TRI MARTININGSIH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5550 · HCAL 1048/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1048/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5550
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1048 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Tri Martiningsih |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 29 June 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 21 June 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1048_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection in Hong Kong failed on all the applicable grounds under the
Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed
the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director
of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 6 September 2021 (“the
Director’s Decision”) and confirmed the same, which rejected the
applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
The applicant’s case
3. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
4. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by her
father’s creditor. The applicant claimed that since her father could
not continue to repay the debt to the creditor, the creditor requested
her to assume the responsibility for her father’s debt. Upon knowing
the applicant was unemployed, she was demanded by the creditor to
marry him. However, the applicant refused. The creditor threatened
to kill her or her father if she did not marry him upon her return to
Indonesia.
Oral hearing
5. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application,
and her case was heard on 24 September 2026.
6. The applicant confirmed that she would rely on the grounds stated in
her supporting affirmation dated 29 June 2023 for her intended
judicial review. When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on
the said grounds, she merely replied that she had a loan in her
country and she could not stay there.
Grounds for judicial review
7. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
8. The applicant did not identify any ground for the intended judicial
review in Form 86.
9. In her supporting affirmation dated 29 June 2023, the applicant first
mentioned that she did not agree with the Board’s Decision, she had
life threat in her country Indonesia, her enemy was a powerful man who
never abided by the law and gave money to the police, the authority
listened to him word for word, and that no one in society would help
her.
10. The applicant then advanced 6 grounds for her intended judicial review
under the heading “GROUNDS”. The grounds are summarised as follows:-
1) The Director did not give her lawyer;
2) Her two claims were different but the Director did not find any
difference;
3) The Director had no common knowledge or he did not read the
applicant’s claim because she specifically stated that there was
significant change in her subsequent claim;
4) The translator did not help her at all and became angry if the
applicant did not understand;
5) The interpreter asked her not to take long time for interview as he
had another job; and
6) She asked the court to help her and save her life.
11. As aforesaid, at the oral hearing, the applicant only said that she
would rely on what were stated in her affirmation and did not
elaborate on any of the matters contained therein. She only added she
had a loan in her country and she could not stay there.
Discussion
12. First of all, the applicant’s danger in her home country had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If the applicant intends to
challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an
application for judicial review.
13. As to the matters that were stated as “GROUNDS” in her supporting
affirmation, the first 3 grounds were directed at the Director. As
the Director’s Decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision, it is
no longer susceptible to judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018]
HKCA 549). Therefore, it is not necessary for this court to deal with
grounds (1) to (3).
14. Nevertheless, this court notes that ground (1) is simply untrue. The
applicant was in fact assisted by a duty lawyer in the first phase of
assessment of her non-refoulement claim (see paragraph 10 of the
Board’s Decision).
15. Grounds (2) and (3) are plainly irrelevant. The applicant’s claim is
not a subsequent claim, nor did she file two separate non-refoulement
claims. It is clear that the applicant must have copied the grounds
somewhere and simply used them as her own grounds without even
considering whether the grounds were relevant to her circumstances.
16. Grounds (4) and (5) were directed at the Board in respect of the
Board’s Decision, but they were asserted without any specificity.
Many applicants in similar applications used them like a template
without any regard to their own cases. The applicant is no exception.
17. The applicant did not state how the interpreter or translator’s
attitude had prejudiced her; and what she wanted to tell the Board was
not presented because of the attitude of the interpreter or
translator.
18. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
19. Thus, the general assertions that were contained in grounds (4) and
(5) cannot help the applicant either.
20. Ground (6) is just a plea to this court and not a ground at all.
21. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
22. Thus, despite the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the
applicant for the intended judicial review, this court will examine
and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural
unfairness and irrationality as aforesaid.
23. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 12 January 2023 and the applicant was present. Thus,
the applicant was given the opportunity to present her case to the
Board in person.
24. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had given a
detailed analysis of all the aspects of the applicant’s claims and its
reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection.
25. The Board had laid out its assessment of the applicant’s claims in
paragraphs 59 to 71 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary
to repeat the same here.
26. In gist, the Board found that the applicant’s case consisted mostly of
bare assertions and hearsay with no objective proof. There was
inconsistency with regards to the alleged debt recovery action taken
by the creditor. The applicant’s assertion with regards to the large
number of followers of the creditor, which was her reason for not
being able to relocate internally, was pure hearsay. On the
applicant’s evidence, the creditor only showed up by himself without
any followers whenever he chased for repayment at her home. The Board
found the applicant’s evidence in this regard highly speculative.
27. The Board accepted that the applicant’s father might have incurred
loan, and that his creditor might have attempted to recover the debt
at their family house. However, the Board rejected the applicant’s
allegation that the creditor had demolished her family house,
threatened her as claimed, or that she was in genuine fear of being
harmed or killed by the creditor.
28. With regards to the assessment of the applicant’s claim on all the
applicable grounds under the USM, the Board found that even if the
applicant’s alleged fear and ill-treatment were accepted, her problems
with her father’s creditor were purely personal matters. There was no
evidence to suggest state acquiescence in the applicant’s case. The
applicant and her father had never received any harm inflicted by the
creditor. The Board was not satisfied that the alleged ill-treatment
would reach the minimum level of severity required for international
protection. The applicant’s claim was not related to any Convention
reasons.
29. Further, in view of the country of origin information (“COI”) which
the Board accepted, the Board considered that the applicant would be
able to access state protection in respect of any harm threatened by
others, if there was any.
30. Given its findings as summarised above, it was not strictly necessary
for the Board to consider internal relocation for the applicant.
Nevertheless, the Board did explicitly state its reasons in paragraphs
84 to 86 of the Board’s Decision for its view that given the
applicant’s profile, it would not be unduly harsh for the applicant to
relocate to other cities in Indonesia where she would not be easily
located by anyone.
31. Thus, the Board found that the applicant had no real risk of any of
the proscribed forms of harm upon her return to Indonesia.
32. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with
the applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to make its
own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the
way the Board reached its conclusion.
33. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
34. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
35. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 30th day of September 2026
| |(Gladys LEE) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 30/09/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any | |interested parties as |
|directions given within| |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave| |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, |Applicant’s ref. no: |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); |Nil |solicitors on: |
| | |30/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | | |
|within 14 days after | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|the grant of leave and | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|serve it in accordance | |Claims Petition Office |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |Putative respondent’s |
|and | |ref. no.: |
| | |USM 18785 |
|c) supply to every | | |
|other party copies of | |Director of Immigration |
|every affidavit which | |Putative interested |
|the Applicant proposes | |party’s ref. no.: |
|to use at the hearing, | |QA T/C 1190/21(Formerly |
|including the affidavit| |RBCZ 10456/21)(T2I118) |
|in support of the | | |
|application for leave | |Department of Justice, |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Senior Assistant Law |
| | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1