ERINO NATIVIDAD DANGBIS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 694/2022

[2022] HKCFI 3599

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 694 of 2022

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of documents only;          or
	consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

1.      Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.      A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.  This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 28 June 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing her subsequent claim of HCAL 555 of 2019 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.  The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.  At the hearing, the applicant informed this Court that she had applied to the Director of Legal Aid (“DLA”) for legal aid and was waiting for the result. The Court therefore adjourned the hearing to a date not before 42 days from 14 September 2022 in accordance with section 15 of the Legal Aid Ordinance, Cap. 91. The applicant appeared before this Court on 9 November 2022. The applicant informed the Court that DLA had rejected her application. She had appealed and the result is not yet known. Appeal of DLA’s decision does not warrant a stay of the proceedings under the law. The proceedings should therefore proceed.

The procedural history

4.  The applicant is an illegal immigrant from the Philippines for staying in Hong Kong without permission.  She had been a domestic helper before and she commuted between China and Hong Kong after her employment in 2003. She last came to Hong Kong on 27 February 2005 as a visitor. She overstayed since 1 March 2005. She surrendered to the Immigration Department on 24 August 2009.  On 12 July 2013, she raised a non-refoulement claim on the grounds of BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; the BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention.  Her claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 18 May 2018.

5.  She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 22 February 2019 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board rejected her appeal.

6.  She applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was rejected by the Court by its Order dated 3 June 2020 (the “Court’s Order”).

7.  She appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and her application was refused by the Court of Appeal on 5 November 2020.

8.  Her Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 7 January 2021.

9.  Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 12 April 2022.

10.  She applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 21 April 2022.

11.  By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application.

The subsequent claim application

12.  The factual basis of her previous claim is that if she is refouled, she would be harmed or killed by her neighbouring family, in particular Antonio Almoza and his men.

13.  The Director found that her claim was not substantiated. The Director took the view that the level of risk upon her return to the Philippines was low; state protection and relocation were available to her. She appealed to the Board.

14.  The Board agreed with the Director. The Board considered the applicant’s evidence and was of the view that the applicant’s evidence in relation to the facts in support of her claim was not acceptable. For the reasons given, it rejected her evidence on the facts as it found that her evidence was hearsay, exaggerated and illogical, just a figment of her imagination.

15.  Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

16.  In support of her subsequent claim, she said that her two brothers and her sister had been in contact with her and they told her that her enemies are still looking for her to get her to sell the family land to them as the land is still under her name. They also threatened to kill her if they found her. On a number of occasions, they had gone to her family in the Philippines to stir up disturbance and vandalize her family. They also assaulted her brother, Ericson. Her brother reported the matter to police, but no action was taken. But they said that they would look into the matter. Her another brother, Marlon, advised her not to return to the Philippines.

17.  The Director considered that her enemy remains the same and that this issue of dispute on her land, together with the state protection issue, had been considered in the previous claim and were rejected.

18.  The Director does not accept that those are significant change of circumstances. Such information, coupled with the previous claim, would not give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success of her subsequent claim.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review application

19.  The applicant has filed an affidavit in support of her application. She set out the grounds below.

a.  The Director did not focus on her claim on the new fact.

b.  Procedural impropriety: failure to apply para 2 of the UN committee against Torture General Comment No. 2; failure to conduct sufficient inquiry into the relevant country of origin condition and there is risk that she would be harmed by her enemies; failure of conducting any screening interview; failure of considering her situation and she could not relocate because her enemies can easily find her.

c.  Error/misdirection in law: the Director did not consider her new fact.

20.  The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

21.  The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said she understood the Director’s reasons rejecting her subsequent claim. She said she did not mean that the Director was wrong. She simply wanted a longer stay in Hong Kong.

22.  Those grounds in paragraph 19 do not assist the applicant. They are mostly her bare allegations or opinions without any evidence in support. It is quite clear that the cause and nature of her subsequent claim are the same as her previous claim, which has been considered by the Director and the Board. Screening process has been provided for her previous claim. It is unnecessary to conduct another screening process for her subsequent claim of similar or same nature. This procedure is provided under the Ordinance and there is nothing amiss for this procedure. It is obvious that the immigration officer has considered the new facts as submitted by the applicant for her subsequent claim before coming to her conclusion.

23.  It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating her previous claim in her subsequent claim application.

24.  The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

25.  Since there is no realistic prospect of success in her subsequent claim, I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

26.  The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

27.  RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

28.  In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

29.  For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing.

30.  Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she just wanted more time to stay in Hong Kong and she had nothing to say.

31.  Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the Court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the Court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge.

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

32.  The applicant’s application is dismissed.

33.  RPO in terms of paragraph 31 be made against the applicant.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1