng’s submission in respect of the need to resolve factual disputes. Here, the Plaintiffs have not filed
any affirmation in reply to dispute the factual evidence relied on by the Defendants
and, indeed, the analysis above is largely made on the basis of the
Defendants’ case and evidence.
92.
It is for the Defendants to raise an
arguable defence or a triable issue. In my view, there is no triable or
arguable defence vis-à-vis the 1st-named Defendant requiring discovery or cross-examination of witnesses that ought to be left for
trial. I
refer to the wise words of Megarry V-C in Lady Anne Tennant v Associated
Newspapers Group Ltd [1979] FSR 298 as cited in Hong Kong Civil
Procedure 2004 para.14/4/3 at p.160 : “A desire to investigate alleged obscurities
and a hope that something will turn up on the investigation cannot, separately
or together, amount to a sufficient reason for refusing to enter judgment for
the plaintiff. You do not get
leave to defend by putting forward a case that is all surmise and Micawberism.”
Conclusion
93.
In the circumstances, I grant final
judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs against the 1st-named Defendant
in the sum of HK$160,000.00 and interest thereon at the rate of 9.234% pa from
the date of the writ of summons to the date of judgment and thereafter at
judgment rate until payment. There is no reason why costs should not follow
event. I grant a costs order nisi
that the 1st-named Defendant do pay to the Plaintiffs costs of this
application and of the action against the 1st-named Defendant
(including all costs reserved, if any) to be taxed if not agreed with
certificate for counsel.
94.
In respect of the Plaintiffs’ claim
against the 2nd-named Defendant, I order that there be unconditional
leave to defend. I also make the following further directions :
(a) there be mutual discovery of documents
within 21 days with inspection of documents within 14 days thereafter;
(b) each party do file into court and serve on
the other party signed witness statements as to fact within 56 days;
(c) liberty to apply for further or other
directions, if necessary.
I also grant a costs order nisi
that the costs of this application against the 2nd-named Defendant
(including all costs reserved, if any) be costs in the cause with certificate
for counsel. I note that although the 2nd-named Defendant has
succeeded in resisting the summary judgment application, she has also failed in
a number of defence arguments which took up time at the hearing. In my view, a
fair and just order for costs would be for costs of the application to be in
the cause.
| |
(Marlene
Ng)
District Judge |
Ms Emma Wong
instructed by Messrs K M Lai & Li for the Plaintiff.
Mr Benjamin Ng
instructed by Messrs Benson Li & Co for the Defendant.
|