KABIR HUMAYUN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 386/2021

[2026] HKCFI 3631

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 386 OF 2021

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 10 April 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 3 March 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 23 February 2021.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 3 March 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 17 March 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons and his supporting affirmation dated 10 April 2026, the applicant explained the delay in appealing by saying that he did not receive the order and decision from the court. He was informed by an immigration officer that his application for judicial review was rejected and it was out of time to appeal.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 11 June 2026, the applicant further explained that he did not receive the decision at all, but he found the decision online and he immediately filed the Summons. However, the applicant confirmed that the decision was sent to his correct address, but he did not know why he had not received it.

9.  The applicant’s explanation for his delay in appealing is not satisfactory, as there is simply no explanation why he did not receive this court’s order and decision at his correct address.

10.  Moreover, there is no merit of the intended appeal at all. The applicant did not give any ground of appeal in the Summons, nor in his supporting affirmation. What he said in the Summons and his affirmation were just that he still had severe problem in his home country and his life was not safe there. When I asked the applicant for his grounds of the intended appeal at the hearing of the Summons, he merely said that he needed to take care of his 11 months old baby and his girlfriend was sick.

11.  What the applicant said in the Summons and his affirmation, as well as at the hearing, cannot amount to any valid ground for his intended appeal against my decision, nor for the intended judicial review.

12.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

13.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.

14.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable explanation for his delay in appealing and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal. Thus, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

15.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.