RAO SUPING v. TRIBEST HOLDINGS LTD

DCEC 2801/2023

[2025] HKDC 459

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION CASE NO 2801 OF 2023

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IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BETWEEN

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DECISION

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1.  I have before me an absurd summons (“the Summons”) taken out by the applicant, one Rao Suping (“A”), on 28 February 2025, seeking an order from me directing the respondent, one Tribest Holdings Limited (“R”), to pay HK$75,000 to A “in full and final settlement” of A’s claim herein, and directing R to pay the costs of the whole action to A.

2.  The Summons is unilateral. It is not a consent summons. R is unrepresented and absent. There is no affidavit evidence that R had ever agreed to pay anything, as damages or as costs, to A, or to any person.

3.  As I mentioned in Lei Yukang v Lin Youjun [2023] HKDC 568 (§20, per DDJ Kenneth KY Lam), and also in Licksun Company Ltd [2025] HKDC 372 (§5, per DDJ Kenneth KY Lam): -

“Practitioners are reminded of what was said by DHCJ Herbert Au-Yeung in JTM324 Strategic Advisors, Inc v Permex Co Ltd [2023] 1 HKLRD 1437 [2023] HKCFI 403 (at §18). A court of law is not a rubber-stamp. All parties to all civil actions and their legal representatives should assist the court by making all necessary inquiries, and placing all relevant materials before the court, in a timely and helpful manner.”

4.  I invited A’s solicitors, KCL & Partners, to identify the legal and evidential bases of the Summons. On 12 March 2025, KCL & Partners wrote to me and said they had already received the said sum of HK$75,000 from Dah Sing Insurance Company Limited on 27 December 2024, some 2 months before A took out the Summons. A unilateral discharge form, on its face signed by A as a deed, was enclosed. It was alleged the Summons was to deal with costs, but even if the insurer had agreed to pay costs (and there is no affidavit evidence on this), that does not mean I should direct R to pay. I hope KCL & Partners are aware R and the insurer are two separate persons so that there is a major difference between (1) directing the insurer (who is not even a party to this litigation) to do something; and (2) directing R (who is and has always been unrepresented and absent) to do something. It seems crystal clear to me that A and KCL & Partners misunderstood our civil litigation procedures, or never thought things through before drafting or taking out the Summons. Litigants and legal practitioners are reminded that costs orders are discretionary. Judges are never obliged to order costs against an absent litigant just because a solicitor stood up and unilaterally asked that this be done, or just because some documents had been faxed to the Court. At the very least, a conscientious solicitor should consider filing proper affidavit evidence and lodging proper written submissions. KCL & Partners did neither.

5.  Those who wish to seek costs in civil proceedings are strongly encouraged to read what was said by DHCJ Herbert Au-Yeung (as he then was) in JTM324 Strategic Advisors, Inc v Permex Co Ltd [2023] 1 HKLRD 1437 [2023] HKCFI 403 and learn from them. I agree with, and gratefully adopt, all of His Lordship’s sage remarks in that judgment.

6.  The Summons is misconceived. I dismiss the Summons. This is without prejudicial to any fresh summons, properly formulated and with affidavit evidence in support, being filed and served in the future.

7.  Since R is unrepresented and did not appear, I make no order as to costs. A and KCL & Partners are encouraged to take competent legal advice before proceeding further. Meanwhile, the next hearing on 3 April 2025 shall stand, and all parties must attend the same.