LATIF SHOAIB v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 1205/2020

[2026] HKCFI 2789

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1205 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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Introduction

1.  The Applicant is a national of Pakistan. He entered Hong Kong illegally via Chinese mainland on 5 February 2016. He surrendered to the Immigration Department 6 days later.

2.  The Applicant submitted a written submission indicating that he intended to apply for protection on 26 September 2016. On 1 August 2018, he submitted a Non-refoulement Claim Form to make his claim under the Unified Screening Mechanism. In gist, the Applicant claimed that he left Pakistan to avoid the family of his girlfriend who had threatened and planned to kill him.

3.  On 14 August 2018, the Director of Immigration refused the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim (the “Director’s Decision”). The Applicant’s subsequent appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) was dismissed on 29 May 2020 (the “Board’s Decision”).

4.  By Form 86 filed on 17 June 2020, the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against both the Director’s Decision and the Board’s Decision (the “Leave Application”). The hearing of the Leave Application took place on 28 July 2025 and the Applicant attended in person. He however indicated that he had nothing to say in respect of the Leave Application.

5.  By the decision dated 4 September 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 4021) (the “Court’s Decision”), this Court dismissed the Leave Application on the ground that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Director’s Decision was misconceived and should be dismissed, and his intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success.

6.  By the Summons filed on 17 April 2026, the Applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal against the Court’s Decision, as the 14‑day period for him to file the appeal under Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court had expired (the “Application”).

7.  The Application was heard on 11 May 2026 and the Applicant attended in person. At the hearing, when being asked about the delay in making the Application, the Applicant said his landlord was in control of the letterbox. He said his landlord was out of town at the relevant time, and so he did not receive the Court’s Decision. He was made aware of the Court’s Decision only when he attended the Immigration Department subsequently. Such explanation is inconsistent with the explanation provided by the Applicant in the supporting Affirmation, in which he said he did not receive the Court’s Decision because he had moved after the hearing on 28 July 2025. At the hearing on 11 May 2026, I asked the Applicant whether he had indeed moved since the last hearing. He answered in the negative, and said he has remained living at the same address.

8.  Apart from the above, the Applicant indicated that everything he wanted to say had already been stated in the Summons and supporting Affirmation, and he had nothing else to add.

Discussion

9.  In considering whether to extend the time to appeal, it is trite that the court will take into account: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason(s) for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the degree of prejudice to the other party if an extension of time is granted. The prospect of success of an intended appeal is important. The court will not grant an extension of time to appeal for a hopeless appeal to be pursued. (see Re Mushtaq Imran Ali [2025] HKCA 705, at §§16-17)

10.  In the present case, there was delay of about 7 months. The delay was substantial. As pointed out above, the Applicant provided inconsistent explanation for the delay in the supporting Affirmation and at the hearing on 11 May 2026. As the Applicant confirmed at the hearing that he has remained living at the same address since the last hearing, the explanation provided in the supporting Affirmation must be rejected. In so far as the Applicant claimed at the hearing that he did not receive the Court’s Decision because his landlord was in control of the letterbox and that the landlord was out of town at the relevant time, I do not accept such explanation in the absence of any supporting evidence. It is the duty of a litigant to give the Court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner. The consequence of any delay or failure occasioned by the ineffectiveness of such an address would fall on the shoulder of the litigant (Re Hasmi Rizwan Imran [2018] HKCA 439, at §15).

11.  Despite the lack of satisfactory explanation for the substantial delay, I shall still proceed to consider the merit of the intended appeal before deciding on the Application.

12.  In the Summons and in the supporting Affirmation, the Applicant did not provide any grounds in support of the intended appeal. Despite being given a further opportunity to make submissions in respect of the Application at the hearing on 11 May 2026, the Applicant indicated that he had nothing to say in respect of the Application.

13.  I have considered the Court’s Decision together with the Board’s Decision in detail. The Board had plainly considered and assessed the Applicant’s situation comprehensively and had provided reasons in support of its decision. The Court had reviewed the Board’s Decision, considered and addressed all the grounds relied upon by the Applicant. The Court was entitled, and indeed correct, to have come to the correct decision that there is no realistic prospect of success in the intended challenge of the Board’s Decision (§§7-16 thereof). I do not see any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Court’s Decision. Neither has the Applicant made any such allegations. Accordingly, I fail to see any prospect of success in the intended appeal.

Conclusion

14.  As there is no satisfactory explanation for the substantial delay, and more importantly no prospect of success in the intended appeal, I refuse to extend the time for the appeal. The Application is hereby dismissed.