RE IDREES AMIR

CACV 1233/2025, [2026] HKCA 238

On appeal from [2025] HKCFI 6209

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 1233 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 42/2020)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is an appeal against the decision of B Fung J (“the Judge”) given on 12 December 2025[1] (“the Leave Decision”) refusing to grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 24 December 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 13 December 2018 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

2.  The applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the Board’s reasons in reaching the Board’s Decision have been set out by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [2]-[6][2], which will not be repeated.

3.  After considering the documents filed by the applicant as well as oral submissions made by him at the hearing of the leave application, the Judge dismissed the application for the reasons stated at [7]-[10] of the Leave Decision.  

Appeal to this court

4.  By a Notice of Appeal dated 24 December 2025, the applicant stated: 

“I do not agree with the decision of the Court of First Instance. The learned Judge did not consider properly.”

5.  By written submissions dated 26 January 2026, the applicant repeated the dangers he allegedly faced should he be refouled, and contended (without providing any particulars or basis to such contentions) inter alia that (i) the Judge was wrong as a matter of law for not having applied the principle of irrationality in his consideration of the Board’s Decision; (ii) the Judge did not have due regard to the requirements of procedural fairness; (iii) the Judge “reviewed the matter lightly” and did not accord to “high standards of fairness”; and (iv) the Board failed to give sufficient chances to the applicant to “arrange relevant evidence” in respect of his claim. 

6.  We heard the appeal on 10 February 2026, at which the applicant appeared in person.  At the hearing, the applicant submitted that he is “scared” to return to his country.

Discussion

7.  As this court has often stated, an appeal to the Court of Appeal is not a fresh application for judicial review.  It is necessary to identify some error on the part of the judge that would justify this court in intervening: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].  The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.  An appeal is not the occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which could and should have been raised but were not raised before the judge.  In the determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and the court will only reverse that decision if an appellant could demonstrate that the judge made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly wrong.

8.  The applicant has failed to identify any error on the part of the Judge and thus failed to raise any viable ground of appeal. The points advanced by the applicant were bare assertions unsupported by particulars or evidence.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].

9.  In the present case, the Board found, on the evidence, that the applicant’s fear or claim of risk of harm from the police in Pakistan and the brothers of Shazia (a girl with whom the applicant was in a romantic relationship and who had unfortunately committed suicide in 2010) was unsubstantiated and without merit.  The Board held that the applicant’s apparent fear of Shazia’s brothers was based merely on hearsay from his father, and that the police had only advised the applicant to leave Pakistan, and posed no actual threat to kill or harm him (Board’s Decision, [49]-[57]).  In any event, the Board concluded that state protection and suitable options of internal relocation were available to the applicant in order to minimise the risk of harm, if any.  These were factual findings open to the Board on the evidence, and were sufficiently canvassed and considered by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [3]-[10].  We see no basis to interfere.

10.  The applicant has failed to demonstrate how the Board had acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its Decision, or how such Decision could be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable.

11.  As we have noted, the applicant advanced no viable grounds of appeal against the Judge’s decision.  There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.