XCHRX SHIH MEI CHIN v. THE LAW SOCIETY OF HONG KONG

HCMP 3/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 3 OF 2000

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J U D G M E N T

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1. The Appellant is the Plaintiff herein. She commenced this action in the High Court on 3 January 2000 by way of an Originating Summons claiming that the Defendant was negligent in its supervision of the solicitors and she suffered loss and damages amounting to $50 million as a result.

2. The Defendant gave its acknowledgement of service on 19 January 2000. On the same day, the Appellant took out an application asking in effect for judgment in default of an acknowledgement of service to be entered against the Defendant. During the course of the appeal hearing, the Appellant admitted that the Originating Summons was served on the Defendant by registered post and the document was posted on 3 January 2000. Under the Rules of the High Court, Ord. 10 r. 1(3):-

Ord. 10 r. 1(2) is related to service by registered post or by insertion through the letter box.

3. In the absence of evidence, the Originating Summons herein would have been deemed to be served on 10 January 2000.

4. Under Ord. 12 r. 5 (read together with Ord. 12 r. 9(1)), the time limited for acknowledging service is 14 days after service of the Originating Summons. If the date of service was 10 January 2000, the latest time for acknowledging service would have been 23 January 2000.

5. I have explained to the Appellant the relevant provisions of the Rules of the High Court during the hearing. Despite this explanation and her indication that she understood my explanation, the Appellant insisted on proceeding with the appeal. She contended that despite the relevant rules, the Defendant ought to have given an acknowledgement of service by 17 January 2000 at the latest because:-

She argued that the 14-day period should therefore start to run from 3 January 2000.

6. I have no hesitation in concluding that the Appellant's arguments were wrong and of no substance. I therefore find that the learned Master had not erred in making an order in the way she did. The appeal is therefore dismissed.

7. Furthermore, this action was already struck out or dismissed by an order of Master Chan on 10 February 2000. The order of the Master which is the subject matter of this appeal therefore has no practical significance since that date. This is because, in any event, the underlying claim has already gone.