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HCAL 333/2021
[2026] HKCFI 2142
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST
NO 333 OF 2021
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BETWEEN
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Khan Raja Qaisar |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative |
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Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
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| Before: |
Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG in Chambers (Open to Public) |
| Date of Hearing: |
10 April 2026 |
| Date of Handing Down of Decision: |
22 April 2026 |
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D E C I S I O N
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Background
1. By way of summons filed on 20 February 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 4 February 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 18 September 2020.
2. Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.
3. In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).
4. As my order was made on 4 February 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 18 February 2026. However, 18 February 2026 was a public holiday. By virtue of section 71(1)(b) of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, Cap 1, when the last day of the period in question is a public holiday, the period shall include the next following day, not being a public holiday or a gale warning day or black rainstorm warning day. As 19 February 2026 was also a public holiday, the next following day was 20 February 2026.
5. In other words, if the applicant had lodged his appeal on 20 February 2026 instead of filing the Summons on that day, he would be within time in lodging the appeal and would not need to apply for an extension of time. Nevertheless, by now, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.
The applicable law
6. In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).
7. However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).
Discussion
8. In the Summons and his supporting affirmation dated 20 February 2026, the applicant did not give any reason why he was late in making the appeal. There was also no ground given for his intended appeal.
9. At the hearing of the Summons on 10 April 2026, the applicant said that he received the court’s letter, which contained the court’s decision and order, late because he did not have the key to the letter box. However, as explained above, the applicant could have lodged his appeal on time and hence he did not receive the letter late.
10. When the applicant was asked for his grounds of appeal, he merely said that he wanted to go back to his country but his family suggested that he should not go back because the situation in his country was not good enough. He further mentioned that his nephew, ie the son of his sister, came from the United Kingdom to stay in Hong Kong and his family also asked him not to go back as well.
11. It is clear that the applicant did not provide any valid ground of appeal at all, as none of the matters he mentioned was concerning my decision.
12. For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).
13. The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.
14. In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.
Conclusion
15. For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.
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(Michael WONG)
Deputy High Court Judge
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The applicant appeared in person
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