RE SUBHANI TOSEEF

CACV 352/2022, [2025] HKCA 1097

On Appeal From [2024] HKCA 137

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 352 OF 2022

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2182 OF 2018)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the judgment of the court):

1.  On 21 August 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal out of time against this court’s judgment of 7 February 2024 (“the Judgment”)  ([2024] HKCA 137). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”)  dated 19 August 2022, by which the Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2022] HKCFI 2581).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  Pursuant to section 24(2)  of the HKCFAO, an appellant has 28 days from the date of the Judgment to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  In the present case, the deadline for the applicant to seek leave to appeal against the Judgment fell on 6 March 2024.  Accordingly, the applicant was almost 1.5 years late in taking out his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

5.  As the applicant did not apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal within time, the Court has a discretion to extend time under section 24(5)  of the HKCFAO only if good and sufficient grounds are shown by the applicant: see Re Imran Muhammad [2021] HKCA 482 at [9] and the authorities cited therein.  In deciding whether there are such good grounds, the Court is entitled to take into account (a)  the length of the delay; (b)  the reasons for the delay; (c)  the chances of the appeal succeeding if an extension of time is granted; and (d)  the degree of prejudice to the respondent if the application is granted: Begum Jahanara v Ian Candy, Esq & Another [2021] HKCA 83 at [4] and the authorities cited therein.

6.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“I would like to reject and review the decision made by the court. They disregard my dangerous situation.” (sic)

7.  The applicant lodged written submissions on 4 September 2025.  In those submissions, he complained that the Director failed to consider the factors in local contexts and did not understand the intricacies of the situation in his home country.  He also asserted that Pakistan had long been a country fraught with problems on human rights issues and that their police was well known for its corruption and ineffectiveness.  He further stated that the Court should understand that he was running away from the problems and that it would be difficult for him to produce evidence, and that his testimonies should be taken as credible as they were consistent.  He further complained that the Country of Origin information stated by the Board was based on knowledge of the state report without understanding the cultural context in Pakistan.  He further claimed that as a Muslim country that is still heavily communal, it is very easy to detect a person and that it is very likely that they will be killed.

8.  At the outset, the applicant’s delay of nearly 1.5 years was extremely substantial and he failed to provide any reason, let alone good and sufficient reason, in support for his delay.

9.  The applicant’s application is also plainly devoid of merit.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  His allegations are also a mere regurgitation of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [9] - [15] of the Judgment.  He did not identify any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014)  at [2] and [3].  Clearly, his assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

10.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

11.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

12.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit and it will be futile to grant him extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal.  The Notice of Motion filed on 21 August 2025 is dismissed.