WONG KWOK KI STEPHEN as the joint and several trustee of the property of KWONG KWOK CHI PATRICK AND ANOTHER v. LEE LIN AND ANOTHER

DCCJ 6382/2020

[2026] HKDC 239

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION 6382 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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1.  Before me was an unusual appeal against the timetabling decision of a Master made in a CMC which was said to have been obtained by a legal representative knowingly misleading the Master.

2.  At the conclusion of the hearing, I held that the right course was to, and did, dismiss the appeal with no order as to its costs, and I also made a wasted costs order against RL&Co as set out in §41 below, and in view of the contents of the Solicitor’s letter of 3 February 2026, also now make another wasted costs order against him as set out in §42 below. These are my reasons.

3.  This is an action commenced in 2020 by the Trustees in Bankruptcy of Kwong Kwok Chi Patrick (respectively “Ps” and “KKC”) against KKC and his ex-wife Lee Lin (“LL”) claiming that KKC’s half interest in a land property co-owned by KKC and LL now vested in them and that the property be sold under section 7 of the Partition Ordinance to repay KKC’s debts. LL, who since very early stage has been legally aided, put forth a case that she alone had paid all the money for the purchase of the property and therefore KKC has been holding his share on trust for her based on a common intention constructive trust or resulting trust.

4.  By December 2025, this action was ready to be set down for trial. In the CMC held before Master Vienne Luk on 9 December 2025, the Master decided to fix the dates of the 8-day trial in consultation with counsel’s diaries, as asked for by both parties, as the respective counsel on both sides have been involved in the action since very early on.

5.  It is now not disputed that the consultant solicitor of Messrs Raymond T.M. Lau & Co (“RL&Co”) solicitors acting for LL, I will call him “the Solicitor”, represented to Master Vienne Luk in the CMC, and later confirmed again when asked by the Master again, that “[LL’s] counsel’s earliest available date [for an 8-day trial] is in March 2027”. On that basis, the 8-day trial was fixed to commence on 2 March 2027 with 3, 4, 5, 8 to 11 March 2027 reserved, and with the PTR be held on 20 January 2027 (“the CMC Order”).

6.  The said representations concerning the diaries of the counsel intended to be engaged by LL for trial (“the Counsel”) are said by Ps to be false and that the Solicitor then knew full well that they were.

7.  By a long letter dated 12 December 2025, which was 3 days after the CMC, to RL&Co and copied to the Counsel, Ps’ solicitors, among others, seriously doubted that such was the true state of the diaries of the Counsel, sought clarification on the actual available dates of the Counsel’s diaries, indicated that they wrote “out of courtesy” and “amicably to avoid miscommunication”, and proposed that with such clarification the parties would by consent move the trial dates to earlier dates.

8.  On 15 December 2025, after having communicated with RL&Co, the Counsel by a short letter to Ps’ solicitors and copied to the Director of Legal Aid and RL&Co said that “… my available dates for an 8-day trial in 2026 and 2027 have been supplied to [RL&Co] before the CMC … ” (my emphasis).

9.  By letter to Ps’ solicitors also on 15 December 2025, RL&Co, while knowing full well that the Counsel had informed Ps’ solicitors that there were available dates in her diaries for the trial in 2026, retorted that Ps’ associated solicitor herself “agreed” to the dates in the CMC, that she had made no protest therein, and that they were under no duty to explain their conduct in the CMC. RL&Co then indicated that “merely to save time and costs”, they were agreeable to refixing the trial dates by consent to fall within either 20-30 April, 18-29 May of 1 to 12 June 2026 (without stating that they were the Counsel’s available dates in 2026) but on the condition that the “PTR be fixed … within the available dates of the legal team of the 1^st Defendant”, but without giving what such “available dates” would be.

10.  By letter dated 17 December 2025 to RL&Co, Ps’ solicitors said, among others, that the trial dates could not be so refixed merely by parties’ consent and insisted on RL&Co providing the clarifications sought as to the actual available dates of the Counsel’s diaries.

11.  By their letter of 18 December 2025, RL&Co refused again, citing confidentiality concerning the communications between them and the Counsel as a reason and that they “are under no duty” to so clarify as the other.

12.  The next day on 19 December 2025, Ps issued the subject Notice of Appeal and asked that the CMC Order be set aside and instead an order be made that those dates be fixed by a Master in consultation with counsel’s diaries.

Did the Solicitor mislead the Master on 9 December 2025 ?

13.  The central point made by Mr Wong, counsel for Ps, was that the Solicitor has misled the Master with the false representations concerning the Counsel’s earliest available dates for trial, which led to the fixing of trial dates as late as March 2027.

14.  The Solicitor made an affidavit herein dated 19 January 2026, leave to file and serve which was given by consent at the hearing.

15.  In that affidavit, an email from the Counsel sent on 3 December 2025 to RL&Co under the subject “DCCJ 6382/2020 (CMC on 9.12.2025)” was exhibited in which the Counsel stated clearly that her available dates in 2026 for the trial in this action were 20-30 April, 18-29 May and 1 to 12 June, with other available dates in 2027 also given.

16.  Pausing here, it therefore seems very plain to me that the Solicitor was informed and well knew for the purpose of the CMC that the earliest available dates for an 8-day trial of the Counsel were not in March 2027, and thus the Solicitor’s repeated representations to the Master that the Counsel’s earliest available dates for an 8-day trial was in March 2027 was plainly and knowingly factually incorrect.

17.  The Solicitor “strenuously denied” in the affidavit that he had misled the Court, thus :

“10. Leaving aside the curious procedural decisions taking [sic] by the Plaintiffs, I shall nevertheless address the serious allegations made by the Plaintiffs’ solicitors.

11. It is not disputed that I did inform Master Luk that counsel's earliest available date is in March 2027, however, it is baffling that the Plaintiffs’ solicitors are seeking to suggest that I have misled the Court. This I strenuously deny. In any case, I did not, and could not have had any intention to mislead the Court in any manner.

11.1 When I, as a solicitor for my client, speak of earliest available date, I do not only have in mind the dates as offered by counsel. Say for example, if counsel had been available at a very early date, it would be unrealistic for me to inform the Court that a trial could be fixed for, say, 1 or 2 months after the CMC. Thus, judgement must be formed. As can be seen from the correspondence below and also Exhibit CPY-3, … , the intended counsel could contact the trial between June 1 to 12 which is simply not, in my view, realistic for the case to be properly prepared.

11.2 I have given consideration to the complexity of the case and also the time and effort required to obtain extension of certificates for legal aid (bearing in mind that at the time of the case management conference, the legal certificate only cover steps up to Case Management Conference (see copy of the Notice of Amendment of Legal Aid Certificate dated 30 May 2022 on pages 2 to 3 of “CWKJ-1”).

11.3 Furthermore, as a responsible practitioner, one must also be realistic about the time required of the firm and the lay client to prepare for the trial and that the pre-trial review will take place much earlier than the trial.

11.4 Hence, the date proposed to the Court was entirely realistic and this is the context within which my representation to the Court should be understood.” (my emphasis)

18.  I am completely unable to accept any of the purported explanations given by the Solicitor in the affidavit as reasons showing that he has not misled the Master in the CMC or did not have any intention to.

19.  The Master asked more than once a simple and direct factual question, which was what the earliest available dates in the Counsel’s diaries for an 8-day trial were. There could be no misunderstanding of what the Master was asking. Yet and as said, the answers given by the Solicitor to the Master more than once were plainly and knowingly incorrect. The plain meaning of the word “mislead” is to “give false information to”, and that of the word “deceive” is to “cause someone to believe an untruth”. In my judgment, the Solicitor has done exactly that to the Master in the CMC when he gave the said answers to the Master’s said questions, irrespective of what his claimed intentions or thought process were.

20.  On those, I cannot let them slide by without giving these comments. What the Solicitor was saying in the affidavit effectively was that in his view and judgment, the “realistic” dates for the trial to take place would be in March 2027, and that he was therefore somehow justified or entitled or not wrong to deceive or mislead the Master by a falsehood into deciding on a result he thought was correct. Such conducts and mentality, all the more from an officer of the court, undermine the proper administration of justice and has no place whatsoever in it. They cannot be condoned.

21.  Evidently, the only proper conduct for the Solicitor was to answer the Master with the actual available dates of the Counsel, truthfully as the Counsel had informed him, and then make his submissions on behalf of LL on the other matters he thought would justify the trial to take place some distant time later, and let the Master decide.

22.  I find the Solicitor has clearly misled the Master on 9 December 2025 in the manner aforesaid.

23.  I would record that Mr Ng, counsel for LL, in my view rightly, in his written and oral submissions did not seek to repeat what the Solicitor said or to raise other matters to attempt to contend that the Solicitor has not so misled the Master. Also and for the avoidance of any doubt, there is not even a slightest suggestion against the conducts of the Counsel, whom I think has acted with propriety and integrity.

Is a timetabling decision by a Master in the CMC susceptible to an appeal to a judge in chambers without first seeking a variation under O.25 r.3 ?

24.  Having found as above, this Court was very much minded to undo any unfair advantage LL has obtained through the said false representations and to right any wrong thereby done to Ps.

25.  However, the particular aspects of the CMC Order under appeal were the dates fixed for PTR and trial, which are milestone dates, and the order sought in its place was merely that those dates be refixed before a Master, but with a view not to refix them to later dates, but to earlier ones.

26.  Mr Ng essentially submitted (a) that such timetabling decision given in CMC is not susceptible to appeal to a judge in chambers as O.25 r.3 expressly provides for the procedure and requirements for the parties to seek a variation of those dates, which Ps should have applied under, and (b) under well-established principles, the higher court would rarely interfere with a case management decision of the lower court, and in the nature of things, a timetabling decision in CMC by a Master (when the dates were first fixed) should particularly be immune from review by a judge in chambers.

27.  The relevant parts of O.25 r.2 and r.3 of the Rules of the District Court read :

“2. Case management timetable (O. 25, r. 2)

…

(2) Where the Court has fixed a case management conference, it shall—

(a) give directions relating to the management of the case and fix the timetable for the steps to be taken between the date of the giving of those directions and the date of the case management conference; and

(b) at the case management conference, fix a timetable for the steps to be taken between the date of the conference and the date of the trial, and the timetable must include—

(i) a date for a pre-trial review; or

(ii) the trial date or the period in which the trial is to take place.

…

3. Variation of case management timetable (O. 25, r. 3)

(1) The Court may, either of its own motion or on the application of a party, give further directions relating to the management of the case or vary any timetable fixed by it under rule 2.

(2) A party may apply to the Court if he wishes to vary a milestone date.

(3) The Court shall not grant an application under paragraph (2) unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the variation.

…

(8) In this rule—

milestone date (進度指標日期) means—

(a) a date which the Court has fixed for—

(i) a case management conference;

(ii) a pre-trial review; or

(iii) the trial; or

(b) a period fixed by the Court in which a trial is to take place;

…”

28.  Mr Wong contended that, notwithstanding the provision for variation by O.25 r.3, the CMC Order was susceptible to an appeal to a judge in chambers as any decision or order by a Master would be subject to such an appeal. He relied on the generality of the wording in O.58 r.1(1), which stipulates that

“Except as provided by rule 2 and Order 32 rule 17, an appeal shall lie to a judge in chambers from any judgment, order or decision of a master, irrespective of whether the judgment, order or decision was given or made on the basis of written submissions only or after hearing”

29.  I think this matter must be approached pragmatically with the practical considerations set in the forefront concerning this inconspicuous but important part of our administration of justice concerning civil claims – the fixing of trial dates.

30.  In case managing in terms of timetabling in CMC by a Master, he or she would not only seek to achieve the just and timely resolution of the particular case before it, but also has to work within the states of the diaries and work loads of different judicial officers, and has to keep weighted and balanced as to how to best and efficiently utilize the judicial resources, to afford the right priority to cases their nature or the particular circumstances properly justifying it, and sometimes even to take into account other logistic considerations. The listing officer, guided by and working with the Chief District Judge and the Registrar, would coordinate the court diaries and give a Master presiding a CMC the available coram and court dates.

31.  A judge in chambers is simply not equipped with the information, nor is it his function, to decide timetabling “de novo” as if he were a Master in CMC “re-hearing” the CMC, in the manner Mr Wong was urging this Court to under the trite principles governing the hearing of an appeal under O.58.

32.  Moreover, I cannot postulate any situation where it would be appropriate for a judge hearing such a “timetabling appeal” to interfere with the dates and coram fixed by a Master in a CMC and fix those before another judge to be heard on certain dates.

33.  In my view, the decision as to timetabling in CMC is a particular aspect of case management that should be kept firmly in the hands of the listing officer of the District Court and the specific judicial officers entrusted with that task, and should not be interfered with by a judge in chambers through an appeal under O.58.

34.  For these reasons, I must reject Mr Wong’s submission that a Master’s timetabling decision in a CMC is generally susceptible to an appeal to a judge in chambers, and accept Mr Ng’s submission, which in my view is the intent of O.25 r.2 and r.3, that a party who has a good reason to seek variation of a timetable fixed in CMC should first apply under O.25 r.3 to the same Master presiding the CMC, or where the proceedings have progressed to be heard by another judicial officer, to that officer.

35.  Mr Wong drew attention to the unfair plight Ps found themselves in now. The trial is now unjustifiably fixed to as late as March 2027 thereby prejudicing Ps’ recovery action. Ps have been trying to resolve this reasonably and amicably. After learning the true position of the Counsel’s diaries that she indeed had available dates in 2026 (but not knowing the exact available dates), Ps wrote to RL&Co for clarification and information in a timely manner, but was met with refusals and retorts. While LL now submitted that Ps should have applied under O.25 r.3., it was quite evident that with RL&Co’s repeated refusals to acknowledge that the state of the Counsel’s diaries as represented to Master Vienne Luk was untrue and to ratify by providing the actual available dates, there was little chance that Ps would succeed in persuading the Master that there were “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of O.25 r.3 justifying the variation of the trial dates. Ps thus had to lodge this appeal to ventilate their grievance. Indeed, even at this hearing, LL was still contending that the making of such false representations to the Master did not amount to “exceptional circumstances”.

36.  I accept that the Solicitor’s such conduct and the whole circumstances, especially RL&Co’s responses by their letters, did put Ps into such a plight.

37.  In the course of the hearing, Mr Wong asked that this appeal be treated as an application under O.25 r.3 to vary the trial dates. I refused to do so, as in its nature such an application was very different from that of an appeal against the CMC Order, and also as said, this Court was not equipped to know the available coram and court dates, nor was its function, to fix and vary the timetable to new dates. An application under O.25 r.3 in the circumstances of this case should have been made to the Master.

38.  Though it can be said that the CMC Order was obtained by deception and was liable to be set aside for that reason, I did not think it right simply to set it aside. At the hearing, this Court enquired and was informed that to refix the trial to the June 2026 period was no longer feasible now because the diaries of Mr Wong, as Ps’ intended trial counsel, have in the meantime been occupied in that period. Thus, it was far from certain that if the CMC Order were to be set aside and the dates refixed, that earlier dates for the trial could be obtained. Indeed, there would even be a risk that later dates would be given upon refixing.

39.  For these reasons, I was of the view that the right course was to dismiss Ps’ appeal, but without prejudice to them applying before a Master under O.25 r.3 to vary the timetable. I so ordered at the conclusion of the hearing.

Disposal and costs

40.  Though Ps’ appeal was so dismissed, I thought it evident that this was a case that costs should not follow the event. In view of my finding on the conduct of the Solicitor, RL&Co’s such responses and Ps’ plight, my provisional view was that the just and appropriate costs order of this appeal between Ps and LL was no order as to costs. The parties did not disagree at the hearing and I so ordered.

41.  Ps applied for wasted costs against the legal representatives in the Notice of Appeal. I think this is a clear case. In view of the Solicitor’s and RL&Co’s said conducts, I indicated to the parties at the conclusion of the hearing that I was minded to make a wasted costs order against RL&Co that there be no legal aid taxation of their costs of and relating to this appeal, including the costs of the correspondence exchanged from 12 December 2025 to date, and RL&Co be not entitled to be paid such costs from LL. RL&Co indicated that they did not resist it and did not wish to make representation. I so ordered at the conclusion of the hearing.

42.  I also took the view that Legal Aid and LL should not be paying the fees of counsel appearing for LL in this appeal and indicated that I was minded to make a wasted costs order against the Solicitor ordering him to pay personally the legally aided taxed fees of Mr Ng. As the Solicitor was not present at the hearing, I directed him to write to this Court within 14 days indicating whether he would object to the making of such a wasted costs order against him, and if he would, directions would be given to enable him to make representation as to why the Court should not make the order.

43.  I thank Mr Wong and Mr Ng for their assistance.

Postscript

44.  By letter dated 3 February 2026 to this Court, the Solicitor offered apologies for his conduct and indicated he would not object to such a wasted costs order and he indeed undertook to pay them. I thus make the wasted costs order as set out in §42 above.

45.  In fixing the PTR and trial dates, the court relies on solicitors, as officers of the court, to give it truthful and accurate information on pertinent matters, no less the available dates of counsel’s diaries, based on which to act. While may be considered an inconspicuous and a small administrative step, the exercise of fixing such dates could have much impact on the case and the working of the system. I thus take a grave view of such conducts of the Solicitor / RL&Co and will refer the matter to the Law Society by copying these Reasons for Decision to them.