HKSAR v. CHAN YIN LUN AND ANOTHER

DCCC 566/2024

[2025] HKDC 1310

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NO 566 OF 2024

----------------------------------

----------------------------------

-----------------------------------------

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

-----------------------------------------

1.  D1 and D2 face a Charge Sheet consisting of a total of 6 charges of Dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence, contrary to section 25(1) and (3) of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, Cap 455.

2.  Charges 1 to 3 are preferred against D1.  Charges 4 to 6 are preferred against D2.

3.  D1 pleaded guilty to Charges 1 to 3.  D2 pleaded guilty to Charges 4 to 6.

4.  Particulars of Charges 1 to 3 are that D1, between A(1) and A(2), both dates inclusive, in Hong Kong, together with a male surnamed “Leung”, a female known as “Man Man” and other unknown persons, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that property namely a total sum of B Hong Kong currency in the bank account with C, account number D, in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence, dealt with the said property.

5.  For Charge 1, A(1) is 14 February 2023; A(2) is 23 February 2023; B is $2,691,046.65; C is Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited; D is 578-8-719590-1.

6.  For Charge 2, A(1) is 8 February 2023; A(2) is 25 February 2023; B is $2,300,285; C is The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited; D is 829-625474-833.

7.  For Charge 3, A(1) is 8 February 2023; A(2) is 22 February 2023; B is $3,337,511; C is Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited; D is 012-792-2-027177-4.

8.  Particulars of Charge 4 are that D2, between 30 January 2023 and 20 February 2023, both dates inclusive, in Hong Kong, together with other unknown persons, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that property namely a total sum of $2,550,256 Hong Kong currency in the bank account with Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited, account number 570-1-963958-6, in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence, dealth with the said property.

9.  Particulars of Charges 5 to 6 are that D2, between E(1) and E(2), both dates inclusive, in Hong Kong, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that property namely a total sum of F Hong Kong currency in the bank account with G, account number H, in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence, dealth with the said property.

10.  For Charge 5, E(1) is 30 January 2023; E(2) is 24 February 2023; F is $3,968,644.5; G is The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited; H is 166-859801-833.

11.  For Charge 6, E(1) is 16 February 2023; E(2) is 22 February 2023; F is $8,149,037.01; G is Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited; H is 012-352-1-030789-0.

Facts admitted by D1 and D2

12.  Between January and February 2023, PW1 to PW21 fell victim to similar investment frauds.  In general, they were lured by swindlers, who approached them via social media, to invest in cryptocurrency on bogus online platform/website with insider information/promising return.  As a result, these victims were deceived to transfer their funds to various designated accounts provided by the swindlers or the platform(s)/website(s), amongst which a total of HKD2,371,376 were made to A/C-1 to A/C-6 (defined below) from 16 to 24 February 2023.  Scams were unveiled when these victims were unable to withdraw their money.  Cases were reported.

13.  At the material times, D1 was the holder and sole account signatory of the following 3 bank accounts:-

(a) A bank account numbered 578-8-719590-1 held with Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) limited (“SCB”) (“A/C-1”);

(b) A bank account numbered 829-625474-833 held with The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”) (“A/C-2”); and

(c) A bank account numbered 012-792-2-027177-4 held with Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited (“BoC”) (“A/C-3”).

D1’s SCB Account (A/C-1)

14.  A/C-1 was opened by D1 on 7 February 2018.  D1 was the sole signatory. His reported income was HK$13,000.  Statement was mailed to his residence in Tseung Kwan O.

15.  From September 2018 onwards, A/C-1 basically became idle until 14 February 2023 when A/C-1 was started to be used again.

16.  Between 14 and 23 February 2023, there were 81 deposits (HK$2,691,046.65) and 33 withdrawals (HK$2,638,491).  There was a remaining balance of HK$52,539.44 after A/C-1 had no further transactions on 23 February 2023.

D1’s HSBC Account (A/C-2)

17.  A/C-2 was opened by D1 on 8 February 2023.  D1 was the sole signatory. He claimed to be unemployed and did not receive any social security.  He left his residential address in Tseung Kwan O as correspondence address.

18.  Between 8 and 25 February 2023, there were 29 deposits (HK$2,300,285) and 60 withdrawals (HK$2,300,238).  There was a remaining balance of HK$47 after A/C-2 had no further transactions on 25 February 2023.

D1’s BoC Account (A/C-3)

19.  A/C-3 was opened by D1 on 8 February 2023 and closed on 13 March 2023. D1 was the sole signatory.  He claimed to be unemployed.  He left his residential address in Tseung Kwan O as correspondence address.

20.  Between 20 and 22 February 2023, there were 66 deposits (HK$3,337,511) and 81 withdrawals (HK$3,283,797.51).  There was a remaining balance of HK$53,713.49 after A/C-3 had no further transactions on 22 February 2023.  That amount (plus two entries of further interest) was withdrawn on 13 March 2023 when A/C-3 was closed.

21.  At the material times, D2 was the holder and sole account signatory of the following 3 bank accounts:-

(a) A bank account numbered 570-1-963958-6 held with SCB (“A/C-4”);

(b) A bank account numbered 166-859801-833 held with HSBC (“A/C-5”); and

(c) A bank account numbered 012-352-1-030789-0 held with BoC (“A/C-6”).

D2’s SCB Account (A/C-4)

22.  A/C-4 was opened by D2 on 30 January 2023.  D2 was the sole signatory. He claimed to be a clerk earning HK$10,000 per month.  He left his residential address in Tin Shui Wai as correspondence address to receive bank statements.

23.  The first transaction was a cash deposit of HK$3,000 on 30 January 2023.  Then, there was a test deposit of HK$1 and withdrawal of HK$1 on 14 February 2023, followed by a cash withdrawal of HK$3,000 on the same day.

24.  A/C-4 became more active between 16 and 20 February 2023.  In that period, there were 75 deposits (HK$2,547,255) and 65 withdrawals (HK$2,546,353.06).  There was a remaining balance of HK$902.74 after A/C-4 had no further transactions on 20 February 2023.

D2’s HSBC Account (A/C-5)

25.  A/C-5 was opened by D2 on 30 January 2023.  D2 was the sole signatory. He claimed to be a part-time salesman earning HK$120,000 per year.  He left his residential address in Tin Shui Wai as correspondence address.

26.  The first transaction was a cash deposit of HK$100 on 13 February 2023.

27.  A/C-5 became more active between 17 and 24 February 2023.  In that period, there were 68 deposits (HK$3,968,544.5) and 107 withdrawals (HK$3,968,613.9).  There was a remaining balance of HK$30.6 after A/C-5 had no further transactions on 24 February 2023.

D2’s BoC Account (A/C-6)

28.  A/C-6 was opened by D2 on 15 March 2013 and closed on 6 March 2023.  D2 was the sole signatory.  He claimed to be unemployed.  He changed his correspondence address to his residential address in Tin Shui Wai on 15 February 2018.

29.  Up until 6 February 2023, the use of A/C-6 appeared to be normal, and the amount of funds and transactions transacted through A/C-6 were not suspiciously large.  It is noted that the last transaction before 16 February 2023 was on 6 February 2023, to which there was a withdrawal of HK$3,800, making the balance to a minimal level of HK$24.54.

30.  Between 16 and 22 February 2023, there were 150 deposits (HK$8,149,037.01) and 137 withdrawals (HK$8,149,053.83).  There was a remaining balance of HK$7.72 after A/C-6 had no further transactions on 22 February 2023.

Arrest of D1

31.  On 7 March 2023, D1 attended a police station, reporting that he was recruited by his secondary schoolmate surnamed LEUNG to work in marketing for quick money, but then he was kept by a group of people in hotels whilst surrendering his bank accounts.  Upon police investigation, D1 eventually revealed that he was in fact told by LEUNG to surrender his accounts for collecting soccer bets.  D1 was arrested.  Under caution, D1 admitted that LEUNG asked him to give away his three bank accounts (ie A/C-1, A/C-2 and A/C-3) to collect soccer bets, and D1 would be rewarded HK$10,000 per day.  In a subsequent video-recorded interview (VRI), D1 said under caution that:-

(a) He worked as a part-time decoration project assistant, making HK$15,000 per month.

(b) He acquainted LEUNG from secondary school, but since Form 3, LEUNG dropped out of school, and they had less contact until February 2023, when LEUNG introduced him a job to earn quick money. LEUNG said he started to do improper and suspicious jobs, and LEUNG asked him to recruit people to do parcel delivery jobs. However, he did not know what those parcels would contain, so he didn’t accept LEUNG’s job offer.

(c) Later, LEUNG told him that there was another job that was to reside at a hotel and to provide bank accounts to receive illegal soccer bets. He learned that there would be around HK$100,000 of soccer bets being laundered through his accounts. He agreed to the job.

(d) He was then referred by LEUNG to an unknown female called Man Man on WhatsApp, who asked him to provide three accounts to the syndicate from either BoC, SCB, HSBC or HSB. Since he only had an HSB, he went to open BoC and HSBC accounts on 8 February 2023. He had not seen Man Man before.

(e) He was also asked to stay in a hotel room when his accounts were being used to launder illegal funds. He would be rewarded HK$10,000 per night (Saturday and Sunday would be counted as one night). He was promised to be rewarded HK$45,000 for staying 8 nights (the first night not counted as no transaction would be done) as LEUNG would collect HK$60,000 from the boss. During the stay at the hotel, he could not use his phone.

(f) Subsequently, he continued to chat with Man Man on Telegram in a group called “Group 102”. There were 4-5 persons in that group, whom he did not know of. He provided his bank accounts details, his personal details (HKID card and proof of residence) to persons in this group.

(g) He started to stay in a hotel on 19 February 2023. He was asked by someone called Ah Chuen to go to North Point MTR station at around 9 pm that day. Ah Chuen also told him that someone called Ah J would come to pick him up to go to the hotel, ie Hotel Plaza North Point. Ah J was the person serving as security guard guarding him at the hotel.

(h) He met with Ah J at North Point MTR station, and they went to Hotel Plaza North Point. Ah J also asked him to give away the three ATM cards as well as his own mobile phone to Ah J, as they did not want him to use the phone that might affect the account record. At around 11 pm at the hotel lobby, he further met with another person called Ah Lung, who was another security guard. Then, Ah Lung took him to Room 2812 in the hotel, where there were 3 persons, ie two security guards and a person (later known to be D2) who was also lending bank accounts for rewards.

(i) He could not leave the hotel room, so the security guards would go out to buy takeaway for him and D2. He stayed in Room 2812 until 22 February 2023. On that day, two persons called Ah Bak and Ah Shui came to Room 2812. Ah Shui asked him for his HKID card to book another room, so he went with Ah Shui to check in another room. The hotel initially gave them a room on 30^th floor, but later the hotel manager asked them to leave as they smoked in Room 2812.

(j) As such, the group of seven (including D1 & D2) left, and they went to a McDonald’s to wait for Ah J to book another hotel. Later, the group went to Kowloon Harbourfront Hotel in Hung Hom. Again, the group used his name to reserve a hotel room (Room 518).

(k) At around 9 pm on 22 February 2023, a female (referred to as “F1”) came to Room 518, who was also someone lending bank accounts for rewards. Since Room 518 could not allow too many people to stay, F1 reserved another room (Room 512) in her name for her to stay.

(l) During the stay at the Hung Hom hotel, they changed to different rooms for different nights. Eventually, he left on 25 February 2023. The persons guarding him at first took him to a restaurant at Whampoa for lunch, as they needed to wait for the boss to clarify with certain matters concerning his bank accounts.

(m) Whilst leaving, he called LEUNG as to his promised reward. LEUNG told him that the boss might not pay him, as he did not stay in hotel for 8 nights. At night, he checked his BoC and SCB accounts to find HK$50,000 each. LEUNG and Man Man told him to transfer out those money, and he did so by mobile phone but failed. He tried again by cash withdrawal, but again failed.

(n) On 1 March 2023, LEUNG called him, telling him to go to SCB the next day as someone would assist him to withdraw money. Next day, he received a call from someone unknown, who claimed to assist him to cancel the bank accounts. That person never showed up, but that person asked him to walk inside the bank to handle account termination. However, the bank staff said the account could not be terminated at that time. Similarly, when LEUNG asked him to cancel the BoC account, he did as instructed but the account could not be cancelled.

(o) Most of his WhatsApp messages with LEUNG and Man Man were deleted, except some that he had discussed the job with Man Man.

(p) He was scared at first when he reported the case to police so he said he was detained by the syndicate, but later he wished to tell the whole truth to avoid any misleading of police.

32.  In another cautioned VRI, D1 explained the WhatsApp messages with LEUNG and Man Man that he had kept from deleting as told by LEUNG, as he thought the deleting of those messages would not protect him but only to protect LEUNG.  In those messages, LEUNG and Man Man explained the job details of lending bank accounts to earn money, and that there were money left in his accounts after the syndicate had used them, so D1 was required to transfer them to LEUNG first.

Arrest of D2

33.  On 8 March 2023, D2 was arrested.

34.  On 15 May 2023, another team of police officers arrested D2 at his public housing residence in Tin Shui Wai regarding his A/C-4 receiving funds of PW1.  Under caution, D2 said that he sold his A/C-4 to others.  In subsequent cautioned VRI, D2 said that:-

(a) He was unemployed, and had worked as a construction worker about 2 months ago at a monthly wage of about HK$20,000. He had not filed any tax returns, nor did he own any vehicle or property; and he was not a director or shareholder of any company.

(b) He did not know PW1.

(c) He opened A/C-4 a few months ago for lending it to a friend (M1) introduced by someone called Ah Chi for receiving remittances at a reward of HK$12,000. He passed the online banking password to M1 after the account was opened.

(d) He was asked to stay in a hotel for 7 days and was not allowed to use his phone during the period. However, he did not receive the promised reward.

(e) He knew Ah Chi in a cyber café in 2015, and Ah Chi introduced M1 to him a few months ago. M1 asked him to open a Standard Chartered Bank account, but he was not very familiar with M1 and did not know M1’s name.

Examination of accounts

35.  In the examined period for each of A/C-1 to A/C-6, the transaction records exhibited money laundering hallmarks, including the use of test deposit of a small amount, large amount of transactions, low bank balance at the end of each transaction day, quick speed of fund dissipation, mirror pattern of aggregate amounts of deposits and withdrawals, and incommensurability of funds deposits.

Criminal records

36.  D1 has a previous clear record.

37.  D2 has a previous clear record.

Antecedents

38.  D1 is aged 28 (26 at the time of the offences), educated to F6 level. He has been working as a Stage Lighting Technician since 2022 with a monthly salary of about $15,000.  D1 lives in private housing in Tseung Kwan O with his parents, elder brother and elder sister.

39.  D2 is aged 30 (27 at the time of the offences), educated to F3 level. D2 has worked as a part-time waiter in restaurants.  D2 lives in public housing in Tin Shui Wai.

Mitigation

D1

40.  Mr Terry Wong of counsel assigned by the Director of Legal Aid mitigated on behalf of D1.  The following is a summary of the mitigation submissions.

41.  D1 is a hardworking person, and has a kind heart in the eyes of his family.

42.  Charge 1 spanned 10 days.  There were 81 deposits (almost $2.7 million) and 33 withdrawals ($2.64 million)

43.  Charge 2 spanned 18 days.  There were 29 deposits ($2.3 million) and 60 withdrawals ($2.3 million).

44.  Charge 3 spanned 15 days.  There were 66 deposits ($3.34 million) and 81 withdrawals ($3.28 million).

45.  There is no sentencing guideline for money laundering.  Usually, the main consideration is the amount of “black money” involved.

46.  In HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi [2010] 5 HKLRD 545, the Court of Appeal emphasized that the amount of money is a major sentencing consideration. Cheung JA, in giving the judgment of the court, also had the following observations at paragraph 9:

“9. There are no sentencing guidelines for the offence of dealing with the proceeds from an indictable offence because the facts vary from case to case. However the following factors are to be taken into account when determining sentence:

(a) It is the amount of money involved that is a major consideration and not the amount of benefit received by a defendant in the transaction.

(b) The culpability of the offence lies in the assistance, support and encouragement offered to the commission of an indictable offence. So a defendant’s level of participation and the number of occasions on which he is involved in the “money laundering” activities are relevant factors to be considered.

(c) The offence of dealing with the proceeds from an indictable offence does not necessarily have any direct correlation with the indictable offence in question. However if the relevant indictable offence can be identified, the court may take into account the sentence imposed on the indictable offence per se when determining the sentence of the dealing offence.

(d) If the case has an international element involving activities carried out across different regions, the court may impose a more severe sentence. This is to protect Hong Kong’s reputation as an international finance and banking hub from being tarnished.

(e) The length of time the offence lasted.”

47.  In Secretary for Justice v Wan Kwok Keung [2012] 1 HKLRD 201, Yeung JA (as he then was) observed that:

“12. “Money laundering” is a serious offence for not only does it encourage criminal activities indirectly, but also attempts to legitimise the proceeds of crime. In order to crack down on serious crimes and to prevent offenders from getting financial gains, it is necessary to deter the commission of “money laundering” offences (see Court of Appeal in HKSAR v Javid Kamran (unrep., CACC 400/2004, [2005] HKEC 80), HKSAR v Xu Xia Li [2004] 4 HKC 16).

13. Generally, the sentence for a “money laundering” offence should mainly reflect the amount of “black money” laundered and not the benefit obtained by the defendant or others. The reason being that it is very difficult to prove the benefit concerned, and in most “money laundering” cases, there may not be evidence to show from what indictable offence the “black money” is in fact derived. Of course if there is information to prove that the “black money” originated from serious crimes, including drug trafficking, kidnap and blackmail, illegal human trafficking and other organised crimes etc, or the defendant’s benefit is huge, then the sentence should be adjusted upward.

14. This Court has, in a number of other similar cases, also listed other factors relevant to the sentence to be imposed including the number of offences, the length of time the offence lasted, the degree to which the defendant participated in the offence involving “black money” and whether or not it was an organised and sophisticated crime etc.

15. In HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi [2010] 5 HKLRD 545, Cheung JA set out the amounts of money involved and the sentences passed in a number of “money laundering” cases. The sentencing starting point is 3 years or so where the “black money” involved is between $1 million and $2 million; 4 years or so where it is between $3 million and $6 million; and could be over 5 years where it is above $10 million.

16. The “black money” in this case was from illegal bookmaking on soccer gambling and not from a particularly serious crime, and the respondent’s offences, including his bookmaking offence, were not well organised either. According to the respondent’s confession, the amount of money that he had received from the offence was not huge, it was not over $150,000. This Court agrees that where the offence of “money laundering” is concerned, this case is not a very serious one.

17. However, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the respondent had “laundered money” on thousands of occasions for as long as seven years and the total amount involved was as high as $14 million. And neither can this Court ignore the fact that the “black money” laundered by the respondent was from the bookmaking offence in which he had participated.

18. This Court agrees with the Secretary that the starting point of 21 months’ imprisonment for the “money laundering” offence adopted by Judge Eddie Yip is manifestly inadequate in that it “falls outside [the range of sentences] which the Judge, applying his mind to all the relevant factors, could reasonably consider appropriate.” (See Lord Lane CJ in Re A-G's Reference (No 4 of 1989) [1990] 1 WLR 41, the test expressed on p.46A).

19. This Court is of the view that the appropriate starting point should not be lower than 4 years’ imprisonment even if the respondent is to be dealt with in a way most favourable to him.”

48.  In fact, the sentencing framework of money laundering cases keeps on evolving in Hong Kong.  In HKSAR and Boma [2012] 2 HKLRD 33, the Court of Appeal emphasized at paragraph 38 that “the question of the amount of money laundered is not the be-all and end-all of a case, but is a significant feature”.  The Court went on to list out other relevant factors that should be taken into account at paragraph 40:

(1) The nature of the predicate offence for generating “black money” and the sentence to be imposed;

(2) Whether the defendant knew what the predicate offence was;

(3) Whether there is an international element;

(4) Whether the offence of “money laundering” involves elaborate steps, schemes or fraudulent means;

(5) Whether there is a criminal syndicate;

(6) The number of transactions and the length of time during which the offences were committed;

(7) Whether the defendant continued to launder money after knowing the nature of the predicate offence;

(8) The role and remuneration of the defendant.

49.  Applying the above principles and factors to be considered, Mr Wong submitted:

(a) The predicate offence was the inducement to invest in cryptocurrency with insider information promising profit via social media. It looks like fraud. This is the background of the black money transferred to D1’s accounts. The maximum sentence of fraud on conviction upon indictment is imprisonment for 14 years’ imprisonment: section 16A of the Theft Ordinance, Cap 210;

(b) D1 did not know what the predicate offence was. D1 learned that the accounts would be used to collect illegal soccer bets in the amount of HK$100,000 each day. Under section 7(1) of the Gambling Ordinance, Cap 148, any person who engages in bookmaking commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $5 million and to imprisonment for 7 years. Bookmaking is comparatively less serious than the predicate offence. Taking Wan Kwok Keung into consideration, it involved HK$14 million lasting for 7 years and the defendant directly participated in the predicate offence ie bookmaking. Not less than 4 years’ imprisonment as the starting point was suitable. Therefore, D1 may be sentenced similarly;

(c) There was no international element;

(d) D1 provided 3 bank accounts and personal information (2 accounts were newly opened) to Leung and Man Man for the purpose of collecting illegal soccer bets ie bookmaking. D1 just followed the instructions of Leung and Man Man who formulated elaborate steps, schemes or fraudulent means which lured D1 to their trap and ended up miserably;

(e) There was a group of people who might or might not be a criminal syndicate consisting of Leung and Man Man and some people who secured D1 in various hotel rooms and prevented D1 from leaving or communicating with other people or checking his bank accounts. But D1 was not a member of the group or the criminal syndicate, he was tempted by the reward offered by Leung to provide assistance to bookmaking which was a less serious offence than the predicate offence which he did not know;

(f) Charge 1 involved 81 deposits (HK$2,691,046.65) within 10 days; Charge 2 involved 29 deposits (HK$2,300,285) within 18 days; and Charge 3 involved 66 deposits (HK$3,337,511) within 15 days. There were a total of 176 deposits (a total sim of HK$8,323,842.65) within 18 days. The length of time was relatively short and the total number of transactions was not too many comparatively speaking;

(g) D1 did not know the nature of the predicate offence whatever it was, what D1 learned was that his accounts were involved in bookmaking, but he did not directly participate in bookmaking activity; and

(h) D1 was lured by Leung and Man Man to provide 3 bank accounts to them for bookmaking purpose, he was being used by them in return for the promised reward which was not paid. He was the smallest potato who played a very limited role. In fact, D1 was being foolish in doing what he was told to do.

50.  Factors to be considered include the amounts of money involved in the 3 charges and the likely corresponding sentences taking into account the aggravating factors including D1 learned that the accounts would be used for bookmaking purpose in return for monetary reward; and D1 committed the offences with other people.  HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi only provides the sentences imposed in some cases in relation to the amount of money laundered.  The overall culpability of D1 is the most important in the determination of the suitable final sentence.

51.  Mr Wong suggested the following starting points:

(a) Charge 1 – 3 years’ imprisonment;

(b) Charge 2 – 3 years’ imprisonment; and

(c) Charge 3 – 4 years’ imprisonment.

52.  Mr Wong submitted that adding up the sentences after the 1/3 reduction for timely guilty pleas would be too heavy.

53.  Mr Wong submitted that if a global approach is applied, the total sum of black money is HK$8,328,842.65, the starting point is likely to be 4 years, resulting in 2 years 8 months’ imprisonment after guilty plea.  There are 3 charges against D1 with aggravating factors.  Mr Wong urges the court to consider imposing wholly concurrent sentences (a) because the periods of time when the offences happened overlapped on the same 18 days and (b) on the application of the totality principle.

54.  D1 does not oppose the furnishing of information by the prosecution pursuant to section 27(2) of OSCO, Cap 455.

55.  Mr Wong submitted that an enhancement of 20% to the sentence is sufficient for deterrence effect.

56.  Mr Wong submitted on behalf of D1 a total of two mitigation letters written in Chinese respectively by D1’s elder brother (and signed also by other family members) and D1’s employer.  The contents are generally that D1 is a filial son and grandson and is willing to learn.  The family members asked for a chance be given to D1 and pleaded for a lenient sentence on his behalf.

57.  Mr Wong also submitted a Foundation Certificate issued by Employees Retraining Board dated 19 May 2025 to show that D1 has completed a part-time 18-hour programme related to Security Training.

D2

58.  Ms Christine Leung of counsel assigned by the Director of Legal Aid mitigated on behalf of D2.  The following is a summary of the mitigation submissions.

59.  D2’s mother and his stepfather are in court to give him support.

60.  D2 was born in the Mainland and came to Hong Kong when he was 13.  He now lives with his stepfather (70, retired) and mother (60, retired).

61.  D2 used to be a construction site worker earning a monthly income of about $20,000.  However, at the time of the incident, he was unemployed and had to rely on the family’s savings to make ends meet.  He felt lost and helpless and wanted to relieve the family’s burden.  D2 was introduced to a man (M1) who said he (D2) would be financially rewarded if he were to lend him bank accounts.  Due to greed and ignorance, D2 opened two accounts (A/C 4 and A/C 5) and lent them together with his own existing account (A/C 6) to M1 in exchange for cash remuneration.  In the end, he did not get a single penny.

62.  D2 has a clear record and has been hardworking since he came to Hong Kong.

63.  D2 was cooperative with the police and confessed the crime under caution.  He indicated his pleas of guilty at the earliest opportunity.

64.  The maximum penalty for money laundering offence is a fine of $5 million and imprisonment for 14 years.

65.  Ms Leung repeated para 9(a) to (e) of Hsu Yu Yi (supra) and laid emphasis on para 15 of Wan Kwok Keung (supra).  Ms Leung also summarized the 8 factors in para 40 of Boma (supra).

66.  According to the admitted facts, D2 was not a member of the fraud behind the scenes.  There was no evidence to show that he had knowledge of the predicate offence and the source of the funds.  He only played a minimal role by opening and lending the accounts, hoping to earn remuneration in return. Due to his ignorance, D2 was used as a pawn and was exploited as the front with all his footsteps traceable.

67.  It was submitted that D2 did not play a leading role in the entire plan, nor did he supervise or instigate others to launder money; nor did he personally deceive the victims; that D2 only followed instructions and handed over his mobile phone and the ultimate control of the accounts; that he did not know the amount involved was so large.

68.  It was further submitted that the duration of the crime was brief: for Charge 4, it was 23 days; for Charge 5, it was 27 days; and for Charge 6, it was only 7 days.  It was submitted that D2’s criminality was of a lower category warranting a lower starting point for sentencing.

69.  D2 has no objection to the prosecution furnishing the statement of CIP Li Yiu Nam dated 20 June 2025, pursuant to section 27(2) of OSCO, Cap 455.

70.  With regard to enhancement of sentence, D2 does not oppose it but urges the court to exercise its discretion and make an enhancement of 25% (see HKSAR v Wan Minqiang [2025] HKDC 919).

71.  The court was invited to impose concurrent sentences bearing in mind (a) the fact that the dates of the 3 charges were around the same time and (b) the totality principle.

72.  Ms Leung submitted on behalf of D2 a total of 3 mitigation letters written in Chinese by respectively D2 himself, his parents and his paternal grandmother.  The contents are generally that D2 is regretful and will not commit the same mistake.  The letter writers all asked for a lenient sentence and a chance be given to D2 so he may have a new start in life.

Sentence

73.  There is an aggravating factor against D1 in that he committed the three offences with other people.

74.  There is an aggravating factor against D2 in that he committed the offence subject of Charge 4 with other people.

75.  The maximum penalty for the offence of money laundering is 14 years’ imprisonment.  There are no sentencing guidelines but a deterrent sentence is always called for.

76.  I have borne in mind the sentencing principles as enunciated in Hsu Yu Yi, Boma and Wan Kwok Keung (all supra).

77.  In the case of D1, the total amount laundered was about $8.3 million. The predicate offence appears to be fraud; however, there was little evidence that D1 knew about this.  The total duration of the three offences was 18 days.  D1’s role was not simply to allow others to use his bank accounts; he was asked to withdraw monies too, though unsuccessfully.  D1 knowingly committed the offences on behalf of an organized criminal syndicate.  There were numerous transactions though the length of time over which the offences took place was limited and was in terms of days rather than months.  D1 committed the offences on an ongoing basis believing wrongly the funds were proceeds of bookmaking.  D1 was promised a reward of $45,000 though it was doubtful if he was in fact paid.

78.  Bearing these considerations in mind, I adopt an initial global starting point of 4 ½ years’ imprisonment.  Because of the aggravating factor of joint enterprise, I increase that starting point by 3 months to reach a final global starting point of 4 years and 9 months.

79.  In the case of D2, the total amount laundered is about $14 million. There is no evidence D2 knew about the predicate offence of fraud.  The total duration of the three offences was 26 days.  D2’s role was to allow others to use his existing or newly-opened bank accounts.  There were numerous transactions though the length of time over which the offences took place was limited and was in terms of days rather than months.  D2 was promised a reward of $12,000 for Charge 4 and an unknown reward for the other charges but there is no evidence they were paid up.

80.  Bearing these considerations in mind, I adopt an initial global starting point of 5 years and 2 months’ imprisonment.  Because of the aggravating factor of joint enterprise for Charge 4 only, I increase that starting point by one month to reach a final global starting point of 5 years and 3 months.

81.  Both D1 and D2 pleaded guilty in good time.  They shall be entitled to the customary 1/3 sentencing discount.  In neither the case of D1 nor D2 do I see any other mitigating factors of weight to justify another sentencing discount.

82.  Therefore, before any enhancement, the sentence of D1 would be 38 months’ imprisonment and that of D2 would be 42 months’ imprisonment.

83.  Neither D1 nor D2 opposed the furnishing of information by the prosecution pursuant to section 27(2) of OSCO, Cap 455.  Nor did they oppose the request for enhanced sentencing by virtue of the information.

84.  Accordingly, I have received the witness statement of CIP Li Yiu Nam dated 20 June 2025.

85.  Table A on page 5 of the statement shows there was a rising trend in the use of money laundering stooges in figures (and proportion of arrested persons in detected Deception cases and Money laundering cases) from 760 (31.38%) in the year 2020 to 7,883 (75.10%) in the year 2024.  The corresponding data for January to May of the year 2025 was 2,146 (70.87%).  By using the mathematical method of extrapolation, the projected figure and proportion for the whole of the year 2025 would result in 5,150 and 70.87%.

86.  It is noted that the forecast would see a drop in the trend from the year 2024 to the year 2025.  However, 5,150 and 70.87% are still large numbers by comparison with the past historical data.  I am therefore satisfied that the use of money laundering stooges in detected Deception and Money laundering cases is still prevalent.  By implication, it cannot be denied that money laundering offences are still prevalent.

87.  Table B on page 6 of the statement shows that for (local) Deception cases with money laundering element (detected with arrest), the reported losses consistently rose and came to a height of $2,143.41M (in 4,701 cases) in the year 2024.  The corresponding figure for January to May 2025 was $219.11M (in 742 cases).  By using the mathematical method of extrapolation, the forecast for the whole year of 2025 would be $525.86M (in 1,781[1] cases).  This represents a drop.  However, the amount of losses would still be significant.

88.  But monetary loss is not the only harm that can be caused to the community.  In para 18 on pp 5-6 of the statement, CIP listed several ways in which the anti-money laundering regime in Hong Kong is hampered by the increasing use of money laundering stooges, as follows:

(a) The increasing number of stooge accounts interferes with the normal operation of the banking system, having a negative effect on the reputation of Hong Kong as a well-known international financial hub;

(b) The increasing number of stooge accounts form multiple layers of “shields” concealing the identity of the masterminds behind, making it difficult, if not impossible, for police to identify the masterminds behind;

(c) The increasing number of stooge accounts substantially facilitates the commission of crimes and in turn leads to more crimes being committed, as the mastermind could easily get away from their criminal liability;

(d) The increasing number of stooge accounts makes money laundering easier, which allows culprits to make use of their ill-gotten gains to extend their sphere to engage in a wider range of illegal activities;

(e) The increasing number of stooge accounts means that the law enforcement agencies have to put in more investigation efforts and resources; and

(f) People with low income or less awareness of the consequences of selling their bank accounts are more likely to be lured by the culprits to take the risks of commission of crimes to surrender their accounts for monetary reward.

89.  Bearing all these considerations in mind, I am satisfied that the extent of harm, whether direct or indirect, caused to the community by recent occurrences of money laundering offences is still substantial.

90.  For the dual reasons of prevalence of the offence and the substantial extent of the harm caused to the community, I will exercise my power under section 27(11) of OSCO, Cap 455, to enhance the sentences of D1 and D2.  I regard 24% enhancement as being just and appropriate in the circumstances of the case.

91.  I am of the view that the resulting sentences of D1 and D2 are not excessive in the circumstances of the offences and the offenders.

92.  I will award notional sentences (after enhancement) for the individual charges and make appropriate orders to arrive at the final sentences for both D1 and D2.

(D1 and D2, please stand)

93.  For Charge 1, the sentence for D1 is 37 months’ imprisonment.

94.  For Charge 2, the sentence for D1 is 35 months’ imprisonment.

95.  For Charge 3, the sentence for D1 is 42 months’ imprisonment.

96.  I order that 3 months of the sentence on Charge 1, and 2 months of the sentence on Charge 2, are each to run consecutively to the sentence on Charge 3, making a final sentence for D1 of 47 months’ imprisonment.

97.  For Charge 4, the sentence for D2 is 37 months’ imprisonment.

98.  For Charge 5, the sentence for D2 is 42 months’ imprisonment.

99.  For Charge 6, the sentence for D2 is 47 months’ imprisonment.

100.  I order that 2 months of the sentence on Charge 4, and 3 months of the sentence on Charge 5, are each to run consecutively to the sentence on Charge 6, making a final sentence for D2 of 52 months’ imprisonment.