RE TICUALA ISABEL MAGNA SAY EO

CACV 429/2020

[2021] HKCA 637

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 429 OF 2020

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 473 of 2018)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Chu JA giving the Judgment of the Court:

1.  On 15 March 2021, this Court (Chu JA and ST Poon J) handed down our judgment[1] dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 3 June 2020 which refused to give her leave to apply for judicial review.     

2.  On 22 March 2021, the applicant filed a notice of motion to apply for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.  She has also put in a written submission to support her application.

3.  Having considered the applicant’s notice of motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case.

4.  The background to this case and the applicant’s claim have been set out in our judgment.  We will not repeat them.

5.  Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484, leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.  The notice of motion set out the following grounds in support of the application:

(1)  The decision maker only relied on country of origin information (“COI”) and facts about the applicant that favour the rejection of her claim.

(2)  Actual life and situation were different from what was stated in the COI.  The officer and the courts chose to ignore the overwhelming evidence of violence towards minorities.

(3)  The decision betrayed a biased and formulaic approach and was unlikely to be a fair assessment of the danger to the applicant’s life.  It was clearly unreasonable. 

7.  The written submission is the same as the one the applicant put in to support her appeal to this Court (see this Court’s judgment at [13]).    

8.  We are of the view that what had been put forward in the notice of motion and the written submission do not provide viable grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  Importantly, the applicant has not identified any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b).  Further, the grounds stated in the notice of motion are unarguable given that the Board had rejected the applicant’s claim as being not credible.  As to the written submission, we had in our judgment (at [21]) pointed out that it had not been shown how the arguments relate to the applicant’s case.          

9.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

10.  As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, we dismiss the notice of motion.