MARTUTI SRI v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 2047 /2024

[2025] HKCFI 112

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO. 2047 OF 2024

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J U D G M E N T

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THE APPLICATION

1.  This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 25 October 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 543 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.  The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.  The applicant appeared before the Court on 9December2024 and admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application.

The procedural history

4.  The applicant, aged 43, is a national of Indonesia. She came to Hong Kong to work as a domestic helper on 22 November 2012. Upon termination of her contract, she did not depart and lodged her non-refoulement claim on the basis of her fear of being sold as a prostitute or killed by loan sharks if she did not repay the loan to her creditor upon her return to Indonesia.

5.  She raised her non-refoulement claim onthe grounds of all applicable risks[1].

6.  Her claim was rejected by the Director for the reason that her claim was not substantiated.

7.  She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). Before the Board made its decision, the applicant applied to withdraw her appeal. The Board accepted her application. She then applied to the Board for re-opening her appeal. The Board refused to reopen her appeal.

8.  The applicant then applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to judicial review the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application. Her appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 20 July 2022.

9.  Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal on 27 February 2024.

10.  By letter dated 5 March 2024, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance.

11.  By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application.

The subsequent claim application

12.  Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

13.  The applicant has submitted 2 letters to the immigration officer, in which she set out her additional information in support of her application. First, she relied on her fear of the creditor in her previous claim. In addition, she has raised other grounds in her letter, which the immigration summarized as follows:

a.  fear of harm from her enemies in the society because she became a lesbian;

b.  fear of harm from her ex-husband because she did not give him money and he wanted to remarry her;

c.  fear of sexual harassment from teachers due to past experience;

d.  fear of harm because she did not receive love from her parents and her friends also bullied her;

e.  fear of being ostracized by her family and the society because she has an illegitimate child;

f.  fear in relation to her high blood pressure; and

g.  fear of Covid 19 virus.

14.  The immigration officer found that her fear of her creditor had been considered in her precious claim and rejected. As to a. and c. the applicant was unable to explain why she did not mention them in her previous claim. The immigration officer looked up the country of origin information (“COI”) and found that there would be positive feedback and attitude from the public of Indonesia towards homosexuality. The immigration officer noted that she had already divorced her husband 10 years ago and her ex-husband had married another woman, the immigration officer considered that it would be unlikely for her ex-husband to want to remarry her. Grounds d, f, and g. are not valid reasons in support of her non-refoulement claim. Ground e does not sustain as according to the COI.

15.  The immigration officer therefor dismissed her application for subsequent claim.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review application

16.  The applicant filed Form 86 on 7 November 2024 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

17.  In her affirmation in support of her application, the applicant did not raise any specific reason to challenge the Director’s Decision.

Discussion

18.  The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

19.  The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that she relied on the same reasons in her previous claim.

20.  For the reasons given by the immigration officer, the applicant does not have any realistic prospect of success in her intended application for subsequent claim. The applicant has raised no valid reason to challenge the immigration officer’s reasons.

21.  There is no valid reason from the applicant to challenge the Director’s Decision.

22.  I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in her subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

23.  The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

24.  RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

25.  In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

26.  For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant admitted that she relied on the same fear of her creditor in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim application.

27.  The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say.

28.  Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court.

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

29.  The applicant’s application is dismissed.

30.  RPO in terms of paragraph 28 be made against the applicant.