CCMJ v. SSM formerly known as SKL

FCMP 67/2010

[2026] HKFC 119

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

FAMILY COURT

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 67 OF 2010

__________________________________

__________________________________

_________________________________

-------------------------------

DECISION
( Charging Order Absolute Application )

-------------------------------

Respondent’s Mother (“M”) 2 Charging Order Absolute Applications

1.  This is a written decision on M’s 2 applications for Charging Order Absolute.

2.  On 30 May 2025, M obtained a Charging Order Nisi arising from the Judgment dated 21 May 2025 at a sum of $6,777,008 (“Lump Sum Maintenance Judgment”) on the funds of $12,122,071.55 paid into High Court pursuant to the order filed in HCMP 2099/2023 on 8 May 2024 (the “funds in High Court”) (“M’s 1^st CO Absolute Application”).

3.  On 5 September 2025, M obtained another Charging Order Nisi arising from costs which the Applicant Father (“F”) was ordered to pay to the M in the total sum of $2,795,422.37 over the funds in High Court (“M’s 2^nd CO Absolute Application”).

4.  The hearings on M’s 2 CO Absolute applications were heard on 23 September 2025 and 7 January 2026 respectively. F opposed the two Charging Order Nisi being made absolute and sought the discharge of these 2 Charging Order Nisi. Case management directions were given on those two hearings and a substantive argument hearing was fixed for 6 March 2026 to determine whether these 2 Charging Order applications should be made absolute.

5.  However, on 27 February 2026, F lodged a letter, enclosing his medical certificate, mainly stating his current mental condition prevents him from attending the hearing on 6 March 2026 and making the following requests:

“I respectively request this court to:

Bring the hearing of the Summons forward to a date before 6 March 2026; or

Order dismissal of Respondent’s charging order application or grant the adjournment on paper based on medical evidence in Exhibit J224-3 and the medical certificate dated today, 27 February 2026.”

6.  In view of F’s letter and in view of the parties already complied with the case management directions on 23 September 2025 and 7 January 2026 respectively, I ordered that M’s 2 Charging Order Absolute applications be dealt with by paper disposal on 3 March 2026.

7.  This is my written decision after perusing the bundle documents and parties’ submissions.

Background relevant to M’s Applications

8.  This case has a lengthy history. I will not reiterate all the details. I will only set out the background facts relevant to M’s Applications in the following table for easy reference:

Date	Event
05 June 2015	Court ordered that One SilverSea Property under the sole name of the F be settled on trust for the use of the daughter and M.
January 2021	F stopped paying mortgage instalment of One SilverSea Property.
9 July 2021	Bank of China, mortgagee bank of the One Silversea Property, issued mortgage action against F.
12 January 2022	An order for possession of One Silversea Property was granted and mortgagee sale was arranged.
November 2022	F executed 4 Legal Charges separately in respect of purported loans allegedly given to him by his mother and 3 other friends between 2018 and 2022. 4 Legal Charges were registered at the Land Registry against the title of One Silversea Property.
10 March 2023	Bank of China sold One Silversea Property. Net proceeds of sale were HK$12,122,071.55 (“Net proceeds of sale”).
10 November 2023	Bank of China took out Interpleader Proceedings since it could not determine how Net proceeds of sale be dealt with. F’s mother and 3 other friends were the 4th Claimant to the 7th Claimant in the Interpleader Proceedings (“F’s mother and friends”).
8 May 2024	Net proceeds of sale were paid into Court under the Interpleader Proceedings.
21 May 2025	Lump Sum Maintenance Judgment was handed down by HHJ G. Own, granting various lump sum awards totaling $6,777,008 to M (“Lump Sum Maintenance Judgment”).
30 May 2025	M obtained the 1st Charging Order Nisi on the Lump Sum Maintenance Judgment.
5 September 2025	M obtained the 2nd Charging Order Nisi arising from the costs that F had been ordered to pay to the M in various occasions from 2015 to 2024 at a total sum of $2,795,422.37.

F’s Speaking Note and F’s Skeleton both lodged to the Court on 3 March 2026

9.  Before summarizing parties’ positions and analyzing their arguments, I need to address that F lodged a speaking note of 5 pages and skeleton of 9 pages with 6 enclosures, including a letter from Court, F’s medical certificate, one paragraph of the Lump Sum Maintenance Judgment and 3 cases that was already included in his list of authorities lodged on 13 February 2026. These two documents were lodged without seeking any leave from the Court.

10.  Court gave sufficient time for the parties to file their evidence and submit their submissions in relation to these 2 Charging Order Absolute applications. Court clearly directed F to lodge and serve his written submissions in opposition (no more than 10 A4 pages, 14 fonts, double line spacing) and List of Authorities on or before 13 February 2026 under the Order dated 7 January 2026. Court also clearly directed to the parties that “No further Affidavits and Submissions be filed without leave of the Court”. These 2 documents were lodged after M lodged her written submissions in reply on 27 February 2026. Court disapproves F’s conduct. Whatever the documents are called, they were plainly lodged without leave and will not be considered.

M’s Applications

11.  M’s applications are based on s.52A(1) of District Court Ordinance (“DCO”). M submits that there could hardly be any dispute that financial orders granted by the Court in the past years have not been complied with by F. In these 2 Charging Order Absolute applications, M submits that F failed to pay the Lump Sum Maintenance and also various costs orders made against him.

12.  M further submits that the funds in High Court sought to be charged originate from the Net proceeds of Sale of One Silversea Property, which was owned by F before the sale. The funds in High Court are regarded as assets capable of being charged under s.52AA(2) of DCO. Further, F has beneficiary interest of the funds in High Court. M relies on Herbert Smith Freehills v Chris Au and Another [2018] 2 HKLRD 207, paragraph 14 in support of her argument that F has beneficiary interest of the funds pursuant to s.52AA of District Court Ordinance, being the equivalent of s.20A of the High Court Ordinance: 

“14. These authorities suggest that a party who has paid money into court as security for costs, as a condition for defence or as fortification for an undertaking as to damages, may be treated as the "owner" of the funds subject to the other party's security interest therein. Applying that reasoning, after a plaintiff such as Chris Au has paid money into court as security for the defendant's costs, while the funds become subject to the control of the court and may be paid out only in accordance with a court order, the plaintiff nevertheless in a limited sense retains a beneficial interest in the money. It is not necessary to decide whether it amounts to ownership or a proprietory interest as opposed to a mere equity. Nor is it profitable, as observed by Hobhouse J in Halvanon, to analyse whether the court or the Registrar stands in the position of trustee in relation to such funds. It is sufficient to say, and in my view it does no violence to the language of s.20A to do so, that such a plaintiff holds an interest in the funds in court beneficially, albeit subject to the security interest of the defendant which it is the purpose of the order for security for costs to confer on him. The word "beneficially" in this context simply means, in my view, that the interest is held for one's own benefit, rather than for or on behalf of another. There is nothing in the authorities, nor any reason in principle or policy, to mandate the view, which Ms Au urges upon me, that such a plaintiff has at most a future interest insufficient for the purposes of s.20A. Indeed, in the case of funds paid by a defendant into court as an offer to settle under O.22, Ms Au accepts that the defendant retains a beneficial interest sufficient to found a charging order.” (emphasis added)

13.  Accordingly, M submits that the 2 Charging Orders Nisi over the funds in High Court should be made absolute.

F’s oppositions

14.  Upon perusal of F’s affirmation in opposition filed on 24 November 2025 and his written submissions lodged on 13 February 2026, I note that F’s arguments are scattered and repetitive. He also advances a considerable amount of legal analysis in his affirmation in opposition. Doing the best I can, I consider F’s major grounds of oppositions to be as follows:

(a)  M’s application is an abuse of process intended to gain priority ahead of other creditors in the pending Interpleader Proceedings.

(b)  M did not make full and frank disclosure of F’s alleged other creditors and F’s insolvency.

(c)  F’s other creditors would be unfairly/undue prejudiced.

(d)  Family Court has held that it has no jurisdiction to order a lump sum be secured over the funds in High Court, and therefore has no jurisdiction to impose a charge over the same fund.

15.  In addition to the above, I will also address in the analysis section F’s application for an adjournment in order to “secure legal representation, improve the Applicant’s (i.e. F) health, and obtain litigation funding for legal support, upholding his right to a fair trial” in section VII of his written submissions.

16.  Although I only focus on 5 aspects in my analysis, I stress that I have considered all the submissions and relevant documents in reaching this written decision. F has raised a number of different arguments but I do not intend to repeat each and every submission advanced by the parties, in order to avoid unnecessary length. I consider analyzing these 5 aspects is sufficient to determine the application.

Legal Principles

17.  Charging Order is one of the enforcement mechanisms designed to ensure an order is not ultimately frustrated. Under s.52A(1) of DCO, the Court may impose a charge for securing the payment of any money due or to become due under a judgement or order on a judgement debtor’s property specified in the order.

18.  Under s.52A(2) of DCO, in deciding whether to make a charging order, the Court has to consider all the circumstances and in particular, any evidence as to the personal circumstances of the debtor and whether any other creditor of the debtor would likely be unduly prejudiced.

19.  Under s.52AA(1)(a)(i) and (2)(c) of DCO, a charge may be imposed on funds in court, which the judgment debtor holds a beneficiary interest. Under s.3 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1), “court” is defined as “any court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of competent jurisdiction.”

20.  The general principles governing the exercise of the discretion to make a charging order may be summarised as follows (Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026 at 50/9A/23):

“1. The question whether a charging order nisi should be made absolute is one for the discretion of the court.

2. The burden of showing cause why a charging order nisi should not be made absolute is on the judgment debtor.

3. For the purpose of the exercise of the court’s discretion there is, in general, no material difference between the making absolute of a charging order nisi on the one hand and a garnishee order nisi on the other.

4. In exercising its discretion the court has both the right and the duty to take into account all the circumstances of a particular case, whether such circumstances arose before or after the making of the order nisi.

5. The court should so exercise its discretion as to do equity, so far as possible, to all the various parties involved, that is to say, the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor and all other unsecured creditors. Cf Wardley v. Aik San Realty Ltd [1985] 2 H.K.C. 695 above.

(The above principles which were stated by Lord Brandon in Roberts Petroleum Ltd v. Bernard Kenny Ltd [1982] 1 W.L.R. 301, 307 ; [1982] 1 All E.R. 685 at 690, CA are not affected by the reversal of that case by the House of Lords [1983] A.C. 192; [1983] 1 All E.R. 564.) …….” (emphasis added)

Analysis

21.  In view of the above legal principles, I exercise my discretion by considering all the circumstances arising from F’s grounds of opposition, and then deciding whether F has shown that 2 Charging Orders should not be made absolute.

Ground 1: M’s application is an abuse of process to gain priority ahead of other creditors in the pending Interpleader Proceedings

22.  F says the M’s present application is an abuse of process, because it is an attempt to gain an unfair advantage over other creditors while the High Court is still dealing with the fund. F says this would undermine the purpose of the interpleader process, namely to allow all claims to be decided fairly in one forum.

23.  M stresses she is not trying to gain priority F’s alleged creditors (i.e. F’s mother and friends) who are the parties in the Interpleader Proceedings, nor can she do so even if Charging Orders Nisi are made absolute. F’s mother and friends are said to be secured creditors by reason of 4 Legal Charges created by F in their favour. The validity of those 4 Legal Charges is one of the issues to be tried in the Interpleader Proceedings. If M’s challenge to the 4 Legal Charges is unsuccessful, she accepts that even if the Charging Order Nisi are now made absolute, she will rank below secured creditors in terms of priority.

24.  According to the land search of F’s One Silversea Property, the 4 Legal Charges in favour of F’s mother and friends were created on 23 November 2022 and registered against F’s One Silversea Property. If the High Court finds in the Interpleader Proceedings that those 4 Legal Charges are valid, I agree with M that even the 2 Charging Orders in this application are made absolute, their priority will remain lower than the creditors under the 4 Legal Charges. I therefore do not accept that granting M’s 2 applications to make the Charging Order Nisi absolute would give M priority over F’s mother and friends who are the parties in the pending Interpleader Proceedings. In my view, making the 2 Charging Orders absolute will not affect the priority of the 4 Legal Charges if they are found to be valid in the Interpleader Proceedings.

Ground 2: M did not make full and frank disclosure of F’s alleged other creditors and F’s insolvency

25.  F submits that:

(a)  M had a strict duty of “full and frank disclosure”.  

(b)  M “willfully neglected the imperative of comprehensive disclosure and the duty to adequately address the interests of all other creditors, as well as her obligations to conduct through enquires into both known and unknown related creditors, whether directly or indirectly through my involvement.”  

(c)  M was aware of “F’s negative net asset worth via his affidavits including the highly tampered 52^nd Affidavit and 5^th May 2023 Form E – which she never challenged or made queries either by questionnaire or cross examination – yet she failed to disclose this probable insolvency in her ex parte application. This omission of material facts constitutes “sharp conduct”. The non-disclosure is a serious matter of abusing the process”.

26.  M submits that:

(a)  She had disclosed the secured creditors and the claim of F’s previous solicitors on outstanding legal fees in support of her Charging Order Nisi application.

(b)  It is untrue that M did not challenge F’s 52^nd Affidavit (filed in opposition to F’s variation of maintenance application) or F’s Form E of May 2023 (“F’s 2023 Form E”). These formed part of F’s evidence at the 2024 trial before HHJ G. Own and were challenged at trial. M also does not agree that there is any evidence that F is insolvent. The fact that HHJ G. Own, after considering all circumstances including F’s claim that he had previously spent $20 million on legal costs and made the financial orders at a total sum of over $6.77 million show Court’s finding of F’s ability to pay.

(c)  F did not file any petition for bankruptcy, and none of his creditors has filed bankruptcy proceedings against him. F continues to reside in a 4-storey house in Kowloon Tong with full-time helper(s), enjoying and maintaining his memberships at the Hong Kong Jockey Club and Kowloon Cricket Club.

(d)  M therefore does not agree that there is any evidence that F is insolvent, nor that she was required to disclose such fact in her application.

27.  It is trite that an ex parte application, the applicant (i.e. M in the present case) has a duty to make full and frank disclosure of the material facts.

28.  In Tsui Yun Bun Barry v Law Wan Tung & Ors [2019] HKCFI 2955, Recorder Steward Wong SC at paragraph 45 of the judgment in a Master’s appeal concerning the setting aside or discharge of a Charging Order Absolute, stated as follows:

“(1) Material facts are those which are material for the Court, when determining the ex parte application, to know and which are necessary to enable the Court to exercise its discretion properly. Those are facts which should have been put in the scales by the ex parte Court, and not only facts which are determinative one way or another.

(2) Materiality is to be decided by the Court and not by the applicant or his legal advisers.

(3) The applicant has a duty to make proper enquiries before making the application and the duty of disclosure covers not only facts known to the applicant but facts which he would have known had he made such proper inquiries.

(4) The matter to be disclosed should normally not be made only in exhibits but must be referred to in the affidavits.

(5) The fact that the non-disclosure is not deliberate but is innocent does not excuse the non-disclosure, but is a factor to take into account when the Court considers what order to be made as a result of the non-disclosure.” (emphasis added)

29.  Applying the above legal principles, M was only required to disclose all material facts for the Court. According to M’s affidavits in support of the 2 Charging Order Nisi applications, she already disclosed there are 7 encumbrances over One Silversea Property, including 3 Charging Order Absolute obtained by M, acting on behalf of the  Director of Legal Aid, and by the Official Solicitor for the enforcement of several costs orders, as well as the 4 Legal Charges, in her supporting affidavit for the Charging Order Nisi Application. M also mentioned that F’s previous solicitors had also issued proceedings against F for outstanding legal fees in HCA 722/2025 and the first chambers hearing was fixed for 30 May 2025.

30.  From reading F’s affidavit in opposition, his other alleged unsecured creditor include:

(a)  F’s younger brother, to whom F alleged there was a $80,000 liability on “Family household maintenance expenses” in F’s 2023 Form E, which later changes to $350,000 as revealed in F’s opposition affidavit in these Charging Order applications;

(b)  F’s mother, to whom F alleged there was a $100,000 “personal loan” in F’s 2023 Form E;

(c)  Unknown creditors of $350,000 under F’s 2023 Form E, described as “other personal loans”; 

(d)  further unsecured loans from his family as alleged by F to have been advanced since May 2023 in the sum of $700,000 under F’s opposition affidavit in these Charging Order applications;

(e)  F’s previous solicitors on outstanding legal fees at a sum of $3,283,942.10.

31.  Among the above F’s alleged unsecured creditors, M already identified F’s previous solicitors in her supporting affidavit. As for the further unsecured loans from F’s family, those were only revealed in F’s opposition affidavit and M could not have been expected to disclose this information that had not yet appeared in the evidence when she made her supporting affidavit.

32.  As regards the alleged loans from F’s brother, F’s mother and the unknown creditors at a total sum of $530,000 mentioned in F’s 2023 Form E, I accept M’s submissions that the “genuineness of these loans” are challenged as F only produced handwritten notes signed only by himself in relation to the alleged F’s brother’s loan and there were no terms of repayment stated in the handwritten loan between F and F’s mother. Further, for other unknown creditors, there is a lack of particulars concerning the exact identity of the lenders and/or loans purportedly advanced by them. I acknowledge that M did not put these alleged loans in her ex parte application. However, I accept that these amounts are not material facts that require M to disclose at the ex parte stage as the “genuineness of these loans” are disputed, identity of the lenders being unknown and these amounts are relatively minimal compared with the funds in High Court and the amount of 2 Charging Order Nisi, which together exceeds $9.4m.

33.  To date, F has not filed any bankruptcy petition, nor has any creditor filed any bankruptcy against him. The 4 Legal Charges in the sum of $6.53m will be further examined in the Interpleader Proceedings as to whether these loans are valid or not and they were disclosed by M in her supporting affidavit. There is no clear evidence at this stage F will become bankrupt and I do not consider M was required to strain to raise matters not clearly borne out by the evidence available to her in her supporting affidavits for the charging order nisi applications. Even if I am wrong in concluding that M was not required to disclose F’s potential insolvency arising from multiple secured and unsecured creditors, I consider this would not cause undue prejudice to other unsecured creditors in light of  Lead Good Group Ltd v Creditland Group Ltd & Ors [2025] 5 HKC 130 which will be analysed in Ground 3 below.

Ground 3: F’s other creditors will be unfairly/unduly prejudiced

34.  F says M is only an unsecured judgment creditor, and that she is trying to use a charging order to move ahead of other creditors in the queue. He says there are other creditors, including secured and unsecured creditors, whose rights would be harmed if the debt were turned into a secured claim over the fund. F submits “M must refrain from instigating disturbance and interference in two courts of differing jurisdictions, so as to prevent “undue prejudice” to other prior secured and unsecured creditors, thereby jeopardizing their respective interests and the financial provisions necessary for my survival.

35.  M refers to Lead Good Group Ltd v Creditland Group Ltd & Ors [2025] 5 HKC 130 and submits F has not referred to any “sharp conduct” on M’s part. Further, M submits that despite notice of this application to F’s brother and F’s previous solicitors, they have not responded and stated any objections of M’s Charging Order applications. For F’s mother, although she, together with other secured creditors, indicated through her legal representatives in December 2025 that that they opposed M’s applications, they gave no reasons and took no steps.

36.  Pursuant to my Order dated 23 September 2025 (“23 September 2025 Order”), M notified F’s mother and friends (i.e. parties in the Interpleader proceedings), F’s brother and F’s previous solicitors the 2 Charging Order Nisi and 23 September 2025 Order. The substantive argument date on 6 March 2026 is clearly stated in the 23 September 2025 Order. However, there is no application from any secured and identified unsecured creditors seeking to intervene in these 2 applications and request for set aside of the Charging Order Nisi.

37.  Lead Good Group Ltd v Creditland Group Ltd & Ors [2025] 5 HKC 130 is a High Court Masters’ appeal case. One of the issues was whether other creditors of the debtor namely Royue, would suffer ‘undue prejudice’ if the applicant, namely Lead Good, obtained a charging order absolute over shares in a Hong Kong listed company beneficially owned by Royue, in circumstances where provisional liquidation had commenced in the BVI but had not been recognized in Hong Kong at the time of the charging order absolute application. Anthony Chan J (as he then was) referred to and agreed with the analysis on ‘undue prejudice’ in British Arab Commercial Bank plc v Algosaibi and Bros Co [2011] 2 CLC 736, and stated the following in paragraphs 30-39:

“30.  The arguments here draw upon the analysis in British Arab Commercial on “undue prejudice” :

(1)  The expression “unduly prejudiced” recognises that a charging order in favour of one creditor would almost certainly, in one sense, prejudice other creditors, because it gives that creditor security against which to enforce his judgment which the other creditors do not have, but it is only where that prejudice is “undue” that the court should consider not making a charging order absolute [54].

(2)  In other words, the mere fact that making a charging order absolute would give one creditor priority over other creditors is not undue prejudice, because such security and priority are inherent in the making of a charging order. This is a prejudice which the other creditors would “inevitably suffer” [55]. If this constitutes undue prejudice, it would be a serious hurdle for any charging order absolute to be made in cases of insolvency.

(3)  The question is whether the other creditors will suffer “some prejudice over and above the prejudice they would inevitably suffer, if an order is made in favour of the judgment creditor” [55].

(4)  If there is “sharp conduct” by the judgment creditor, that may amount to exceptional circumstances resulting in undue prejudice so that it would be appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion not to make a charging order absolute [56].

(5)  Examples of sharp conduct include (a) the applicant putting other creditors off the scent by purporting to agree to forego immediate pursuit of a claim; (b) undue haste in obtaining a preferred position, and (c) unfair use of special knowledge [56].

31.  It appears that this point had not been the focus of, and probably not argued in, the Hong Kong cases. Rather, it seems to have been assumed that getting priority over other creditors and overcoming the pari passu scheme is per se undue prejudice to other creditors: see, eg, Tsui Yun Bun v Law Wan Tung [2019] HKCFI 2955, Recorder Stewart Wong SC, [56].

32.  With respect, I find the analysis in British Arab Commercial compelling and I agree with the same. This brings me to Royue’s argument that Lead Good is guilty of sharp conduct.” (emphasis added)

33.  The sharp conduct complained of is as follows :

(1)  Knowing that the JPL were of the view that a winding up order should be made on the basis of Royue’s insolvency during the hearing on 17 February 2024 (see para 7 above), 2 days before the hearing Lead Good objected to the grant of winding up order and proposed to adjourn it pending the investigation of Royue’s solvency.

(2)  Shortly thereafter, on 25 February 2025, Lead Good took out proceedings to enforce the CO.

(3)  At all material times, Lead Good was aware of the application for winding up order before the BVI Court in respect of Royue and that the order was expected to be granted on 17 February 2025. However, Lead Good chose to raise an objection before the BVI Court to delay the grant of the order, and in turn took out enforcement action in Hong Kong. Such conduct amounted to undue haste which justifies the departure from the principle of first past the post.

34.  First of all, the threshold for establishing sharp conduct must be one of stringency. This is self-evident from the fact that to justify not applying the general rule of first past the post, exceptional circumstances have to be established (see para 30(4) above). It should be added that the court should be vigilant not to allow what should be a simple application for order absolute to be turned into a full scale legal battle.

35.  Second, pursuing a step or steps allowed under the rules of litigation cannot, per se, be regarded as sharp conduct. On the other hand, pursing such step knowing that it is without merits for the purpose of causing obstruction or delay to the other side is abusive of the rules and can constitute sharp conduct.

36.  Third, I do not believe that Lead Good should have simply accepted the view taken by the JPL on Royue’s solvency without question. The appointment of the JPL was caused by Royue. In the context of adversarial litigation, Lead Good was entitled to come to its own view on the issue of Royue’s solvency. That issue was contested before the Master, and the court was not satisfied on the evidence adduced by the parties that Royue was insolvent. This demonstrates that the matter was not clear cut.

37.  Finally, I agree with Mr Chiu that, firstly, “undue haste in obtaining a preferred position” (see para 30(5) above) cannot be equated with acting with urgency to enforce the Award. Lead Good was acting within its rights, and it may be said to be the whole point of “first past the post” – acting quickly to obtain priority under a charging order.

38.  Secondly, Royue has no complaint of sharp conduct on the part of Lead Good in obtaining the CO. Rather, its complaint concerns the subsequent steps by Lead Good to enforce the CO, which had not been stayed and was valid and enforceable. There was no sharp conduct to speak of.

39.  In the premises, I am unable to accept that there was any sharp conduct on the part of Lead Good. Issue (2) is resolved against Royue.”

38.  In summary, the principles are:

(a)  the mere fact that making a charging order absolute would give one creditor priority over other creditors is not undue prejudice. The question is whether other creditors will suffer some prejudice over and above the prejudice they would inevitably suffer. (Lead Good Group Ltd,  paragraph 30(2 and 3))

(b)  it would only be appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion not to make a charging order absolute when there is “sharp conduct” by the judgment creditor, that may amount to exceptional circumstances resulting in undue prejudice to other creditors (Lead Good Group Ltd, paragraph 30(4)).

(c)  the threshold of establishing sharp conduct is a stringent one. Exceptional circumstances must be established. The Court should be vigilant not to allow what should be a simple application for order absolute to be turned into a full-scale legal battle (Lead Good Group Ltd, paragraph 34).

(d)  examples of sharp conduct include (i) applicant putting other creditors off the scent by purporting to agree to forego immediate pursuit of a claim; (ii) undue haste in obtaining a preferred position; (iii) unfair use of special knowledge. Pursuing a step knowing that it is without merits for the purpose of causing obstruction or delay to the other side is abusive of the rules and can constitute sharp conduct (Lead Good Group Ltd, paragraphs 30(5) and 35).

(e)  pursuing a step or steps allowed under the rule of litigation cannot, per se, be regarded as sharp conduct. Undue haste in obtaining a preferred position cannot be equated with acting with urgency to enforce the Award if the creditor is acting within its rights. That may be said to be the whole point of “first past the post” principle, namely acting quickly to obtain priority under a charging order (Lead Good Group Ltd, paragraphs 35 and 37).

39.  Applying the above legal principles, I do not consider M’s actions in applying Charging Order Absolute could be regarded as sharp conduct hence will cause undue prejudice to other unsecured creditors:

(a)  It is inevitable that M’s Charging Order applications may create disadvantage to other F’s alleged creditors. However, I do not consider M’s applications create unusual and unfair additional harm which would justify refusing granting the Charging Order absolute. The alleged loans from F’s brother, F’s mother, family and other personal loans were said to have arisen some years before this application. From the evidence, none of those creditors has taken any steps, even up to the presentation application, to pursue enforcement.

(b)  I do not find M acted unfairly, hid material facts or rushed to gain an improper advantage when applying for Charging Order Nisi. Applying the examples of sharp conduct mentioned in Lead Good Group Ltd, there is no evidence that M misled other creditors into thinking that there was no need to act quickly; there is no evidence that she rushed in an improper and opportunistic manner to obtain priority; and there is no evidence that she used any inside information or special advantage unfairly to gain priority over other creditors.

40.  Therefore, I do not agree that F’s alleged other creditors will be unfairly/unduly prejudiced by M’s 2 Charging Order Absolute applications.

Ground 4: Family Court has held that it has no jurisdiction to order lump sum be secured over the fund in High Court, hence it also has no jurisdiction to make a charging over the same

41.  F relies on paragraph 77 in HHJ G. Own’s judgment in the Lump Sum Maintenance judgment dated 21 May 2025 in justifying that “M is precluded from utilizing the Family Court, which lacks the jurisdiction to secure a lump sum for their claims, thereby legitimising their application for a charging order absolute.”

“77. With the net proceeds of sale forming the subject matter of the interpleader proceedings, and presently under the direction of the Court of First Instance, I have no jurisdiction to order lump sums to be secured over the net proceeds of sale or further directing the sale proceeds be paid into the Family Court.”

42.  I entirely agree with M that this ground of opposition is entirely misconceived. HHJ G. Own’s holding that he has “no jurisdiction” to order lump sum to be secured over the funds in High Court was in response of M’s application for a secured financial order under s.10(2) of Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13). This does not mean that M cannot seek enforcement of the unpaid and unsecured award under the Judgment dated 21 May 2025 by way of Charging Order against the funds in High Court, as this is a separate application on enforcement of a judgment sum.

Ground 5: Adjourn the applications in order for F to “secure legal representation, improve the Applicant’s (i.e. F) health, and obtain litigation funding for legal support, upholding his right to a fair trial

43.  F stresses he is self-represented, and “medical certificates issued by Kowloon Hospital indicate F’s mental health conditions are alarming, major depression and anxiety have been substantially exacerbated by protracted legal proceedings”. F asks for “adjournment to secure legal representation” and “litigation funding order should be made against the better-resourced M, following principles in Currey v Currey [2006] EWCA Civ 1338. F consider the Court should “invoke RHC Order 17, r 7 to stay all competing actions, ensuring a single transparent adjudication.”

44.  M is correct to say that F’s attempted to slip in evidence (e.g. medical reports and a certificate of waiver of medical charges) by way of attachments to his written submissions. F has all along given full written submissions on this application and is able to argue on different legal authorities as shown in this written decision. There is no court order showing F is a mentally incapacitated person and cannot proceed with the proceedings. For litigation funding from M, who is legally aided, is not relevant to these applications. Further, Order 17 concerns entitlement to relief by way of interpleader which is irrelevant to these proceedings. This ground of opposition of F obviously fails.

Conclusion and Order

45.  In light of the above analysis, F has failed to show any grounds of opposition that would justify refusing to make the 2 Charging Orders absolute. After considering all the circumstances, I order that the 2 Charging Orders Nisi be made absolute.

Costs

46.  I consider costs should follow the event. I ordered the following on costs:

(a)  F should pay to M costs of and occasioned these 2 Charging Order Applications, including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed.

(b)  M’s own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

47.  This is a costs order nisi which would become absolute if no application to vary the same was made within 14 days from the date of this Judgment.

For the Applicant