ABSOLUTE DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT LLC v. MARK YONG KHONG YOONG AND ANOTHER

HCMP 675/2026

[2026] HKCFI 3785

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 675 OF 2026

_________________

_________________

_________________

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

1.  In this application, the Plaintiff seeks amendment of the Order made on the Plaintiff’s ex parte application for a Mareva injunction on 24 April 2026.

2.  There is no doubt that when the Plaintiff made its application, the draft order it submitted to the Court sought orders in terms of its body, which injuncted the Defendants from removing or disposing of their assets “which are within Hong Kong” only.

3.  This is notwithstanding the fact that the heading of the draft order expressed it as “injunction prohibiting disposal of assets worldwide”.

4.  The Plaintiff now submits that the body of the order, as confined at para 1(a) and (b), are mistakes and clerical errors made by its legal advisers, which can be corrected by the Court under the slip rule under Order 20 rule 11.

5.  The applicable legal authorities are not in real dispute, and the principles for amendment of an order of the court are as summarized by our highest court at Man Ping Nam and Man Fong Hang (No 2) (2007) 10 HKCFAR 140. The issue is whether the confinement of the order to assets within Hong Kong and the failure to refer to the Defendants’ assets outside Hong Kong as being included in the injunction are “clerical mistakes” or “errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission” of the legal advisers preparing the draft order, which failed to express the “manifest intention” of the court appearing from the body of the order.

6.  The order was made at an ex parte application, and in such applications, the Court relies on the skeleton submissions filed by counsel for an applicant to set out its case and to draw the attention of the Court to the relevant and material facts, rather than on the details in the evidence filed in the ex parte application. The Court also pays attention to the draft order submitted by the applicant, to examine what relief it seeks from the court.

7.  There can be no doubt that, generally speaking, however wide an applicant frames its case in the evidence, and whatever may be the scope of the submissions made by Counsel, it is the draft order submitted to the Court for approval which defines the order actually sought and is ultimately made by the Court on the application. As Counsel for the Defendants pointed out, the Court has no duty and is not in a position to second-guess the Plaintiff’s motives and reasons why an order is confined or restricted to the terms expressed in the draft.

8.  That is why, when queries were made by the 2^nd Defendant on the order made, the Court’s reply on 1 June 2026 was: “The terms of the Order are expressed in the body of the Order.”

9.  The order made by the Court on 24 April 2026 was in terms of the Plaintiff’s draft order, subject to various cosmetic amendments made by the Court and as discussed with Counsel in the course of the hearing. There is no doubt that the order made was as sought by the Plaintiff on 24 April 2026, and there is no clerical error made by the Court.

10.  The Plaintiff relies on the fact that notwithstanding the contents of the Order, it had made it clear in the Plaintiff’s affidavits filed for the application that it had intended to seek “a worldwide Mareva injunction” in addition to a proprietary injunction, together with a disclosure order for the Defendants’ assets in Hong Kong and in other jurisdictions.

11.  In the skeleton submissions filed by Counsel for the Plaintiff for the hearing, reference was also made to the fact that it was an application for “a worldwide Mareva injunction and a proprietary injunction”. The heading on page 1 of the draft order submitted to the Court referred to an injunction prohibiting the disposal of “assets worldwide” and the body referred to the disclosure of assets in and outside Hong Kong, although the injunction expressed in the body of the order sought only restricted the removal and disposal etc of assets within Hong Kong.

12.  I have given careful consideration to the fact that as the Defendants argued, the amendment or extension of the order sought by the Plaintiff makes a significant variation to the nature of the order made: from a domestic injunction to a worldwide injunction, with totally different effect on the Defendants.

13.  Looking at the entirety of the order made on 24 April 2026, I agree that it is not without doubt that the injunction is worldwide in effect. On its reading, the disclosure of assets worldwide may not by itself mean that the prohibition against disposal or dealing with the property is also of worldwide effect. On the contrary, para 1 of the Order is expressed to be confined to assets which are within Hong Kong only. Nevertheless, looking at the draft order submitted and the standard forms set out in PD 11.2, I accept that the draft was on the whole made by the Plaintiff’s team with reference to the standard form for a worldwide injunction.

14.  I agree with Counsel for the Plaintiff, that the discussion with Counsel at the hearing on 24 April 2026 and the comment from the Court as to the Plaintiff seeking to restrain the Defendants from moving their assets from Hong Kong was in the context of the Court’s observation, that only the gateway referred to at Order 11 rule 1(b) was applicable, as the Plaintiff was seeking to restrain an act in Hong Kong (the judge’s own note of the hearing being “(b) Hong Kong act being injuncted” – the focus was on the act, rather than the asset, in Hong Kong).

15.  In any event, the intention of the Court was to grant the ex parte application made by the Plaintiff on 24 April 2026, and if the Plaintiff had expressly reminded or referred the Court to the fact that the injunction was directed against the Defendants’ assets worldwide, that relief would have been granted. I do not agree that in light of the affidavits and the skeleton submissions filed for the Plaintiff’s ex parte application, the worldwide injunction had never been asked for. It was only the accidental slip and omission of the Plaintiff’s legal team that the draft order submitted to the Court on 24 April 2026 did not include the express reference to the Defendants’ assets worldwide. This is regrettable, but it does not alter the fact of the Court’s intention to grant the application made by the Plaintiff on 24 April 2026 on the evidence filed and the submissions made by the Plaintiff.

16.  In the premises, I will allow the Plaintiff’s application, but the confusion which has arisen and the correspondence which ensued as to the nature of the injunction granted was all caused by the mistake made by the Plaintiff’s team, and the leave for amendments and indulgence sought by the Plaintiff should be granted on terms that the Plaintiff must pay the Defendants’ costs of and incidental to the application, with certificate for counsel.