OHANEBO CHIDIEBERE v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 3526/2019

[2025] HKCFI 6337

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 3526 OF 2019

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 7 November 2025 (“the  Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of  time to appeal against my order made on 23 October 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 22 November 2019.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 23 October 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 6 November 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In his supporting affidavit dated 7 November 2025, the applicant relied on the ground that he received this court’s decision late to seek for an extension of time to appeal.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 10 December 2025, the applicant alleged that his landlord gave this court’s decision to him very late and hence he could not appeal in time. When I asked the applicant when he received this court’s decision, he first answered that he could not recall the date. When I reminded him that the decision was dated 23 October 2025, the applicant then said it was one month after 23 October 2025.

9.  It is simply implausible that the applicant received this court’s decision one month after 23 October 2025, ie on or about 23 November 2025, as the Summons was filed on 7 November 2025. There was no reason at all why the applicant would have filed the Summons before he received the decision and alleged in his supporting affidavit that he received the decision late before he actually received it.

10.  Thus, the reason given for his delay is utterly unbelievable. I am not satisfied that the applicant has a reasonable excuse for the delay at all.

11.  When I asked the applicant for the grounds of his intended appeal at the hearing, the applicant said that he still needed time, his life was in danger, his enemies were still after his life, there were a lot of things happening in his country and the security was tight. He also said that his claim was about a land dispute, his enemy was still there and he could not go back. He asked for time to solve the problem. He further said that he was from a tribe in Nigeria and the other problem he had was that there was genocide committed by the Muslims there.

12.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

13.  What the applicant said at the hearing were just some background facts for his non-refoulement claim, but there was nothing to show that I had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong.

14.  In fact, the other problem concerning the alleged genocide committed by the Muslims in Nigeria had never been raised to the Board nor to this court before. As held in Trinh Thuy Huyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1090, the Board had no duty to make investigation into any matter without the applicant raising it and it should not be considered by this court at this stage. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

15.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review and I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

16.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.