Case Details
For Applicant(s):
Mr Tam, counsel
Listing:
MAHAMOUD OSMAN MAHAMED v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
MAHAMOUD OSMAN MAHAMED v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6248 · HCAL 1351/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1351/2024 [2026] HKCFI 6248 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1351 of 2024 BETWEEN Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following; Order by Deputy High Court Judge To dated 22 October 2026: Leave to apply for Judicial Review be granted; and There be no order as to costs of the application save that the Applicant’s own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations. Observations for the Applicant: Introduction This is the Applicant’s application by Form 86 filed on 15 August 2024 for leave to apply for judicial review (the “leave application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 18 July 2024 refusing to re-open his appeal (the “Decision”). The Applicant is a Somalian national, now aged 31. He arrived in Hong Kong on 5 February 2012 and raised a non-refoulement claim on 28 March 2014 by written signification. His claim was assessed on all four applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism and rejected by the Notice of Decision issued by the Director of Immigration dated 27 June 2018. His appeal against the Notice was dismissed by the Board’s Decision. He applied for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The judicial review was settled by way of a consent order by which the Board’s Decision was quashed and remitted to the Board for fresh determination. On 15 September 2023, the Applicant wrote to the Immigration Department (the “Department”) saying that he had a connection who would help him to relocate to a different city and requested the Department to facilitate his return as soon as practicable as the arrangement is time sensitive. It should be noted that the letter was neither addressed nor sent to the Board and made no mention of withdrawal of his appeal. On the same day, he wrote a second letter addressed to the Department stating that he wanted to go back to his home country, that it is safe for him to return and he has funds to purchase his air ticket. He also said he wished to “cancel all [his] non-refoulement claims” in Hong Kong. It should be noted that though he expressed his wish to cancel, which effectively means to withdraw, all his non-refoulement claims, the letter was neither addressed nor sent to the Board. Between 20 November and 8 December 2023, there was some discussion between the Applicant and an immigration officer about his willingness to surrender his Somalian passport. On 27 December 2023, the Applicant issued a follow up letter to the Department, headed “Subject: Expediting Repatriation Process”, in which he repeated his request to facilitate his repatriation as soon as possible (the “27/12/2023 Letter”). On the same date, he issued a second handwritten letter at the request of an immigration officer to explain his lateness in reporting since 22 December 2023. At the end of that letter, he appended his residential address (the “handwritten address”). As the events unfolded, some ambiguities flowed from the way the address was written. Mr Tam, counsel for the Applicant, submits that the handwritten address reads as follows: “Apartment Q-1 1/F Block Q Wing Lung BUILDING No. 226 CASTLE PEAK ROAD CHEUNG SHA WAN SHAM SHUI PO” (the “Q-1 address”) He submits that the Q-1 address is same as the address as stated in the Agreement on Administering and Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance of the International Social Service Hong Kong Branch submitted to the immigration officer on the same occasion. However, the address was read by officers of the Immigration Department as: “Apartment G, 11/F Block G Wing Lung BUILDING No. 226 CASTLE PEAK ROAD CHEUNG SHA WAN SHAM SHUI PO” (the “G-11 address”) The Applicant’s handwritten address is reproduced hereunder in typewritten form as: “Apartment Q-11/f Block Q Wing Lung Building No: 226 Castle peak road Cheung Sha wan Sham Shuipo” In the Court’s opinion, the Applicant’s handwriting is not clear, the spacing between the two figure “I” is misleading and punctuations are missing. On the other hand, the immigration officers’ misreading of a hyphen for a comma, twice misreading letter “Q” for “G” are careless and inexcusable. The address as interpreted by the immigration officers is clearly non-sensical. Even a casual reading would raise a doubt in any reasonable mind and would call for verification with source documents or a telephone call before adopting it. Anyway, for reasons as will be revealed in the later part of this decision, there is no need to pursue on whom responsibility for the fault lies. On 16 January 2024, the Immigration Department forwarded the 27/12/2023 Letter to the Board. It should be noted that the letter was not addressed to the Board. At the request of the Board, the Immigration Department gave the Board the G-11 address as the Applicant’s address. On 19 January 2024, the Board wrote to the Applicant at the G-11 address referring to his 27/12/2023 Letter requesting to close his case and to allow him to return to Somalia (the “1st Direction Letter”). In the letter, the Board said if it did not receive any reply from the Applicant on or before 26 January 2024, it would consider approving his application for withdrawal of his appeal against the Notice. Naturally, the Applicant did not receive the 27/12/2023 Letter. On 2 February 2024, the Board issued direction that the Applicant’s appeal be withdrawn (the “2nd Direction Letter”). On 7 February 2024, the 1st Direction Letter was returned undelivered. The Board requested the Immigration Department for the Applicant’s updated telephone number and/or address. The Department again provided the Board the G-11 address. The 2nd Direction Letter was also returned to the Board subsequently. On 23 February 2024, the Applicant collected a copy of the 1st Direction Letter from the Board in person. Despite that at the time the Board had already issued the 2nd Direction Letter which had also been returned undelivered, the Board did not give a copy of the 2nd Direction Letter to the Applicant or inform him that his appeal had been withdrawn. The Applicant immediately wrote to the Immigration Department and requested it to halt his repatriation including closing his case with the Immigration Department. On 1 March 2024, he sent a typed-up version of his letter to the Immigration Department. It should be noted that despite having received a copy of the 1st Direction Letter and despite having asked the Immigration Department to halt his repatriation, he did not protest to the Board against the 1st Direction Letter. On 15 July 2024, the Board once again asked the Immigration Department for the Applicant’s updated telephone number and/or correspondence address. On 16 July 2024, the Immigration Department again informed the Board of the G-11 address. Then, on 18 July 2024, the Board issued the Decision stating that the Applicant’s appeal is considered withdrawn as of 27 December 2023 and that it had no jurisdiction to re-open the Applicant’s appeal which had been validly withdrawn. The Decision was sent to the Applicant’s new address in Chatham Road North and received by him. On the same day, the Applicant wrote back to the Board and requested to re-open his appeal. The Applicant now seeks leave to apply for judicial review of that Decision. He advanced five grounds of application. Ground (1): Error of law – misinterpretation of the procedure prescribed under section 37ZTA of the Immigration Ordinance Mr Tam submits that the Board erred in law by treating the Applicant’s appeal as having been validly withdrawn, without following the strict requirements prescribed under section 37ZTA(1) of the Immigration Ordinance (the “Ordinance”) which provides that: “A person who has filed a notice of appeal under section 37ZS (or section 37ZT if late filing is allowed) may, at any time before the Appeal Board determines the appeal, withdraw the appeal by filing a written notice with the Board.” (emphasis added)” In Yung Chi Keung v Protection of Wages on Insolvency Board and Another, the Court of Final Appeal held that whilst the court will construe the meaning of a statutory provision with regard to the purpose of the statute, it is impermissible to ignore the actual words used in a statute in order to construe its effect. The section provides in simple language that a person who has filed a notice of appeal may withdraw the appeal by filing a written notice with the Board. The section may only be engaged by the person who has filed a notice of appeal and by filing a written notice to withdraw that appeal with the Board. On the law and on the fact, there can be no argument that only the Applicant has the locus standi to file the written notice to withdraw the appeal. In paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Decision, the Board relied on the Applicant’s 27/12/2023 Letter and the 23/02/2024 Letter to the Immigration Department which were then forwarded by the Department to the Board as the notice of withdrawal. It is the Applicant’s evidence that he had never asked the Department to forward these letters on his behalf to the Board. Mr Tam argues that the letters were sent by the Department to the Board on its own volition. Neither did the Board claim that the letters were filed by the Immigration Department on the Applicant’s behalf. In the 27/12/2023 letter, the Applicant told the Immigration Department that he had decided to withdraw his case or, giving it the widest possible interpretation, his appeal to the Board. It is plain common sense the fact that somebody told another person that he had decided to do something is not the same as he had actually done that something. What the Applicant said in that letter is just a statement of intention short of a proper withdrawal. Here, the evidence taken at its highest is that the Applicant told an immigration officer that he had decided to withdraw his appeal. That is just a statement of intention which is miles away from telling the Board he had decided to withdraw his appeal, not to mention having actually filed something with the Board which may be regarded as a proper notice of appeal. The Board also sought to rely on the Applicant’s 23/02/2024 Letter in which he said he would like to cancel his earlier withdrawal application due to change of circumstances as acknowledgment of the notice of withdrawal in his 27/12/2023 Letter. Attractive as that statement may appear to the Board, it is at least arguable that the so-called withdrawal which is acknowledged by the Applicant is, for reasons as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, rested on unsustainable ground. Apart from the above, the Board had not mentioned anything about filing of the notice. Had the Applicant filed anything which may be taken as a notice of appeal, it would have been filed with the secretariat of the Board and the Board would not have failed to mention that in its Decision. For these reasons, this Court considers it strongly arguable that the Board erred in its construction of section37ZTA, erred in its finding that the Applicant had filed a notice of withdrawal with the Board and came to the wrong conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to re-open the appeal. Ground (2): Error of law – procedural ultra vires for deeming withdrawal Mr Tam referred to the Board’s 1st direction letter requiring the Applicant to respond by 26 January 2024 otherwise it will approve his application for withdrawal. He submits that there is no “deemed withdrawal” under the Ordinance and that the procedures adopted by the Board were ultra vires the Ordinance. This Court agrees that there is no provision under the Ordinance for “deemed withdrawal” and the Board has no power to deem an appeal as having been withdrawn. But, it does not appear to the Court that Board was exercising such jurisdiction when it “approved” the Applicant’s withdrawal application. Properly read, section 37ZTA does not give the Board any power to approve or not to approve an application for withdrawal. Section 37ZTA(1) permits an appellant to withdraw his appeal by filing a written notice of withdrawal. Section 37ZTA(2) gives legal effect to the notice once it is received by the Board. The Board has no power to “approve” the notice in the strict sense of the word. What it could do is to ascertain the validity of the decision to withdraw in the sense that it is an informed decision made voluntarily with full understanding of the consequence of the withdrawal. These are the basic requirements of a valid withdrawal: see HT v Betty Kwan (Adjudicator). If satisfied that the decision to withdraw meets these requirements, the withdrawal is valid and would not be a nullity. The Board could do nothing but to accept the withdrawal and not to allow the appellant to file any further notice of appeal thereafter. If not satisfied that the decision is valid, then in the discharge of its high standard of fairness, the Board has to advise the appellant of the consequence of withdrawal so that he may reconsider whether to properly proceed with his withdrawal application or to proceed with his appeal. As noted in the preceding section, most probably the Board laboured under a mistake of law and fact that that 27/12/2023 Letter was a proper notice of withdrawal filed with the Board by the Applicant. In the first paragraph of its 1st direction letter, the Board referred to the 27/12/2023 Letter. In the second paragraph, it advised the Applicant that it presumed (1) that he was applying to withdraw his appeal; (2) that he considered it safe to return to Somalia; and (3) that he understood the consequences of the proposed withdrawal. In advising the Applicant of the Board’s presumptions, the Board was ascertaining if his decision to withdraw is voluntary and valid. In the third paragraph, the Board advised him to seek independent legal advice. Then, in the fourth paragraph, the Board said “If we do not receive any reply from you on or before 26 January 2024, the Board will consider approving your application for withdrawal.” The Board could not leave its determination on the validity of the notice in the air. Thus, it fixed a time for the Applicant to respond. If the Applicant responded, the Board could decide on the issue of validity and the course to take. As the Applicant did not respond, it was open to the Board to make the presumptions and on that basis to find his decision to withdraw is valid, accept the notice and let section 37ZTA(2) take effect. In inviting the Applicant to respond and imposing a time limit for him to dos so, the Board was only discharging its high standard of fairness to the Applicant. It was not exercising any jurisdiction of “deemed withdrawal”. This Court does not consider Mr Tam’s submissions arguable or sustainable on the facts. The Board’s use of the word “approving” was misleading for it has no power to approve the withdrawal which takes effect by operation of law. What it may do is to accept the notice if the decision to withdraw is valid; and if the decision is invalid, advise the applicant of the consequences of the withdrawal and assist him to make a valid decision or to proceed with the appeal, even by default if necessary. Ground (3): Material error of fact – delivering to the wrong address As indicated in paragraph 7, all the Board’s correspondence addressed to the Applicant were sent to a wrong address and were never received timely by the Applicant. Mr Tam submits that the mistake was material to the deeming procedure adopted by the Board because the Applicant had never received the 1st Direction Letter. Because of the Court’s conclusion in respect of Ground (2) that the Board had not deemed the Applicant’s appeal as having been withdrawn by his failure to respond, this ground must necessarily fail. Furthermore, in the Court’s opinion, the Applicant’s handwriting is not clear and misleading, but the immigration officers’ misreading the hyphen for a comma and twice misreading letter “Q” for “G” is careless and inexcusable. Both the Applicant and the immigration officers contributed to the mistake. Be that as it may, even if the Applicant had not contributed to the mistake, the mistake has no impact on the Decision because the Decision is the result of the Board’s error of law in construing section 37ZTA and its finding of fact that the notice had been filed with the Board by the Applicant. Even if all the Board’s correspondence to the Applicant had been delivered to his correct address and received by him, the Board would not have made any other decision as it was labouring under a mistake of law and of fact that the notice had been filed with the Board by the Applicant. The mistake on the address was immaterial. The Applicant is not entitled to any remedy. This ground is wholly unarguable. Ground (4): Right to make representation – failure to hold preliminary hearing Mr Tam argues that the Board was in breach of procedural fairness by failing to hold a preliminary hearing on the validity of the withdrawal. He referred to AP (Pakistan) and El-Tuyeb v SSHD and submits that where a withdrawal of an appeal is contested, the Adjudicator must allow an opportunity to put the case against withdrawal and where there is a contested withdrawal, there should be a determination with reasons as to whether the appeal is withdrawn or not. This Court has no disagreement with these basic principles of procedural fairness but finds on the fact that these principles are not engaged. Mr Tam submits that as result of the mistake about the Applicant’s address, the Applicant did not receive the letter dated 27 December 2023 and was deprived of the opportunity to clarify the alleged withdrawal or to explain the reason behind the alleged withdrawal. On the face, the letter Mr Tam referred to was the 27/12/2023 Letter written by the Applicant to the Immigration Department requesting the department to facilitate his repatriation as soon as possible. That statement makes no sense. It must be a mis-quote and Mr Tam must be referring to the 1st Direction Letter dated 19 January 2024 which the Applicant collected from the secretariat of the Board on 23 February 2024. It is accepted that the Applicant had not received the 1st Direction Letter until 23 February 2024 and he immediately protested to the Immigration Department and requested it to halt his repatriation process including closing his case with the Immigration Department. He also sent a typed-up version of that letter to the Immigration Department on 1 March 2024. But he never protested to the Board. The Court understands that an appellant may be confused about the separate identities of the Board and the Immigration Department and their separate functions. However, after having received the Notice of Decision from the Immigration Department refusing his claim for protection and advising him of his right to the Board, the Applicant lodged his appeal with the Board and attended the hearing before the Board. He also went to the secretariat of the Board on 23 February 2024 to collect the 1st Direction Letter. He must know that the Board is a separate and higher authority which makes the final decision on his application for non-refoulement protection. He deliberately chose to communicate with the Immigration Department about his repatriation, but not with the Board about his appeal or withdrawal. Even after collecting the 1st Direction Letter from the secretariat of the Board, he just told the Immigration Department to halt his repatriation process. He never protested to the Board about its intention to approve his application for withdrawal of his appeal. He never told the Board or the Immigration Department to cancel the withdrawal of his appeal. He never informed the Board that the alleged withdrawal was contested until after he had actually received the Decision on 14 July 2024. Before the Board issued that Decision, what it had was the Applicant’s 23/12/2023 Letter expressing his intention to withdraw his appeal which it erroneously accepted as his notice of appeal filed with the Board. The Board had no notice that the withdrawal of his appeal had been withdrawn or was being contested. When the Board came to know about the mistake in the address, the Decision had been made. The principles in AP (Pakistan) and El-Tuyeb v SSHD are not engaged. Ground (5): Wednesbury unreasonable Mr Tam submits on the basis that the above four grounds are arguable that the Decision was Wednesbury unreasonable. In the Court’s opinion, only the first ground is reasonably arguable and has good prospect of success, but not the other four grounds. Ground (1) is essentially based on error of law and of fact. The leave application stands or falls with Ground (1). An error of law could not render a decision Wednesbury unreasonable. Conclusion Having rigorously examined the Decision with anxious scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that Ground (1) is reasonably arguable and has good chance of success. Accordingly, leave to apply for judicial review under Ground (1) is granted. The Court makes an order that there be no order as to costs, save that the Applicant’s own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations. Dated the 12th day of November 2026 ( Seline Sze ) for Registrar, High Court Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence Form CALL-1