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HCAL 1727/2020
[2025] HKCFI 4313
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1727 OF 2020
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BETWEEN
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Nguyen Quang Dong |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative |
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Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
1. Extension of time for the application for leave to apply for Judicial Review of the decision of Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 7 March 2019 be refused; and
2. The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
1. The Applicant is a 48-year-old national of Vietnam who had repeatedly in the past entered Hong Kong illegally and was arrested and convicted of various criminal offences, and after serving various prison terms ranging from 10 to 24 months he was repatriated to Vietnam, but on 4 May 2014 he sneaked back into Hong Kong, and more than 3 months later on 18 August 2014 he surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if he returned to Vietnam he would be harmed or killed by his creditor over his unpaid debts. He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.
2. The Applicant was born and raised in Hai Phong City, Vietnam. After having repeatedly in the past come to Hong Kong illegally to look for jobs and was invariably arrested and repatriated back to Vietnam, the Applicant in 2013 started his own business running gambling operation betting on football matches with the help of a loan borrowed from a local money-lender with monthly interest payments which he initially managed to make from his business income.
3. However, his business did not fare well, and by early 2014 he started to default with his loan repayments that his creditor sent men to threaten him, and after a last warning from his creditor that his men would kill him next time if he still failed to repay his loan, the Applicant became fearful for his life and fled from his home district to hide in his aunt’s place, and on 2 May 2014 he departed Vietnam for China, and from there he again sneaked into Hong Kong and subsequently raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 18 October 2017 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).
4. By a Notice of Decision dated 18 December 2017 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).
5. In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his creditor and followers upon his return to Vietnam as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no evidence of any real intention of his creditor to seriously harm or kill him other than to press him to repay his debts, that in any event it was a private monetary dispute between him and his creditor only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Vietnam with a large population of 96 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 331,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Hanoi where it would be difficult if not impossible for his creditor to locate him.
6. On 6 February 2018 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which the Board did not hold any oral hearing and proceeded to deal with the appeal on papers based on the materials and information provided earlier by the Applicant to the Director and available in the hearing bundle before the Board. On 7 March 2019 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.
7. In its decision[1] the Board accepted the Applicant’s claim of fear of harm from his creditor over his unpaid debts but found no reliable evidence of any real intention of his creditor to seriously harm or kill him other than to press him to repay his debts, and that in any event it was a private monetary dispute between him and his creditor only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to Vietnam as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other parts of the country away from his home district without any risk of being located by his creditor that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.
8. On 26 August 2020 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, but no ground for seeking relief was given in his Form or in his supporting affirmation of the same date in which he just stated that he does not agree with the decision but without putting forth any proper ground for his intended challenge, nor did he request any oral hearing for his application.
9. By then the Applicant was also out of time with his application, as Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the day when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason to extend the period within which the application shall be made.
10. As the last day of the three-month period for him to file his Form 86 fell on 7 June 2019, the Applicant was therefore more than 14 months late with his application, and in considering whether to extend time, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration: AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393.
11. In the Applicant’s case, a delay of more than 14 months must be considered as extremely substantial and inordinate, for which he did not provide any explanation or reasons in his Form or affirmation, and as the record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 7 March 2019 to his then reported address without being returned through undelivered post, I am unable to see any good or valid reason for his such serious delay.
12. As for the merits, if any, of his intended application, as noted above that the Applicant has also failed to put forward any proper ground for his intended challenge. As such, and in the absence of any error of law or irrationality or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any merits in his intended application either.
13. As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
14. In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in his claim if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of Vietnam, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.
15. In the premises, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.
16. As I am for the given reasons not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in the absence of any good reason for his such serious delay, I therefore refuse to extend time and accordingly dismiss his leave application.
Dated the 18th day of September 2025
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(Klein Tse)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant on 18 September 2025
Nguyen Quang Dong
Applicant’s ref. no.:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 18 September 2025
Torture Claims Appeal Board
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 10209/18/2/93/V1986
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 2514/17
(formerly RBCZ/3001588/14)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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