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RUANAH ZUHRIMAN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
RUANAH ZUHRIMAN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5753 · HCAL 1204/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1204/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5753
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1204 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Ruanah Zuhriman |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |Putative |
| |Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| |Application for Leave to Apply for | |
| |Judicial Review | |
| |NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord | |
| |53 r 3) | |
Following:
|( |consideration of documents only; or |
| | |
|( |consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open |
| |court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Keith Lam:
The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 filed on 18 July 2023 (“Form 86”), the Applicant seeks
leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”) dated 22 March 2023 (“TCAB Decision”),
which affirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“DOI”)
dated 22 June 2021 (“DOI Decision”).
2. The Applicant requested for a hearing of this application, which was
held on 14 September 2026. When asked if she had anything to add, she
said that she got married here last year with a Hong Kong local, and
was still arranging for a dependent visa and wanted to stay a little
longer in Hong Kong.
Background
3. The Applicant is a national of Indonesia. In gist, she fears that she
will be killed by her cousin. She says that she is owing money to the
cousin because she was a guarantor for her mother’s loans, and the
cousin proposed that he would waive the outstanding amount if the
Applicant were to marry him, but when she refused, he threatened to
kill her when she returned to Indonesia.
4. The Applicant’s personal background, the relevant facts and relevant
procedural history have been sufficiently set out in the TCAB
Decision, which can be viewed through a hyperlink.[1] There is no
need for me to repeat the same. Unless otherwise specified, the
abbreviations and descriptions used in the TCAB Decision are adopted
herein.
Legal Principles
5. The leave application operates as a filtering process and there is no
requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision:
Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23. I therefore set out below brief
reasons for my decision, which I have reached upon considering all the
materials before me.
6. In a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of
appeal. While I remind myself that in non-refoulement cases, I would
adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the TCAB
given the seriousness of the issue at hand, this court would not usurp
the role of the TCAB, which together with the DOI are the primary
decision-makers. A finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of
the TCAB, and this court will not intervene by way of judicial review
unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the decision of the TCAB: Nupur Mst v Director of
Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14(1). There must be a reasonably
arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for
judicial review will be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at §§14-17.
7. An applicant is required to clearly and succinctly identify the
grounds of judicial review relied upon in the Form 86 and the
supporting affirmation: Ho Loy v Director of Environment Protection,
HCAL 21/2015 (unrep.) 22.12.2016 at §142. He or she is also under a
duty to make full and frank disclosure of material facts: Kan Hung
Cheung v The Director of Immigration [2008] HKC 323 at §§14-17.
8. Given RHC O 53 r 4(1) and s 21K(6) of the High Court Ordinance (CAP
4), where an Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review
more than 3 months after the decision:
1) The failure to apply within 3 months constitutes “undue delay”.
To justify an extension of time in which to apply for leave, the
Applicant must show “good reason” to extend time. In deciding
this, certain factors that are likely to be significant are:
(i) the length of the delay; (ii) the explanation for the
delay;[2] (iii) the merits of the substantive application;[3]
(iv) prejudice; and (v) whether the application raises questions
of general public importance.
2) Where the court considers that there is no good reason for
extending the period, it will refuse leave to apply for judicial
review. The refusal of an extension of time is part and parcel of
a refusal to grant leave to apply. It is not the case that the
court refuses the extension of time as a discrete decision and
then makes no decision on the question of leave to apply for
judicial review, treating this as a separate matter entirely.
3) If the court is satisfied that there is good reason for extending
the period, it does not follow that leave to apply for judicial
review will automatically be given. While the court might grant
leave, it retains a discretion to refuse to do so and the
existence of a good reason for undue delay is only one facet of
the question, others including sufficiency of interest and the
need to satisfy the arguability test. Leave may also be refused
on the basis that the granting of the relief sought would be
likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially
prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to
good administration.
See: Thing Sunil v TCAB [2025] HKCFI 4366, at §9, citing AW v Director
of Immigration & anor. [2016] 2 HKC 393 (CA) at §§23-36 and Thomas Lai
[2014] 6 HKC 1 at §§43-45; H v Director of Immigration (2020) 23
HKCFAR 248 at §§17-22, 36-44.
Discussion
9. The application by the Form 86 was out of time by slightly less than 1
month. Such a delay is not too long.
10. In considering whether to extend time, I have considered the following
matters.
11. I note that the Applicant has not explained the delay on paper. When
asked about this in Court, her answer was that she did not receive any
letter about the decision. This cannot be right given that her Form
86 referred to the TCAB Decision. It seems to me that she might have
meant that she received notice of the TCAB Decision late (which is
dubious because there is a letter from the TCAB to the Applicant which
was sent to her then address notifying her of the TCAB Decision on the
same day), or she might have been referring to not receiving notice of
the oral hearing of the preset proceedings (which would not be
relevant).
12. In any event, I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended
application for judicial review of the Board’s Decision is reasonably
arguable with any realistic prospects of success (see Peter Po Fun
Chan v Winnie Cheung & Another (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676), and I would have
dismissed the present application even if it had been brought within
time.
13. The Applicant stated the following grounds of judicial review in the
supporting affirmation: -
1) “Adjudicator did not consider my claim. Adjudicator directly
dismissed. He did not even take time or did not think about my
life.” (“Ground 1”)
2) “I had some documents but all in my mother language. I submitted
all but Adjudicator did not accept because he could not
understand.” (“Ground 2”)
3) “I request him to give me some time to translate in English of my
all documents and I too took some preparation but my officer had
no time.” (“Ground 3”)
4) “Translator did not help me at all. If I did not understand he
became angry.” (“Ground 4”)
5) “Interpreter asked me to not take long time for interview as he
had another job.” (“Ground 5”)
6) “Please help me and safe my life.” (“Ground 6”)
14. I have scrutinised the TCAB Decision carefully and come to the view
that none of the above Grounds can be established or considered as
valid or effective public law grounds.
15. Most if not all of the grounds merely consist of generic, vague and/or
unparticularised assertions without reference to any underlying facts
or matters establishing why, how and where each of those complaints
arise in relation to the TCAB Decision. General assertions without
particulars are not effective grounds and cannot assist the Applicant:
Re Haider Khalil [2021] HKCA 223 at §16.
16. Ground 1 is clearly not correct given that the TCAB Decision
considered the Applicant’s evidence about the alleged threat to her
life in detail, as discussed in §19 below.
17. Ground 2 to Ground 5 are bare assertions and are contrary to what was
recorded in the DOI Decision and the TCAB Decision and must be
rejected: -
1) It would appear from the DOI Decision that, in the Applicant’s
initial application and at her interview with the Immigration
Department, she had no difficulty in providing detailed
information about her claim: see DOI Decision §6. In particular,
the DOI Decision specifically referred to certain information
provided by the Applicant, and quoted certain responses by the
Applicant to the DOI’s questions, at the screening interview:
§§6.15, 6.18. 6.19, 6.21, 6.22, 6.23, 6.24, 6.25, 6.26, 6.28,
6.29, 6.31.
2) Despite the allegation that the Applicant had some documents in
her mother language to submit to the Adjudicator which he refused
to consider, no such documents are presented in her supporting
affirmation in this application.
3) The Applicant attended the oral hearing before the TCAB without
legal representation. She was assisted by an interpreter
qualified in the Bahasa and English languages: TCAB Decision §7.
There was no indication of any difficulty in giving evidence
and/or answering the questions raised by the TCAB. As recorded in
the TCAB Decision, the TCAB made extensive inquiries of the
Applicant and the Applicant’s responses were recorded: see TCAB
Decision §§46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 68.
18. Ground 6 self-evidently has no substance.
19. As can be seen from the TCAB Decision, the TCAB took into account all
the evidence available and found that on the basis of the same,
applying the correct legal principles in respect of all applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism, the TCAB concluded that
there was no real risk that the Applicant would face any of the
proscribed forms of harm should she return to Indonesia: §§58-82. It
is clear that the TCAB considered the evidence available thoroughly
and in detail. In particular:
1) The TCAB was not prepared to accept the Applicant’s claim that she
feared of being forced to marry her cousin was truthful or that
she was at risk of any harm if she returned to Indonesia (in
particular because she could easily have married her boyfriend in
Hong Kong, who is a permanent resident, in the meantime, and her
acceptance that her cousin could do nothing to her if she had so
married): §§66-68. Indeed, it would appear that this perceived
risk would have gone now that, according to the Applicant, she has
married a Hong Kong resident.
2) The TCAB noted that the Applicant has not claimed that there is a
consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights for the
purposes of section 37ZI(5) of the Immigration Ordinance or
otherwise. In any event it would not accept it based on reliable
country of origin information: §69. There were also no claims
against the authorities or police or public officials: §§73, 76.
3) There can be no claim that the authorities acquiesced in any ill-
treatment as the Applicant had not even reported her fear to the
authorities: §74.
20. I have also considered the Applicant’s oral submissions. However, the
Applicant’s personal circumstances in Hong Kong being her marriage to
a Hong Kong permanent resident and her dependent visa application are
not valid grounds or relevant consideration in relation to her own non-
refoulement claim: Oguzie Ikechukwu Charles v Torture Claims Appeal
Board [2022] HKCA 135, at §20; Re Adeel Muhammad [2023] HKCA 948 at
§7.
21. Therefore, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality on the part of the TCAB Decision. I would have
dismissed the application in any event.
22. Further, an extension of time for an unmeritorious application such as
the present one would result in further undue delay, prove
prejudicial, and undermine the orderly conduct and progress of the
refoulement process.
Conclusion
23. In light of the foregoing, no extension of time is granted and the
application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.
Dated the 23rd day of October 2026
| |(Joyce Ooi) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 23/10/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |Ruanah Zuhriman |Putative Interested |
|granting leave and any | |Parties as may be |
|directions given within|Applicant’s ref. no:|directed by the Court / |
|14 days after the leave|Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|was granted (Order 53, | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|rule 4A); | |23/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|originating summons | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|within 14 days after | |Claims Petition Office |
|the grant of leave and | |Putative Respondent’s |
|serve it in accordance | |ref. no.: USM 18179 |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | | |
|and | |Director of Immigration |
| | |Putative Interested |
|c) supply to every | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|other party copies of | |574/21 (formerly RBCZ |
|every affidavit which | |10232/21) |
|the Applicant proposes | | |
|to use at the hearing, | |Department of Justice, |
|including the affidavit| |Senior Assistant Law |
|in support of the | |Officer |
|application for leave | |(Civil Law) |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1]https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL0012
04_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
[2] In that the presence of a credibly valid explanation for the delay will
strengthen, and the absence of an acceptable explanation will weaken, the
Applicant’s request for what is an indulgence to be granted in the court’s
discretion.
[3] Although where an applicant is many months out of time, leave may be
refused however strong the complaint might otherwise be, and an applicant
who sleeps upon his rights may be barred from pursuing them in a judicial
review even though he may have a meritorious case (AW v Director of
Immigration & anor. [2016] 2 HKC 393 (CA) at §27(iii) as approved in the
other cases cited below, in particular H
!")-7;Dbc{¦©ª®³v Director of Immigration (2020) 23 HKCFAR 248 at supra at
§37(2)).