INDAH ANGGRAINI PUTRI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5915 · HCAL 1931/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1931/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5915
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1931 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Indah Anggraini Putri |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and the applicant being absent in open |
| |court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 26 October 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 28 September 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL001931_
2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s appeal/petition against the
decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 20
September 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) failed on all the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”).
Accordingly, the Board confirmed the Director’s Decision, which
rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
The applicant’s case
3. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision,
which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
4. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if
refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by Ariyanto, her
separated husband who had forced her to work as a foreign domestic
helper and to send him her wages. Ariyanto had used violence on her
when she was in Indonesia. Ariyanto would kill her because she had
converted from Islam to Catholicism.
5. The applicant also claimed that she would be harmed or killed by
Saropah, who was a moneylender, due to the applicant’s inability to
repay the debt owed to him.
6. Moreover, the applicant claimed that her neighbours and relatives in
Jambi and Jumber would persecute her because of her conversion from
Islam to Catholicism.
Oral hearing
7. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application.
However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 15 October 2026.
8. As held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091, an application for leave to
bring judicial review should not be dismissed for want of prosecution
merely because the applicant failed to attend the oral hearing of the
leave application. The correct approach is to treat the applicant as
having withdrawn the request for a hearing by reason of the absence at
the hearing, and to proceed to determine the leave application on its
merits.
9. Thus, this court will proceed to consider the merits of the Leave
Application based on the written materials before this court.
Grounds for judicial review
10. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
11. The applicant did not advance any grounds for judicial review in Form
86. In her supporting affirmation dated 26 October 2023, the applicant
stated that she did not agree with the Board.
12. In the document with the title “GROUNDS” that was annexed to her
supporting affirmation, the applicant mentioned a few matters, which
are summarised as follows:-
1) The Board did not truly consider her claim;
2) She was given a lawyer at the screening interview, but the lawyer
did not help her at all. The applicant only talked to the
interpreter, and when the interpreter was writing down her
statement, her lawyer was sleeping;
3) The Board dismissed her claim but showed some bad arguments. The
Board was prepared to dismiss her claim before the oral hearing;
4) The adjudicator should be one kind of a judge, but the adjudicator
assessing her case was not neutral, so he did not find any reason
to grant leave to the applicant; and
5) The applicant’s life was not totally safe in her country. Despite
that she had told the Board all her story and submitted all
documents, but there was no good result.
13. As aforesaid, the applicant was absent at the oral hearing before this
court. Thus, no elaboration on the aforesaid grounds could be obtained
from the applicant at the scheduled hearing.
Discussion
14. First of all, the applicant’s comment in her supporting affirmation
that she did not agree with the Board’s Decision cannot help her. She
did not say why she did not agree with the Board’s Decision, how the
Board’s Decision was wrong or how the Board erred in its assessment of
her non-refoulement claim and/or her appeal/petition.
15. In ground (1) of the applicant’s document as summarised above, the
applicant complained that the Board did not truly consider her claim.
However, this ground was advanced without any particulars. The
applicant did not state how the Board had failed to truly consider her
claim, or how her claim ought to be considered.
16. Contrary to the applicant’s assertion, this court notes that the Board
had thoroughly and carefully considered all aspects of her claim,
including her fear of her separated husband due to the past violence
and her conversion from Islam to Catholicism, her fear of her creditor
arising from the non-repayment of loan and her fear of her neighbours
and relatives due to her change of religion.
17. The applicant complained in ground (2) about the lawyer assigned to
assist her at the screening interview. However, there was nothing
before this court to support the applicant’s allegation in this
respect. In any event, if she found that the lawyer was not assisting
her at all or was even sleeping when her statement was being recorded,
she should have raised this complaint to the interviewing officer, who
should be present at the material time. She could and should also have
complained against the lawyer to the Duty Lawyer Service.
18. More importantly, the applicant failed to indicate how she had been
prejudiced as a result of the attitude of the lawyer. Thus, ground (2)
has no substance.
19. In ground (3) as summarised above, the applicant asserted that the
Board had showed some bad arguments when dismissing her claim, and was
prepared to dismiss her claim even before the Board’s hearing. Again,
this ground was advanced without any specificity. The applicant did
not state what “bad arguments” the Board had given, or why she believed
that the Board was prepared to dismiss her claim even before the
Board’s hearing.
20. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, there is simply no reason to
believe that the Board was prepared to dismiss the applicant’s claim
even before the Board’s hearing. The Board had asked extensive
questions of the applicant at the Board’s hearing to try to understand
all aspects of her claim, and discussed the availability of state
protection to her and the viability of internal relocation for her.
21. In ground (4), the applicant complained that the adjudicator assessing
her case was not neutral, and he did not find any reason to grant leave
to the applicant. The applicant did not specify what the adjudicator
had done to show that he was not neutral. The mere fact that the Board
found the applicant’s appeal/petition failed on all the applicable
grounds under the USM cannot in itself be interpreted as the Board not
being neutral in its assessment of the applicant’s case.
22. Finally, the applicant stated that her life was not totally safe in her
country in ground (5). However, all her dangers in her home country
had been duly assessed but rejected by the Board after careful
examination of her case. If the applicant intends to challenge the
Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for
judicial review unless there were errors of law, procedural unfairness
or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.
23. Thus, this court finds that none of the matters asserted by the
applicant in her affirmation and the document with the title “GROUNDS”
constitutes a valid ground to challenge the Board’s Decision.
24. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of
judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
25. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite the
lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
26. In assessing the applicant’s appeal/petition, the Board held an oral
hearing on 19 July 2023 and the applicant was present. Thus, the
applicant was given the opportunity to present her case to the Board in
person.
27. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had duly considered
all aspects of the applicant’s claims and all the documents she
submitted in relation to her non-refoulement claim. The Board’s
findings on the applicant’s claim and evidence, and its reasons for
concluding that the applicant’s appeal/petition against the Director’s
Decision failed on all the applicable grounds, were laid out in
paragraphs 140 to 185 of the Board’s Decision.
28. In gist, the Board found that the applicant was unable to recall
correctly major events that affected her life and family. The
applicant had failed to explain why her education and experiences would
have made her unable to do so. The applicant had not explained why she
had omitted to mention events in her Non-refoulement Claim Form and
Screening Interview; whilst she could remember at the time of
testimony. The Board found that the crucial aspects of her core claims
were contradictory. Her testimony was a manifestation of
inconsistencies, inventions and implausibility.
29. The overall impact of the problems in the applicant’s claims and
testimony had led the Board to find that she was not a credible
witness, and the Board rejected her core account. After due
consideration of all the factors, the Board concluded that there were
serious credibility problems such that the Board was unwilling to
attach any credence regarding her information leading to her claimed
risks that were summarised in paragraph 165 of the Board’s Decision.
The Board found that the applicant did not face a real risk of torture,
ill-treatment, arbitrary deprivation of life or persecution upon her
refoulement.
30. This court finds that the reasons given by the Board for the finding as
summarised above fully justified.
31. The Board had conducted very extensive research on country of origin
information (“COI”) of Indonesia in its assessment of the availability
of state protection to the applicant (see paragraphs 222 to 248 of the
Board’s Decision). In gist, the Board found that effective criminal
law provisions were put in place in Indonesia to protect its citizens.
Even if the applicant’s alleged harms, or threats of death or harms had
some credence, the information provided by the applicant did not show
that the government of Indonesia was unwilling and/or unable to provide
effective protection. The applicant had not reasonably exhausted all
avenues of state protection open to her. There was no clear and
convincing information to demonstrate that the alleged harms, or
threats of death or harms, were knowingly tolerated by the authorities,
or that the government of Indonesia refused, or was unable, to offer
effective protection to the applicant.
32. Despite its findings as summarised above, the Board had also given due
consideration as to the viability of internal relocation for the
applicant. The Board had given full and justified reasons in
paragraphs 250 to 251 for its conclusion that the applicant could
reasonably live without fear of the alleged harms and undue hardship,
if she relocated to Surabaya, Jakarta and Semarang upon her return to
Indonesia.
33. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s claim for non-
refoulement protection and her appeal/petition against the Director’s
Decision failed on all the applicable grounds under the USM.
34. The finding of facts in relation to the applicant’s case, including the
assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm, was primarily within the
realm of the Board. The Board was entitled to come to its own
conclusion. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way
the Board reached its conclusion.
35. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high
standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
36. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave
must be refused.
Conclusion
37. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 21st day of October 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 21/10/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any |Applicant’s ref. no: |interested parties as |
|directions given within|Nil |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave| |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, | |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |21/10/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and | |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance | |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 18837 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes | |QA T/C 1002/21(Formerly |
|to use at the hearing, | |RBCZ 11051/21) |
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | |Department of Justice, |
|application for leave | |Senior Assistant Law |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1