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HCAL 1800/2024
[2026] HKCFI 4131
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1800 of 2024
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BETWEEN
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Mondal Pankaj |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board / |
Putative |
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Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 10 October 2024, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 19 September 2024 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 19 April 2024 rejecting the applicant's non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1] . The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL001800_2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The applicant was a supporter of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party which was the opposite party of the Awami League (“AL”). The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Bangladesh, he would be harmed or killed by an AL supporter, Bhuia, who had illegally occupied a piece of farm land belonging to the applicant’s father. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
3. At the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application, this court scheduled a hearing on 7 July 2026. The applicant attended the hearing in person. The court told him that the court would not be able to consider and evaluate any new documents that he had sent to the court before the hearing. The applicant said he understood. He had in fact submitted all documents before the Board, and he had nothing to say.
Discussion
4. The leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.
5. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no such grounds.
6. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the Board found that the applicant’s evidence was mostly reliable, and accepted the applicant’s account on past events. Despite the lack of documentary support, the Board was prepared to accept the dispute between Bhuia and the applicant about a piece of land leased to the applicant’s family. However, the Board concluded that the applicant would not be subjected to risk of harm if refouled as it found that the dispute was a private dispute without any involvement of any public officials, and reasonably viable that it would be for the applicant to internally relocate to cities such as Dhaka. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors.
7. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant provided no grounds in support of the Leave Application. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5].
Order
8. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Dated the 31st day of July 2026
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(Alfred Chan)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 31/7/2026
Mondal Pankaj
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 31/7/2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 23513
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 498/24 (formerly RBCZ 5001865/23) (T4S95)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142].
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676
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