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NGUYEN TRAN TU v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
NGUYEN TRAN TU v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 4863 · HCAL 840/2022
Court of First Instance
HCAL 840/2022
[2026] HKCFI 4863
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 840 of 2022
BETWEEN
| |Nguyen Tran Tu |Applicant |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Intersted Party|
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following;
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|(|consideration of the documents and the Applicant being absent in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Andrew Li:
1. The Applicant’s Form 86 be amended to name only the Torture Claims
Appeal Board as the putative respondent and the Director of
Immigration as the putative interested party; and
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
INTRODUCTION
1. By a Form 86 filed on 29 August 2022 (“the Form 86”), the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision by the
Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 23 August 2022 (“the
Board’s Decision”), which affirmed a decision by the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 9 September 2021 in refusing the
applicant’s non-refoulement protection claim. He named the Board and
the Director as the proposed respondents but neither of them was
listed as interested parties.
2. I amended the Form 86 on my own motion to name only the Board as the
putative respondent and the Director as the putative interested party.
3. The applicant requested for a hearing but he was absent at the
scheduled hearing on 20 August 2026. From the court record, the
Notice of Hearing dated 27 July 2026 was sent to an address updated
through the Immigration Department. Such updated address was,
presumably, provided by the applicant to the Immigration Department in
the first place.
4. Bearing in mind what Barma JA held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091
at [19], i.e. in an application for leave to bring judicial review
proceedings, it is not essential for the applicant to attend an oral
hearing, when the applicant fails to turn up at an oral hearing he/she
had requested, it should be regarded as a decision to forego the right
to the requested oral hearing and the court can deal with the
application on paper. Applying the same logic, if the applicant
failed to provide an updated address to receive notices from the
court, it also signals a disregard of, and indeed a decision to
forego, the right of attending an oral hearing.
5. I therefore decided to proceed to deal with this application on paper
notwithstanding the applicant’s absence at the hearing.
BACKGROUND
6. The applicant is a national of Vietnam. He seeks non-refoulement
protection on the basis that if he is refouled, he would be harmed or
killed by his creditor. His personal background, the relevant facts
and relevant procedural history have been sufficiently set out in the
Board’s Decision, which can be accessed through a hyperlink[1]. I
shall not repeat the same herein.
DISCUSSION
7. In a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of
appeal. Though in non-refoulement case an enhanced standard in
scrutinizing the decision of the Board is required given the
seriousness of the issue at hand, this court should not usurp the role
of the Board, which together with the Director are the primary
decision-makers. This court will not intervene by way of judicial
review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the decision of the Board (Nupur Mst v Director of
Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, [14(1)]). There must be a reasonably
arguable claim with a realistic prospect of success before leave for
judicial review will be granted (Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung &
Anor (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676).
8. In the “Grounds on which relief is sought” attached to the Form 86,
the applicant merely repeated his reasons why non-refoulement
protection was sought in the first place. He also raised the issue
that the Director’s suggestion that he should relocate to another city
within his own country is “completely unfeasible” in his case due to
his health and other personal factors. Lastly, he considered that
with the nationwide social network of gagsters and clandestine
connections with corrupt people in the government and police
apparatus, it is quite possible that his creditor and gangsters will
able to find out his new residence.
9. Insofar as the reasons for the non-refoulement protection are
concerned, they have been fully considered by the Board in the appeal
and it is not the function of this court in an application for leave
to appeal to re-consider them. As regard to the purported grounds of
review made against the Director, it has been held that the Director’s
decision is not susceptible to judicial review once an appeal to the
Board had been pursued: See Re Raschpal Singh [2020] HKCA 978 (as the
then was) at §§40-41.
10. I noted that the applicant has not pointed to any errors of laws,
procedural unfairness and irrationality in the Board’s Decision.
11. Looking at the Board’s Decision, the Board bore in mind the correct
legal principles in respect of each of the four applicable grounds
under the USM [10-14].
12. It took into consideration the applicant’s case and evidence [15-26].
13. After analysing and assessing the above, the Board came to the
findings and conclusions that none of the grounds was made out [27-
31].
14. Despite rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I could not find
any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the
Board’s Decision.
CONCLUSION
15. For the above reasons, I am not satisfied that this court should
intervene by way of judicial review. I therefore dismiss the
application.
Dated the 8th day of September 2026
| |(Cheung Ho Yat, Annson) |
| |for Registrar, High Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |on 8/9/2026 |Respondent / the Putative |
|interested parties as | |Respondent’s solicitors / |
|may be directed by the |Nguyen Tran Tu |such Putative Interested |
|Court the order | |Parties as may be directed |
|granting leave and any |Applicant’s ref. no.:|by the Court / the Putative|
|directions given within|Nil. |Interested Parties’ |
|14 days after the leave| |solicitors on 8/9/2026 |
|was granted (Order 53, | | |
|rule 4A); | |Torture Claims Appeal Board|
| | |/ Non-Refoulement Claims |
|b) issue the | |Petition Office |
|originating summons | |Putative Respondent’s ref. |
|within 14 days after | |no.: |
|the grant of leave and | |USM 18753/21/9/105/V3061 |
|serve it in accordance | | |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |Director of Immigration |
|and | |Putative Interested Party’s|
| | |ref. no.: |
|c) supply to every | |QA T/C 961/21 (formerly |
|other party copies of | |RBCZ 10924/20) |
|every affidavit which | | |
|the Applicant proposes | |Department of Justice, |
|to use at the hearing, | |Senior Assistant Law |
|including the affidavit| |Officer |
|in support of the | |(Civil Law) |
|application for leave | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | | |
____________________________________________________________________________
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1]
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2022/HCAL000840_
2022_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf