DREAM MAKER GAME SHOP 訴 招商局保險有限公司

DCCJ14166/2001

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟2001年第14166號

----------------------

---------------------

時間： 下午3時47分

_____________________

判案書

_____________________

背景

1． 原告人是由一位張景成小姐獨資擁有的生意，所經營為化妝品批發。原告人的營業地址在銅鑼灣銀座商場地庫6號店。

2． 在2000年10月24日，原告人透過CMS Insurance Agency (Hong Kong) Limited保險代理公司購買一份火險保險單，保險代理公司是由一位商業經理張潤輝(譯音)先生代表，原告人沒有直接與張先生交易，她是透過中介人廖梓華小姐購買這火險保單。保險單除火險外還有額外保險，已在保單附表上列明，包括有任何人的惡意行為而令到受保的資產受損失(包括爆水管或水缸漏水)，但卻不包括首3,000元的損失。

3． 廖小姐不單是代表原告人作中介人，在銀座商場內，有好幾個營業者都有透過她再經張先生的保險代理公司向保險公司購買保險單。但這個訴訟只涉及6號舖，而不涉及其他店舖。

4． 張小姐在銀座地庫的6號舖是一個細小舖位，面積只有約50平方呎，她在1999年7月租下來作存貨之用。在2000年8月，她開展了化妝品的經銷生意。除此店外，她亦在同一地庫35A店開設了一個遊戲機售賣店，由1996年開始經營。此外她在這地庫還經營另一種業務，就是提供影印服務。

5． 在本案中，原告人張小姐並沒有提供任何證據，只有廖小姐代原告人提供證據。除廖小姐外，原告人亦沒有提供其他證人。

6． 在2000年12月21日早上約三時半，有兩個蒙面人帶着刀闖入銀座商場的地庫，他們把看更綑綁，並用救火喉把水噴在地庫地面。該名看更約在一小時後為自己鬆綁，然後發現男廁內有三條水管被破壞，所以引致地面水浸兩至三吋。

7． 銀座商場的管理公司在一封2000年12月22日信件，透露他們在同日(12月21日)早上八時半已經恢復商場的電力供應，同時用電泵把水由商場泵走。

8． 在這個事件之前，張小姐有五十箱化妝品擺放在6號店舖內，這些貨物是被分成十棟，每棟五箱。箱內有以小玻璃瓶或小塑膠瓶盛載的化妝品，每個小瓶是放在一個紙盒內。這些化妝品是原告人在2000年10月11日、13日及18日向永霞歐洲貿易公司以總價港幣555,000元買入，除了向永霞購買這批化妝品外，原告人在事件之前或之後都沒有向永霞或其他供應商購買過任何其他化妝品。這批化妝品的一部分被原告人在2002年11月14日、11月27日和12月13日售出，總售價為港幣115,955元。

9． 永霞在2000年2月2日開業，並由一位鄭麗霞（譯音）小姐獨資擁有。在2月3日，廖小姐加入成為股東。但鄭小姐在2月4日退出，廖小姐於是成為永霞獨資擁有人。在2000年3月15日，一位何超群(譯音)小姐加入永霞，成為股東，到2000年6月12日，廖小姐亦退出永霞。鄭小姐、廖小姐和何小姐均報稱相同的住址。

申索

10． 在2000年12月21日早上發生的事件後，原告人表示她的化妝品受損，故根據保險單向被告人索償港幣469,777元。她亦追討港幣19,750元作為裝修上的損失，但被告人否認責任。

11． 19,750元的裝修費索償可以簡單地解決。保單的附表上註明了所保財產只是一般商品庫存，包括化妝品及香水，價值港幣600,000元正。附表說明的所保財產並不包括裝修或重新裝修所需的費用，既然本席不能判該19,750元是在受保範圍內，所以本席要撤銷這項索償。

12． 餘下來的是469,777元的化妝品索償。保單指出保險公司(被告人)的責任有以下的規範，原文如下：

"Subject to the terms exceptions and conditions contained herein or endorsed or otherwise expressed hereon which shall so far as the nature of them respectively will permit be deemed to be conditions precedent to the rights of the insured to recover hereunder."

13． 中文譯本將這段文字譯為「本公司同意依照保險單所載條件、除外責任、基本條款及各種性質之批改書作為受保人根據保險索償的先決條件。」這個譯本譯漏了"so far as the nature of them respectively will permit"，這段的意思即謂若這些個別條件的性質容許，這些條件才會成為索償的先決條件，而不是每一條條件寫下來也會變成索償的先決條件。本席申明此點，因為本席要裁決究竟原告人所依賴的條款是否索償的先決條件，亦要申明並非每一條條件會自動地成為先決條件。

被告人引用之保險單條款

14． 被告人引用的保單條款為第7(a)(i)、7(c)、9(a)(ii)和10條，條款翻譯如下：

「7 ─ 索償步驟

若受保人得悉事故發生會引致或可能引致本保險單之索賠，受保人應該：

（a） 立即

（i） 採取措施減輕損毀之程度並尋找任何失物。

（c） 除時在公司合理要求自費向本公司提供下列有關之資料、文件或證明：

（i） 損毀之起源和原因以及發生的情形；

（ii） 任何涉及與本公司有關的責任或其賠償金額的事情；

並應提交經宣誓或其他法律上聲明書以證明其索償及有關事項之真實性。

9 ─ 持有權利

當損毀索償發生時：

（a）本公司及其任何授權人在不承擔任何責任或不減少本公司在本保險單給予之權利下可處理以下事項：

（ii）接管受保的財產或需將該項財產交予本公司，本公司會以一切合理的方式及方法處理該財產。

10 ─ 恢復原狀

本公司自己或聯同其他人，其他公司或其他保險公司，可自由選擇修理或更換全部或任何部分之損毀來代替賠款，但本公司則不擔保修理到絲毫無損，只可以在相當合理情形下修復之。無論在任何情況下本公司都毋須支付多過財產損毀時所需之收理費用，亦不能超過該財產之保額。」（註）¹

15. 被告人亦依賴保單的8(d)段，翻譯如下：

「8. 利益之喪失

在下列情況下本保險單之一切利益均即損失:

(d) 如受保人或其代表妨礙或阻止本公司行使自己的權利。」（註）²

被告人之答辯理由

16. 被告人的案情透露，原告人在未得到被告人同意前扔掉了所有貨物，所以原告人沒有採取任何步驟去減輕被告人的損失，所以被告人指原告人違反7(a)(i)段，而被告人亦表示這是一個索償先決條件。

17． 同樣地，因原告人在未有得到被告人的事前准許而把貨物扔掉了，所以被告人指原告人令他喪失第9(a)(ii)段的接收權或第10段的收補或替代權。被告人謂基於上述的兩項權利被原告人所剝奪，原告人已違反保單中的8(d)段。

18． 再者，被告人亦指原告人沒有提供他合理地需要的有關資料和文件來協助他調查這申索，原告人於是違反保單中第7(c)段，被告人說7(c)段亦是一個先決條件。

先決條件

19． 本席需要考慮的第一件事是7(a)(i)和(c)(ii)是否索償先決條件。本席在上文已提到不是保單中所有條件都是先決條件，一定要個別條件本身性質，容許這條件才可以成為先決條件。

20． 在這一點，本席亦參考過一本保險法律的著作名為《MacGillivray on Insurance Law》第20版第10.06、10.10和10.11三段，該三段的內容如下：

“10.06 Collateral promise

A stipulation in a policy may be merely a collateral promise by the assured to do some act without making his right to recover dependent on his fulfilment of the promise. Here the only remedy of the insurer in the event of breach is a counterclaim for damages. If insurers desire to create a condition precedent then sufficiently clear wording should be used to demonstrate that intention, and a clause which is not clearly expressed as a condition is likely to be read as a collateral stipulation unless a cross action for damages would be an inadequate redress in the event of breach. In Re Bradley & Essex and Suffolk Accident a stipulation in an employer's liability policy that the assured should keep a proper wages book was held to be merely a collateral promise relating to the adjustment of premiums, and a breach did not discharge the insurers from liability. Although described on its face as a "condition precedent", the clause in question formed part of a larger provision which could not take effect as a condition precedent and created an ambiguity which had to be resolved against the insurers.

In Stoneham v. Ocean Railway General Accident, it was held that the condition that "in case of fatal accident notice must be given to the company within seven days", was not a condition precedent to recovery, but was merely a contractual term the breach of which imposed an obligation upon the assured's representatives to reimburse the company for any extra expense which they might incur from having to investigate the circumstances of an accident at a long interval after its occurrence. Since the "condition" was not expressed to be a condition precedent to recovery on the policy, whereas others were, and since the result of holding it to be done would in that case have produced an unreasonable result, the decision is not surprising."

"10.10 Duties to be performed by the assured

There are terms in every policy which impose certain obligations on the assured. For example there are clauses which require the assured to do certain things in the event of a loss, such as give notice of loss within a specified time, notify the insurer of claims brought against the assured, deliver particulars of loss in a limited time, initiate a reference to arbitration, or prosecute a dishonest employee. Other clauses impose duties on the assured during the currency of the risk, such as the common condition in a motor policy requiring the assured to take all reasonable steps to safeguard the insured vehicle from loss or damage and to maintain it in efficient condition.

10.11 The effect of the assured's breach of such a term depends upon an interpretation of the clause in question in the context of the whole policy. Clauses requiring delivery of particulars of loss within a specified time have been construed as conditions precedent to recovery even when not expressed to be either a warranty or condition precedent, but it is unlikely that a court would take the same view today. The modern drafting technique is to include a general clause which declares that the due observance and fulfilment by the assured of all the obligations cast upon him by the policy terms shall be conditions precedent to any liability of the insurers to make any payment under the policy. Breach by the assured of a term of the kind described above then provides the insurer with a defence to payment, regardless of whether it was either remedied before or casually connected with the loss. A literal interpretation of a general condition precedent clause suggests that the insurer is altogether discharged from liability under the policy for the future, and not merely from liability to meet the particular claim, but it is submitted that the courts will endeavour to interpret it as not barring recovery for future claims if at all possible as, for example in a case where the assured's breach consisted of a failure to intimate a claim within the time limit. Where the assured's compliance with a policy term is expressed to be a "condition precedent to recovery", the insurer may have a defence to payment only so long as the breach remains un-remedied."

21. 在考慮第7(c)(ii)段是否一個索償的先決條件，本席亦考慮過以下三個案例。

22. 第一個案例是Worsley v. Wood and Others 6 T.R.710，案例的摘要段落如下：

"If a policy of insurance refer to certain printed proposals, the proposals will be considered as part of the policy. - By the proposals of the Phoenix Company it is stipulated that "persons insured shall give notice of the loss forthwith, deliver in an account, and procure a certificate of the minister churchwardens and some reputable householders of the parish, importing that they knew the character, &c. of the assured, and believe that he really sustained the loss and without fraud:" held that the procuring of such a certificate was a condition precedent to the right of the assured to recover, and that it was immaterial that the minister, &c. wrongfully refused to sign the certificate."

23． 在第790頁Ashhurst J.有以下的說法：

"The question is whether the certificate required be or be not a condition precedent; if it be, the plaintiffs below cannot maintain their action. It is perfectly immaterial whether they have entered into an improvident contract; if they choose to take the burden upon themselves, they cannot call on the insurance office until they have complied with the condition. I think that it is a condition precedent, and that the assured engaged at all events to procure the certificate before they applied to the office for an indemnity. Nor is there any thing unreasonable in these terms. It is well known that great frauds are sometimes practiced on the insurance offices, and therefore it behoves them to take all care to prevent frauds. In order to guard more effectually to protect the Phoenix Company, they insist on having a certificate from the minister and churchwardens, from persons who are not likely, from their situations in life, to assist in such frauds. But as the plaintiffs below have not procured that certificate they cannot maintain this action."

24． 第二個案例是Hiddle and Another and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company of New Zealand [1986] A.C. 372，案例摘要說：

"Where, in an action on a fire policy, the plaintiffs' evidence shewed that they could have complied with the condition as to giving within fifteen days a detailed account of their loss "as the nature and circumstances of the case will admit" much more fully and completely than they had done: -

Held, that they were rightly non-suited, since even if the question of compliance were for the jury, a verdict could not have been reasonably given in their favour."

25． 在此案例，有關保險條款如下：

"6. Statement and settlement of claims: The insured sustaining any loss or damage by fire shall forthwith give notice to the company in Dunedin, or to the recognized agent thereof, at or near the locality in which such loss or damage shall occur, and shall within fifteen days after such fire deliver to the same an account in detail of such loss or damage as the nature and circumstances of the case will admit; and shall verify the same by solemn declaration or affirmation before a magistrate, and shall produce books, vouchers, and such other information and evidence as the directors or agents of the company may reasonably require; and unless such account, verified as aforesaid, shall be delivered within the time aforesaid, and such other information and evidence, if required, shall be produced in manner aforesaid, no part of such loss shall be payable."

Lord Davey的判詞有關段落：

"The fire took place on January 10, 1894, when the whole stock of the appellants, with a trifling exception, was destroyed. Some of their books, including the cash-book and customers ledger were in a safe and were saved from the fire. The stock-book, however, and the stock-sheets of the end of 1893 were destroyed.

On January 24, 1894, the appellants, in assumed compliance with the sixth condition, forwarded to the respondents a statutory declaration that by the fire they had sustained loss amounting to 2250l. as per detailed statement marked B. This statement was in the following terms:- "

（In Statement referred to, there were only set out the "Particulars of Items burnt", and "Value at time of fire" and "Amount claimed".）

"At the trial before Stephen J. it appeared from the evidence of the appellant Hiddle that the goods in the store at the time of the fire were the goods they bought back plus the invoice goods purchased since minus the goods sold. There were in addition 40l. worth bought from one Paassvanti. The witness stated that the invoices of the goods purchased by them in Melbourne and Sydney were destroyed in the fire - that they had written to the vendors for copies of those invoices, but did not get them until after fifteen days from the fire. The appellants put in evidence (amongst other documents) a detailed inventory and valuation of the stock bought back by them from their trustees in July, 1893, and estimates prepared by their accountant from the materials in their possession after the fire, shewing how the amount of the loss was arrived at."

"It was contended on behalf of the appellants that they were only bound to give such an account as the nature and circumstances of the case would admit of, or (in other words) the best account they could, and that whether they had done so was a question of fact which ought to have been submitted to the jury. Their Lordships, however, accept the rule laid down by Willes J. in the case of Ryder v. Wombwell (2), and they think that the non-suit was proper, although there may have been some evidence to go to the jury, if the proof was such that the jury could not reasonably give a verdict for the plaintiffs. In the present case their Lordships doubt whether the statement forwarded by the appellants was an account at all within the meaning of the sixth condition, and they consider it proved by the evidence of the plaintiffs themselves that at the time of forwarding their statement they had in their possession materials which enabled them to give a much fuller, more detailed, and better account for the purpose of enabling the insurance company to test the reality and extent of the loss."

26． 第三個案例是Welch v. Royal Exchange Assurance [1939] 1 K.B. 294，案例撮要如下：

"By the terms of a policy of fire insurance the conditions thereof were, "so far as the nature of them respectively will permit" to "be deemed to be conditions precedent to the right of the "insured to recover." Condition 4 provided that on making a claim the insured should "give to the corporation all such "proofs and information with respect to the claim as may "reasonably be required," and that "No claim under this policy "shall be payable unless the terms of this condition shall have "been complied with." A fire occurred on the insured's premises and he claimed to be indemnified under the policy. The insurance corporation repudiated liability, and the dispute was referred to arbitration. The insured used and controlled for the purposes of his business certain bank accounts standing in the name of his mother. The insurance corporation repeatedly, both before and during the arbitration, requested the insured to furnish them with information as to these accounts; but the insured failed to disclosed them until he was under cross-examination during the arbitration proceedings:-

Held, by the Court of Appeal that the insured was not entitled to recover any sum in respect of his claim: by Slesser L.J. on the ground that, even if on the true construction of the policy the requirement of information in condition 4 was not a condition precedent, but merely a condition that the insurance corporation need not pay until the information there required was produced, the insured could not say that such information was in fact given before his claim was made; by MacKinnon and Finlay L.JJ. on the ground that on the true construction of the policy that requirement was a condition precedent with which in the circumstances the insured had not complied."

27. Slesser L.J.在這個案例的305頁有如下說法：

"During the hearing before the arbitrator it was for the first time relied upon by the insurance company that the claimant had failed to give the respondents any information which was reasonably required with respect to two banking accounts of his mother which had been used and controlled by the claimant for the purpose of his business and that large sums of money accruing to the claimant had been paid by him into the accounts and large sums drawn out of the accounts by him for the purposes of his business.

At the arbitration, in the course of the cross-examination of the claimant, the claimant, for the first time, offered to give, and did give, full information as to these two banking accounts, but the learned arbitrator finds that until the accounts were so produced the respondents were not in possession of sufficient information to enable them to allege that the claimant's failure to give information in respect of the said accounts was a breach of condition 4 of the policy."

在307頁: "In these circumstances, even if the requirement of information in condition 4 be not a condition precedent, but merely a condition that the insurance company need not pay until the information required in condition 4 is provided, the appellant fails because he cannot say that such information was in fact given before the claim was made, and therefore it becomes to my mind unnecessary in this case to determine whether the failure to comply with condition 4 as to information was a failure to satisfy a condition precedent. For myself, I would wish to keep open that question. Had the phrase at the end of condition 4 been "no claim under this policy shall "be payable until the terms of this condition have been "complied with" instead of the word "unless," the case would have resembled that of Weir v. Northern Counties of England Insurance Co. (I), where it was held that such words did not constitute a condition precedent but only a requirement to be satisfied before a liability to pay arose, but it may well be said that here the word "unless" has no such temporal limitation.

In the result I think this appeal should fail, not upon the ground that condition 4 is a condition precedent, but upon the ground of the claimant's failure to give necessary information before a claim was made by him, which failure the appellant through his own act in the circumstances of this case is unable to excuse."

28． MacKinnon L.J.在312頁和313頁有如下說法：

"But in truth the more formidable argument for the respondents does not depend on the last sentence of condition 4. They say that the promise in the body of the policy is "subject to the conditions which, so far as the nature of "them permits shall be deemed to be conditions precedent to "the right of the insured to recover." In condition 4 there is the provision that "the insured shall give all such information as "shall reasonably be required." The nature of this requirement does permit compliance with it to be a condition precedent to the right of the insured to recover. It is found by the arbitrator that it has not been complied with. There has therefore been a breach of a condition precedent to the right of recovery."

"None the less I am driven to the conclusion that the stipulation that the insured shall give all such information as may be reasonably required is one whose nature permits it to be a condition precedent to the right of the assured to recover, and that the presence of the last sentence in condition 4 does not by any ambiguity alter that nature or invalidate that conclusion."

29． 基於上述三個案例所述的原則，本席認為第7(c)(ii)段是一個索償的先決條件，因為受保人必須把有關於保險公司的責任和索償的款額的資料和文件，在保險公司合理要求下提供給保險公司，這是一個十分重要的責任，否則，保險公司便無法適當地處理索償。在7(c)(ii)段中，並沒有任何性質令它不適合作為一個索償的先決條件，本席亦認為以這條款作為一個先決條件是合理的。

30． 至於7(a)(i)段，本席認為它不應被視為一個索償的先決條件，因為如果受保人違反了7(a)(1)段，保險公司隨時可以向受保人要求賠償，如果受保人沒有採取任何措施減輕保險公司的損失程度，這並不等於該受保物件會完全沒有用。就本案為例，若原告人只是沒有把完好的與已損毀的化妝品分開，而沒有把它們扔掉，保險公司因此而受損的程度絕對可以計算到。縱使有部分受保的財物損失了，而受保人沒有去嘗試尋回，這個損失亦可以計算到，並不會令保險公司為處理這索償而面對很大的困難。

第7(c)(ii)條

31． 至於究竟受保人(原告人)有否違反第7(c)(ii)條，保險公司委託的東方(譯音)公證行的曾景雄先生接受盤問時，確認原告唯一未提供的文件就是原告人以其營業名稱開立的銀行戶口的月結單。

32． 東方公證行曾在2001年2月21日及2月28日的兩封信件中向原告人要求提供銀行月結單，但原告人兩次也拒絕提供，所給予的理由是月結單與索償無關和私隱權。但當他們向立法局議員楊森辦事處求助時，楊森議員辦事處代原告人寫給東方公證行的信件曾明確地指出「貴公司可約時間到張小姐公司或本辦事處查看，基於私隱及商業秘密的原因，請勿拿走及複印。」對這封信件的建議，東方公證行並沒有作出任何回應。

33． 在公證行的第二個中期報告(2001年4月11日)中，曾先生並沒有提到議員辦事處在同年4月4日願意容許他們查看這個銀行戶口的月結單，而在該報告中，他是有提及到與議員辦事處的通信。如果公證行仍然希望或認為需要查看這個銀行戶口的月結單，他應該會回覆議員辦事處，如果他認為查看也不太足夠，一定要影印副本的話，他亦沒有理由不回覆議員辦事處。再者，當事件經由議員辦事處處理時，原告人的態度明顯比較軟化。

34． 而且被告人的律師樓在2001年5月3日發出的否認責任信中，是完全沒有提到原告人沒有提供所需的文件或資訊，如果被告人仍然需要這些銀行月結單，本席認為這應該會被用作否認責任的理由之一。所以本席就著上述事件作出的結論，就是被告人根本已經不再需要這些銀行月結單，所以曾經經由東方公證行作出的要求已經不再有效。既然被告人不再有要求原告人便不會有違反這條款，所以本席亦宣判原告人並沒有違反7(c)(ii)的索償先決條件。本席亦察覺到被告人只是在經修訂的答辯書內才引用第7(c)(ii)條。

第7(a)(i)條

35． 本席現在考慮究竟原告人有否違反7(a)(i)條，即受保人要採取措施減輕損毀之程度，並尋找任何失物。由被告人第二證人韓烈華(譯音)先生的證供，可看到有些貨品己受到嚴重的損毀，但有些貨品的損毀卻不太嚴重，而有部分貨品是可以當作新貨賣出，但沒有人採取任何步驟去挽救這些不太嚴重損毀或較輕微損毀而可當作新貨賣出的貨品。

36． 當韓先生檢驗這些貨時，他是與廖小姐、原告人、36號舖的李小姐及她的男性朋友一起做的。韓先生本人也不發覺有需要把他認為較完好的貨品或可當新貨賣出的貨品從壞的貨品中分開，他只把貨品放回或容許在場的人仕把它們放回原本儲存貨品的黑膠袋中。所以若原告人有違反7(a)(ii)條，這個違反行為亦有保險公司所委任的公證行員工韓先生所參與，既然這個違反條款的行為是有公證行人員(保險公司的代表)的參與，這便不算是違約，所以本席亦宣判被告人不能夠依賴這一點，作為拒絕賠償的道理。

第9(a)(ii)條

37． 至於保單的9(a)（ii)條，它的意思十分明顯和清晰，那些受損的貨物是不可扔掉的，因為被告人保險公司有權把它拿走，本案原告人實際上知道這些貨物是不可以扔掉的。雙方也不爭議在12月22日下午點算在36號舖的李小姐所經營的服裝損失時，雙方曾為受損的貨物可否扔掉而爭吵。李小姐要把貨物立刻送走，曾先生卻不容許她這樣做。曾先生與張潤輝先生都有向在場的人說明這些受損的貨不能扔掉，因為它們有剩餘價值，廖小姐亦知道這點，因她曾是保險行業的從業員，亦明白到貨物有剩餘價值。最後李小姐與曾先生的紛爭由廖小姐建議騰出一些空間作為臨時儲蓄地方而解決，所以李小姐與廖小姐完全知道那些受損貨物是需要保存的。

38． 原告人張小姐雖然在同日下午爭吵發生時並不在場，但她對這件事完全知曉，因為當晚(即12月22日晚至12月23日凌晨)，廖小姐與李小姐有在她面前討論有關12月22日下午與曾先生的爭端，還恥笑曾先生的態度。但原告人的說法是韓先生容許她把這些貨物扔掉，廖小姐說在12月23日上午四時半至五時，廖小姐曾問韓先生要否取回已損毀的化妝品，如果要，便取回到保險公司去，韓先生表示不需要，可把它扔掉，因為已經沒有用。韓先生當然極力否認有說過這些說話，他堅持在12月22日晚上至12月23日早上從來沒有人討論過那些貨物可否扔掉，他亦不知道原告人張小姐會把那些貨扔掉。

39． 在2002年3至4月間，廖小姐曾經致電韓先生，廖小姐把這電話對話錄了音。在電話上，廖小姐多次向韓先生講述謂當晚韓先生同意他們把貨物處理，但韓先生堅持不知道張小姐會把貨物這樣處理。

40． 本席毫不猶豫地接受韓先生的證供，他當時只不過是公證行的一個僱員，在聆訊時他已不再是公證行的僱員。在12月22日下午，他目睹上司曾先生與其中一位受保人的爭吵，他知道受損的貨物需要保存，亦根本完全沒有理由把李小姐36號舖的成衣與張小姐在6號舖的化妝品界定有任何的分別，所以沒有任何理由指韓先生會容許張小姐把化妝品扔掉。若果韓先生有任何懷疑，他可以在幾小時後問曾先生拿答案，韓先生沒有理由韓先生不可等待幾小時的時間。韓先生本身的證供亦被他在電話上所說的話支持，因他在電話上亦承認他的上司從來沒有叫他前往取樣辦，因而他沒有去取，所以最後沒有樣辦。在法庭作供時，他亦承認替6號舖點貨當晚(12月12日至23日)，他亦有參與廖小姐與李小姐恥笑曾先生的事件，本席認為韓先生是一個直接而誠實的證人。

41． 另一方面，本席不接受廖小姐有關扔掉化妝品事件的證供，廖小姐亦不否認在12月22日下午的氣氛不太融洽，受保人數次與公證行爭執，受保人數次在檢查貨品上堅持自己的做法，他們與公證行曾先生的關係絕對不和，所以絕對有可能是原告人根本不想保存那些貨品而堅持用自己的方法處理，可能當時她並不了解後果的嚴重性，所以本席認為原告人有違反保險單中的9(a)(ii)點，因為原告人已把貨物扔掉。

第8(2)(d)條

42． 本席更認為原告人是知道當日(12月22日)下午曾先生與李小姐對於已損毀的貨物保存與否的爭執，既然本席不相信廖小姐的證供謂原告人處理這些貨物時，是得到韓先生的事前准許，所以縱使原告人處理這些貨物時不知道在12月22日下午的爭執，她仍然不可這樣處理那些貨物。既然原告人把貨物棄掉，她便令被告人喪失把貨物接管的權利，所以同時違反保單內的8(2)(d)條。

第10條

43． 至於被告人欲引用第10條恢復原狀的權利，本席覺察到這一段是在答辯書的修訂階段才加入，亦覺察到被告人並沒有提供任何證據，指出已損毀而不可當作新貨賣出的化妝品是可以修補。至於替換，雖然這些化妝品已被扔掉，但這並不會令被告人在考慮替換與否時發生任何困難。

放棄追究權利

44． 在聆訊期間，本席曾提出謂曾先生在2001年12月29日致原告公司的信中已提出原告人已把貨物扔掉，並要求被告大律師考慮這封信是會否構成被告人放棄追究權利，但其實公證行方面並沒有忘記或放棄原告人扔掉貨物這件事，因為在公證行答覆楊森議員辦事處(日期2001年3月29日)的信中，公證行還再覆述謂原告人處理貨物是未經被告人事先准許，而會影響到被告人的經濟利益。

45． 在放棄追究這一點，本席亦參考上述MacGillivray課本第10.101、10.102、10.103和10.104段。四段內文如下：

10.101

"We have seen that the breach of a term of the policy by the assured gives the insurer a remedy which varies according to the status of the term which is broken. Circumstances may arise in which the insurer is held to have waived the right to exercise that remedy as a result of his conduct either before or (more frequently) after the breach by the assured. In order to appreciate how the doctrine of waiver applies to breaches of policy terms it is first necessary to consider its juristic basis."

10.102

""Waiver" is not a term of art and has been criticised as vague. In the present context it means the abandonment or relinquishment of a right or a defence which may occur as the result either of an election by the insurer or of the creation of an estoppel precluding him from relying upon his contractual rights against the assured. Election arises where the insurer becomes entitled to exercise a right on the commission of the assured's breach of contract, and he must decide whether to do so. An example would be the right to void the policy in reliance of a forfeiture clause. If the insurer is aware of the facts which create the right in question, and (though this is not completely clear) is also aware of his legal right, and he acts in such a way as clearly to evince a decision to relinquish it, he will be held to have elected not to exercise it against the assured, and that election is irrevocable. The time may come when the law will deem him to have elected to exercise or to forego his right, as the case may be, when he takes no action to communicate a decision."

10.103

"Election is to be contrasted with equitable, or "promissory" estoppel. Where a person who possesses a legal right or defence against another unequivocally represents by words or conduct that he does not intend to rely upon it, and the other party acts, or desists from acting, in reliance on that representation, the representor will be estopped from enforcing his legal rights inconsistently with his representation to the extent that it would be inequitable for him to do so. Whereas election requires a party to have knowledge of the facts which create a right exercisable by him (and, at least possibly, knowledge of the legal right) before he can be held to have made an election in respect of it, the principle of equitable estoppel does not require any particular state of knowledge on its part, although it is submitted that in practice it will be difficult for an assured to make out the elements of an equitable estoppel against an insurer unless the latter is known to be aware of the assured's breach of contract. Another point of distinction is that an election, once communicated or deemed to be made, is irrevocable, whereas an equitable estoppel may in certain cases only suspend the exercise of a right temporarily. As applied to breaches of contract the concept of equitable estoppel means that when one party represents to the other that the latter's breach of contract will be overlooked, he will not be allowed later to rely upon it where to do so would be unjust to that other party."

10.104 Waiver of breach of warranty

"The effect of the assured's breach of warranty is automatically to discharge the insurer from liability as from the date of the breach. Consequently, the insurer possesses an immediate defence to a claim by the assured and is not required to elect or exercise a remedy, such as rescission of the contract, in order to acquire a defence. In the last edition of this work, it was submitted that waiver by election is therefore inapplicable to breach of warranty, not because the contract of insurance has terminated, which is not the case, but because the insurer is not put to any election by the occurrence of the breach, and cases decided before Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association in which an insurer was said to have elected not to avoid liability for breach of warranty must be regarded as wrongly applying the law. The view that the election is inapplicable to a case of breach of warranty has now been accepted by a number of first instance judges and, more recently, the Court of Appeal. An assured who wishes to contend that an insurer has waived a breach of warranty must therefore establish waiver by estoppel, which invariably means equitable estoppel. The same analysis must be true of waiver of a breach of a condition precedent to liability which affords a defence to all claims originating after the breach."

46. 在本案中，本席看不到被告人有透過自己或東方公證行通知原告人謂被告人會放棄任何權益，或任何因原告人違反保單條款而產生的被告人權益，被告人亦沒有向原告人宣稱謂被告人會不考慮原告人的任何違約行為。所以本席認為被告人並沒有放棄行使任何權益，而且在被告人的第一封在2001年5月3日行所發出的律師信中，亦有清楚說出原告人違反9(a)(ii)和8(d)兩條款，致令被告人有權否認責任。

證供不一致

47． 本席亦覺察到在張潤輝先生、韓先生和曾先生三人的證供中有少許地方不銜接，但本席亦明白這個事件是發生在2001年12月尾，即超過兩年半前發生，不同人對同樣事件的記憶方面會有少許差別，經過長時間後這亦算是自然。但本席亦認為要考慮到張先生與曾先生沒有參與有關原告人6號舖的驗貨事件，主要來說，兩人證供均是有關10月22日下午在36號舖所發生的事，至於該事件的內容，雙方都沒有爭議。

廖小姐 - 原告人的代理人

48． 在本案中還有一點是雙方曾經爭議的，就是廖小姐是否原告人的全權代表，時間是在下午雙方為貨物可否扔掉而發生爭吵時。其實，本席已經判定張小姐知道貨物不可拋棄，所以根本沒有必要再為此事而作出決定。不過若本席需要作出此決定，本席會接受張先生和曾先生的說法。他們說於12月22日下午在6號舖遇到張小姐時，廖小姐走上前推開張小姐說，廖小姐是原告人張小姐的全權代表，可以回答他們任何問題，以及他們不需要向張小姐發出任何問題。

49. 本席認為張先生和曾先生不需為這事件說謊，在這事件上，本席認為他們是誠實證人，其實張先生當日到達現場只是協助大家。而這事件發生後，他一直勤力和負責任地去處理廖小姐的諮詢和投訴，張先生是一名勤勞而負責任的保險代理人。至於曾先生，本席亦看不到他為何要為這事而說謊。本席認為廖小姐是張小姐的全權代表，這裁決亦有其他證據支持。在銀座商場地庫有好幾個營業單位的保險也是透過廖小姐向張潤輝先生介紹的保險公司投保，雖然張先生已經把他的電話號碼印在所有保單上，讓受保人有任何問題可直接向他諮詢。但所有受保人有任何問題也是選擇透過廖小姐向張先生諮詢，從來沒有一個受保人直接向張先生諮詢(包括原告人張小姐)。由這事件看到，商場中各受保人對廖小姐有著莫大的信任。至於12月22日下午，當大家爭吵時，廖小姐一直是站在投保人的一方而爭拗他們要求的做法。

50． 縱使本席的裁決謂廖小姐是原告人的代理人是錯誤也好，原告人亦知道那些貨物不可扔掉，即使她不曾聽過曾先生說貨物不可扔掉，她亦不應該把貨物扔掉。

裁決

51． 基於本席上述的裁定，認為原告人扔掉貨物是違反保單中9(a)(ii)和8(d)兩項條款，故本席會撤銷原告人的申索。

堂費

52． 至於堂費方面，除非雙方有任何爭議，本席認為原告人只需要付一半堂費給被告人，因為被告人引用很多答辯理由，有些還是後加的，但最後只能夠根據他初時否認責任的其中一個道理勝訴，其他所有道理，無論是證據方面，或在陳詞方面，都是敗訴。所以本席認為如果被告人把答辯的範圍縮窄，最後仍會就扔掉貨物理由勝訴，而無須引用其他論據，要是這樣本案在準備處理和進行過程中，實不需那麼長的時間。以上是本席的判決。

(審裁官與雙方討論有關訟費申請事宜)

53． 基於本席剛才所述的理由，雖然廖小姐代表原告人反對堂費的裁決，本席仍然認為該裁決是有足夠論據，所以本席判被告人只可向原告人收取一半堂費。因為本案本身亦牽涉到很多法律觀點，所以被告人聘用大律師處理本案亦是合理，所以本席亦認為被告人可向原告人收取大律師費用，但當然是在剛才所講「一半」的基礎。

（註）1 ：

7. Claims (Action by the Insured)

If any event giving rise to or likely to give rise to a claim under this Policy comes to his knowledge the Insured shall:

(a) immediately

(i) take steps to minimise the Damage and recover any missing property

(c) at all times at his own expense provide to the Company all such information and available documents or proofs regarding:

(i) the origin and cause of the Damage and the circumstances under which the Damage occurred;

(ii) any matter touching the liability or the amount of liability of the Company;

as may be reasonably required by the Company together with a declaration on oath or in other legal form of the truth of the claim and any matters connected therewith.

9. Possession Rights

On the happening of Damage in respect of which a claim is made:

(a) the Company and any person authorised by the Company may without hereby incurring any liability or diminishing any of the Company's rights under this Policy:

(ii) take possession of or require to be delivered to the Company any Property Insured and deal with such Property for all reasonable purposes and in any reasonable manner;

10. Option to Reinstate

The Company may at its option, repair or replace the Property Damaged, or any part thereof, instead of paying the amount of the Damage, or may join with any other persons companies or insurers in so doing, but the Company shall not be bound to repair exactly or completely, but only as circumstances permit and in reasonably sufficient manner, and in no case shall the Company be bound to expend more in repair then it would have cost to repair such Property as it was at the time of the occurrence of such Damage, nor more than the Sum Insured thereon.

（註）2

8． Forfeiture of Benefits

All benefits under this Policy shall be forfeited:

(d) if the Insured or any person acting on his behalf shall hinder or obstruct the Company in the exercise of its rights;