BAGUM SEFALI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 3631/2019

[2026] HKCFI 105

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 3631 OF 2019

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  This is the Applicant’s application, by summons (“the Summons”) filed on 16 September 2025, seeking leave to appeal this Court’s decision dated 4 July 2025 (“the Decision”), which dismissed her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Petition Office dated 26 November 2019. That decision confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 27 June 2019, rejecting her non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (USM).

2.  Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order.  The Applicant was therefore late in taking out the Summons by 60 days.  In determining whether to extend time for appealing a refusal of leave, the court will consider: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh and Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office CAMP 64/2020 [2020] HKCA 844 at §10). 

3.  Having regard to the 14-day appeal period, the delay in this case is plainly substantive.  In her supporting affirmation, the Applicant asserts that she did not receive the Decision and was therefore late.  Having checked the records, I reject that assertion.  In short, the Decision was sent to the same Room D address as updated by her, and which appears in the Summons, her affirmation, and also in the Notice of Hearing[1].

4.  In any event, turning to the most important consideration, namely, the merits of the proposed appeal, I note that the Applicant has not advanced any valid or arguable grounds of appeal against the Decision (see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017).  I had considered the Board’s findings with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced standard required by law given the seriousness of the issues at hand.  I was satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the burden and standard of proof, the applicable law, and the key legal principles under the USM, and that it had observed a very high standard of fairness.

5.  The Applicant’s claims had been reviewed in detail.  While the Board had accepted that she had suffered domestic violence until her divorce in 2009, it did not accept her account of renewed harm or threats upon her return to Bangladesh in 2012, nor that her departure for Hong Kong in 2013 had been motivated by fear of her former husband.  The Board had further rejected her new claim concerning her son’s alleged involvement in a murder, finding no basis to conclude that she would be implicated or harmed as a result.

6.  Having considered all the evidence, the Board had rejected the Applicant’s claim based on Torture Risk, BOR 2 Risk, BOR 3 Risk, and Persecution Risk.  The assessment of evidence, COI materials, and risk of harm fell squarely within the province of the Board, which had been entitled to determine the weight to be given to them.  The Applicant had failed to demonstrate any error of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.     

7.  Allowing the Applicant to pursue a challenge that is plainly devoid of merit would serve only to delay the proceedings unnecessarily, thereby prejudicing the orderly administration of the refoulement process and undermining the interests of the proposed respondent. 

8.  Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave to the Applicant to appeal out of time and dismiss the Summons.