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HCAL 1696/2025
[2026] HKCFI 4365
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1696 of 2025
BETWEEN
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Ida Oktaviani |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |
Putative |
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Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
1. The extension of time for the application for Judicial Review be refused; and
2. The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.
THE APPLICATION
1. The applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision dated 18 March 2025 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board’s Decision”). Her application is late. Her application shall not be later than 3 months from the date of the Board’s Decision[1], which expired on 18 June 2025. Her application was filed on 28 July 2025, which is late for 1 month and 10 days. This issue will be dealt with below.
2. The applicant did not request an oral hearing.
The applicant
3. The applicant is a national of Indonesia. She is an illegal immigrant. She lodged a non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department on the basis that, if refouled, she will be harmed or killed by her husband because of monetary and marital dispute and by a loan-shark. Details of her story are set out in the Board’s Decision. See hyperlink https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL001696_2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf.
The Director’s Decision
4. The Director considered the applicant’s claim in relation to the following risks:
a. risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, (“the Ordinance”) (“Torture risk”);
b. risk of violation of the right to life under Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”) (“BOR 2 risk”);
c. risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (“CIDTP”) under Article 3 of Section 8 of the HKBOR (“BOR 3 risk”); and
d. risk of persecution by reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”) (“Persecution risk”).
5. By way of Notice of Decision dated 6 January 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director dismissed the applicant’s claim on all applicable risks because it was unsubstantiated.
The Board’s Decision
6. The applicant appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. On 10 March 2025, the Board conducted an oral hearing. However, the applicant was absent. Pursuant to subsection (1) of section 15 of Schedule 1A of the Immigration Ordinance, the Board proceeded to consider her appeal without a hearing. The Board considered the evidence and materials before it and found that even if her story on the papers were accepted, her claim could not sustain for the reasons that she did not suffer any serious injuries from her husband; that she did not seek protection from police; that her problem was localized and there was no evidence that the state was involved [25]-[27]; that internal relocation is viable [43],
7. For the above reasons, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal and confirmed the Director’s decision.
Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision
8. The applicant has filed Form 86 dated 28 July 2025 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.
9. In support of her application, the applicant stated that the Board had not considered all the matters she raised. She has attached a copy of the Board’s Decision to her affirmation.
DISCUSSION
10. As mentioned in paragraph 1, this application is late. In AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam CACV 63 of 2015, 3 November 2015, §27 the Court of Appeal held that for extension of time for making the application for leave to apply for judicial review, the Court has to consider, inter alia, the prospect of the intended appeal. I shall consider the merits of the applicant’s case.
11. The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Board complied with the public law requirements in coming to the Board’s Decision on the applicant’s appeal. The Court will not usurp the fact-finding power vested in the Director and the Board. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).
12. The Court will bear in mind that the Board’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. The Board had considered the merits of her case on the papers. Since she was absent, she had abandoned her chance to state her case before the Board. The Board was entitled to reach its conclusion on the evidence before it. She has given no reason for her absence before the Board.
13. In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
“13. (1) … …Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.”
14. The reason raised in paragraph 9 is only bare assertion without any evidence in support and is not valid to challenge the Board’s Decision. The applicant has not given any explanation for her delay.
15. The applicant therefore fails to show that she has any realistic prospect of success in her proposed judicial review of the Board’s Decision.
DISPOSITION
16. I refuse to extend time for the applicant to apply for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. Accordingly, I dismiss her application.
Dated the 19th day of August 2026
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(Klein Tse)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 19/8/2026
Ida Oktaviani
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 19/8/2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.: USM 25405
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: INCL-0002600-24 (D) (CZ)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] . Delay in applying for relief (O. 53, r. 4)
(1) An application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. (L.N. 356 of 1988)
(2) Where the relief sought is an order of certiorari in respect of any judgment, order, conviction or other proceeding, the date when grounds for the application first arose shall be taken to be the date of that judgment, order, conviction or proceeding.
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