KOO MING KOWN v. REV. MR. MOK KONG TING AND OTHERS

HCA 2337/2016

[2026] HKCFI 802

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2337 OF 2016

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  Introduction

1.1  This is my decision on the Plaintiff’s summons dated 12 August 2025 (“Summons”), by which the Plaintiff seeks (1) as against the 3^rd Defendant, further and better particulars of §21A(1) (“F&BPs”) of the Re-Amended Defence (“RAD”) and (2) as against, 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants, an extension of time for the Plaintiff to file his consequential replies to within 14 days after the provision of the F&BPs.

1.2  At the hearing the Plaintiff was represented by Mr Kelvin Leung (with Ms Isabel Tam) and the 3^rd Defendant by Mr Keith Chan.

2.  Background

2.1  The Plaintiff commenced these proceedings in September 2016. The trial of this action is to commence on 15 September 2026, with 10 days reserved. As noted by DHCJ MK Liu at Koo Ming Kown v The Baptist Convention of Hong Kong & Ors [2026] HKCFI 1096 §25, the Plaintiff has brought more than 10 actions against the 4^th Defendant and its related parties, all concerning Pui Ching Primary School (“Primary School”) and Pui Ching Middle School ("Middle School” and collectively “Schools”). The Plaintiff is an alumnus of the Schools. As observed by K Yeung J at Koo Ming Kown v The Baptist Convention of Hong Kong & Ors [2024] HKCFI 2869 (“2024 Decision”) §103(a), the Plaintiff is passionate towards matters relating to the Schools, verging on being obsessive.

2.2  In these proceedings, the Plaintiff’s complaints are concerned with the 3^rd Defendant’s allegedly “bogus” academic qualifications. The Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the 3^rd Defendant is not a fit and proper person to serve or continue to serve as the Supervisor, principal, manager and/or teacher of the Schools.

2.3  The 3^rd Defendant was a former Supervisor of (1) the Middle School from September 2010 until August 2017 and (2) the Primary School from September 2010 to August 2018. As has been pointed out by Mr Chan, since over three years ago (in March 2022), the 3^rd Defendant had offered an undertaking that he would not seek any position or role with the Schools. I note Mr Chan’s observation that the 3^rd Defendant’s sensible position ought to have brought the proceedings (as least as against him) to a conclusion. As has been pointed out at Zamir & Woolf: The Declaratory Judgment, 4^th Ed at §4-98, the granting of a declaratory judgment is discretionary, and in practice, what will be determinative of whether relief should be granted is the court’s assessment of whether the declaration will serve some useful purpose. When I raised the foregoing with Mr Leung at the hearing, somewhat surprisingly, he frankly admitted that the issue of practicality had not been considered. To be clear, as I have not heard any full submissions, I have not made up mind on the issue. This is a matter to be resolved at the trial.

2.4  What is plain, however, is that not only has the Plaintiff been described by K Yeung J as being obsessive, he has also been described by another judge as being resourceful and a successful businessman, a combination which may lead to undesirable effect on the parties subject to the Plaintiff’s pursuit, if unchecked by the court.

2.5  Prior to the amendments made in June 2025, the Plaintiff’s case against the 3^rd Defendant’s allegedly false academic qualifications was only targeted at the 3^rd Defendant’s doctoral degree. It was and is maintained that the 3^rd Defendant’s doctoral degree was a bogus degree obtained from a bogus university.

2.6  In yet another set of proceedings (HCA 1619/2014), the Plaintiff had also sought a declaration that the 3^rd Defendant’s doctoral degree was bogus. Anthony Chan J (as he then was) made the following criticisms in his decision dated 2 June 2017[1]:

“[7] It is important to note from the contents of the RASOC that, quite clearly, Koo has conducted a personal campaign against Chan on his academic record. To advance his challenge on that matter, a press conference was held by Koo; letters were sent by him to the listed companies of which Chan was an independent non-executive director; flyers were distributed by Koo to the public; and private investigators were engaged by him in London to investigate the authenticity of Chan’s doctoral degree.

[20] …With respect, the complaint over Chan’s title has been magnified out of all proportion. I see little substance in the causes of action, and I am certainly not satisfied that the Averments are significant in this action.

[22] I regret to say that Koo’s own case suggests that he may be a vindictive litigant. In my view, there is an obvious risk that the contempt proceedings will be used by him to harass Chan prior to the conclusion of this action. It cannot be allowed. I have been referred to the case of GB Minerals Holdings Ltd v Short [2015] EWHC 1387 (TCC). It involved rather different facts and should be distinguished. In particular, the Averments here are not significant.” (emphasis added)

2.7  As noted by K Yeung J at 2024 Decision §§75 and 103, the Plaintiff sought and was granted leave to discontinue HCA 1619/2024 on 22 September 2022 in the course of the trial with indemnity costs.

2.8  By amendment made in June 2025 to the Re-Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff’s complaints against the 3^rd Defendant’s academic qualifications have now expanded to his bachelor degrees and master degree by the inclusion of, inter alia, §§10A-10B and 11AA, 11C and 11F to the latest version of the Statement of Claim (“RRRRASOC”). The 3^rd Defendant filed his RAD on 2 July 2025.

3.  The pleadings and the genesis of the Summons

3.1  The relevant parts of the pleadings are as follows.

3.2  RRRRASOC pleads as follows:

“[10A] It is furthermore averred that the 3^rd Defendant at all material times repeatedly and continuously held himself out to the 1^st and 4^th Defendants as having obtained two Bachelor degrees and a Master degree without providing any or any sufficient particulars to support such claim, including for the purposes of, or resulting in, his appointment by the 4^th Defendant as the Supervisors of the Schools for a number of terms from 2010 to 2018, including as follows:…

(a) Bachelor of Science in Engineering from Canada (“加 拿大工程理學士”);

(b) Bachelor of Art (“文學士”)

(c) Master of Business Administration from the United States (“美國工商管理碩士”); and

(d) Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration from the Ireland (“愛爾蘭管理學哲學博士”)…

[10B] It is furthermore averred that as a matter of fact and practice, Supervisors elected and nominated by the Education Department usually had attained academic qualifications at the level of university bachelor degree or above.

[11] …Having regard to the requirement of the integrity on the part of a supervisor in the education sector, and the crucial importance for a long-standing education institution to safeguard and maintain its good name and reputation, the making of a false claim of academic qualifications by the third defendant is wholly injurious to the office of a school supervisor and to the reputation of the Schools…

[11AA] Further or alternatively… the 1^st and 4^th Defendants failed to carry out verification checks on the truthfulness of the 3^rd Defendant’s representation that he had the Claimed Bachelor and Master Degrees…

[11C] …the 3^rd Defendant shall not make false representations as to his academic qualifications when standing for election as Supervisors of the Schools…

[11F] The Plaintiff furthermore sent emails to the 3^rd Defendant, raising query on his academic qualification in particular his Claimed Bachelor and Master Degrees…. The 3^rd Defendant did not respond to the said emails.” (emphasis added)

3.3  It is pertinent to note that the above paragraphs, as accepted by Mr Leung, do not aver that the bachelor and the master degrees are not genuine degrees. This is to be contrasted with the Plaintiff’s case on the 3^rd Defendant’s doctoral degree where it is expressly advanced at RRRRASOC §§9D and 10 that that the 3^rd Defendant had knowingly made a false declaration in that the doctoral degree was not a genuine degree and not granted by an accredited institution with degree awarding authority. Read fairly, the paragraphs of the RRRRASOC recited in the preceding paragraph simply advance a case that the 3^rd Defendant had refused to particularize his bachelor and master degrees to support his claimed credentials.

3.4  As noted above, the F&BPs are requested only in respect of RAD §21A which is in the following terms:

“As to paragraph 10A:

(1) The 3^rd Defendant has obtained the following qualifications:

(a) On or about 4 June 1980, the 3^rd Defendant was awarded with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Engineering (“Engineering Degree”) from University of Guelph, Canada [(“UOG”)].

(b) In or about June 1985, the 3^rd Defendant was awarded with a degree of Bachelor of Commerce (商學士) in Business Administration (“BBA Degree”) from the 私立廣大學院, a Taiwan-accredited institution.

(c) In or about November 1993, the 3^rd Defendant was awarded with a degree of Master Business Administration (“MBA Degree”) from Pacific Westerm University (Hawaii), USA [(“PWU”)]…”

3.5  RAD §21A further clarifies that the reference to “文學士” pleaded at RRRRASOC §10A was an inadvertent mistake and was intended to refer to the BBA Degree. In my view, read fairly, RAD §21A essentially provides the particulars of the 3^rd Defendant’s bachelor and master degrees which RRRRASOC complains to be missing.

3.6  Following the filing of the RAD on 2 July 2025, on 17 July 2025, the Plaintiff’s former solicitors (“SFKS”) sought discovery of the certificates of the bachelor and master degrees pursuant to RHC Order 24, rule 10.

3.7  On 18 July 2025, SFKS further requested discovery of the transcripts and “other documentary proof of the completion” of the bachelor and master degrees (“Subject Documents”).

3.8  On 23 July 2025, the Defendant’s solicitors (“Karas”), without admitting that the Plaintiff’s request fell within the ambit of RHC Order 24, rule 10, voluntarily provided to SFKS the following documents (“Certificates”):

(1)  Copies of the certificates in respect of the Engineering Degree. It was pointed out that there were three versions, with one version issued in 1980 and two versions re-issued by UOG in May 2025 upon the 3^rd Defendant’s request;

(2)  A copy of the certificate in respect of the BBA Degree;

(3)  A copy of the certificate in respect of the MBA Degree.

3.9  Karas declined to provide the Subject Documents, pointing out that there were not relevant to the issues in dispute and not necessary for the fair disposal of the cause or matter or for saving costs. In this regard, Karas pointed out that the authenticity of the bachelor and master degrees pleaded at RAD §21A was not disputed, and in any event, the Certificates should be more than sufficient to evidence the authenticity of the bachelor and master degrees.

3.10  Dissatisfied, by letter dated 24 July 2025, SFKS reiterated the request for the Subject Documents. SFKS pointed out that the Plaintiff’s case that the 3^rd Defendant was not a fit and proper person was premised on the 3^rd Defendant’s lack of integrity as evidenced by the false declaration of his academic qualifications when he participated in the election of Supervisor of the Schools. The Subject Documents were said to be directly relevant to whether the 3^rd Defendant’s claimed bachelor and master degrees were genuine and whether the 3rd Defendant’s declaration of academic qualifications was true. SFKS also invited the 3^rd Defendant’s cooperation by sending the certificate in respect of the BBA Degree to the Ministry of Education in Taiwan (“MOE”) for verification, on the basis that the exercise would “clear doubt over [the 3^rd Defendant’s] academic qualifications and narrow down the scope of dispute.”

3.11  Karas replied on 1 August 2025 to the Plaintiff’s then current solicitors (“H&C”)[2]. Karas reiterated that there was no allegation on the current pleadings that the 3^rd Defendant’s bachelor and master degrees were not genuine, and in any event, the Certificates already clearly showed that the degrees were authentic and genuine. For good measure, purely for the purpose of saving time and costs, Karas provided to H&C the following documents (“Additional Documents”):

(1)  the correspondence between the 3^rd Defendant and UOG in relation to the application for the re-issuance of the certificate in relation to the Engineering Degree and the explanation from UOG on the two different versions of the re-issued certificates, explaining, inter alia, that the signatures were different from those on the original certificate as some of the legacy signature files were lost when the university updated its student information system in 1999 and confirming that the 3^rd Defendant was a student at the university and graduated with a Bachelor of Science (Engineering);

(2)  a confirmation from the MOE dated 9 July 2025, inter alia, that the MOE had examined and approved the 3^rd Defendant’s graduation credentials.

3.12  On 6 August 2025, H&C requested to inspect the originals of the Certificates, which inspection took place on 21 August 2025.

3.13  On 7 August 2025, H&C asked for the F&BPs, which are in the following terms:

(1)  Whether the 3^rd Defendant had classroom attendances for each of the respective courses prior to being awarded with the [bachelor and master degrees] (“Request 1”);

(2)  If the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, the place where the 3^rd Defendant had classroom attendance in each of such courses, and the dates when the 3^rd Defendant commenced and completed each of such courses (“Request 2”);

(3)  If the 3^rd Defendant did not have classroom attendances in any or all of the courses and had been awarded with the respective degrees, the mode in which such course(s) was delivered to the 3^rd Defendant and the dates when the 3^rd Defendant commenced and completed each of such courses (“Request 3”);

(4)  The branch of engineering relating to the Engineering Degree, for example, whether it was civil engineering, mechanical engineering or electrical engineering (“Request 4”);

(5)  Whether the 3^rd Defendant knew at the time when he enrolled with PWU for the alleged MBA program that PWU was known to be an unaccredited institution for granting degrees (“Request 5”);

(6)  The purpose of the 3^rd Defendant to enroll with PWU, being known to be an unaccredited institution for granting degrees (“Request 6”);

(7)  The academic qualifications(s) which the 3^rd Defendant relied on in enrolling in the Program with EUI [ie the institution which awarded the doctoral degree] (“Request 7”).

3.14  On 8 August 2025, H&C wrote to the the solicitors for the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants and stated that as the Plaintiff had requested the F&BPs, he sought an extension of time to file the Plaintiff’s replies to the defences filed by the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants.

3.15  On 11 August 2025, Karas stated that (1) the 3^rd Defendant objected to the Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time on the basis that the Plaintiff’s reply was not dependent to any answers to the F&BPs and (2) they would provide a substantive response on the Plaintiff’s requests for the F&BPs by a separate letter.

3.16  Before Karas provided a substantive response on the F&BPs, the Plaintiff issued the Summons on 12 August 2025.

3.17  By letter dated 14 August 2025, Karas pointed out that the requests for the F&BPs were hopeless, in that they were not in respect of material facts and were plainly not necessary for the fair disposal of the cause or matter or for saving costs.

4.  The applicable principles

4.1  The principles governing requests for further and better particulars are summarized at Willwin Development (Asia) Co Ltd v Wei Xing, HCA 797/2012, 25 February 2013 §§24-30 and Taching Petroleum Co Ltd v Meyer Aluminium Ltd [2020] HKCA 1005 §§31-33:

(1)  Pleadings need only contain material facts, not evidence. Material facts are those facts which must be proved in order to establish a ground of claim or defence. It is therefore only material facts that can be the subject of a proper request for further and better particulars;

(2)  The court will not order particulars of any immaterial allegation;

(3)  The purpose of further and better particulars is to permit the parties to understand the case they have to meet at trial. The modern practice of requiring discovery, witness statements, etc to be exchanged should reduce the need for further and better particulars to clarify pleadings. As long as the pleadings do convey the nature of the party’s case and state the material facts, they should not attract applications for further and better particulars even if some details that are likely to come forth in discovery or witness statements are not disclosed;

(4)  It is for the applicant to show that the order for further and better particulars is necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs. It is not sufficient for the applicant to show that the further and better particulars would be relevant.

4.2  Moreover, the following principles are to be borne in mind:

(1)  Applications to the court for particulars to be ordered should only be launched where there is a genuine need for clarification of the nature of the other side’s case in order to ensure fairness or to avoid wasting costs: Taching §31;

(2)  It is inappropriate to make requests for further and better particulars with a view to cross-examine the other side, or to expose weaknesses of the pleaded case of the other side: Taching §31 and Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026 Note 18/12/70;

(3)  In other words, a request for further and better particulars should never be a disguised tactical move to ‘test’ the other side’s pleaded facts by microscopic examination - this is not fair and does not save costs: Luen Tat Merchandise Ltd v Mr Christmas Ltd, HCA 121/2011, 18 September 2013, §35;

(4)  An application for further and better particulars should not be used to request general information about the pleader’s case which the applicant may wish to know: Willwin §52;

(5)  Requests for further and better particulars on matters that are marginally material or not material should be discouraged after the CJR: Willwin §117;

(6)  Requests for further and better particulars cannot be made to fish for information to support potential unpleaded claims: Taching §35.

4.3  Whilst the foregoing general propositions are not controversial between counsel, Mr Leung relied heavily on Tin Shui Wai Development Ltd v Attorney General, HCCT 5 of 1987, 23 May 1991 §7:

“…Alternatively, if it is clear to the court, either from the nature of the case or from what is stated by counsel or otherwise, that the defendant intends to set up an affirmative case, which, if established, would defeat the plaintiff's prima facie case, particulars of such an affirmative case will be ordered; for otherwise there will be doubt as to what are the issues to be determined between the parties. Where the denial of a negative allegation leaves it in doubt as to what the true nature of the denial is, the pleading will be regarded as embarrassing and evasive and it will be ordered to be struck out, or amended, or particulars may be ordered of any affirmative case relied on.”

5.  The F&BPs

5.1  Before I deal with the Requests individually, I should first make an overarching observation.

(i)   Overarching observation

5.2  There can be no doubt that the evidence filed in support of the Summons seeks to challenge the authenticity of the bachelor and master degrees and/or the Certificates:

(1)  At Koo 23^rd §4(1), the Plaintiff points out that, in relation to the Engineering Degree, the re-issued certificates state that the 3^rd Defendant completed the honours program whereas the original certificate does not. He says that it is general knowledge that in the Canadian tertiary education system, an honours program is different from a general degree and the different versions of the certificates show that the Engineering Degree may not be genuine;

(2)  At Koo 23^rd §§4(2) and (3), the Plaintiff points out that according to UOG’s website, the university does not confer Bachelor of Science in Engineering. According to his opinion, a degree in engineering would specify the particular discipline (eg civil engineering or mechanical engineering) and the certificate would so specify. He argues that an engineering degree is “meaningless” without specifying the discipline, and in the present case, neither the original certificate nor the re-issued certificate specifies the discipline;

(3)  At Koo 23^rd §§4(7) and (8), he points out that certificates issued by educational institutions in Taiwan are considered verified when the designated verification area is stamped by an authorized individual. He notes that the certificate produced by the 3^rd Defendant in relation to the BBA Degree does not contain a verification stamp at the designated verification area;

(4)  At Koo 23^rd §4(9) he points out that he has discovered from the public domain that PWU was an unaccredited university which had closed in May 2006 following a lawsuit filed by the State of Hawaii a year earlier. He also refers to certain transcript of a hearing before the Committee on Government Affairs in the USA Senate in May 2004 on certain investigations on diploma mills and it is recorded therein that (a) PWU charged a flat fee for a degree and (b) PWU had represented to the investigator that it was not in the business of providing course training but was in the business of marketing degrees for a flat fee.

5.3  Despite the foregoing evidential challenges, as noted above, Mr Leung acknowledged that the issue of authenticity of the bachelor and master degrees is not raised in the RRRRASOC, in contrast to the positive case pleaded against the doctoral degree. I am unable to accept Mr Leung’s submission that, depending on the answers to the F&BPs, the Plaintiff can then plead a case challenging authenticity in the Plaintiff’s reply, it being a core allegation of the Plaintiff’s claim (if made).

5.4  In any event, I accept Mr Chan’s submissions that the Plaintiff’s position that he can further formulate his pleaded case depending on the answers to the F&BPs offends one of the core principles on further and better particulars, namely requests for further and better particulars cannot be made to fish for information to support potential un‑pleaded claims.

5.5  Mr Leung is therefore driven to characterize the requests for the F&BPs as being made on the basis that the 3^rd Defendant has himself raised a positive case to assert that the degrees are genuine, and by reason of Tin Shui Wai §7 cited above, the F&BPs should be ordered.

5.6  I am unable to accept Mr Leung’s submission. The bases for Mr Leung asserting that the 3^rd Defendant has raised a positive case on the authenticity of the bachelor and master degrees are said to be RAD §22AA and Chan 6^th §8.

5.7  RAD §§22AA pleads as follows:

“As to paragraph 11AA:

(1) There was no reasonable basis to require investigation into the truthfulness or veracity of the 3^rd Defendant’s Engineering Degree, BBA Degree and/or MBA Degree, The Plaintiff does not aver that 3^rd Defendant’s Engineering Degree, BBA Degree and/or MBA Degree are not genuine.” (emphasis added)

5.8  Mr Leung relies on the underlined words as showing that the 3^rd Defendant has mounted a positive case on the authenticity of the bachelor and master degrees. The position advanced by Mr Leung is a blinkered one, as he ignored the bolded words which immediately followed, namely on the Plaintiff’s own pleaded case no case of non-authenticity has been advanced. As already recited above, RRRRASOC §11AA is in fact a plea not against the 3^rd Defendant but against the 1^st and 4^th Defendants, alleging a failure on 1^st and 4^th Defendant’s part to carry out verification checks on 3^rd Defendant’s bachelor and master degrees. Read in its proper context, RAD §§22AA simply pleads that as the Plaintiff has not pleaded a case challenging authenticity, the alleged duty to carry out verification checks did not arise.

5.9  The reliance on Chan 6^th §8 does not assist the Plaintiff either. The 3^rd Defendant states as follows in Chan 6^th:

“[7] In the letter [from Karas dated 14 August 2025], I had set out the reasons why the FBP Summons is hopeless, and that I would be opposing it…”

[8] It follows that nothing in P’s 22^nd and 23^rd Affirmations in support of the FBP Summons (“P’s Affirmations”) actually has any relevance to this application…. I will not trouble the Court with a detailed response to those allegations at this stage. Suffice it to say that, insofar as P insinuate that my qualifications as pleaded in [RAD §21A(1)] were somehow not genuine and all that I obtained such qualifications knowing them not to be genuine, I do not agree. The fact that I have not specifically responded to any allegations in peace affirmations should not be taken as an admission thereof.”

5.10  The primary position taken by the 3^rd Defendant is that the requests are demurrable for more fundamental reasons. In any event, insofar as Mr Leung seeks to rely on the observations at Tin Shui Wai §7 that “if it is clear to the court, either from the nature of the case or from what is stated by counsel or otherwise, that the defendant intends to set up an affirmative case”, I accept Mr Chan’s submission that Tin Shui Wai is primarily concerned with whether the denial of a negative allegation was “pregnant” with an affirmative case. The passage relied on by Mr Leung cited above is preceded by the following:

“It is for present purposes essential to notice that what we have here is a negative allegation made by the plaintiff and traversed by the defendant. Such a traverse necessarily involves a double negative; but, although, in ordinary parlance, a double negative must involve an affirmative proposition, for pleading purposes the denial of a negative allegation does not necessarily involve the making of an affirmative proposition. Whether it does so or not depends on whether it is, on the one hand, a mere traverse; or, on the other hand, a traverse which, though negative in form, is in fact pregnant with an affirmative. The denial of a negative allegation may operate as a bare traverse and no more, whereby the defendant simply puts the plaintiff to the proof of the negative alleged. In such a case, if it is not possible to read into the mere denial of the negative allegation any affirmative allegation beyond that which is necessarily implied from such a traverse, particulars will not be ordered; but then once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant will be precluded from setting up an affirmative case in answer, for that would be to allow him to set up a case which he has not pleaded.” (emphasis added)

5.11  In the present case, RAD §21A, insofar as it pleads to the bachelor and master degrees: (1) is essentially an admission of RRRRASOC §10A that the 3^rd Defendant had made the representations as to his academic qualifications, save that there is a correction made to the reference “文學士” and (2) the denials set out therein have nothing to do with the authenticity of the degrees but are (a) a denial that the 3^rd Defendant was under a duty to provide particulars to support his qualifications and (b) a denial that his degrees causatively led to his appointment as Supervisor in the sense that he could not have been appointed but for his having such qualifications. It is plain from the foregoing that the pleaded issues in the present case do not engage the observations made at latter part of Ting Shui Wai §7 relied on by Mr Leung.

5.12  Mr Leung then further sought to draw a distinction between the 3^rd Defendant obtaining a certificate and whether the degree as shown by the certificate was obtained from unaccredited organizations and/or without undertaking the standard processes of academic study and assessment, relying on A v B (2009) WL2392299. I observe as follows:

(1)  First and foremost, this further basis is not pleaded in the RRRRASOC either (in contrast with the pleaded case on the doctoral degree);

(2)  In any event, Mr Leung has provided no basis in his written submissions to doubt the Additional Documents issued by UOG and the MOE, in both cases confirming the 3^rd Defendant’s credentials. When queried by the court, he submitted that if UOG “sold” the Engineering Degree to the 3^rd Defendant, it is unsurprising that it would confirm the 3^rd Defendant’s credentials. In my view, Mr Leung’s submissions are regrettable. The Plaintiff has adduced no substantive evidence, other than the Plaintiff’s own opinions, to cast (serious) aspersions against UOG;

(3)  The Plaintiff may stand on firmer grounds in relation to the MBA Degree as he has adduced some evidence to suggest that PWU was a diploma mill. However, the evidence only suggests that PWU was revealed as operating a diploma mill in 2004, more than 10 years after the 3^rd Defendant obtained the MBA Degree. Indeed, as part of the Plaintiff’s evidence, he himself refers to an article in Wikipedia which states that in December 2001, PWU received official recognition and a commendation from the 21^st Hawaii State Senate and another recognition and commendation from the 21^st Hawaii State House of Representatives. The article states that both legislative bodies honoured the university for its innovative, cost effective and quality distance education programs. The article also refers to a number of alumni who obtained degrees from PWU without questioning their credentials. As such, the Plaintiff has adduced no evidence to suggest that PWU was a diploma mill at the time when the 3^rd Defendant obtained the MBA Degree.

5.13  Viewed thus, the overarching observation is that the Requests are made in respect of issues which do not arise from the pleadings and I reject the Plaintiff’s contention that the 3^rd Defendant has raised a positive case on the authenticity of the bachelor and master degrees.

5.14  The above overarching observation would by itself provide ample reason to refuse the Requests. In any event, the Requests are individually demurrable on additional bases, to which I now turn.

(ii)   Requests 1 to 3

5.15  I agree with Mr Chan that Requests 1 to 3 should not be allowed as (1) they are requests for evidence, (2) they are plainly disguised attempts to cross-examine the 3^rd Defendant or to expose weaknesses in the 3^rd Defendant’s case and (3) they have the effect of fishing for further information for potential but unpleaded claims.

(iii)   Request 4

5.16  Given that by the Additional Documents, UOG has already confirmed that the 3^rd Defendant graduated on 4 June 1980 with a Bachelor of Science (Engineering), Request 4 which asks the 3^rd Defendant to specify the branch of engineering is in my view immaterial.

(iv)  Requests 5 and 6

5.17  There is no pleaded case by the Plaintiff that PWU was known to be an unaccredited institution for granting degrees, whether at the time of the 3^rd Defendant obtaining the MBA Degree or at any other time. There is no factual basis at all for making these requests and the requests are a disguised form of cross-examination of testing of the 3^rd Defendant’s case.

(v)  Request 7

5.18  At the hearing, when queried by the court, Mr Leung accepted that Request 7 does not arise from RAD §21(A). Mr Leung then belatedly raised an oral application to amend Request 7 which I refused. There was no explanation as to why an application for amendment was not made earlier given Mr Leung’s readiness to accept that Request 7 is not within the scope of RAD §21(A). The prejudice caused to the 3^rd Defendant by the belated attempt to salvage Request 7 (after the defect was pointed out in Mr Chan’s skeleton submissions) is clear.

5.19  For all the above reasons, I refuse the Requests.

6.  Conclusion

6.1  I dismiss the Plaintiff’s application for the F&BPs and order the Plaintiff to file his replies within 14 days hereof to (1) the Re-Re-Re Amended Defence of the 1^st Defendant, (2) the RAD and (3) the Re-Amended Defence of the 4^th Defendant. For completeness, even had I allowed some or all of the Requests, I still would not have granted an extension of time pending the provision of the answers.

6.2  I also make a costs order nisi that the Plaintiff is to pay to the Defendant the costs of the Summons to be summarily assessed on an indemnity basis. I agree with Mr Chan that the Summons utterly lacks merits and the Requests amount to an abuse of the procedures and objectives for requesting further and better particulars.

6.3  The 3^rd Defendant is to lodge and serve his statement of costs (limited to 3 pages) within 7 days hereof and the Plaintiff his statement of objection (limited to 2 pages) within 7 days thereafter. Summary assessment will then be carried out on the papers.