PHECHRAK KANJANA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5822 · HCAL 1207/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1207/2024
[2026] HKCFI 5822
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1207 OF 2024
BETWEEN
| |Phechrak Kanjana |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
|Π|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant or |
| |counsel in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of
Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 25 July 2024, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 8 January 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL00
1207_2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant was unable to make out her claims
for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong. Hence, the Board
rejected her appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 3 August 2023 (“the Director’s
Decision”) on all the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening
Mechanism (“the USM”) and confirmed the Director’s Decision, which
rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. In Form 86, the applicant named the Board and “NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS
PETITION OFFICE” as the putative respondents, and did not name any
putative interested party.
4. In fact, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office which
provides administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of
the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.
6. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and to add
“Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party.
Late application
7. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
8. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 25 July 2024, which was more
than 6 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 8 January 2024).
The applicant was hence late for more than 3 months in making the
Leave Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any
good reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application.
9. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
10. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay when she filed the Leave
Application.
11. A delay of more than 3 months is substantial. There is simply no
reason for this court to extend the time for the applicant to make the
Leave Application when no explanation was given for the delay at all.
More importantly, there is no merit in the Leave Application
whatsoever as discussed below.
12. Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to
grant any extension of time to the applicant to file the Leave
Application. The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the
ground of being made out of time alone.
13. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still deal with
the Leave Application.
The applicant’s case
14. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
15. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Thailand, she feared being subjected to ill-treatment
or being harmed or killed by her ex-husband.
Disposal on paper
16. The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave
Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application
can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court.
Hence, the Leave Application is dealt with on paper.
Grounds for judicial review
17. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
18. The applicant did not advance any ground for her intended judicial
review in Form 86, nor in her supporting affirmation dated 25 July
2024.
Discussion
19. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
20. Thus, despite the fact that the applicant failed to advance any ground
for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize the
Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality as aforesaid.
21. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 22 November 2023. The applicant was present and was
thus given the chance to present her case to the Board in person.
22. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board gave full and
detailed reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claims. Its
assessment on the applicant’s case and her credibility were laid out
in paragraphs 38 to 54 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not
necessary to repeat the same here.
23. In gist, the Board found that the applicant’s claim was a bare claim
without any evidence in support. The Board had written to the
applicant before the Board’s hearing and had given the applicant
another 30 days after the Board’s hearing for her to provide her
marriage certificate and divorce certificate. It was the applicant’s
evidence that her parents were retirees and were quite well-off. The
Board was of the view that it should be within the applicant’s
capabilities to obtain the certificates either from her possession or
from the local registry through attorneys in Thailand if needed in the
event that they had been misplaced.
24. The applicant failed to provide any documents as requested by the
Board, including any record of her alleged marriage, such as
photographs. The Board did not accept that the applicant had been
married or divorced. The Board considered that the applicant had
failed to at least establish a factual basis of her claim.
25. The Board thus concluded that the applicant’s claim was not a credible
claim. There was no basis whatsoever for the applicant’s claim. The
Board was of the view that the applicant’s claim was fabricated for
the purpose of allowing the applicant to spend a prolonged length of
time in Hong Kong, including for sightseeing. The Board did not
accept that the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm anywhere
in Thailand and rejected the applicant’s appeal/petition on all the
applicable grounds under the USM.
26. The Board did not consider availability of state protection and
viability of internal relocation. However, as the Board found that
the applicant did not face a real risk of torture, ill-treatment,
arbitrary deprivation of life or persecution in her country at all, it
is not necessary for the Board to consider the availability of state
protection.
27. As to internal relocation, it is a well-recognised principle that the
decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the
applicant has established that she qualifies as a refugee pursuant to
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor
[1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997). In other words, internal
relocation only arises if the applicant has established a real risk of
persecution in her home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).
28. As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of
any of the proscribed forms of harm whatsoever, it is not necessary
for the Board to further consider internal relocation.
29. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including
the assessment of evidence and risk of harm, was solely within the
ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s appeal/petition.
This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board
reached its decision.
30. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
31. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
32. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed for being
made out of time and also for lack of merits.
Dated the 21st day of October 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 21/10/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after | |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted |Applicant’s ref. no: |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); |Nil |21/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 22024 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes| |QA T/C 520/23 (Formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 5000480/23) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1