AHMED NABEEL v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 931/2020

[2025] HKCFI 3639

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 931 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 3 July 2025 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 21 May 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 28 April 2020.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 21 May 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 4 June 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons, the applicant alleged that he could not apply on time because he did not receive the court’s letter. In his supporting affirmation dated 3 July 2025, the applicant did not give any further reason for the delay. He merely stated that the decisions of the Director of Immigration and the Board were unlawful, his life was in danger in his home country and it is a matter of a human life. The applicant did not give any ground for appealing my decision at all.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 8 August 2025, the applicant said that he did not receive my decision because he had moved from his address in Cheung Sha Wan to another address in Sham Shui Po about 11 months ago. He only came to know about my decision about a month ago when his friend told him about it. His friend checked the internet and found my decision in respect of the applicant.

9.  However, my decision was sent to the applicant’s then address in Sham Shui Po (although the applicant gave another address in Sham Shui Po to this court at the hearing on 8 August 2025). Thus, his moving from Cheung Sha Wan to Sham Shui Po could not be the reason for not receiving my decision.

10.  The applicant admitted that he did not inform the Immigration Department about his change of address, but alleged that he was not asked to provide his new address. He also alleged that about 3 months ago when he tried to inform the Immigration Department about his change of address, the immigration officer said that they were busy and asked the applicant to tell them later.

11.  As it is the applicant’s duty to inform the Immigration Department whenever he has changed his address, I do not find the applicant’s explanation for the delay satisfactory.

12.  Nevertheless, since the delay in the present case was not very long, just about a month, the arguability of the intended appeal is an important consideration (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra). Thus, I am not going to take issue on the delay or the reason for the delay, but will consider the merits of the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

13.  It is not necessary for me to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s decision dated 28 April 2020, which can be viewed in the hyperlink attached to the Form CALL-1 dated 21 May 2025.

14.  The applicant failed to advance any ground for the intended appeal in the Summons or his supporting affirmation. The applicant filed a written submission to this court on 30 July 2025, the contents of which also did not disclose any ground for the intended appeal.

15.  At the hearing on 8 August 2025, the applicant merely asserted that his brother was killed on 20 September 2024 (ie after the Board’s decision), and he asked this court to give him some time to get the proof including some photographs.

16.  The applicant gave different accounts to this court and the Immigration Department about the name of the brother who was killed and the number of brothers he has. In any event, it is not for this court to investigate into these matters or to receive new evidence from the applicant. His brother’s death cannot amount to any valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review at all.

17.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

18.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

19.  Furthermore, as discussed in the Form CALL-1, the applicant’s alleged dangerous situation was duly considered by the Board. The finding of facts was solely within the ambit of the Board. This court finds nothing wrong in the way the Board reached its conclusion based on the evidence available to the Board.

20.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review and I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal, even though the delay was not too long.

Conclusion

21.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.