LEE SAI HO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

1996, No. 176
(Civil)

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J U D G M E N T

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Nazareth, V.-P. (giving the judgment of the Court) :

1. The appellant is a partner in a scrap metal business. Their premises reverted to the Crown pursuant to a notice of resumption. He then applied to the Lands Tribunal in the normal way for determination of compensation under the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance, Cap. 124.

2. By a judgment dated 23rd January, the Lands Tribunal adjudged the compensation at some $9 million. On 16th February both the appellant and the respondent lodged an application for review. The Lands Tribunal reviewed its judgment and confirmed its original amount of compensation. On 30th August the appellant filed a notice of appeal. The notice contained only one ground of appeal which is in the following terms:

"The ground for review is that the calculation approach cannot fulfill the fundamental principle of compensation which is to put the party who has suffered in the same position he would have been if he had not sustained the damage due to resumption."

3. The requirements of law in relation to notices of appeal are set out in s.11(2) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance which makes it clear that an appeal can only be on a point of law. And O6A r2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court requires the grounds of appeal to be specified and the question of law to be determined by the Court of Appeal.

4. When one looks at this sole ground of appeal, it can be seen that it is nebulous. It merely makes the bald assertion that the calculation approach cannot fulfil the fundamental principle of compensation mentioned. No reasons are given. What the ground is is not at all clear. If effect is to be given to it, this can only be done by yet another review of the entire compensation exercise. But that is not what the law provides. It provides that once the Lands Tribunal assesses the compensation, a review can be applied for. It was applied for in this case and the compensation was reviewed and upheld. The Lands Tribunal Ordinance then provides that an appeal can only be made on a point of law. This Court has no jurisdiction to review the entire award. See Chum Hon-chi v. Director of Lands, Civil Appeal No. 122 of 1996. Upon that basis, the notice of appeal is wholly incompetent.

5. But the matter does not stop there. Some days after lodging the notice of appeal, the appellant submitted a skeleton argument. This strictly does not meet the requirements of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance or the Rules of the Supreme Court. But as the appellant is not legally represented, although it would appear from the size of the award that he could quite easily secure legal representation, we have granted him the indulgence of studying the skeleton argument in some detail to see whether there are any grounds in them, and particularly any points of law. We feel bound to say at the outset that we have not found it possible to detect any. The arguments appear to be the criticisms of the result of the award. However, having regard to what he has said today in amplification of his skeleton argument, it is clear that he suggests three grounds which appear to be as follows:

(1) That the Tribunal erred in law in not applying a personal injuries discount rate of the order of 4-5%.

The Tribunal gave its reasons why it applied a multiplier of 3.5. The Tribunal has unfettered jurisdiction to determine the multiplier. And it was open to the Tribunal to give no discount for capitalisation particularly given the low multiplier it adopted. Nothing urged in the skeleton argument identifies any point of law or indeed any grounds to show that the Tribunal was wrong.

(2) That the Tribunal erred in adopting a forced sale price for his stock to determine the free market willing buyer/willing seller price on the basis of a correlation or formula.

We can see no substance in this ground and no point of law.

(3) That the Tribunal was biased in adopting a low multiplier and in correlating the forced sale price with the free market price.

The Tribunal has given its reasons why it used that multiplier and why it accepted the auction price. It was entitled so to determine those matters. There were no indications of bias. Again there is nothing in this ground, nor is there any point of law involved.

6. Looking at the skeleton argument and submissions as a whole, we are not persuaded that these grounds have any prospects of success.

7. A fourth ground is sought to be raised before us, and this is that Article 10 of the Bill of Rights was breached in that the Tribunal had treated the appellant differently from others in similar but separate proceedings. There is nothing in that complaint, nor does it disclose anything in the nature of a point of law.

8. We have shown the applicant a great deal of latitude for; from as long ago as 1994 he has been encouraged to obtain legal assistance and identify proper grounds. A time must come when the latitude afforded in these circumstances is brought to an end and the time of the courts and the taxpayers' funds in meeting the costs of these proceedings is safeguarded.

9. As this Court held in Ng Shek-po and Wong Wai-ching v. the Director of Lands, Civil Appeal No. 39 of 1996, where an appeal does not lie it has inherent jurisdiction to strike out the appeal following the decisions in Aviagents Ltd v. Balstravest Investments Limited [1966]1 All ER 450 and Burgess v. Stafford Hotel Limited [1990]3 All ER 222.

10. In the result there is no question of law, and no appeal lies. Accordingly we grant the application and strike out the notice of appeal.